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ABSTRACT

SPRACHE ALS BE-WËGEN:
THE UNFOLDING OF LANGUAGE AND BEING
IN HEIDEGGER’S LATER WORK, 1949-1976

By
Douglas F. Peduti, S.J.
December 2009

Dissertation Supervised by James Swindal, Ph.D.
Much neglected is Heidegger’s latter work in favor of the fundamental ontology
of Being and Time. Consequentially, conceptions of Heidegger’s question of Being are
oftentimes misconceived. Currently three main models have been proposed: (1)
existential phenomenology, exemplified by Joseph Langan in the 1950s; (2) the popular
thought of Being model in the 1960s as developed by William Richardson; (3) and in
counter distinction to these unified models Joseph Kockelmans offers in the 1970s the
many ways model, touting the end of systems. These misconstruals have spawned much
Heideggerian dialogue, and in recent years, has had its effect upon Western continental
scholarship from structuralism to post-structuralism.
Rather than usual conceptual models, this dissertation proposes a new model of
Heideggerian scholarship seen through the lens of “Being as Saying.” Neither mystical
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nor incomprehensible Heidegger’s unique linguistic turn negotiates the inadequacies of
modern conceptions of the subject, object and cognition. Through a careful reading of
Heidegger’s work from 1949-1976, I trace Heidegger’s utter reliance upon language as
the way-making of Being, “Sprache als Be-wëgen.” More originary than ordinary
language, Heidegger’s Being as Saying arises from Nietzsche’s insights on nihilism. For
Heidegger Being is no-thing, and as such reveals itself as unconcealment. We hear it as a
deep, unsettling silence. From Being’s two-fold character of concealing and revealing
and humanity’s subsequent discomfit, we derive all forms of communication, including
thought and logic, even our world as a response to, and/or evasion from this pervasive
silence.
Most notably Heidegger unseats the preeminent stature of thought and subject,
only to reincorporate them within language. To achieve this he develops notions of
Ereignis and Geviert, at once simple and complex, by which Being manifests itself, no
longer through Dasein as prime discloser, but through a crossing of four regions. What
emerges is a dynamic gathering-as-separated dialogue, a far richer, relational
understanding of the world and the person. Heidegger’s new way can best be described
as a “phenomenology of the inapparent,” wherein Being and humanity are in a relational
dialogue of unconcealing and revealing. With this insight we can reengage the Western
philosophical tradition meditatively.
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INTRODUCTION

— … the pathway …
“The pathway gathers in whatever has its Being around it; to all who pass this
way it gives what is theirs.”1 Martin Heidegger wrote this line in 1949, a step along the
way in a small essay entitled, “Feldweg,” now published in the volume entitled, Aus der
Erfahrung des Denkens. In it Heidegger envisions a new way in the experience of
thinking toward the question of Being. As Heidegger grapples with this problematic
issue from the earliest moments of his career,2 language emerges as a continual theme
throughout his life.
And so from his earliest days to his death, Heidegger always returned to language
as central to his question of Being. Any experience of thinking, even the experience of
thinking of Being involves language. Language is both part of the way toward Being and
that which grants the way, both tool and its context of granting the possibility of using
language. As “part” and “that which grants,” Heidegger’s mature understanding of Being
1

Martin Heidegger, “The Pathway,” trans. Thomas F. O’Meara, O.P., revised by Thomas Sheehan,
Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago, IL: Precedent, 1981) 70.
2
The title of his 1916 habilitation thesis, based on a work of Thomas of Erfort, a member of the school of
Duns Scotus, was entitled, “Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus” treats this very issue
of language, its meaning and sense.
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and language has long been grist for philosophical mills. How can language be both that
which grants the tool and the tool itself? Heidegger revisited this quandary time and time
again. To this question and to Heidegger’s response, we turn our attention.
It seemed contradictory at least, and to some it sounded even worse, it sounded
mystical: a veritable death knell for any philosopher. How could Heidegger navigate
between a false ultra-rationality and irrationality? Language somehow seemed to be the
thread that was common to both. How could Heidegger devise a new understanding of
the self, without incurring all the constrictions the dichotomy between subject and object
of Cartesianism? Language helped. How could Heidegger rework the understanding of
the world and our relationship to it? Language was his guide. How could Heidegger
understand Being behind beings without falling into the pitfalls of metaphysics?
Language emerged as the answer.
Exactly what that answer was depended on the specific approach in his attempt to
discover/recover/relate to Being. Through his journey of life Heidegger changed his
approach of language vis-à-vis the question of Being, but, all the same, remained
steadfast in that which was most his own philosophical stamp, the “Turning,”3 [Kehre]
toward the Being’s history [Seinsgeschichte].4 And so one might say that Heidegger’s

3

Among Heideggerian scholars this term’s translation and meaning is still hotly contested. We shall soon
define it.
4
This term is also debated. On the one hand, it is translated as “Being’s history” or the “history of Being.”
Both phrases place the objective genitive, Being, in priority with history or its saying as an attribute
modifying it. The other translation, “historical Being” places the emphasis on the modification of Being.
Both seems to evade the complex and nuanced meaning which Heidegger tries to capture, that Being is not
an entity.
What is at stake has been the theological issue of whether Heidegger intends a univocal Being that
precludes a Christian concept of Being as God, “onto-theo-logos” or whether Heidegger intends Being
which appears to us through history, both with tainted accretions and the ability to uncover it, neither in the
sense of the Being as the Christian concept nor in its denial as is the case with atheism. On the other side
of the debate, questions arise whether this term can refer to one of the three Persons of God in Christian
theology. These discussions are far too broad for our purposes here. We will allow such worthy
discussions for the theologians to draw out implications.
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own pathway has given to him what was his, a way. A way best described as
Being:Saying.
This current work sets its task toward understanding language as the unfolding of
Being as offered by Heidegger’s thinking. Most, who consider the problem of the
relationship between Being and language, understand it as a tangential issue, but not so
for Heidegger. Heidegger came to appreciate a deep, indeed, originary relationship. This
quest for this originary relationship spanned the entirety of his life; our task of
understanding Heidegger’s relationship between Being and language will need careful
attention to all of Heidegger’s movements, a way not easily traversed.
To appreciate the immensity of this task, we apportion our approach to this
problematic into three major parts. Part I is entitled, “FAINESQAI;” the use of the
Greek phrase is a purposeful attempt to avoid the various, recent meanings of
“phenomenology” at this point in our discussion until we have a chance to clarifies its
nuanced meaning. The Greek means “to show itself” or “o be in the light.” For
Heidegger “fai&nesqai” is the deepest type of knowing and this section approaches
Heidegger’s work as it shows itself, with as little interpretive overlays as possible. While
some interpretation is always present, our goal in this section is to allow Heidegger’s
words to speak to us, to allow his way to show itself to us.
Part I is indeed the largest section of our work; it contains chapters 1- 6. It traces
Heidegger’s discussions of language, briefly in the early works, then in detailed fashion
in works from 1949 onward. Chapter 1, “Early Approaches I,” will discuss Heidegger’s

Heidegger discusses Being as that does or does not appear and why its appearance or lack thereof
is so. The issue for us is that Heidegger continually returns to this topic and each time holds for a closer
relationship between Being and its history and how language is the center of that discussion. This is our
topic. For this reason I opt for “historical Being,” for it seems to draw out ably this closer relationship.
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first approach, which was one of fundamental ontology. It includes his magnum opus,
Being and Time, published in 1927, the year Heidegger’s mother dies, as well as other
works in the 1920s and 30s. It mined ordinary experience so as to discover Being; Being
was its focus. Its primary focus entertains the question on language certainly; but the
relationship of language as discourse to thinking and to Being as such draws out
important formal indicators that language is deep within the ontological care structure of
Dasein and still immersed deeply within the experiential, everyday ontical existence of
Dasein. Ultimately this poses a problem, which Heidegger soon realizes, that the analysis
of the meaning of Being cannot be achieved fully within the analytic of Dasein.
In an effort to resolve this difficulty, Chapter two, “Early approaches: II” focuses
on much of his work in the 1940s with the early Greek philosophers, Nietzsche and
culminated in Heidegger’ Contributions. This second approach, we argue, was one of
destructive retrieval to uncover Being. Within this period Heidegger massaged and
transformed language in order to uncover originary thought and language, asymptotically
nearing, but never reaching, Being. Its emphasis was the thought of Being.
Heidegger’s two earlier approaches on language, both interesting and fulsome in
their own account, but ultimately incapable of leading Heidegger toward that which he
ultimately sought, that is Being. While the first approach emphasized Being and the
latter the thought of Being, both still have difficulty relating language and Being. Still
both are helpful for they have Seinsgeschichte as their primary inquiry with language at
its heart.
Once these two approaches are outlined, a third approach will be fully explored,
which began slightly before 1950 and continued in different ways until his death. It is the
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main area of our research and contains Heidegger’s mature thought on language and
Being. Our third chapter’s title, “From Language and Being toward Being:Saying,”
indicates the trajectory of Heidegger’s later work. Like the two previous approaches, it
too has Seinsgeschichte as its concern. Yet unlike the two previous approaches, it
explores the deeper relationship between Being and Language. It is in the “between” of
Being and Language wherein Heidegger has reached Seinsgeschichte in a way that
doesn’t fall into the traps that are still some variation of metaphysics, which veils Being
as another thing. This chapter moves from a discussion of ontological difference toward
Ereignis.
Ereignis shows language’s centrality with Being and beings. This approach, then,
reformulates Seinsgeschichte as the originary Saying, the originary language [Sage], from
which all languages, all forms of communication, whether implicit and explicit, all forms
of theoretical formulation, even logic itself, derive. All of these forms of communication
are found along the path of language as Saying. Each step of this pathway will highlight
some new understanding toward originary language. Every step is of greater moment,
Ereignis, occurring between the human5 and Being. In short, this approach illustrates
how language for Heidegger is both the way and its steps along the way.

5

Notice the purposeful and careful use of the term “human” in the section regarding Heidegger’s later
philosophy and language. This is markedly de-centering Dasein from the early works. This not to say,
however, that Heidegger did not employ the term, “Dasein” in his later works. One need only look into
Zollikon Seminare to find its pervasive use. But there, Heidegger is dialoguing with psychologists, whose
primary focus is the human person and the then new type of psychoanalysis called “Daseinanalysis.” As
such it seems quite pertinent. Our project is not Dasein per se, but language and Being. Thus, the term,
“human” retains the meaning and sense of Dasein without its opacity while downplaying individuality of
the term, “man”—all the while highlighting the centrality of Being with human involvement. No one term
will completely satisfy all the various ways Heidegger intends. Yet “human” seems least problematic.
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Beginning with “Kehre”6 in 1949 and concluding with Heidegger’s 1950 essay
entitled, “Sprache,” this chapter follows Heidegger’s concern with the problems of
fundamental ontology and destructive retrieval, yet at the same time employs these
approaches to discern what indeed is the relationship between Being and language.
During this brief, yet fecund two years, Heidegger’s account emerges. It is the account of
how originary language heard as Silence is communicated as Saying; it occurs as the
gathering of the fourfold into things and world. In pain, man notices an ontological
difference between Being and beings and listens to the Stillness. In hearing, man
corresponds and human language emerges. This chapter outlines Heidegger’s work
wherein he delves deeper into the question of Being through language.
Next, Chapter 4, “From lo&goj toward Being:Saying” begins with the insight of
“Sprache,” that originary language is primarily a showing and as such is relational.
Originary language is heard as Silence. Upon hearing this Silence, man in pain responds
as given in ordinary language. This relational, indeed conversational character of Being
as Saying is fundamental. Ordinary language is relational and can no longer be
conceived as a tool, nor is it simply that which allows Being to emerge. Intimately,

6

Our reason for choosing this essay as our point of departure is not to say that this was Heidegger’s first
use or understanding of Kehre for he indeed uses the term and its meaning in earlier works. See “Vom
Wesen der Wahrheit (1930),” or its English translation, “On the Essence of Truth.” Heidegger cites the
first use of Kehre in published materials in a later work in 1947, “Letter on Humanism,” but admits that ten
years earlier it was already part of his thought. Thomas Sheehan argues that Kehre made its debut in July
1928 in Die Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, GA 26: 201.30, 35. Cf.
Thomas Sheehan, “Kehre and Ereignis: A Prolegomenon to Introduction to Metaphysics” in A Companion
to Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, ed. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried (New Haven, CN: Yale
University, 2001) 4.
Nor that this is to say that choosing the essay “Die Kehre” is by any means random. Rather, “Die
Kehre,” marks Heidegger’s explicit exploration into what indeed is entailed in Seinsgeschichte. “Die
Kehre” is the lecture in which Heidegger moves his gaze away not only from Dasein as is the case for the
early years but also away from the truth of Being in the middle years and looks closer into what makes a
thing a thing. This is, I argue, is the beginning of finding Being as the originary language unfolding into
language.
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language and Being are now gathered as Ereignis. By looking at the whole once again,
we see that Being and language are indeed far closer than once thought.
In this chapter we see Heidegger’s way as one which focuses on lo&goj.
Heraclitus’ lo&goj becomes for him the way of exploring how speech as verbal
communication wrongly became the primary, perhaps sole, understanding of language.
By exploring this movement, Heidegger too wants to incorporate Heraclitus’ “flux” as
part of the unfolding of Saying, highlighting a non-stagnant framework for his way.
Most intriguingly, Heidegger explores the ramifications of lo&goj; it draws thought and
discourse closer, and tries to bridge Being and beings.
In chapter five, “From Sprache toward Being:Saying” we follow Heidegger’s
movement from a “logos” understanding of Being:Saying and toward a relational
understanding of language as Being:Saying. During this period Heidegger engages most
directly language and Being. It culminates with Heidegger’s 1959 essay “On the Way
toward language.” Heidegger comes to his clearest point regarding language and Being.
Ereignis, the manifestation of Being as Saying is a way-making. Originary language as
way-making, though, is way-making as the originary language, “be-wëgen als Sage.” It
does bring the essence of language as Saying into ordinary language. And yet, waymaking is always already the unique region of the essence of language itself, from which
our thinking of language emerges. Language is the Gestalt, the whole, from which all
steps of language derive. Even the dangerous (yet not without saving power)
machination and enframing emerge from the whole of language. And the whole emerges
as Ereignis as the “site” of Seinsgeschichte as Being:Saying.
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Once Heidegger finds this crucial insight of Ereignis, he circles back to a
discussion of Dasein. For fundamental ontology located Dasein as the “site” of
Seinsgeschichte as Being:Saying. Therefore, Chapter Six, “From Da-sein toward
Being:Saying” follows Heidegger reworking his notions of Dasein. More properly
Heidegger understands man as mortal as one of the four elements of the fourfold through
which Being as Ereignis is manifested. Now Heidegger calls man Da-sein; through Dasein we move toward Being:Saying.
Heidegger surveys in his 1961 volume, Zollikon Seminare the region of dwelling
of Da-sein. Dwelling allows us to see man in his proper sense. Since Heidegger is
discussing psychological issues of man and his proper dwelling, Heidegger must reenter
the arena of ontology begun in Being and Time. It is through this reengagement with
fundamental ontology, hermeneutics, and phenomenology, wherein Heidegger sees waymaking though possibilities. Phenomenology is now seen not simply Being showing
itself in the very way it shows itself; Heidegger’s mature understanding of
phenomenology is looking ahead [Vor-sicht]. With the twofold characteristic of Being as
concealing/revealing, manifested as Ereignis in the gathering/separatedness of the
fourfold, Heidegger see Being unfolding as possibilities with limitations. And man is
now the placeholder of the “nothing,” clearing out all beings so that Being as Saying can
be heard as Silence.
Concluding Part I, “FAINESQAI” we see chapters 1-6 placing the burden of its
evidence upon the actual texts and their contents. While these chapters’ content is
certainly important, also important is the way the Heidegger’s works circles around many
central philosophical issues all arriving at Being as Saying, originary language and its
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relation to beings. From language and Being toward Being:Saying, from lo&goj toward
Being: Saying, from Sprache toward Being:Saying, from Da-sein toward Being:Saying—
all say the same thing, Being as Saying. Most importantly, we find in these chapters the
path of way-making unfolding as Ereignis.
Once Heidegger’s language as both the way of Being and the steps toward Being
is explored in the works treating language, we must investigate what this unfolding might
entail. In order to accomplish this, we must view earlier major interpretations of
Heidegger’s understanding of language and Being. Part II, “WIEDERHOLEN” repeats
or retrieves the earlier chapters, but as a way to analyze them through the eyes of
scholarship. The many scholarly attempts, interpreting how language and Being unfold
for Heidegger, show in various ways by concealing and revealing Heidegger’s facility to
gather together creatively all the facets of Being and language while maintaining
Seinsgeschichte. This to say that one might capture Being but miss language’s important
role or another might see the importance of language but strays from Being. Some see
content; others see method. Each in their own way contribute and yet, still conceal
Heidegger’s Sprache way-making.
“Overgrown Paths,” our seventh chapter, deal with major interpretations of
Heidegger’s understanding of Being. These interpretations attempt to draw together all
the various works of Heidegger into a coherent whole, whether as an explicit whole or
simply as a way of organizing the work through one topic. Thomas Langan, William
Richardson, Joseph Kockelmans et al. developed strong models of how Heidegger’s
corpus should be viewed. Each had good success as it showed us part of Heidegger’s
way: “phenomenology,” “thinking of being,” and “many ways.” Yet from our present
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vantage point, they appear as successful failures. They are all foremost authorities on
Heideggerian scholarship. Yet it appears that their models conceal as much as they
reveal. Language’s relation to Being is still tenuous, elusive.
Earliest Heideggerian scholarship emphasized Dasein as a way toward Being
[Sein] with language as just a side bar. When Dasein becomes the centerpiece, the
outcome is humanistic with unique existential and phenomenological terminology as
proffered by Langan. Richardson’s breakthrough displaced the centrality of Dasein for
Being, moving from a phenomenological mindset toward a thoughtful one, from
phenomenology to thought. Since this paradigm placed Being, not Dasein, at its center,
Richardson needed to account for the divergence in Heidegger’s work; and so Richardson
developed the explanatory account of Heidegger I and II. Its drawback was its
mischaracterization of the Kehre as a shift in Heidegger’s thinking, when in fact the
Kehre was the constant factor throughout all of Heidegger’s work. Historical being,
Seinsgeschichte, has always been Heidegger’s concern; this is the Kehre.
Nearly a decade later another paradigm arose. Rather than attempt to make a
meta-narrative of Heidegger’s work as did the earlier paradigms, Joseph Kockelmans
chose the approach of many approaches. Heidegger remarked late in his life that perhaps
his way was one of many ways. Kockelmans’ approach has invoked a strong plurality of
meaning possibilities of Heideggerian language as is illustrated in his major compilation7
with a weak, non-binding centrality. Rather than thinking of Being, this paradigm
focused on the multiplicity of the language of Being.
Our eighth chapter, “Be-wëgen,” then, sets a new trajectory of unfolding the way
of Being as Saying. Rather than a static paradigm with either humanistic or pluralistic
7

Kockelmans, Joseph, J., ed. On Heidegger and Language (Evanston, IN: Northwestern University, 1972).
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tendencies, whether with or without unity, we need a paradigm that is not static. As a
paradigm that has transformation or movement as its guiding relationship, Be-wëgen does
not exclude the previous paradigms, but transforms them. The house of Being brought
forth by Heidegger includes certainly Heidegger himself, Langan, Richardson and
Kockelmans, but a multitude of other voices that respond to Language as Saying. Indeed,
the steps of this pathway unfold ever anew while always already being the pathway as
way-making.
It is this creative tension between the pathway, the plethora of things on the
pathway and the relationship between the pathway and humanity that these major
paradigms have engaged so rightly. But it is the way in which these were engaged that
becomes the issue. Between beings and Being, between subject and community, between
identity and difference, between the first beginning of Western philosophy and the other
beginning—between is the key to this current project. Framing “between” as a way
rather than way-making ends in a cul-de-sac. Presenting the issue in a positive light, we
see that way-making doesn’t frame, but opens up the path as possibility; “between” is
identity as relation: Ereignis.
This current paradigm holds constant the meaning of Kehre as Heidegger held
consistently throughout his works. It also reflects the shift of approaches from the early
ontological approach to the middle destructive retrieval of “logos” approach and finally
to the later language approach, creatively placing Ereignis as the center of these
unfolding approaches as language as Saying. In the last approach is contained in the
earlier two, as steps are contained in the way. But the final approach is not the sum total
of steps, but the transformation of a “way” to “way-making.”
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Thus “way-making” unifies the multiplicity, not in superficial “ways.” But in an
elusive and originary source from which all is derived, which conceals itself in all, and to
which all seeks its ground as non-ground. Yet this “way-making” is not set in stone, but
as a dynamic swaying of Being and language as the originary Saying. Once we have
gathered how this could not been seen or understood for a variety of difficulties in
previous scholarly attempts as illustrated above, “way-making” can unfold afresh.
Part III, then, takes up the task of unfolding of way-making. It appears to us in
our epoch, but it is of all epochs. More importantly, in drawing man to the Silence,
Being as Saying transforms beings into their most proper light, transforms man into what
is most proper, and brings to light Being as concealing/revealing as Ereignis. Thus,
“URALTER EIGNIS” addresses the question of the “age-old enowning” or showing of
Being, given as Seinsgeschichte, as continual way-making.
The ninth chapter, “Unfolding,” discusses the possible ways in which Ereignis
can be an unfolding. Moving from the first beginning, leaping toward the other
beginning, all the while remaining between the two, unfolding shows what leaping might
look like. Engaging both the philosophies of the first beginning and the other beginning,
this chapter discusses all the ways unfolding of Being as Saying, manifested as Ereignis
in the fourfold can and cannot be understood. More than other chapters it engages the
reader in a discussion of possibilities of Being within the limitations of beings.
The major foil of this chapter is Hegel, who had the right problem of unfolding,
but the wrong answer. He offered a linear progression of Absolute knowing, realizing
itself through the process of Aufhebung. Heidegger’s Unfolding is neither progression,
nor linear; rather it is multifaceted as Ereignis.
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The final chapter, “Dénouement,” looks at the possibilities of unfolding of
language as Saying, as encountered in the world. All movement along the path is a
response to the original language as Saying. Thus all languages find their source and
summit in Being as Saying. All forms of communication, all forms of theory, all forms
of movement of life, have in their plurality their unity in the original language as Saying.
They, too, are the external forms emerging from the originary language: language as
Saying that can never be reached, but only to that which they respond.
This last chapter argues that current non-Heideggerian approaches too are
inadequate. Linguistic theories are still metaphysical; structuralist theories cannot
account for the divergence of multiplicity; post-structuralist theories have no
commonality. The reception of Heidegger occurred, as of yet, three waves and in four
basic regions, which, we argue, coincide with stratifying of the fourfold. While the
current Heideggerian scholars apply Heidegger’s meditative thinking in new and creative
ways, they fall short of way-making, as they do not bring the four regions into a
gathering/separateness. Truly remarkable in their applications, they too fall short of waymaking. For in their stratifying into four regions, already they are enframing.
Finally in our concluding chapter, we offer a way which permits the
gathering/separateness of the four regions that interrelate. As such these regions to be
understood they need to be communicable in their multiplicity, unity, sameness,
difference. Conversely, French theory8 cannot account for any true communication in the
face of multiplicity; thus they lack any unity. Badiou, in his Being and Event, does seem
8

This phrase encompasses a number of philosophies, also collectively known as postmodernism. It is
employed by François Cusset in his book, French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze & Co.
Transformed the Intellectual Life in the United States, trans. Jeff Fort with Josephine Berganza and Marlon
Jones (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 2008).
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to balance these issues of the “world,” but he fails in that he is unable to account for the
human. Anglo-American and post-analytic theories of language fall short of human
experience. Only Heidegger seems to negotiate these issues with “Sprache als Bewëgen.” Thus unfolding of language and Being in Heidegger’s still is viable, hardly
passé in our current philosophical discussions. It creatively holds Being, beings,
language and humans, and it gathers; and, in gathering, unfolds into all aspects of the
event Heidegger called Ereignis. In Ereignis language and Being influence all arenas of
human interest and study. This, we argue, is the true unfolding with language and Being
as Sprache als Be-wëgen, a dynamic paradigm shorn of Hegelian overtones. This
phenomenology can truly speak to us—and we can dwell properly.
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PART I:
FAINESQAI

CHAPTER ONE:
Early Approaches I

— We uncover the path … .
SEIN UND ZEIT
When any philosophy undertakes its departure, it should ask where to begin and
what are its presuppositions; and yet, at the same time by doing so, it has already
begun—for things appearing to us as such and such the case, is already in the middle of a
stance. For Heidegger, the beginning could not take the path of the failed dialectics of
Hegel, the culmination of the gigantic, artificial construction of metaphysics. Through
dialectics can we ever know anything except for that which we ourselves have
constructed? Since that is the case, then we are merely able to describe it. In doing so
we might find some hint, some indicator, which will show us the way.
Likewise, the approach in this section through the treatment of Being and Time,
the Beiträge, and continuing through Heidegger’s work until the 1970s will be one of
description. We will neither defend nor criticize Heidegger’s approach, we will employ
it. While for many readers steeped in philosophical analysis, this approach seems
pointless. But pointless, it is not; the point is to allow Heidegger’s work to show itself as
it engages in its own project of searching, uncovering, retrieving, hearing, responding to
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Being in all is manifestations—only then can Being show itself in the very way that it
shows itself.9
For Heidegger phenomenology seemed a better alternative of seeking Being, and
particularly that of Edmund Husserl. Regarding this problematic of what we can know,
Husserl writes: “[t]hroughout phenomenology one must have the courage to accept what
is really to be seen in the phenomenon precisely as it presents itself rather than
interpreting it away, and to honestly describe it. All things must be directed
accordingly.”10 Heidegger chose this pathway akin to Husserl’s phenomenology, for he
desired not only to allow the phenomenon of Being to appear, but also to describe its
appearance in such a way which does not obscure it in our image. In short, we want to
avoid interpreting away Being.
For Husserl the Hegelian system, all psychologisms, all Idealisms, all
Empiricisms are wrong precisely on this account; they interpret away what can be seen,
reformulating Being into a preconceived pattern. Heidegger held that these systems all
concealed the worthy question of Being. Husserl’s phrase at the end of his preface of
Logical Investigations soon becomes phenomenology’s banner slogan: “Back to the
things themselves.” If we return to the things themselves, then we can eschew
interpreting away Being.
Joining in on Husserl’s banner call, Heidegger famously writes in Being and
Time: To the things themselves! [»Zu den Sachen selbst!«];11 for Heidegger this seemed a
9

From the outset a caveat must be made: our project is never without hidden constructions or agendas. Our
claim, like Heidegger’s is to minimize and expose those constructions, so as to allow Being to appear in the
very way that it appears.
10
Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy,
First Book, trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht, NE: Kluwer, 1982) 257.
11
Another translation could be: “To the matter itself!” See Heidegger, GA 2: 46, 221/Being and Time,
trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1962) 58, 209-210. The
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better, more concrete12 access to Being and a warning to interpret only what is really to
be seen in the phenomenon. Its method as phenomenological and its content as things or
beings were Heidegger’s fundamental presuppositions.13 His phenomenology, like
Husserl’s, saw itself as descriptive and avoiding of all thoughtlessly accepted
philosophical standpoints or directions.14
Although the descriptive phenomenology of Husserl searched for the essential
structures of consciousness by examining phenomena, Heidegger sought Being in the
structures of beings by examining the meaning and ground of what appears or more
specifically the existential structures of Dasein.15 Heidegger’s phenomenology soon took
a different tack from Husserl, for, according to Heidegger, Husserl’s transcendental
phenomenology could not find its way out of its solipsism of the subject and

Macquarrie translation will be our source for the English edition of Being and Time. While Joan
Stambaugh’s translation is interesting and sufficient in its own right (Albany, NY: State University of New
York, 1996), for our propaedeutic purposes it offers no divergence from the Macquarrie-Robinson
translation. On the positive side, most scholarship on Being and Time still employs the phrasing of
Macquarrie-Robinson’s translation and, therefore, makes our jargon-filled, cumbersome task less so. For
the Husserlian reference, see Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (Tübingen, DE: Niemeyer, 1968) 1.
12
GA 2: 1/19. This emphasis early in the text for a concrete working out of the question of Being counters
many claims that Heidegger is an Idealist. For instance, William Blattner argues that Heidegger employs a
temporal Idealism. While Being and Time is vulnerable to this claim, Heidegger’s later work avoids the
analytic of time as a means by which we access Being. See William D. Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal
Idealism. (New York, NY: Cambridge University, 1999).
13
It may be a helpful reminder that through the use of the term, “presuppositions,” we, like Heidegger do
not mean to establish an unproven principle from which later suppositions are derived. Rather,
presupposition of phenomenology—allowing entities to be seen as they appear—is laid down as an avenue
of discovery. See Paul Gorner, Heidegger’s Being and Time: An Introduction.
Also, a helpful advisory to the reader, one should not restrict too narrowly the meaning of the
words “content” and “method.”
14
One must admit that Heidegger’s claim of utter disassociation with all philosophical standpoints is
indeed in itself such a claim. Heidegger, at this point in his thought, does not seem to be able to counter
this criticism.
15
While Daniel Dahlstrom suggests that Dasein should no longer remain esoteric, and suggests its
translation as “there-being,” we shall respectfully retain Dasein. Our reasoning hinges on Heidegger’s
latter shift to Da-sein. Following Dahlstrom’s suggestion, “Da-sein” would then need to be translated as
“being-there.” The distinction between “there-being” and “being-there” seems too fine a line for readers to
follow. We shall cover this later in chapter 6.
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consciousness; Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology16 is “to let that which shows
itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” 17 … through
discourse.18 In other words, solipsism is overcome in Heidegger’s phenomenology
because there is no bifurcation of subject and object. Heidegger would not begin with the
self or with the world, but with how things show themselves to us as Being-in-the-world
[In-der-Welt-Sein]. Rather than the foundation of knowledge, which grounds all forms of
knowing, Heidegger wants to look deeper toward Being.
The question of Being, then, becomes paramount. Indeed, asking the question of
Being is a mode of Being. It is the mode of Dasein. There is difference among beings
[Seindes], but there is one being [Dasein], for whom its Being [Sein] is an issue19 and
each case it has its Being to be its own [daß es je sein Sein als seiniges zu sein hat].20
Heidegger holds that through Dasein we can find a way toward Being.21 The question of
Being is the relationship of Being and Dasein and the mode of inquiry takes place in
language.

16

Etymologically, Heidegger breaks phenomenology into its two ancient Greek components: fai&nesqai,
means to show itself; and lo&goj is the account of that which is seen—one might call it discourse.
Phenomenology gives us a relational revealing, an account. Thus, from the outset we see the importance of
the relationship between Being and language. See GA 2: 36-52/49-63.
17
GA 2:46/58.
18
Heidegger distinguishes the many senses of “discourse” which are inadequate, and the adequate sense in
which he means “discourse.” He concludes his analysis on “discourse” in section §7, B: “When fully
concrete, discoursing [Reden] (letting something be seen) [Sehenlassen] has the character of speaking
[Sprechen]—vocal proclamation in words [stimmliche Verlautbarung in Worten]. … an utterance
[stimmliche Verlautbarung in Worten] in which something is sighted in each case.” In this early
formulation of language we see how the character of letting something be seen also has the character of
speaking. The question we will constantly pose is precisely this dual character of language of speaking and
letting things be seen. What should the reader should not overlook in all the details is that phenomenology
has the character of speaking. GA 2: 44/56.
19
GA 2: 16/Being and Time 32.
20
GA 2: 17/Being and Time 33.
21
GA 2: 7/Being and Time 25. Heidegger here emphasizes that what we seek, must be guided beforehand
by what is sought. While the project of fundamental ontology is the task of Dasein, it is still guided by
Being. This early statement in the Heideggerian repertoire shows two things: while the task of fundamental
ontology is Dasein’s, it is nonetheless guided by Being. This supports our thesis that Being and Dasein
both have a role to play in concealing and revealing Being through language.
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Dasein is also always in relation to other entities and their totality is what we call
the “world.” Dasein is ontically closest to itself22 and the world while ontologically
Dasein is farthest [das Fernste] away from itself and the world. Therefore, while we
must begin by looking at Dasein in its everydayness [Taglichkeit],23 we employ language
in the ontological project of uncovering Being through Dasein.
What we find in everyday life is that Being hides “in” beings. Using the clues of
everyday language,24 we encounter the cover-up through a formal indicator [formalen
Anzeige]25 of how the cover-up occurs and underlying truth. Phenomenology traces this
path in order to unveil Being. Furthermore, phenomenology unveils the covered-up-ness
[Verdecktheit] toward Being. Covered-up-ness is the counter trajectory of
phenomenology. In fact Verdecktheit is the reason for the need of a fundamental
ontology, for we must uncover layers of ontology to find a fundamental ontology by

22

GA 2: 21/Being and Time 36. Heidegger’s text reads as follows: “Das Dasein ist zwar ontisch nicht nur
nahe oder gar nicht das nächste—wir sind es sogar je selbst.” Macquarrie and Robinson follow
Heidegger’s emphatic italics of “sind.”
23
GA 2: §5.
24
In Being and Time language is pivotal. While Heidegger never called language a tool in Being and Time,
like that of a hammer; it is, nonetheless, the means by which Dasein seeks Being. Broadly speaking, then, I
argue that Heidegger at times does hold language to be used like a tool in its serviceability: it is the tool of
excavation, but is also the means of covering over. Language then is the thread into the labyrinth of the
ontic toward the ontological. Language, understood thusly as tool, is integral to Heidegger’s project even
from its earliest conception.
Later understandings of language emerge out this “language as mere tool” notion, where
Heidegger explicitly calls language a tool, when employed ontically. See GA 4: 37/“Hölderlin and the
Essence of Poetry” (1936), wherein Heidegger writes: “Die Sprache dient zur Verständigung. Als dazu
taugliches zu Werkzeug ist ein »Gut«.” [Language serves to facilitate understanding. As an appropriate
tool for this purpose, it is a ‘good.’] See also GA 12: “On the Way to Language” (1950s) for similar
usages.
25
GA 2: 155/Being and Time 152. A formal indicator is one that indicates or gestures, but it indicates not a
“form” as in sense of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition; rather, it indicates some of the content of the
phenomenon, but a content of which can never be exhausted. See Richard Polt, The Emergency of Being:
On Heidegger’s Contributions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2006) 37. There Polt notes that
Heidegger’s clearest explanation of formal indication occurs in Heidegger’s 1929 The Fundamental
Concepts of Metaphysics 296-97.
Current discussions surrounding “formal indication” have flourished recently. One morning was
dedicated to formal indication at the 2009 Heidegger Circle meeting, where Leslie MacAvoy presented a
paper entitled, “Formal Indication and the Hermeneutics of Facticity.” Similarly, the forthcoming 2010
SPEP conferences will feature Ted Kisiel’s paper, “Formally Indicating Our Historical Situation.”
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interrogating Dasein phenomenologically. In other words, phenomenology would not be
necessary, if Being were not to hide from Dasein and if Dasein were not to hide from
Being.
This was Being and Time’s project; to uncover being through historical
[geschichtlich] Dasein in a historiological [zu einer »historischen«] interpretation26 of
language. By the term, “historischen” Heidegger meant to distinguish his process from
that of mere history, which is still metaphysically based. Since Dasein is a historical
being, the central problem of ontology of Being is the phenomena of time.27 Time would
be the ultimate knot to untangle, for how could one assess time while within time.
While the analysis of time becomes problematic, the project of Being and Time
does avoid the typical problematical issues of solipsism, dualism, abstraction, idealism
and empiricism. Why? This is the case because the phenomenological project is about
Being-in-the-world, not about the individual subject. We allow Dasein to appear
phenomenologically in an ontological, not in an epistemological, manner.
Consequently, ontology is not a kind of anthropology, biology or psychology.
These sciences look at inner or outer worlds; ontology is more fundamental than inner or
outer worlds, separated subject or object. For Heidegger, these dualities’ claim of
transcendence or objectivity means that man is something that reaches beyond himself.
But this claim relies on a separation of object from the subject, a claim which Heidegger
26

GA 2: 53/Being and Time 63. Heidegger understands both interpretation and history in two senses: In
this phrase “»historischen« Interpretation,” a derivative sense is indicated. For Heidegger more primordial
terms for history and interpretation are “Geschichte” and “Auslegung.” Hence, »historischen«
Interpretation” ontologically speaking resides farther away from Being than does “Geschichte” and
“Auslegung.” See GA 2: 50-51/Being and Time 62.
While it is usually the case the German terminology would be placed in the nominative case, I
retain the case exactly as Heidegger offers it. In this sense we shall see, as Heidegger argues, that words
are not like buckets, scooping out meaning, but are in relation. Thus, I retain the relational character of the
word in it original usage.
27
GA 2: 24/Being and Time 38.
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rejects from the outset.28 While these sciences emphasize man’s separated objectivity
and conceived transcendence, Heidegger’s phenomenology notices the prior
connectedness of Dasein and the world.29 Heidegger argues that these sciences, rather,
are dependent upon ontology.30
Prior to conceived separateness, there is relation. The “world” and “man” are
related and in such a way that they are mutually implicated. Always Dasein and Being
are involved in each other’s concept, to speak in Western continental philosophical
jargon. Instead of prior separateness there is prior involvement [Bewandtnis],31
involvement of Dasein with others, with the world, and with Being. This certainly is a
fundamental distinction between Heidegger and the prevalent view of objective sciences
of the time
In these sciences, we find the view of language as a tool, which is closely related
to the hiding of Being in the overall setup of Sein und Zeit. Through these sciences man
discovers Being as the highest Being in a historiological interpretation. Being is sought
through the use of language which is the manifestation of thought. Within Being and
Time language is the means Dasein uses to uncover Being in a historical fashion. But
language is also the means whereby Dasein conceals Being. Thus, in addition to time,
language becomes problematic.

28

GA 2: 49-50/Being and Time 65-66. This Heideggerian rejection is the rejection of priority of the duality
of subject and object. Some have claimed that Heidegger argues that all sciences are thus null and void.
Heidegger’s claim is more modest, we argue, that sciences are derivative and simply have a deeper ground
than mere epistemology; it is not the claim that logic or any other science is without worth. Rather,
Heidegger subverts the primacy of these sciences to the status of “tools.” In their place we shall see
language emerge as ontologically primary.
29
If it is true, as Heidegger holds, that every philosopher has one thought, this is ours: relatedness is prior
to any identity. We shall see that this relational character comes in many visages: gathering/separateness,
concealedness/revealedness, truth/untruth, gathering in/going out, and community/individual.
30
GA 2: §10.
31
GA 2: 115/Being and Time 112.
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The process whereby Heidegger uncovers Being through language is precisely the
way of Sein und Zeit. By beginning with the everydayness of Dasein, Heidegger’s
project is necessarily an existential-phenomenological pathway. “Part One” of Sein und
Zeit treated the interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality. Originally Heidegger
held that this pathway could move beyond Dasein. But only the first two divisions of
“Part One” were completed: the analysis of Dasein; and Dasein and Temporality. The
treatment of “Time and Being” was attempted in Being and Time, but Heidegger was
unsatisfied with its results and never published it. Therefore, the pathway of Being and
Time appears as Dasein’s uncovering of Being through time. Dasein is the lens, through
which Being is sought in time; as such this investigation is provisional, for it “merely
brings out the Being of this entity, without interpreting the meaning of Being.”32 All
paths in Being and Time speak of Dasein and leads back to Dasein.
The overall plan in Being and Time was to continue to interpret the meaning of
Being of Dasein via “Part Two.” It would have discussed the basic features of the
destruction of the history of ontology.33 From a discussion of Dasein “Part Two” would
move through time toward a treatment of Being as such. The destruction of the history of
ontology was not written. In fact, the remainder of the project was unfinished here in
Being and Time. But the project continued in various ways in later works, when a deeper

32

GA 2: 24/Being and Time 38. It is for this very reason that Being and Time is a successful failure. The
text leads us toward Being in Dasein, but we must look elsewhere for its interpretation. Being and Time
ends with Dasein. This, we argue, is why some understand Heidegger’s project solely as a simple
phenomenological, indeed, humanistic endeavor.
33
GA 2: 53/Being and Time 63. The destruction of the history of ontology arrives, as we shall see, in the
second approach we call the destructive retrieval, which is similar to the approach of Being and Time sans
Dasein’s centrality. In lieu of Dasein’s central place, destructive retrieval explores language as the means
of disclosure. True, humanity, in the person of Heidegger, is disclosing in that case as well, but the
emphasis then will be Being’s disclosiveness/concealment of Being as the Abandonment of Being.
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analysis reveals time and space to be grounded metaphysically. Once that understanding
occurs, Being and language can continue.
Before we can focus on Being and language, we must first review the basic thrust
of Being and Time. For, we argue, the answer to the question of Being and language lies
within the way itself and its trajectory in an incipient way in Being and Time. Let us
interrogate Dasein and gather what we can of the relationship between Being and
language. In it we shall discover that there is much we can glean positively of Being and
language, yet that which we harvest is not everything. The harvest has humanistic
elements and overtones of the metaphysical structure which Heidegger first wished to
abandon entirely as a cul-de-sac toward the question of Being. But in realizing that way,
the later Heidegger can place language in its proper relation toward Being. Let us delve
into Being and Time, so that we may find early indications of the relation of language and
Being.
Each section of Being and Time uncovers a deeper level in the ongoing search for
Being. As Being is more and more revealed in beings, we see that language is there in
the process. As we have noted, language is the means by which Dasein reveals Being:
language is used to describe Dasein’s understanding, Dasein’s moodedness, and even
Dasein’s discourse is described through the use of language. Granted that Heidegger’s
treatment of language is meager in Being and Time, nevertheless it reveals a deeper, yet
undefined relationship between language and Being. Minimally, one must concede that
language accompanies each layer of revealing the way toward Being.
This is the basic orientation of Dasein; only through language Dasein comports
itself understandingly toward that Being [sich in seinem Sein verstehend zu diesem Sein
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verhält].34 This is referring to the simple, irrefutable fact that Dasein exists and for
whom Being is an issue. Thus, Heidegger holds a unique relatedness between Dasein and
Sein; language is that which reveals [or conceals as in idle chatter] that relation. What is
the character of this uniqueness, we shall explore in great length.
Dasein is not an abstracted meaning of the subject, but rather Dasein is an
ontological designation. Dasein is Being-here.35 As Heidegger explicitly draws out:
“when we designate this entity with the term “Dasein,” we are expressing not its “what”
but its “Being.”36 “Furthermore,” writes Heidegger, “Dasein is an entity, which in each
case I myself am.”37 It has each time the character of “mineness” [Jemeinigkeit].38 And
at the same time Dasein belongs to the condition called Being-in-the-world, that, while it
is a compound expression, “it stands for a unitary phenomenon.”39 Thus, the ontological
term “Dasein” rescinds from the traditional terminology of a human being as an instance
or that of human beings as a genus of philosophical analysis. But Dasein is neither an
instant nor a genus of human being; as such Heidegger’s term overcomes traditional
philosophical analysis.
Rather than traditional philosophical analysis, we look to the way Dasein appears.
First, Dasein comports itself by decision toward Being; and Dasein does this in one of
34

GA 2: 70/Being and Time 78.
Paul Gorner makes an interesting point—worthy of pursuance in another context than ours—that Dasein
is Being-here or Being-there or something between the two. It is about human beings as Dasein is in
human beings. Our context, in contrast, is the relation between Being and Dasein as shown in language.
See Paul Gorner, Heidegger’s Being and Time: An Introduction (New York, NY: Cambridge University,
2007) 23.
36
GA 2: 57/Being and Time 67. Such a distinction is oftentimes missed by a number of readers, who
misunderstand Heidegger to use the term “Dasein” simply to be a term for human being or subject solely to
avoid the connotations of centuries of misuse of what is meant be a human being or a subject. That he is
doing. But Heidegger more importantly is also focusing on the Being of Dasein. Part of that confusion lies
in that Dasein is ontological as Da-Sein, but is also an ontic being with the character of Dasein. As such
Heidegger intends to straddle the ontic and ontological.
37
GA 2: 71/Being and Time 78.
38
GA 2: 41, 42/Being and Time 67, 68. Heidegger writes: “Das Sein deises Seienden ist je meines.”
39
GA 2: 71/Being and Time 78.

35
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two ways. Since it is its ownmost possibility [eigenste Möglichkeit], it can choose itself
or it can lose itself; it can choose itself authentically [eigentlich] as something of its own
or not. Heidegger is careful here to locate both ways in Being-in-the-world. Authenticity
and unauthenticity are modes of Being. [Die beiden Seinsmodi der Eigentlichkeit und
Uneigentlichkeit].40
The preliminary analysis is ontico-ontological, that is to say, we look at that
which is closest to us in appearance in order to allow that which is hidden to appear. We
readily see things around us; we see ourselves; we encounter the world and its order. Yet
this everyday structure is quite superficial. It appears as though we are alongside or
opposite other things and are opposed to the world.
But even the above superficial stance remains a unitary phenomenon. This
phenomenon is “Being-in-the-world.” For things to appear they depend on a “world” in
which to appear. For things to appear in the world they need to “be” in the world. For
things to appear, existing in the world, they appear “with” many other entities. For other
entities to appear in the world there needs to be a unitary sense in which all of the
appearances are occurring as something that can be grasped. In short, and this is the
second aspect of Dasein, Dasein and “world” are inseparable; this is what we take
Heidegger to mean by a unitary phenomenon of “Being-in-the-world.”
“Being-in-the-world,” while a unitary phenomenon, appears in three ways.
Heidegger investigates first “in-the-world” of “Being-in-the-world.” Heidegger calls this
the worldhood of the world.41 The second way is via Dasein’s facticity, Dasein’s Being.

40

GA 2: 57/Being and Time 68. From the German root, “eigen-,” it is easy to see the importance of the
relation of “ownmost” and “authentically” choosing. There are some who argue for a third mode of
indifference with others. But this seems quite problematic in the case of Dasein with itself.
41
GA 2: 72/Being and Time 78.
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Facticity occurs as that which is apparent, occurring as “Being-in” as such. Finally, we
can look at “Being-with.” “Being-with” views Dasein with others amidst discourse in its
fallenness. These three ways are still views of the same Being-in-the-world, which is a
basic state of Dasein.
For the most part, Being has been represented exclusively in the history of
philosophy by a single exemplar of knowing the world [Welterkennen]. For this reason,
knowing has always been given priority and our understanding of Dasein’s ownmost is
led astray. We are led astray in the appearance that our understanding of Being is Being
itself. And thus the history of thought in Western philosophy as given in epistemology
diverged from the history of Being.
As a corrective, we need a founding mode of Being, which has a unitary, not
dualistic structure.42 As Heidegger expressed, “Being-in-the-world” is a unitary
phenomenon. Rather than plumbing the depths of thought, we must start not from our
thoughts, but from everyday, ontic experience. If Being-in-the-world is a basic state of
Dasein, then Being-in-the-world must show itself ontically too. In a sentence, Heidegger
writes well the connection between the ontological basic state of Dasein as Being-in-theworld and the ontic world in general: “Being-in-the world, as concern, is fascinated by
the world with which it is concerned.”43 This is where Dasein looks first, there [Da],
before any subsequent looking inward or outward of the sciences, says Heidegger.
Indeed Heidegger’s focus in Being and Time, if not his entire life, explores the relation
between the ontic and the ontological.

42

GA 2 §12.
GA 2: 82/Being and Time 88. “Das In-der-Welt-sein ist als Besorgen von der besorgten Welt
benommen.” Macquarrie and Robinson place the word, “fascinated” in italics and follows Heidegger’s
own emphasis with “benommen.”
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Between the ontic and the ontological is the “region” we must map out, if we are
to see the relation of language and Being. For in that region, we could say that we see the
relation between the contents of meaning, given ontically, and its structure, indicated
ontologically. We shall investigate Dasein at the ontic level, then move toward the onticontological, finally reaching the existential care structure of Dasein. But to express it
thusly would be stating the issue of language and Being as a project of Western
metaphysics. Expressed as a unitary phenomenon, we shall see how language and Being
appears between the ontic and the ontological; how language contents and structure
unfold as one phenomenon of language and Being as the way. First, we begin with the
everyday world.

Worldhood of the World

While examining anything outside in world we see things, e.g., a desk, and
worlds, e.g., “the world of Hollywood.” We discuss them and think about these
“worlds;” they come and go—things perish, the Victorian age passes. In fact there are
many senses of world. They are cultural and historical; speaking of them in this manner
is “ontical” [ontisch].44 Yet all these senses presuppose a unity, a “worldhood;” and
while things and worlds dissipate, worldhood always remains, so we say the ontological
[ontologisch] grounds the ontic.
Worldhood is related to all structures of the “world.” And yet why is it that we
see things in the world or a world as a whole instead of “worldhood”? If we are to be
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GA 2: 85/Being and Time 91.
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able to interpret the worldhood of Dasein and the possible ways Dasein is made worldly,
then as Heidegger writes: we must show “why the kind of Being with which Dasein
knows the world is such that it passes over the phenomenon of the worldhood both
ontically and ontologically.”45 In other words, if Dasein is so closely related to beings,
then why is “worldhood” and Being hidden?
With this trajectory of questions Heidegger directs his attention toward the
uncovering of “worldhood” and Being. World is that which is part and parcel of factical
Dasein, that whenever Dasein is, it is as a “Fact;”46 as such Dasein can be said to live in
an environment [Umwelt]. While it seems contradictory that “world” is both outside of
Dasein and the “there” in which Dasein abides, the ambiguity is not a failure of our
faculties, but is indeed that which lies at the heart of Being. World is ontic and
ontological; it has a “thingly” character [existentiell].
Worldhood, on the other hand, is not a “thing,” but a structure [existentiale] of
Dasein. It is always already there. The worldhood of the world includes the totality of
all relations, the environment [Umwelt]. All the relations are all gathered and not noticed
theoretically47 unless the totality is somehow disturbed at which point Dasein notices
equipment [Zeug]. Thus, we see already that ontic things can be seen only if there is an
ontological relation. “Things” are given in their structure.
Just as Dasein notices two modes of Being: ontic and ontological, so too “things,”
now called equipment comes in a variety of modes. Beings are in the mode of readiness45

GA 2: 88-89/Being and Time 94. Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation is somewhat awkward for
Heidegger’s phrase: “warum das Dasein in der Seinsart des Weltkennens ontisch und ontologisch das
Phänomen der Weltlichkeit überspringt.” Perhaps a smoother translation would render the text thusly: why
Dasein in its way of knowing the world passes over the phenomenon of the worldhood both ontically and
ontologically. The italicization of “why” is consistent with Heidegger’s text.
46
GA 2: 75/Being and Time 82.
47
GA 2: 90/Being and Time 95.
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to-hand [Zuhandenheit] when there is no disturbance in the context
[Verweisungszusammenhang]48 of the totality of equipment [Zeughaftigkeit].49 When the
context is blocked there is unreadiness-to-hand and equipment becomes conspicuous
[Auffallen]. When there is no context at all, beings are in the mode of presence-at-hand
[Vorhandenheit]. There are many variations of modes of equipment,50 depending on the
variation of blocked context.
As modes of equipment arise, so too their relations to Dasein emerge as that
which appears. The relations emerge from a unitary Being-in-the-world. With the
relations emerge an engagement with these relations and a way of relating to them called
circumspection [Umsicht]. From our totality of references emerges ontic “spatiality,”
“temporality,” and “causality,” as well as our semantic space. What we are arguing is
that far deeper than simply perceptual and social worlds, references lie too in structure.
This dual relationship is that which our everyday language partakes.51 In this
section Heidegger has an inkling that our language conceived as semantics or as a
performative act too narrowly confines what he holds to be language, simply as part of
“Being-with.” Language too is tied up somehow in references. And thus we must look
closer as what is meant by a reference and a sign.
In worldhood, Dasein comes across equipment and their relations in various and
complex ways. Equipment can appear as signs. As signs, which designate many kinds of
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GA 2: 110/Being and Time 113.
GA 2: 92/Being and Time 98.
50
GA 2: §15-16.
51
Günter Figal of Freiburg, Germany recently delivered at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh on October
18, 2008 a keynote address entitled, “Spatial Thinking: Considering the Possibility of Phenomenology.”
Figal emphasized Heidegger’s point here that Dasein is part of the phenomenon and yet discloser of
phenomenon. He argued that Heidegger’s conception of space leads to openness, a region [Gegend] of
openness in which disclosiveness can truly appear. It is this open region from which space as commonly
understood is derived. See his forthcoming publication.
49
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things, but they also can be formalized as a universal kind of relation [zu einer
universalen Beziehungsart].52 Signs, then, include the relations from Dasein to
equipment and from equipment to equipment, measured by Dasein. More importantly,
writes Heidegger: “A sign is not a Thing which stands to another Thing in the
relationship of indicating.”53 On the contrary, it is an item of equipment which explicitly
raises a totality of equipment out into circumspection so that the readiness-to-hand
announces itself. The salient feature here is that signs don’t point simply to another
thing, like a line, but signs gather a referential totality such that the equipment raises a
totality out into circumspection. Only as readiness-to-hand announces itself, then signs
ontically can become concretized or seen as a thing.
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GA 2: 103/Being and Time 108. There is no attempt to describe the blocked context, entities, and their
related signs as a type of correspondence of cause and effect; it simply suffices to illustrate their coimplication. If one were to ascribe the blocked context as the cause and signs as their effects, then a type of
idealism would ensue, for causality emerges as the mind constructing the signs and their relationship. If,
on the other hand, one’s temperament would cite entities as cause for the emergence of signs, then the
opposite tendency of materialism follows. Heidegger’s phenomenology remains indifferent to this type of
causality.
St. Augustine in De Magistro most notably draws this connection between words and things; thus,
for Augustine words arise from things. Yet even Augustine sees some of the problems of this simply word
and thing correspondence, when he discusses the line from Virgil’s Aeneid (Book II, 659): “Si nihil ex
tanta superis placet urbe relinqui.” [If nothing from so great a city it pleases the gods be left]. If words
arise from things, then how do we explained the word, “if”? The question arises to what thing would the
word “if” refer? This issue becomes crucial for language, as we will discuss in chapter two, language must
be part of the very ontological structure of being, and subsequently can be ontically observed. Otherwise,
language is always drawn into this correspondence of a duality problematic. Briefly, we might counter
Augustine in that we could accept that words come from things, but both words and things emerge from
Dasein’s totality of references.
St. Augustine’s concern echoes Plato’s earlier reflection in the Cratylus. The dialogue wonders to
what extent names are natural or conventional. If names are entirely natural, then the names don’t refer,
but are the things themselves; there is no relationship, only identification; if the contrary were true: names
are entirely conventional, then names can never truly refer; there is only difference. Heidegger worked on
Plato during this early period. Plato’s Sophist, GA 19 was Heidegger’s interest in 1924-5, somewhat before
Being and Time. Later Heidegger engaged Plato more directly on issue of truth in 1931-32 and 1940.
Those works include: “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” found in GA 9 and a lecture course: The Essence of
Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus, GA 34.
This topic of identity and difference of “things” becomes central to Heidegger’s later theory of
language. More than mere correspondence or simple relatedness between words and things, Heidegger
holds a complex relationship of identity and difference between things in language as part of the Ereignis.
See Identity and Difference, GA 11: 30-40; 73. We shall discuss this topic in chapter two.
53
GA 2: 107/110.
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From this we should note three relations between a sign and reference: a sign
indicates a way of relation, a “towards-which” [Wozu], which can become concrete, yet is
founded upon the equipment-structure; the indicating of the sign has the character of
ready-to-hand [zu-handen] and belongs to a totality of equipment, or to a context of
references; and as ready-to-hand it allows the environment to be accessible for
circumspection. Thus, a sign is ontic as ready-to-hand and indicative of the ontological
readiness-to-hand [Zuhandenheit] reference; for this reason, the reference cannot be a
sign, for references are the bases of signs.54
Most importantly, we must not allow the point to be forgotten that signs and
references indicate involvement with Dasein. The involvement of Dasein is the source of
the reference toward the totality and can seen in a variety of ways, as a “toward-which,”
[Wozu], “for-the-sake-of-which,” [Worumwillen], “for-which” [Wofür], “with-which”
[Womit], “in-which” [Wobei], etc. in relation to these emerging signs and things. Thus,
Dasein is always related to the world in a particular phase of the world and to the
worldhood as a whole. “Before” there are things, signs, even references “in” the world,
Dasein is in relation to worldhood. For Heidegger this relationship is drawn by Dasein,
and we, as a being with the character of Dasein, experience it as intentionality.55 This
idea of intentionality Heidegger borrows from Husserl56 and Franz Brentano.57
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GA 2: §17.
While we argue that intentionality is deeper than consciousness, we do not argue that intentionality is
merely materialist’s attraction, like that of the Stoics. Rather intentionality as we conceive it lies
“between” Being and beings.
56
See Husserl, Ideas I, wherein Husserl describes intentionality as the character of consciousness as both
the stream and unity of consciousness: “It is intentionality which characterizes consciousness in the
pregnant sense of the term and which, at the same time, justifies designating the whole stream of mental
processes as the stream of consciousness and as the unity of one consciousness. … Under intentionality we
understand the own peculiarity of mental processes ‘to be the consciousness of something’” §84.
57
See Brentano, Psychology, 88. Brentano describes intentionality as a referent, direction or immanent
objectivity: “Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called
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Consequently, the intentionality of Dasein toward “worldhood” heals the
philosophical rupture between the subject and object. This intentionality is the basis for
all references and all systems of signs, the referential totality, and signs as readiness-tohand. Moreover, this intentionality is the source not only of equipment, and its later
attribution of a “thing” or “object” but also awareness as consciousness and its later
accreted term “subject.” Yet, as we have already asserted, we now demonstrate that
Heidegger, unlike Husserl and Brentano, does not see intentionality primarily as a feature
of consciousness. Rather, Heidegger illustrates the evidence of referentiality in the
ontological structure of “worldhood.” Consciousness does not found intentionality, but
for Heidegger intentionality “precedes” consciousness, which “grounds” thought.58
From this ontological structure, the phenomenological attitude announces itself
for Dasein. It is the wherein, which is the “worldhood” [Weltlichkeit] of the world.59 It
appears as the totality of relations, all of the “toward-which” and all of the “for-the sake
of which” [Worum-willen] as the totality of all relations or environment [Umwelt] with
familiarity [Vertrauheit] and the relations [Bezüge] in the world is the basis of the
understanding of Being.60 Thus, we see the worldhood of the world given as the totality
of relations and familiarity in terms of the understanding of Being. Dasein’s
understanding of Being emerges out of its ontological structure.

the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly
unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as
meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within
itself … .”
58
We must nuance this notion later in Heidegger’s later work, “Words” (1959) with “thinking as thanking.”
The nuance will question whether we can privilege either ontology or consciousness. Indeed Heidegger
will privilege neither ontology nor consciousness but rather Being as Saying. See GA 12: 221/ “Words,”
On the Way to Language 152.
59
GA 2: 49-50/Being and Time 65-66.
60
GA 2: 116/Being and Time 119.
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Why do we belabor this point that consciousness emerges out of the relation
between ontic “thing” and ontological structures? We do so in order to show that all
these relations which are part of consciousness are “grounded” in a relation that is best
described as language. Language allows consciousness and the understanding of Being.
This is contrary to the view that language emerges out of consciousness and thought. The
relation between language and Being must be prior to the relationship of thought and
Being as given in the thought of Being. Yet this relationship between language and
Being cannot be demonstrated fully at this point in Being and Time. At this juncture
language as linguistics is inadequate for the task we have laid out, but our task here is to
recognize the seeds of a later analysis of language and Being.
Indeed this relation of language and Being for Heidegger will continually reemerge through years of inquiry. Each time the relationship becomes more intimate.
Even though in this early work of Being and Time this relationship is still implicit, it will
become necessary to understand more explicitly how things, Dasein, and world are at the
heart of the issue of language and Being. Let it suffice here to illustrate simply that
Being-in-the-world demonstrates Dasein’s relation with the “world” to be far more
related than merely connecting established things with words. Likewise, language is
intimately connected to “worldhood,” not solely to Dasein existential structures, as is
commonly understood. We will continue to return to these entities—things, words and
relations as part of Being-in-the-world—only to allow Heidegger to unknot and reveal
slowly a concealed relationship of Being and language. But first we look to Heidegger’s
treatment of language as it emerges as part of “Being-with.”
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Being-with

Perhaps the most criticized section of Heidegger’s Being-in-the-world is his
treatment of “Being-with.” It seems that such a robust account of Dasein and relations
would also lead to a robust sense of community. But Heidegger restricts community to a
distinction of authenticity and inauthenticity and develops little beyond that distinction in
twenty, short pages. Indeed, I argue that a truncated treatment of “Being-with” can
develop more robustly only when a strong sense of individualism is displaced.
The question arises for our pondering: can phenomenology centered around
Dasein be sufficient to displace individualism? We shall argue that Heidegger’s move
toward Dasein is necessary; however, it is not sufficient. Somehow community must
emerge out of an idea which Heidegger later calls the fourfold. Still, Dasein as “Beingwith” has valuable lessons. Lessons, occurring in the terminology of authentic and
unauthentic, lead us once again to the issues of ambiguity, relationality, and of Dasein.
Dasein appears authentically as that which answers itself in terms of the “I” or the
“subject,” while the authentic answer of the multiplicity occurs as the “who,” [das Wer].
Heidegger explains that the “who” maintains itself as identical throughout all experiences
and ways of behavior.61 Dasein encounters these entities, but unlike equipment, they
appear as Being-in-the-world. They are neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand
[Vorhanden]; on the contrary, these entities appear like Dasein; they are “there” and with
Dasein.
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GA 2: 155/Being and Time 150. One must recall that Dasein is simply not a being with the character of
Dasein, but Dasein is the character of a being for whom Being is an issue and in each case mine.
Therefore, the term “Dasein” does not indicate a mere multiplicity of individuals, but an existential
structure of Dasein that is Dasein-as-Being-with and relational in character.
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How is the “who” characterized? The “who” is not all of those besides “me.”
Rather, the “who” has the sameness of Being as Dasein with the circumspective concern
of Being-in-the-world. Just as the reference of Dasein to disclosedness is in the
circumspection [Umsicht] with readiness-to-hand, so too is the case with the “who.”62
The phenomenological attitude, too, is one of concern [Besorgen].63 Dasein dwells.
Such is the case with the “who.” The “who” is like Dasein, like another Dasein. Thus,
Dasein dwells and dwells as “Being-with.” Part of Dasein’s structure is “Being-with” as
the “who” and must be relational in character.
And we thus see that the “who” is not simply another Dasein, it is an indication of
Dasein’s own structure; it is an existential structure. Heidegger explains, “The Other is
encountered in his Dasein-with [Mitdasein] in the world.”64 Furthermore Heidegger
notes: “These entities are not objects of concern, but rather of ‘solicitude’ [Fürsorge].”65
With these two quotations we are not to understand Dasein-with simply as a multitude of
Dasein, but another existential structure where-in Dasein dwells in the world. Dasein
dwells as Mitdasein, even as Being-alone. Dasein is somehow relational in its identity.
In each case of Mitdasein the dwelling takes place in both authentic and
inauthentic modes. Just as Dasein has modes of Being and beings come in a variety of
modes, similarly “Being-with” has two basic modes. The negative mode is indifference.
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Sartre has famously developed this notion in both Nausea and Being and Nothingness, especially with
the term, the “gaze.” Heidegger’s notion, on the contrary, shows no connotations of violence in “Beingwith.”
63
GA 2: 159/Being and Time 155.
64
GA 2: 160/Being and Time 156. Our point here is that while ontically focused there are others, but
ontologically Dasein is always Dasein-with.
65
GA 2: 162/Being and Time 157. Solicitude is a correlative of circumspection, with the clear difference in
that while circumspection is toward the “world,” solicitude is toward other Beings with the character of
Dasein.
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The positive modes have two extreme possibilities.66 The phenomenological attitude of
“solicitude” [Fürsorge], then, has authentic “leaping-in” [einspringen] and “leapingahead” [vorausspringen]. The overly simplistic analogy oftentimes used to explain these
two authentic modes is offering a man a fish to eat (“leaping-in”) or teaching a man to
fish (“leaping-ahead”).
While the reference to beings is one of circumspection, the reference to “Beingwith” is considerateness [Rüchsicht] authentically as “forbearance” [Nachsicht] and
inauthentically in many ways that ultimately leads to inconsiderateness
[Rüchsichtslosigkeit], all due to indifference.67 Thus, we can rightly conclude that
“Being-with” is always with others, always in relation to others, and always for the sake
of others.68
Like Dasein in its everyday structure, “Being-with” has authentic and inauthentic
modes. The “who” [das Wer] appears as “Being-with” [Mitsein] with Dasein. The
inauthentic mode appears as the “they” [das Man]. For Heidegger the inauthentic mode
appears as public. That is to say that Being-with appears as not for the sake of others, but
its Being is taken over by others. This enhances their power and dissolves one’s own
Dasein, a clear indication of inauthenticity. Identity as defined solely by others is
inadequate.
The various relations of Mit-Dasein as the “they” are basically ways of
distantiality [Abständichkeit]. The “they” distances Dasein from its own character and
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GA 2: 163/Being and Time 158. Much quoted, these two modes are usually misunderstood as one being
authentic and the other extreme is unauthentic but Heidegger is clear that both modes are positive. “Die
Fürsorge hat hinsichtlich ihrer positiven Modi zwei extreme Möglichkeiten.”
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GA 2: 164/Being and Time 159. The German is ambiguous in its sentence construction, but the above is
the preferred translation by Macquarrie and Robinson.
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GA 2: 164/Being and Time 160.
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distances the character of Dasein from all of the “who.” Thus the “they” removes more
and more the others of Mitdasein. What is left is an other-less “they.” The everything is
managed for us; everything becomes well-known and is manipulated. Everything and
every Dasein is managed as a way of “leveling-down” [Einebnung], “averaging”
[Durchschnittlichkeit] by the “they.” Dasein fails authentically to maintain that which is
ownmost, as Dasein, a being for whom Being is an issue.
In conclusion, Dasein is a not a mere multiplicity, but a being, for whom Being is
an issue as a being concerned for others. The structure of Dasein is also Mit-Dasein.
Authentically, Dasein can never be a lone individual, nor can Dasein be part of a mob.
Rather Dasein always already has solicitude for others as another Dasein, for whom
Being is an issue. Dasein’s proper identity occurs in relations with others in community.
While this hardly is a robust account of community, it certainly is not void of any
ethical or moral concerns; many have accused Heidegger of lacking any ethical concern.
But why not develop such an account here in Being and Time or elsewhere for that
matter? When questioned by Jean Beaufret on November 10, 1946 on the relationship
between ethics and ontology, Heidegger responded with a letter that is now published as
“Letter on Humanism:” wherein he writes a correct ontology is more fundamental than an
ethics, but one could construe ontology as being a correct ethics.69 We are learning that
any ethics must be based upon not only a true account of community, but also on a
discussion of “Being-in” as such, to which we now turn.
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One must admit that Heidegger never wrote specifically regarding ethics. Yet as I infer, one could at the
very minimum understand ontology as the foundation for an “ethics;” ethics emerges from the proper
dwelling of the ethos. See “Letter on Humanism,” in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University, 1998); GA 9: 186-189/“Letter on Humanism,” Pathmarks 270-272. Nevertheless,
one must accept that, for Heidegger, ethics is metaphysical by nature. We shall discuss Heidegger’s,
Building Dwelling, Thinking as dwelling impinges ontologically upon language and Being.

24

Before we do so, a note on language is necessary. If discourse of all types, both
authentic and inauthentic, arises as “Being-with,” then any false notions of community
could belie the truer nature of language as simple discourse. If the complaint that
Heidegger’s notion of community is thin in Being and Time, then his notion of discourse
also seems to be thin. Indeed, this is, we argue, what Heidegger realizes later in the
1950s.

Being-in

A much briefer treatment of “Being-in” will follow, since in many respects this
topic of the Being of the “there” seems to be disclosed in a focal way in the Beiträge.
Yet we cannot overlook it entirely, for it contains a few specific remarks Heidegger
offers on language. “Being-in” centers on Dasein’s involvement with and to objects; it
involves all beings “in” the world of Da-sein, of the “there,” [Da].
Dasein always finds itself “there,” i.e. attuned to the “world.” This state-of-mind
[Befindlichkeit]70 is a fundamental structure of Dasein; it shows Dasein involvement with
things in a clearing [Lichtung]; Being-in-the-world is itself the clearing.71 As beings are
uncovered and present in a clearing, they are disclosed. In such a mode of disclosedness
[Erschlossenheit] beings are revealed as “there.”
What might miss the unsuspecting reader is the co-relation of the “there” and
“Being-in.” While Dasein is the site of the clearing of beings; Dasein too is the clearing
site of Being as “Being-in.” In the disclosiveness of beings, Being is hidden; in the
70
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GA 2: 178/Being and Time 172.
GA 2: 177/Being and Time 171.
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disclosiveness of Being, beings are concealed. This unique position of Dasein as the site
clearing of Being and beings occurs through moodedness.
In moodedness, Dasein is always regarding beings. With circumspection
[Umsich] Dasein regards beings as ready-to-hand. This concern [Besorgen] with beings
shows its relatedness as it shows it relation to itself as dwelling. These relations as
moodedness occur in authentic ways and in inauthentic as the public. Public moodedness
shows Dasein as not proper to itself, but aligned with the “they.”
But more than simply passions of the soul, as the philosophy of the first beginning
would call them. Moodedness shows Dasein’s concern with beings is at the same time a
concern for itself; and concern for beings and itself, moodedness also shows a concern
for Being.
This preliminary analysis of Being-in-the-world shows the relation of the ontic
and the ontological. More importantly, this analysis of the everyday world leads Dasein
toward a structure that allows such a Being-in-the-world to be the site of disclosure. We
see that Dasein not only shows these ecstatic directions of facticity [Faktizität] as “Beingin,” fallenness [Verfallenheit] as “Being-with” and existentiality [Existenzität] as
“worldhood” as a multiplicity of possibilities as Being-in-the-world, but also Dasein
shows its constitution. To this structure, we now turn.

Toward an Ontological Constitution

Just as from the appearance of the worldhood of the world, Dasein is led to Beingin the “world” as its everyday structure, so too we are led towards Dasein’s constitution
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through Being-in. There are two constitutive ways to see the being of the “there:” in
“state-of-mind” [Befindlichkeit] and “understanding” [Verstehen]. Both draw us toward
the existential structure of Dasein. Heidegger characterizes them as equi-primordial by
discourse [durch die Rede].72 The “there” of beings also discloses the characteristic of
Dasein’s being, that character is “thrownness” [Geworfenheit],73 that Dasein is “there.”
Dasein’s thrownness is such that the being of the “there” maintains itself. One could say
that as clearing clears what is shown is the “there” of Dasein and the “there” of the world.
Yet the clearing never shows them “there” in the same sense.
The fact that Dasein is ontologically “there” draws Dasein continually back to
itself ontically as mooded. Heidegger writes: “In a state-of-mind Dasein is always
brought before itself,”74 not in the sense of perceiving itself, but finding itself in the mood
that it has. Dasein is always in some mood. The variety of moods is numerous. Even
theoretical thinking has not left all moods behind it. Proximally and for the most part,
moods lead Dasein in the manner of an evasive-turning away [in der Weise der
ausweichenden Abkehr].75 The issue for Dasein is that its structure is such that it
constantly surrenders itself to the “there” of the world and lets the world matter in such a
way that Dasein evades itself.
Equi-primordial with Befindlichkeit is “understanding.” To say that Dasein is
“there” in a disclosive sense is to say that there is a “world” is wherein Dasein abides.
Being-there is also Being-in. This relationship highlights the reference of Dasein and
72

GA 2: 178/Being and Time 172. Macquarrie and Robinson translate “durch” as by—perhaps “with
discourse” could be a better translation. They retain Heidegger’s italic emphasis.
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GA 2: 180/Being and Time 174.
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GA 2: 180/Being and Time 174. Heidegger’s text reads as follows: “In der Befindlichkeit ist das Dasein
immer schon vor es selbst gebracht, es hat sich immer schon gefunden, nicht als wahrnehmendes Sichvorfinden, sondern als gestimmtes Sichbefinden.”
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world. The disclosedness of this purposeful relationship of the “for-the-sake-of-which” is
what we call “understanding” [Verstehen]. Heidegger reminds us: “A state-of-mind” has
its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its
mood.”76 Discourse discloses that understanding and state-of-mind are co-implicatory.
“Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s potentiality-for-being,”77 writes
Heidegger. Thusly defined, understanding is not a concrete mode of knowing, but that which
makes all knowing possible.78 The structure pertains to the whole basic state of Being-in-theworld. The totality of involvements is revealed as the categorical whole of a “possible
interconnection of the ready-to-hand [einer Möglichkeit des Zusammenhangs von Zuhandedem].”79
But this unity can be revealed only if a possibility of it has been disclosed. As such we call it
“projection” [Entwurf].80 This is not Dasein comporting itself toward a plan; rather, Dasein has
already projected itself in terms of possibilities. Both the thinking and intuition are derivative
forms of understanding.
We see that Dasein is “thrown-projection” [geworfenes-Entwurf]. Always Dasein is
directed to the world and sees this directedness in terms of possibilities. Always the possibilities
of Dasein are seen in terms of the world. Neither understanding nor state-of-mind has priority, for
neither could be without the other. Together they form a fundamental structure of Dasein. Dasein
is “thrown-projection.”
Discourse, the third equi-primordial structure of Dasein is the means which “thrownprojection” is drawn into clearing. That which is understood is revealed through “articulation”
[Artikulation] when the being is brought close interpretively. This articulation is prior to any
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assertion made of it. Though the “as” structure is articulated for the first time in assertion, it has its
structure in articulation. Indeed when Dasein relates to equipment it is already in a structural, if
unasserted, “as” structure. The totality of references too needs the “as” structure, but it does not
need a thematic interpretation.
The thematic interpretation is given in what Heidegger calls the “fore-structure” [VorStruktur]. When something in the world is encountered, the thing already has an involvement
which is disclosed in our understanding of the world and gets laid out in interpretation. We never
throw a primary signification onto a thing.
We have this totality of references in advance in a “fore-having” [Vorhabe].81 Likewise,
every “fore-having” is grounded in a “fore-sight” [Vorsicht].82 The projected character gives
Dasein its sight; but Dasein can have sight only of what it has drawn out of circumspection. “Foresight,” then, is the first attempt of interpretation of the “fore-having” and is the first having of what
is seen. From the “fore-having” and the “fore-sight” arises the interpretation that is decided for a
definite way of conceiving it, “fore-conception” [Vorgriff].83 And in a similar fashion what occurs
as “fore-sight” and “fore-having” always has some framed givenness called “fore-conception.” In
every case interpretation is grounded in something that appears to us in advance. This is what
Heidegger calls the Fore-structure [Vor-Struktur] of fore-sight, fore-having and fore-conceiving.84
The Fore-structure as such is necessarily circular. In other words, we have eyes because we see.
When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein, they are
said to be understood. When they are understood they are said to have meaning [Sinn]. Heidegger
cautions us that that which is understood is not the meaning, but the entity or Being. Heidegger
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explains: “Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility [Verständlichkeit] of something maintains
itself. That which can be articulated in a disclosure by which we understand, we call ‘meaning.’”85
Meaning is the “upon which” in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something.
The crucial move for Heidegger is the fact that the question about the meaning of Being in
so far as it enters into the understanding of Dasein. The meaning of Being can never be contrasted
with beings; nor can the meaning of Being be given as the “ground” which supports entities. For
“ground becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is the ground as the meaningless abyss.”86
One could speak of the ground of meaning as groundless, but we prefer to maintain adherence to
the Fore-structure. Thus, the meaning of Being is limited by the understanding of Dasein, and this
in turn, is determined by the “worldhood” which includes beings.
Thus we come to the circle of interpretation.87 As the disclosiveness of the “there”
understanding pertains to the whole of Being-in-the-world. In every understanding of the world,
existence is understood with it. All interpretation [Auslegung] operates in the “Fore-structure.”
Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding must already have been understood to
interpret it. The circle can never be avoided; to attempt to do so is to misunderstand understanding
from the ground up. Rather than a vicious circle, for Heidegger it is a circle that reveals something
of Being.
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In terms of traditional philosophical discussions, the hermeneutical circle would be seen as
a situation of aporia, a contradictory situation, wherein no solution can be found. While
philosophers through the ages have used such aporias to illustrate absurdities, or unsolvable
problematic,88 Heidegger employs this as the very heart of Dasein and Being. It is the very arena
of language, from which all discourse arises. Although Heidegger does not elaborate much on this
topic in Being and Time, it does emerge later. We simply need to be aware of the fact that in the
core of Heidegger’s early work are the seeds for later meditation on language and Being. For in its
treatment we how structure and content of linguistics can show itself as both the step and the way,
unfolding as Being as Saying
Before we move on to those works, we will unfold the trajectory of Being and Time
somewhat further until we complete the complete structure of Dasein as care [Sorge]. Care is
Dasein ahead-of-itself being already-in-the-world as a being alongside entities within the world.
To understand or to discuss one part of the structure is to use necessarily the other parts to help
explain it. All three aspects are equi-primordial and co-implicatory and never without the others.
At the same time in order to explain or understand them we must use discourse, which has it very
root in the care structure. As we begin to see this dilemma of the hermeneutic structure along with
the trajectory of Dasein, we see why Being and Time is a successful failure. Within Dasein’s
structure a deeper kind of language lies prior to assertion, and without language as assertion we
cannot understand or articulate fully Dasein’s structure.89
From interpretation [Auslegung] an assertion [Aussage] arises; it is derivative. By
considering an assertion we can see how the “as” structure can be modified. This analysis is
crucial since from the ancient times, for Heidegger, lo&goj functioned “as the only clue for
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obtaining access to that which is, and for defining the Being of such entities.”90 The primary
signification of “assertion” is “pointing out” [Aufzeigen]. Second, “assertion” means “predication;
we assert a predicate of a subject and the subject is given a definite apophantic character. Finally,
“assertion” means “communication” [Mitteilung] and speaking forth [Heraussage].91
With these characteristics, assertion is leveling off of the hermeneutical “as-structure” [AlsStruktur]. It is derivative of the hermeneutic “as-structure” and is merely a pointing-out.
Assertion means no less than predication. Finally, assertion means communication. It is,
therefore, a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates.
With the “as-structure” logic is developed; thus, even logic is rooted in the existential analytic of
Dasein. All of those arenas of communication and thinking in everyday life, then, are derivative
modes of the hermeneutic “as-structure.”92
As we have learned assertion is also derivative of understanding. We can see how
understanding is more primordial than cognition in Heidegger’s mindset. While cognition is the
outcome of the process of thinking, understanding is how the process can occur in the first place;
cognition relies on understanding. This is not a constructivist approach to thinking. Rather,
understanding discloses the thing as something and discloses in itself as what Dasein is capable.
Understanding configures both Being and the thing together. Meaning is never private, but always
includes the world. Dasein can be transparent to itself—seizing on the
concealedness/disclosiveness as a being. Heidegger highlights understanding as a more primordial
structure, so as to illustrate that any modes of cognition arise from it.
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Likewise, discourse [Rede]93 is more primordial than simply language or words. Rather,
Rede makes possible spoken language. It is articulation of meaning and intelligibility; it includes
hearing and keeping silent [Schweigen], hearing and silence. More than grammar, logic and
meaning, instead Rede includes hearing by attending to others and oneself with silence as its
attending, if primary, mode. The task of liberating discourse from grammar, logic or meaning as
language-as-components requires a positive understanding of the basic structure of discourse in
general as an existentiale structure of Dasein. Hearing is based on the more primordial hearkening;
hearkening is relational, even silence reveals the relational structure of Dasein. Discourse [Rede]
is the existential-ontological foundation of language [Sprache].94
Conversely, to see language-as-component is to engage in the world ontically. Languageas-component engages in “idle talk” [Gerede]. Idle talk is constituted by gossiping or passing the
word along; it is superficial. Average intelligibility is different from primordial understanding.
Itelligiliblity is without making it one’s own and is utterly public and is not imparted by
communication. It is groundless floating and leaves the roots of intelligibility untapped. Silence
from primordial understanding, on the other hand, quiets “idle talk” by drawing Dasein to its
ownmost; thus, it reveals the ontological depths of Dasein as care.
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Care Structure

While the three aspects of the care structure appear as separate and were treated as
separated, they are actually gathered as Being-in-the-world. As thus Heidegger finds that these
together occur as a formal indicator of the deeper analysis that worldhood, being-in and being-with
have ontological status.95 The ontological status reveals the primordial totality as a whole. The
whole is revealed by the trajectory of the phenomenological approach.
Having arrived at the care structure as a whole, we need to address this totality of the
structure briefly before concluding our meditation on Being and Time. To do so we look, not
outside, but within Dasein for the attunement that discloses Dasein to itself. Since Dasein’s
average everydayness can be defined as Being-in-the-world which is fallen and disclosed, thrown
and projected, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being
alongside the ‘world’ and in its Being-with Others, Dasein’s everydayness is that which reveals or
conceals Dasein.96 That primary mood that reveals is anxiety [Angst], which fundamentally
reveals the unity of Dasein’s structural elements as care97—we are that type of being whose Being
is revealed in being concerned about its Being. We are aware of this pre-ontologically, but it is
masked in our everyday existence. The experience of Angst is a confirmation of the primordial
totality. Worldhood shows the ecstatic direction of “existentiality” [Existenzität], Being-in has the
ecstatic direction of “facticity” [Faktizität]; Being-with has the ecstatic direction of “beingfallenness” [Verfallenheit].
In turn, a deeper analysis reveals the existential modes “beneath” the ecstatic directions.
“Existentiality” had the existential mode of “understanding” [Verstehen]; “facticity” has the
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existential mode of “state-of-mind” [Befindlichkeit/Stimmung]; “being-fallen” has the existential
mode of “discourse” [Rede]. These modes also can appear inauthentically: understanding as
“ambiguity” [Zweideutigkeit]; “state-of-mind” appears as “curiosity” [Neugier]; “discourse” as
“idle talk” [Gerede].
The existential or existentiell modes of Dasein point to a deeper existential-ontological
construction. Thus “understanding” points to “projection” [Entwurf]; “state-of-mind” points to
“thrownness,” “always already” [Geworfenheit]; “discourse” points to “fallingness” [Verfallen].
Each existentially appears: “projection” as “death;” “thrownness” as “guilt;” “Fallingness” as
conscience.”
Yet all the modes and in all their levels occur as unity, Being-in-the-world as “care”
[Sorge]. Care is Dasein ahead-of-itself being already-in-the-world as Being alongside entities
within the world. Heidegger here is undoing common notions of truth, Being-as-presence and
undoing Western philosophy. But Heidegger retains the practical, for indeed the theoretical was
always given in the practical. The practical is what directs us in the trajectory from the everyday
by informal indicators to find the structure of Dasein as “care.”
Angst is one such formal indicator; it leads us to it by the discomfiting mood of
“uncanniness” [Unheimlichkeit]. Due to the discomfit, we rather flee into “the they” and into
“tranquilized familiarity” [beruhiger Vertrautheit] of the “at-home” [Zuhause]. The Existential
structural of “Fallenness” as absorption in-the-world can become the existentiell “falling” or
fleeing as idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Idle talk, groundless floating, curiosity [Neugier], all
disclose everything as everywhere and nowhere; ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit] suppresses everything
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as everything and nowhere. But what is the motivation of the fleeing? Dasein is equi-primordially
both in truth and in untruth, as a Being unto death.98

Dasein and Temporality
From this realization—Dasein as discloser and concealer, as grounded both in
truth and untruth—the true trajectory of the analysis of Dasein emerges. Heidegger can
now raise the question of Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole [Ganzseinkönnen].99
As long as Dasein is, there is something which Dasein could be, and thus, something is
always outstanding. Included in what is outstanding is the “end” or death. Death is
revealed as the goal of one’s ownmost Being. Death leads Dasein to “anticipation,”
[Vorlaufen] of its own possibility of non-being and the discomfiting mood of
“uncanniness” [Unheimlich]. Since death is the ownmost possibility of Dasein; it leads
Dasein to impassioned [involved] “Freedom-towards Death.” Death’s “call” reveals
“Guilt” [Schuld] to Dasein as the one who is guilty; Dasein is not guilty in a moral sense,
but in the sense that Dasein’s ownmost possibility is as not-Being or the “not” [Nicht].
Facing the possibility of not-being leads Dasein to conscience [Gewissen] and ultimately
leads to resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] to “hermeneutic situation,”100 which for
Heidegger is the totality of all these explicit presuppositions of death.
Thus, death as an existential nullity is not a privation. “Guilt,” the “Not,”
“Conscience,” “Call,” “Resoluteness,” “Situation” all reveal that untruth is hiding the
Being that belongs to Dasein. The unity of existentiality, facticity, and fallenness, which
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is the totality of Dasein’s structural whole, reveals the “truth” that belongs to Dasein.
That “truth” is revealed as temporality. Anticipatory Resoluteness as self-transformation
leads to no identity, the potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, [Ganzseinkönnen]. Temporality
is the entirety of the whole as fallen-projecting-thrownness, which reveals the structure of
temporality.
Thus Heidegger holds that Dasein’s structure lies in the very fabric of
temporality. While the trajectory of Being and Time seemed a long pathway, it is not a
movement of steps along a linear path. Temporality once appeared as a series of
instances along the way of a lengthy exposition, but is now revealed not as an instant but
as a non-linear moment. Heidegger writes: “Temporality temporalizes itself as a future
which makes present in the process of having been.”101 This is non-successive readinessto-hand time. It is shown as ecstasies of already, having-been and present.
Historicality, then, is the form of authenticity while history is the form of
inauthenticity. Being’s history is not a Hegelian progress [Fortschritt] through time. The
“Moment” [Augenblick] is the change with respect to Dasein who accepts, discloses, and
is resolute towards death. Disclosing is a fuller form of authenticity; it allows for a
change of identity and gives ourselves a fate [Schicksal]. Fate for Heidegger is not the
fate of the materialism of the Stoics nor is it one of religious fate. Rather “fate”
acknowledges Being-unto-death as the “Moment” [Augenblick]. It changes Dasein. But
more importantly, the “Moment” transforms Dasein from a linear Being to a Being of
circularity, a futural-having-been-in-a-moment-of-vision Being, poised between the
future and past. Rather than future that will never be, Dasein faces a primordial
interpretation [Auslegung]. As such the “Moment” is the fullest form of authenticity,
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leads to authentic changes in cultures or worlds and gives an authentic destiny [Geschick]
shorn of the Hegelian stream of time and amassing of wealth and power. This is time as
the horizon of Being.
For Heidegger time as horizon of Being emerges from this primordial time of
time as the “Moment.” Heidegger expresses it thusly: “Temporality reveals itself as the
meaning of care.” 102 Present-at-hand time is successive and unites temporality with all
those of disclosing Being: its tendencies toward all those of everydayness: “datability,”
“spannedness,” “significance” and “publicness.” Inauthentic time is part of Dasein’s
tendency to conceal.
Again, the ongoing primordiality is seen in the care structure. Care is primordial;
also care appears whole and direct. Care is revealed as temporality; the structural aspects
of Dasein appear as standing–out or as “ecstasies” of temporality; they are the
phenomena of the primordiality of the “Moment.” In care Dasein appears as “Ahead-ofitself [sich-vorweg],” “Being-already [Schon-Sein-in],” “As-being-alongside [Sein-bei]”
equi-primordially. So too temporality appears as Future [Zukunft], past [Gewesenheit],
and present [Gegenwart] equi-primordially. Dasein is drawn relationally to- [zu], in[auf], and with- [bei] equi-primordially vis-à-vis Being. Dasein, then, is seen having the
character in-between, in-between truth and untruth, in-between time and in-between
Being.
Since temporality reveals itself as the meaning of care, Heidegger insists that care
leads us through formal indicators to temporality. Temporality [Zeitlichkeit] of future
[Zukunft], past [Gewesen] and present [Gegenwart], now show themselves as truth: future
as “driving,” past as “context,” and present as “what happens.” Truth is now revealed as
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GA 2: 432/374.

38

a “truth” consisting of both truth and untruth. The attributes of disclosing [Erschliessen]
are all at once to close-over [Verschliessen], to uncover [Entdecken] and to cover up
[Verdecken].
While we noted early in this chapter that Dasein’s tendency to conceal is the
reason that we need phenomenology, we now see that phenomenology too may still be
part of the concealing, for Dasein is both revealer and concealer. A Dasein-centered
analysis can never find a pathway of solely revealing. Heidegger writes: “The
ontological source of Dasein’s Being is not ‘inferior’ to what springs from it, but towers
above it in power from the outset; in the field of ontology, any ‘springing-from’ is a
degeneration.”103 While Heidegger has shown to us that ontology is prior, perhaps even
superior, to that which springs from it, the phrase ‘towers above it in power’ still hints at
some mode of construction with power, toward some “something” of Dasein, other than
Being-itself.
Concluding this long and winding journey, following the trajectory of Being and
Time has been fruitful, but not conclusive. We have revealed a path that shows us a way
toward Being, only to find that the pathway we have uncovered is but of our own device.
We have uncovered ourselves in the process of uncovering. The steps, admittedly, are
labyrinthine, even seemingly extraneous to our topic of Being and language. But have
we not seen the crucial point to which we have come? We have come to the very nexus
of Dasein and Being, which will be shown in language. Moreover, we have found that
language properly understood is more primordial than originally conceived. In this
demonstration alone, we have come a far distance along the path.
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But the question still is unresolved: What is exactly the relationship between
language and Being. If language is merely a tool, it will be ontic, but how can ontic
language be employed to describe the deeper ontological description. Certainly the being
with the character of Dasein uses language. Yet language’s relationship to Being must be
as deep as that which it describes. Surely, it must be part of the care structure, but shall it
be placed within understanding or Mitsein? Language does have expressive
characteristics, tied to possibility. But, at the same time, language is relational and seems
to reside in Mitsein. Moreover, language seems to straddle both understanding and
Mitsein, as between, or that which enables the hermeneutic circle to remain intact. These
questions lie at the heart of why Being and Time seems inadequate to Heidegger’s task.
We must now turn to Heidegger’s next major approach to Being and language in
the Beiträge as Being unfolds as the Ereignis, the event. Rather than look to Dasein, we
ask: What is the Being of the things-that-are and how integrally is language related to it?
In that way the overall plan in Being and Time could continue to interpret the meaning of
Being of Dasein. From Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology of Dasein, we move
toward a meditation on the event of appropriation as the manifestation of Being.104 We
now move toward the destruction of the history of ontology as Heidegger intended, but
could not, complete in Being and Time.
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CHAPTER TWO:
Early Approaches II

— The path, circling around, is drawing us along ... .

POETRY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY
In a very clear way the unfinished work of Being and Time becomes the focus of
this next phase of Heidegger’s investigation of Seinsgeschichte, but rather than a search
for a fundamental ontology, Heidegger engages in the destruction of the history of
ontology. Being and Time has given us a phenomenological trajectory toward the
relationship between Being and language and yet that path seemed to be a cul-de-sac.105
After Being and Time Heidegger’s major efforts detail the destruction of metaphysics and
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As Dieter Thomä writes poignantly on Heidegger’s treatment of the mountainous collection of
terminology in Being and Time and its aporetic conclusion: language’s indexicality “endorsed the privilege
of a Dasein surrounded by things caught, for their part, in a net of meanings and references.” Later
Heidegger transforms the system of indexical language into a liberating effect by attending to the “things”
themselves. This chapter illustrates the direction toward the things themselves, via the thought of Being.
See Dieter Thomä, “The Name on the Edge of Language: A Complication in Heidegger’s Theory of
Language and its Consequences,” in A Companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, ed. Richard
Polt and Gregory Fried (New Haven, CN: Yale University, 2001) 111.
Heidegger realizes how the usage of language in Being and Time led toward opacity in his
thought; once he had broken through this opacity, he reflected years later on this issue in 1946 in the
“Letter on Humanism:” “The liberation of language from grammar into a more original essential
framework is reserved for thought and poetic creation.” GA 9: 314/“Letter on Humanism,” Basic Writings
240.

41

de-centering of Dasein; both Kant and Nietzsche become dialogue partners, not simply to
outline metaphysics and its ultimate destruction, but also in our words to map out a new
course.
Heidegger argues in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics106 that any process of
epistemology leads to a Supreme Being of Metaphysics and unattainable pure reason.
While Kant saw the problem of Being within the first Critique, somewhat as Heidegger
does now. Kant concludes differently with the aporia that what we know (phenomenon)
must be grounded by that which we cannot know (noumenon). While in dialogue with
Kant’s works, Heidegger comes to appreciate the fact that ontology, though not
metaphysics, still has inherent problems that mirror the problems of metaphysics.107
Ontology’s problem lies in the circularity of a discloser, who is also disclosed in a
process of disclosiveness using the language of the discloser; the problem is that while it
discloses well Dasein as an analytic, it fails to disclose fully the meaning of Being.
What similarity does this hermeneutic circle share with Kant’s problem of the
noumenon, the noumenal self, and noumenal Being? In both cases, that which we cannot
know or see is then posited with a coined term. Man treats the posited term as though it
were the solution to a solved problem, rather than the problem itself. In both cases, man
uses terms of language as buckets of meaning, scooping up known entities. Both Kant
and Heidegger in Being and Time fail to disclose Being fully.
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Tellingly, the early Heidegger and Kant both seem to offer the human person
somehow as the key; it might be said that the human appears for the modern era as a
Deus ex machina as did God so often for the Medievalists. Nietzsche’s bold claim that
metaphysics leads to nihilism reverberates a death rattle even in Heidegger’s Being and
Time, for if ontology has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, it remains
blind to its task, as Heidegger has already cautioned us.108
During this time Heidegger turns toward poetry and the philosophies of, and those
prior to, Plato and Aristotle as an avenue of discovery through this problematic. Poets
break open language to reveal new possibilities of reality. What are those characteristics
of poetry which assist in a new way toward the understanding of Being and language?
How were the philosophies of Heraclitus and Parmenides more primordial than the
narrow conception of thought since Plato and Aristotle, as Heidegger asserts? These are
the questions which preoccupy Heidegger in the ensuing years.
To address the aporia of these questions, we now direct our attention to
Heidegger’s destructive retrieval.109 It is contained in much of his work in the 1930- and
40s on the early Greek philosophers, poets and centers around the Beiträge.110 This
approach massaged and transformed language in order to uncover originary thought and
language, asymptotically nearing, but never reaching, Being. It circled around the same
issues of Being, language and things. It even breaks apart language in an attempt to
retrieve Being. Its emphasis was the thought and language of Being.
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On this new path we primarily will discuss Heidegger’s works in this order:
“Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” and “On the Essence and concept of fu&sij in Aristotle’s
Physics B, I,” both of 1931, will treat the shortcomings of Western philosophy in its early
years, fracturing truth;111 followed by a treatment of poetry in “Hölderlin and the Essence
of Poetry,” 1936,112 and a treatment of art in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 1936, to
rupture language and “things” via “aesthetics;” and finally “Nietzsche I,” 1936, explores
how art is simply a manifestation of the will to power. Once these ways have taken root
as the history of Being, we will focus on “Seyn” of the Beiträge elucidating the
relationship of Being as such with language. The path of the thought of Being leads to
no-thingness.
The pathway of the thought of Being, then, is offered as Heidegger’s entrée
toward Being. While the above ways are not the entirety of Heidegger’s work during this
period, they are certainly emblematic of our concerns for language and Being. Instead of
phenomenology, Heidegger enters the thought of the “world” of the first beginning, i.e.,
Western philosophy; Heidegger breaks apart thought by using poetry and art and lays it
open for new possibilities. Heidegger employs both art and thought so that we may be
drawn toward Being. For this reason, we could characterize this inquiry of Heidegger as
engaging in the thought of Being. Heidegger begins with the Western philosophical
tradition.
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Both essays are translated by Thomas Sheehan and are found in GA 9/Pathmarks.
“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry” is found in GA 4/Elucidations, a compilation of reflections that
spans the entirety of Heidegger’s lifetime. This early essay is surprising in its clarity of later themes, which
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with later themes highlights the fact that Heidegger’s thought is more consistent than might be offered by
William Richardson’s theory of Heidegger I and II.
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Heidegger holds that those thinkers before Plato and Aristotle did not even call
thinking philosophy. Thinking for them was the thinking “of Being.” Heidegger
highlights the double meaning of the genitive usage here. Thinking is “of Being” insofar
as it is appropriated by Being and belongs to Being. Thinking also is “of Being” as it
listens to Being. Years later in 1946, Heidegger ponders this idea in “Letter on
Humanism:” “As belonging to the being that listens, thinking is what is according to its
[thinking’s] essential origin.”113 In other words, since man is a listening being, thinking
must have the same comportment as listening. This path of listening seeks Being as
essential origin; thinking, by using language, might show us the way toward Being.
But this way of thinking from the time of Plato onward, became concerned with,
and entangled in, truth and its attainment, not the thinking “of Being.” Truth has been
ensconced in the notion of truth as an agreement to the thing. In his allegory of the cave,
Republic, Book VII, Plato depicts in various stages the movement of a prisoner from the
dark cave into daylight and back again. Heidegger notes that while each level of
dwelling the prisoner sought a particular level of truth [a)lhqe&j] normative at each
level,114 dwelling was defined by that which it sought. For example, the lowest level of
imagining [i0kasi&a] was defined by that which it sought, namely, images or shadows
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GA 9: 147-148, 150/“Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” Pathmarks 241, 243. Heidegger continues insightfully
his way of thinking regarding language of essential origin: “Language still denies us its essence: that it is
the house of truth of being. Instead, language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an
instrument of domination over beings. Beings themselves appear as actualities in the interaction of cause
and effect. … But if the human being is to find his way once again into the nearness of being he must first
learn to exist in the nameless.” Heidegger’s point of departure uses thought, rather than language, as the
way. Heidegger persists in drawing along the way, ever closer to the Being of beings. For that reason, we
will find that he will abandon later the thought of Being path for a new one as Being as Saying. Could it be
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[ei!konej];115 lowest because it was most changeable and, therefore for Plato, less
knowable. To know, for Plato, was to imitate or to participate in the objects of
knowledge, the unchanging, eminently knowable forms [ei}doj]. Heidegger, roughly
speaking, holds Plato as defining things by their participation in transcendental, knowable
forms.
For Heidegger, Plato concealed the actual dwelling of the human person and
wrested truth from its grounded situation. Instead of truth as non-concealment, truth, for
Plato, was the accord between what was seen-as-separate and the seeing of the seen-asseparate. How this accord was explained preoccupied philosophers thereafter.
Heidegger sees this preoccupation with truth a humanistic venture. In this venture Being
is hidden and language is at the service of truth’s adequation to an outside source; its
central problem is the explanation of how any thing can move toward the totally other
without the mediation of a third thing; in other words, how does participation of forms
participate.116
Aristotle, too, continues to conceal Being and language, Heidegger insists. In
addition to Plato’s truth as seeking forms, Aristotle’s concealment occurs on the level of
the conception of a “thing.” The thing is comprised of form and matter as a substance
[u(pokei&menon]. The form is not, outside, but within the thing itself as its essence or its
fu&sij. The Romans translate fu&sij117 into natura, from which we receive the word,
nature. But rather than Plato’s problem of Being hidden in the search of an outside
adequation of truth, Aristotle’s problem of Being is now hidden within “enformed things”
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See Plato’s The Republic: 514a-517a.
Ample space has been dedicated previously to this so-called “third man argument,” coined by Aristotle
and the problem of infinite regression in Plato’s participation of the forms.
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and the need to adequate their inward truth; adequation now struggles to be expressed
outwardly.
In 1939 Heidegger discusses the concept of fu&sij in Physics B.118 Like Plato’s
notion of truth, Aristotle’s concept of nature hides Being. The essence of fu&sij is
defined through its state of movedness, namely, ki&nhsij. This state of movedness,
though, is of its own “nature.” Since movedness is of its own “nature,” Aristotle finds
the best way to express its fu&sij-like nature is by placing into an appearance; i.e., only
where there is morfh&, a stationary shape. Heidegger concludes that Aristotle infers that
morfh& constitutes the essence of fu&sij, or at least co-constitutes it.119
Since mopfh& is seen as the essence, as an appearance without the movement of
fu&sij, any discussion of the fu&sij must be described by a word that seems also to be
without movement. Thus lo&goj must be stationary and can only reflect the stationary
form of the thing. Aristotle’s problem is one of adequation between the moving thing
and the stationary morfh& and its correspondingly stationary lo&goj.
But Heraclitus describes lo&goj differently. According to Heidegger, fragment 93
of Heraclitus offers another meaning of nature and its corresponding lo&goj: nature is in
flux, logos is unconcealing/concealing. The fragment reads as follows: “The Lord whose
oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but gives a sign [ 0Ou&te le&gei 0Ou&te le&gei
ou!te kru&ptei alla se&mainei].120 Heidegger reinterprets this fragment: “le&gein is
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opposed to kru&ptein;”121 Heidegger says, therefore, revealing is counterpoised to
concealing. Thus, Heraclitus has the meaning that the oracle does not directly unconceal
nor does it simply conceal, but it points out, Heidegger emphasizes. This means: it
unconceals while it conceals, and it conceals while it unconceals. Since Heraclitus’
lo&goj follows nature, pointing to the flux, it too is flexible.
Nature can be looked at from these above two viewpoints, as moving and
stationary, because while nature is one kind of Being, Being is twofold and expresses its
twofold manner; Being is the gathering of the self-concealing revealing.122 Fu&sij is
Being come out into the unhidden. Heidegger elaborates on this point with another
fragment of Heraclitus, namely, fragment 123: “fu&sij kru&ptesqai fi&lei: Being loves to
hide itself.”123 Though fu&sij comes out into the unhidden, it prefers to remain hidden.
Heidegger explains: “Self-revealing is a coming-forth into unhiddenness, and this means:
first preserving unhiddenness as such by taking it back into its essence. Unhiddenness is
called a0-lh&qeia.”124 Truth, then, is essentially not human knowing and asserting; rather,
truth as self-revealing/concealing belongs primarily to Being itself. Fu&sij as a0-lh&qeia,
is unconcealing as the unconcealing of what is primarily concealed.125
In this text two issues need illuminating for Heidegger. Heidegger privileges
Heraclitus over both Plato and Aristotle, because of their misunderstanding of truth as
seemingly static, whether immanently [morfh&, a stationary shape] or transcendently
[changeless ei]doj]. Second, the search for truth hides the search for Being; this is the
reason, in part, why Being is so elusive and its meaning ambiguous. But more
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importantly Being, Heidegger insists, is elusive for the reason that Being is not a thing
with a fu&sij, but loves to hide in beings.
When we come the being called human being, when we see Aristotle’s definition
of the human person—a!nqrwpoj-zw==|on lo&gon e!xon: man, the animal who has
logos126—we see how misleading that construal can be. In that construal man had
language as a capability. Instead, Heidegger defines the human being as the living entity
who holds oneself in the word.127 For Heidegger the human being dwells within the
word, he moves and lives in its house. Heidegger notes that we can interchange “word”
for “language,” provided we think the nature of language adequately and originally,
namely, from the essence of lo&goj correctly understood.128 The human person does not
have the capacity of language or speech merely, but language has within itself the means
to gather; the human person can use a word, but more properly a human being is born
into a language, immersed in it. Once with within language’s ability to gather meaning,
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While this formulation is attributed to Aristotle, the case needs to be clarified. In Politics 1253a 9-10
Aristotle writes: “Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who has the
gift of speech.” and similarly in 1332b 5: “Man has reason, in addition, and man alone.” See Aristotle,
Politics, trans B Jowett, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University, 1984).
While the translation is not false, some further details are needed to nuance fully the term,
“lo&goj.” Lo&goj means more than reason for Aristotle. W. K. C. Guthrie lists eleven common meanings
of lo&goj in the fifth-century Greek world: anything said, worth, account, proportion, reason or argument,
reason, speech, measure, general principle and definition are among them. See A History of Greek
Philosophy, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1962) 419-24. Of these possibilities, Aristotle, in
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etc., then the human person can use language to make assertion. Due to the above
gathering, then, humans can derive from language the ability to use language as assertion.
This route seeing language merely as a tool, this Aristotelian route of man having
language, draws away from Being. A new possibility is needed.
Rather than continue with the philosophical language of Plato and Aristotle,
Heidegger diverges from this first beginning and investigates language as poetry for the
possibility of its source leading toward Being. Or more accurately said, Heidegger
hereafter continues to intersperse philosophy of the first beginning with poetic
reflections. Since poetry refuses the jargon of philosophy, it seems the perfect arena to
avoid the traps of the first beginning.129
But Heidegger does not simply choose a poet simply for literary excellence.
Rather, Heidegger chooses Hölderlin as poet because Hölderlin’s mission was composing
poems solely about the essence of poetry. Without using philosophical jargon, Hölderlin
is already part of the conversation of what is question worthy, namely, Being. Essence,
source, ground are all terms which both worlds of philosophy and the poetry of Hölderlin
employ. Hence, Heidegger’s poetic divergence still holds the same goal as the first
beginning: Being.
“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry”130 is remarkable in its ability to knead the
conceptual framework of the philosophers and rework its language so that Being is
revealed in language. Heidegger deliberately italicizes the first title word of its
encompassing volume, Erläuterungen, for emphasis; its root, lautern, draws the reader,
129

But Heidegger comes to realize that poetry also has jargon of it own. See GA 12: 186/“The Nature of
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not to philosophical appearances, but to the sounds that poetry make readily heard. As
heard, these poetic sounds allow Being to appear.131 The shift from knowing-as-seeing to
knowing-as-hearing is quite deliberate. Philosophical thought is subordinated, so that a
new type of thinking can emerge.132
Heidegger takes five stanzas from Hölderlin’s poetry as encapsulating
Heidegger’s own intentional confrontation with philosophy.133 Poetry confronts
philosophy’s false clarity, which demands our obedient attention; playful, even innocent,
poetry invites, entices, and persuades us to come closer to Being. But poetry is not a
harmless game. Language grants the first possibility of standing in the openness of
beings.134 For this reason poetry can be dangerous, but with a harmless appearance.135
As we come closer to Being, we come to the awareness of the possibility of the Being of
beings. We come closer to the fact that the beings, which inflame our hearts, might
deceive us with illusions; as Heidegger pens: “Language first creates the manifest place
of this threat to being… .”136 Language makes manifest and yet conceals beings and
Being. As such it is a danger both to beings and to itself. Language is a tool, but not a
mere tool; rather, a tool in a more primordial sense, not a tool at man’s disposal, but it is
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“that primal event [Ereignis] which disposes of the highest possibility [die höchste
Möglichkeit des Menschseins verfügt] of man’s being.”137 Language is at the service
[verfügen] of the event, Ereignis, not as mere tool, but as unfolding “tool” of Ereignis.
How does language occur? The third set of verses discusses this question.
Language disposes as Ereignis in conversation [Gespräch]. While man’s being is
grounded in language, grounding occurs only in conversation.138 Language is essentially
conversation and poetry is essentially the essence of conversation. What usually is meant
by language—its words, grammar, and its expression—is only an effect, a manifest
aspect, of primordial language. Heidegger concludes: “Being able to talk and being able
to hear are co-original [Redenkönnen und Hörenkönnen sind gleich ursprünglich].”139
For Heidegger hearing and talking are a relation that is deeper than language as assertion.
Because they are relational in a primary sense, they can become be employed in
assertions afterwards.
Yet it is not we who have begun the conversation, but the gods, who give
conversation its foundation and significance, claims Heidegger. Heidegger’s discussion
seems to the philosophically minded to verge on the theological or mystical. Though we
might question Heidegger’s turn, as John Caputo does,140 let us simply confine our
reflections to the notion of conversation as event. Later we will address what Heidegger
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might mean by “gods,” when it bears full on the discussion of the “fourfold.” In
conversation, one or the other person does not make the conversation, so its significance
cannot come entirely by one or the other, or to the sum of the members. Instead, the
conversation’s significance lies between the parties. Whether we should quibble over
language as between or among members of a conversation is a topic for the next chapters.
At minimum one must agree that conversation can never be founded on a single
individual subject. Heidegger asks who is it that bears this conversation from the gods to
man? It is none other than the poet. The poet is the message bearer of significance and
foundation.
Finally, Heidegger enlarges the topic of a particular conversation into the realm of
human dwelling taken as a whole. Our dwelling is most human when it is poetically
grounded, when it is conversational. Thus poetry is not simply expression, but lies in the
domain of language and is the founding of being and the essence of all things; thus poetry
makes language possible, yet not as we usually understand language makes poetry
possible; poetry is the sustaining ground of history.141
Heidegger concludes that Hölderlin puts into poetry the very essence of poetry—
but not in the sense of a timeless valid concept [zeitlos gültigen Begriffes].142 This
essence of poetry belongs to a definite time, in a particular conversation. The poem
stands in the time of need143 [düftige Zeit] because it “stands in a double lack
[gedoppelten Mangel] and a double not [Nicht]: in the no-longer [Nichtmehr] of the gods
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who have fled and in the not-yet [Nochnicht] of the god who is coming.”144 The poem in
its essence stands between the no-longer and the not-yet. The language of the poem
opens up an ontological space in time, which seems suspended. The essence of the poem
is the interface of time and language and Being. Rather than defining this moment as an
instant, Heidegger highlights it through the double negative.
But more than a semantic turn of phrase, the double negative defines that which is
most effective in the poem’s essence as defined more by the tension of its negation, of
what it lacks, than by what it contains positively. In attempt to understand the double
lack, the poet uses a positive phrase, employs time, and employs a “world” to convey that
which is not. The positives attributes, speaking in terms of metaphysics, is the effect of
the double lack. The positive attributes of the moment and the things it contains are
historically due only to the “double lack.” Due to what they are not, makes them
historical.
But more than simply historical, the “double lack” makes the essence of poetry
primordially historical or historical in the highest degree. Heidegger explains: “The
essence of poetry which is founded by Hölderlin is historical in the highest degree
[geschichtlich im höchsten Maße], because it anticipates [vorausnimmt] a historical time
[geschichtliche Zeit].” Historical time is not a moment of history, but a moment of
significance. Heidegger, then, concludes that this opening of significance makes the
essence of the poem historical. To what extent can we say that the poem’s possibility
equals the essence of the poem? Neither the poem’s words, grammar, nor any part
which it contains, makes up its essence, but that which it does not contain, which evokes
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possibility that is indeed its essence.145 And the poet is the one who makes this “nothing”
possible. As Heidegger depicts the poet, as the one who: “… holds firm in the
Nothingness of this night [im Nichts dieser Nacht].”146 The poet embraces nothing,
bearing it to others.
Heidegger does see that Hölderlin’s poetry is that which best reveals his point:
that the relationship between language and Being is more intimate than first ventured.
Moreover, it seems that Hölderlin’s poetry is Heidegger’s counterexample to Plato’s
philosophy. Rather than participation in eternal forms to define life, Heidegger defines
that which is most historical in life by the essence of poetry as a double lack.

THE ORIGIN OF THE WORK OF ART
Having drawn the language of poetry to nothing, Heidegger now needs to break
open this intimate relationship of language and Being on the side of things. “The Origin
of the Work of Art”147 could be seen as Heidegger’s counterexample to Aristotle’s
substance, defined as en-formed matter. Aristotle’s simple substance is broken open in
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the work of art for Heidegger. In searching for the origin of art, might we also find in it
an allegory or path to the origin of beings?148
Heidegger asks: What is a work of art? It is a commonplace to hear that the work
of art is more than the existence of its material. But even interpreting this adage as
extreme idealism, we should still be able to gather what art is from the artwork. To do
that we must find the essence of art, which is not in the material of the work, but perhaps
it could be found in its connection to the artist or later with the art aficionado. So we see
that art is tied intricately to the artist and others. While we see that art is more than the
material and the work, paradoxically, too, we learn in “The Origin of the Work of Art”
that the artwork is the source of the artist’s life. This, the work of art, reveals not only the
Being in things, but also things in their Being.
Since the first beginning of philosophy we look to the “thingly” character of art as
though the thing were inert. Traditional interpretations distort both the “thing” and
“work.” For Heidegger, art arises, not as equipment as “thing” and “work,” but as a
“world,” which opens space for man and things. Art, too, is of the “earth,” that is to say
that some of the artwork is concealed as physical. Heidegger uses Van Gogh’s painting
of the peasant’s shoes in order to unknot the problematic of art. The shoes of the peasant
symbolize the mundane, the earthy, while the art as a whole uplifts the shoes into having
great significance to anyone who might meditate upon it. Art is both of the “earth” and
the “world.”
Artwork is of the “world.” As in Being and Time, world is defined as the
structural whole of significant relationships that Dasein experiences. “World” is already
148

Bernasconi notes that from the time of “The Origin of the Work of Art” Being and language is draw
closely together for Heidegger. Bernasconi writes: “Being is thought of in respect of its coming to
language.” Question of Language, 38.

56

familiar to Dasein in everyday human existence. And yet Dasein has always been codisclosed with the disclosure in all of humanity’s projects and possibilities. Albert
Hofstadter remarks on this multifaceted disclosure of art: “‘World’ names the essential
mystery of existence … the disclosedness of beings, [and] the openness of Being.”149 In
other words, the peasant’s shoes speak to us of a world of toil that beautifully speaks to
us in a way that is deeper than words and concepts.
Artwork is of the “earth.” “Earth” is strange to us, continues Hofstadter. It is that
which is void of Dasein. “Earth” is vibrantly not present to us as ready-to-hand. Rather,
it is present-at-hand. It protects or shelters, even nourishes without our notice. In
Hölderlin’s poetry we find references to “earth” in poetry. Hölderlin celebrates this
protection and nourishment of the “earth” by what it affords us. It freely offers. The dirt,
not noticed and not significant, is there nonetheless.
Artwork is both “world” and “earth.” Artwork is the creative strife [Streit] of
“world” and “earth;” more precisely, Heidegger writes: “The opposition of ‘world’ and
‘earth’ is strife.” 150 This strife, while sounding violent, is not violent; instead it reveals
beings and lets them come to radiant appearance in a dynamic fashion. The work
instigates this strife. Hofstadter concludes of art: “In all its work the language of art and
thought houses the splendors that come to light.”151 Lowly is its status among things, the
pair of shoes now is elevated to speak grandly, spanning “world” and “earth.” Heidegger
concludes: “Matter and form and the difference between them have a deeper origin.”152
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While the artwork is both of “world” and “earth,” the “world” and “earth” are not
to be conceived as form and matter, nor even concealment and unconconcealment, but
one of strife. For example, what art is should be given from what the work freely offers;
we should come to know the essence of art in the work. Yet in order to know the work of
art, we rely on the essence of art, which does not lie in the work. This dynamic process
brings together art’s essence and its work; it gathers as it holds separate—as strife. The
work as gathering-while-holding-separate is the reason that work of art can be seen as a
symbol [Symbol].153 Thus, for Heidegger the symbol as symbol is dependent on strife.
But we must ask: how far from Dasein should that gathering-while-holding-separate, this
strife, be construed? Construed too far, the symbol appears as if there were no
separateness; construed too closely and it appears as though “earth” and “world” are
completely separate.
To field this question of construal, Heidegger circles back to philosophy.
Heidegger holds that the “thingness” of the thing in Western philosophy can be seen in
three ways. The first way a thing appears is as a thing too-far from Dasein such that the
essence of the thing vanishes as separate from the thing. The Greeks called the
“thingness” with a vanished essence [to/ u9pokei/menon] of a thing with characteristics [ta/

sumbebhko/ta], which occur along with it. “Roman thinking takes over the Greek words
without the corresponding, equally original, experience of the Greeks,”154 insists
Heidegger. The Western interpretation of the Being of beings becomes stabilized in the
following terminology: “u9pokei/menon becomes subiectum; u9po/stasij becomes
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substantia; sumbebhko/s becomes accidens.”155 But this translation of Greek into Latin is
not without consequence. What once always came along [ta/ sumbebhko/ta], now is
seen as unimportant, accidental, disconnected from Dasein who keeps them [ta/

sumbebhko/ta], gathered together. The too-far thing’s essence vanishes because the
thing seems that it is all “world.” It looks akin to Kant’s unity of apperception, wherein
multiplicity of the manifold disappears.
The rootlessness of Western thought then continues in describing this “too-far
thing” in this fashion as it pertains to language. Language seems to take this unified
structure as indicative of what is true; sentence structure seems to follow the thingstructure. But does it? Heidegger cautions us:
We must ask: Is the structure of a simple propositional statement (the
combination of subject and predicate) the mirror image of the structure of
the thing (of the union of substance with accidents)? Or could it be that
even the structure of the thing as thus envisioned is a projection of the
framework of the sentence?156
At this point is still unclear how language can be both originary and derivative for
Heidegger. But what is clear to Heidegger is the realization that, in order for language
and things to relate in any way, they must have a mutual source. Heidegger argues:
“Both sentence- and thing-structure derive, in their typical form and their possible mutual
relationship, from a common and more originary source.”157 Heidegger calls this a toofar view of a thing. In this too-far version of a thing, language emerges as a structural
whole; all variations are but reflections of the one natural origin.158
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Another philosophical tradition takes a view in which, instead of the essence of
the thing vanishing, the thing itself vanishes because, as Heidegger holds, it is too-close.
The thing appears simply as the manifold given in the senses. But do we ever really first
perceive a throng of sensations, e.g. tones of sound waves and splotches of color in the
appearance of things—as this too-close thing-concept asserts? Rather, do we not hear the
car crashing, feel the wind brush against our skin, not isolated noises and sensations? “In
the too-close thing-concept there is not so much an assault upon the thing, but rather,”
Heidegger offers, “it is an inordinate attempt to bring it into the greatest possible
proximity to us.”159 Thus, the too-close thing vanishes because the thing appears as all
“earth,” all multiplicity without unity.
Language built upon this too-close conception of the thing-structure emerges as
simple building blocks, a multitude of infinite parts, which can be assembled and
reassembles in an infinite of ways. Any given assembly of blocks is new and interesting.
No one assembly is the correct variation. All assemblages are equally correct and
conventional. Rather than structured, language is mere expression.160
A third tradition, equally old as the two previous ones, holds sway. This is to say
it both remains and is stationary. This analysis of the thing as matter [u4lh] and form
[morfh/] is posited at the same time. What is constant in a thing, its consistency, lies in
the fact that matter stands together with a form. The thing is formed matter. This
interpretation of the thing invokes the immediate sight with which the thing concerns us
through its appearance [ei]doj] as the immediate view.161 Such a distinction is the basis
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for art and aesthetics, for it entails the possibility of an aesthetic appearance along with
the thing. But Heidegger is still concerned about the origin in this view: is it the thing or
its appearance which is primordial? Heidegger asks: “Where does the matter-form
schema have its origin; in the thingness of the thing or in the work-character of the
artwork?”162 He will finally come to the conclusion that they are co-originary.
What seems to be lacking here is Heidegger’s analysis of language arising from
this view. While it is clear that language would have characteristics both of the things
and the appearances, structure and expression, it too seems inadequate in that language
emerges as an effect of the thing-structure. Heidegger still needs to express a way that
describes thing-structure and sentence-structure as co-originary, but with a mutual
primordial source.163
So we see, all three models have presumptions and semblances. All three include
the thing, its traits, and the manifold of sensations. While the models seem very
scientific, reasonably philosophical, they don’t seem to fit with what the
phenomenological description has taught us in Being and Time. The models don’t square
with the equipment mode of the work of art. The equipment mode proffers an important
yet, up to this point, unseen clue towards the way of finding the thingly character of the
thing and the work-character of the work. In short, depending on the situated use of the
equipment, matter and form will differ. Van Gough’s painting is the disclosure of what
the pair of shoes is in truth. Being emerges from this disclosure, the unconcealment—

phenomenological school of thought. But rather than applying fully Husserl’s terminology of the
phenomenological approach, e.g., the eidetic reduction, Heidegger is thinking through and even beyond it.
This evidences Heidegger’s movement away from phenomenology toward thinking.
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a0lh/qeia. This is an occurring, a happening of truth at work.164 Truth occurs for
Heidegger in the happening of the work.
The work opens up a world and keeps it abidingly open in force as “world” and
“earth.” Each—“world” and “earth”—is essentially different one from another and yet is
never separated. The opposition of “world” and “earth” occurs as strife. In essential
strife, the opponents raise each other into the self-assertion of their essential natures.
Self-assertion of essence, however, is never a rigid insistence upon some contingent state,
“but rather a surrendering into the hidden originality of the source of one’s own
being.”165 The work accomplishes this by setting forth strife between “world” and
“earth.” In part, the essence of art is given as strife, in the form of a double refusal, the
no-longer and the not-yet. Refusal of “world” and refusal of “earth” emerge as work-instrife-as-art. Strife is what emerges as the beautiful in art. And thus Heidegger is able to
say of the work of art: “Beauty is one way in which truth as unconcealment comes to
presence.”166 Strife is also the source of beauty. Employing the vernacular, beauty isn’t
simply in the eye of the beholder.
But strife is not a rift [Riss] nor a crack, a tear, laceration, cleft between the
“world” and “earth;” rather, strife is the intimacy with which opponents belong to one
another … by their common ground.”167 Only when “world” and “earth” are noticed as a
thing does there appear a rift, but the rift appears as fixed in place like a rune etched in
granite. It is fixed in place within a “figure” [Gestalt].168 The figure is the structure of
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the rift in its self-establishment. The structured rift is the jointure [Fuge]169 of the shining
of truth. Heidegger writes: “What we call ‘figure’ is always to be thought out of that
particular placing [stellen] and placement [Ge-stell] as which the work comes to presence
when it sets itself up and sets itself forth.”170 Thus, art and poetry allow the advent of
truth to happen as strife between “world” and “earth.”171 Truth for Heidegger is not a
matter of correctness or adequation.
But such an advent of truth needs more than the artwork and Dasein. There is still
something else that happens.172 In the midst of beings as a whole an open place comes to
presence. There is a clearing. This clearing, thought from beings, is more in being than
is beings [Sie ist, vom Seienden her gedacht, seiender als das Seiende.]173 This open
center is, therefore, not surrounded by beings. Rather, “this illuminating center itself
encircles beings—like the nothing that we scarcely know,” writes Heidegger in a rare
flourish.174
How shall we find Being in this clearing? Neither philosophy nor poetry alone
seems to be able reach Being. Phenomenology can go only as far as Dasein can reach.
But Being in these modes seems to lie too far beyond, or too near immanently, or merely
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of Dasein’s world. Have we come to another impasse? Heidegger is persistent in
looking for Being. And so he circles once again, around Being.
Heidegger holds that the essence of all art is poetry and that poetry is language, so
instead looking a Dasein or the thing, we look to language. But language is usually
understood as a kind of conversation.175 As Heidegger argued earlier in “Hölderlin and
the Essence of Poetry,” language includes hearing and speaking. “But language is neither
merely nor primarily the aural and written expression of what needs to be
communicated,” Heidegger asserts.176 Relaying meanings is part of what language does,
but that is not what language is in its originary essence. Instead, language brings beings
as beings, for the first time, into the open.177 To express this in a negative formulation, if
language were not present in its originary sense, there would be no openness, and neither
ordinary language nor its meaning could ever be possible.
Thus, language is the bearer of beings into the open. Heidegger describes this
bearer of beings in the open: language “nominates beings to [zu] their being and from out
of [aus] that being. Such saying is a projection of the clearing in which announcement is
made as to what beings will come into the open as.”178 As a projection, language is that
which stands out as from Being. Moreover, projective saying as poetry is the saying of
“world” and “earth” as strife. In conveying strife, language itself is poetry in its essential
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sense. The reader it to assume that art is a form of poetry; thus, language is in art in its
essential sense.
Language, though, is not simply the projecting out of the clearing, not simply
arising out from Being, language permeates the very strife of things. We saw earlier that
in the essence of poetry, poetry happens in language only because it preserves the
primordial strife. Like creatively composing poetry, the prose in language occurs in the
open of saying, which permeates and guides it. Poetizing within the clearing of beings
has already happened, unnoticed, in a deeper mode of language.179
In this way art too can be poetry. It is not only the creation of the work that is
poetic. This is indeed the case; equally poetic is our continual engagement with the art.
Both artist and devotee are poetic in their involvement with art. Artwork as such is
artwork only when this creative poeticizing occurs; it works to bring our Being to take a
stand within the truth of beings. For Heidegger’s “Origin of the Work of Art,” art and
language both have poetry as their essence.180
The essence of poetry is the founding [Stiftung] of truth as the strife between
“world” and “earth.” But this founding is not a firm foundation; it is a founding as
holding sway. Heidegger elaborates: “‘Founding’ is understood, here, in a threefold
sense: as bestowing, as grounding, and as beginning.”181 Hence, the founding of truth
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grounds as a beginning that bestows the open.182 Rather than trying to explicate this any
further, we shall allow it to remain in its dense formulation, until later works, wherein
Heidegger is able to unfold language more clearly. For our purposes we need only to
appreciate the fact that philosophy and art, thought and aesthetics,183 are not distinct for
Heidegger, but rather have a common root.

THE WILL TO POWER AS ART
What is this common root for philosophy and art for Heidegger during this
period? Are they simply sounding boards from which to work, mere circling criticisms:
philosophy criticizing poetry and poetry criticizing philosophy? Heidegger gives us a
clue in “The Will to Power as Art.” Philosophy and art are both effects of the will to
power. Both establish the “uppermost value [der oberste Wert] in terms of which and
according to which all beings are to be.”184 Rather than unchanging forms, both truth and
art are historically grounded; they are grounded as the uppermost value of their respective
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arenas. This uppermost value is always criticized and replaced with new or better highest
value.
Heidegger follows Nietzsche in that the former also sees that any critique of
highest values shows the doubtful origins of the values from the outset. Nihilism is
rooted in this dynamic relation. In fact, Heidegger, quoting Niezsche, insists, “Nihilism
means that the uppermost values devalue themselves.”185 Nietzsche’s manner of thinking
is one of perpetual reversal, every value is eventually overturned ad infinitum. For
example, while Schopenhauer interprets art as a “sedative for life,” Nietzsche claims art
is a stimulant of life; on the question whether truth is changeless, Nietzsche claims that
truth is a kind of error.186 Both art and truth are set as highest values and as such each
value will be soon overturned by, and for the next highest value.
In the case of truth, truth is more so the faculty of thinking than it is a corresponce
to what would be called reality; the essence of a faculty is, Heidegger postulates,
“grounded in the essence of will as power [Willen als Macht]; and “will is taken to be a
kind of cause [Ursache].187 The intellect can be said to have the faculties of reasoning
and willing. While a faculty can be known as a power, and usually is so known—
Heidegger’s Nietzsche sees will as power and power as will.188 For Nietzsche the
characteristics of the will are of passion and affect, the irrational. Thus, Nietzsche’s truth
is founded on the irrational. Heidegger transforms this notion of irrational truth vis-à-vis
rational truth into the dynamic truth as holding sway, flexible notion of truth.
185
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Likewise, “holding sway” is the basic mode of Dasein, where man confronts the
“Da” in the openness and concealment of beings. Passions for Heidegger never have to
do with mere desire, but are always connected to a world of Dasein, beyond Dasein.
Startlingly, Heidegger comes to the claim that “[S]elf-assertion is original assertion of
essence/Selbst-behauptung ist ursprüngliche Wesensbehauptung.”189 Any discussion of
self-expression, e.g., the essence of language, poetry or art, is a discussion arising from
the will. As such, it too will be overturned.
More germane to our topic, meditation on art is a matter of illuminating the Being
of beings in language. Heidegger asserts that art is the basic occurrence of all beings
[Grundgeschehen alles Seienden]; to the extent that they are, beings are self-creating,
created [das Seinde ist, sofern es ist, ein Sichschaffendes, Geschaffenes].190 While
seemingly contradictory, Heidegger’s statement lies at the heart of what he means by
Dasein: Dasein is created and self-creating; created in time, and self-creating through the
course of life.
Self-creating emerges as a will to power. Likewise, the will to power becomes
visible in terms of art. Art in its creativity is the countermovement to nihilism. As such,
Heidegger reflects on Neitzsche’s claim that art is worth more than “truth.”191 For as a
countermovement to nihilism, we see how art for Heidegger is a configuration [Gestalt]
of the will to power; art is another outcome of the will to power.
In order to illustrate this point that art is a configuration of the will to power
Heidegger traces the development of the history of aesthetics and returns to philosophy.
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For the ancient Greeks art and knowledge coincided. But as soon as matter as fu&sij was
described as u#lh-morfh&, knowledge and all practical arts were separated: truth and logic
were separated from ethics, te&xnh, and aesthetics. In the modern age the split became so
radical that knowledge was purified to reason and aesthetics dropped to a level of mere
feelings. At the height of the Enlightenment era when aesthetics received, as Heidegger
notes, its highest rigor of form, great art comes to an end. Heidegger explains the
situation in these somewhat broad terms: Kant described aesthetics as disinterested
delight and Hegel sublimated it into the absolute, and yet with no commensurate
examples of art. Thus, Hegel asserted that art has lost its power as the preserver of the
absolute. Heidegger would agree with Hegel to the extent that art does lose its power, but
it does so because in the Enlightenment period aesthetics is filtered out of the knowledge
process.
Nietzsche later sees art as the countermovement to Hegel’s grounding man’s
historical existence upon beings as a whole.192 Thus, one could say that not only great art
comes to an end with enlightenment, but so too the fabric of Enlightenment’s valuation is
now seen for what it truly is, constructed values. That which is constructed can also be
deconstructed. As truth declines in its effectiveness, art emerges as the most effective
source of power. As Heidegger poignantly pens, “Art is the supreme configuration
[Gestalt] of power.”193
Constructed values of the Enlightenment are exploded by Nietzsche’s conception
of art as rapture [Rausch]. But Heidegger notes that Nietzsche’s rupture itself is
noteworthy. For rupture alone would be simply to invert one system of valuation with
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another: the Enlightenment for the Romantic period. And for Heidegger, this is simply
replacing one system of metaphysics with another. Rather than replacing one system for
another, Heidegger places then in tandem. For Heidegger breaking through and elevating
Kant’s disinterested beauty as rapture becomes the basic mood akin to Niezsche’s view,
while Kant’s disinterested beauty does the attuning, writes Heidegger.194 Placing rapture
and sublime beauty together, Heidegger explodes the subjectivity of the subject and the
objectivity of the object; the Dionysian reverie undoes the Apollinian structure of
individuation; the Apollinian form and principle of limit undoes the Dionysian matter and
principle of the unlimited.195 Heidegger also ends the replacement of one value system
for another, e.g., the classic for the romantic, and opens up the event of nihilism as the
constant cycle of their mutual replacement. Aesthetics as the will to power, then for
Heidegger, is opened up as ongoing discord with truth.
Indeed this raging discordance between truth and art is exactly what Heidegger
seems to have been preoccupied within this period of thinking of Being. Philosophy
structures experience; poetry as the essence of all art breaks open that structure. The
circling seemed to define and redefine each vis-à-vis the other,196 yet never reaching
Being. And still, new light has shone in the end of this dialectical process: nihilism.
Metaphysics, the search for truth, and the creativity of art end in the devaluation of all
values and nihilism results, but not as an end which ultimately overcomes and destroys
them, but overcoming in the sense that it never ends and leads to nihilism. Nihilism,
194

GA 6.1: 125/“The Will to Power as Art,” Nietzsche I: 123.
These are Nietzschean terms arising from The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of Music/Die Geburt
der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik, 1872.
196
Bernasconi understands the dialogue between poetry and thought leads to the thinking of Being, as we
argue. Employing “Anaximander’s Saying” 19, Bernasconi makes the claim that all poetry is thinking and
thinking is poetry in both narrow and broad senses, that both exist in metaphysics. We must find, he
argues, a language for thinking that is not bound by metaphysics. We shall agree, barring “thinking;” our
quest is a language that is related to Being. See Bernasconi, Question of Language 46.
195

70

while nothing, sheds light on Being as no-thing. Neither truth nor art, but nihilism,
shows Being.
While Heidegger discusses this issue from the perspective of the consequences to
metaphysics,197 let us redirect the effects of nihilism onto language and Being. For
language—this oscillation of truth and art, this resonance—illustrates that language is no
mere sequence of communicative signs, and therefore, no mere correspondence of truth
to the thing, as would the correspondence theory of truth have us to believe. To this
point, Heidegger demonstrably writes:
… language as resonant [lautendes] signification roots us to earth and
transports us to our earth and roots us to our world, meditation on
language and its historical domination is always the action that gives
shape to Dasein itself. The will to originality, rigor, and measure in words
is therefore no mere pleasantry; it is the work that goes on in the essential
nucleus of Dasein, which is historical existence [als eine
geschichtlichen].198
Rather than correspondence, language resonates between “world” and “earth” just as the
thing is the holding sway of the strife between “world” and “earth.” It is precisely into
this resonating relation between truth and art that Heidegger places language. Heidegger
holds that language is that “relation [Verhältnis] between art and truth [as] a discordance
that arouses dread.”199 For Heidegger the main insight which Nietzsche offers us is the
connectivity of truth and art, of essence and that which veers away from essence.
Nietzsche’s insight dislodges the notion that Being is opposed to Becoming. The
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connectivity, which is discordance,200 draws us closer to Being and language looks closer
to primordial relation.
This discord, this dread, draws us closer to Being. It draws us toward the silent
resonation of nothingness. One might conceive of this silence simply as a lack of
language, but for Heidegger this silence is indeed language’s deeper reality.201 The
destruction of metaphysics and aesthetics leads us to nihilism. While philosophy and art
see nihilism as cul-de-sac, Heidegger sees new possibilities of a deeper relation. As the
double negation of the thing [it is no longer and not yet] proffered meaning to the thing,
now nihilism too can proffer meaning to Being and language. Or better said, the silence
and dread of Being draws us closer and appropriates us. Heidegger explicates that
nihilism is not vacuous, but it is a reordering of the structure [Ordnungschema
verwandeln].202 Could it be that nihilism is a reordering of us, appropriating us from Dasein, Being-there into silence and concealing the “Da,” the “there,” so that we are drawn
toward Being? And in being drawn toward Being, we hear Being as silence.
Now that we have gathered together all the Heideggerian moments of Being and
language—Western philosophy, poetry, the thing, the work of art, truth, strife, the event
and nihilism—we are left with the question: have we come closer to Being and, more
importantly, to Being and language in this circling mode of destructive retrieval, drawing
us closer to silence? Or are we still left with a type of humanism?
In 1947 Heidegger responds to a letter by Jean Beaufret, who asked Heidegger
certain questions regarding Sartre’s “Existentialism is a Humanism,” dated 1946, wherein
200
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Beaufret describes both Sartre and Heidegger as atheistic203 existentialists. Heidegger
demurs, by showing the inadequacies of humanism. Heidegger answers that we must
find a new route that is not humanistic, not of our own design.
The design that we employed thus far describes language as a tool devised and
employed by us to discover Being. But Being, insists Heidegger, offers itself to thought,
which comes to us via language. Language houses Being.204 The house of language in
which we dwell, houses Being as well. And yet Being offers itself and comes to
language. Man can use language like a tool in the house, but language itself houses
Being and man dwells in the house. To solve this conundrum we cannot look to Dasein
alone, but to Being.
But if Being is heard as silence, then how could Heidegger ever hear it himself or
convey such a pathway to us? Certainly the standard means of explicating a text with
ordinary words would not convey silence. Conveying silence by the use of words seems
an impossible task. Yet silence and nothing aren’t empty concepts or sets for Heidegger;
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Beaufret comments here are slightly misleading. Neither atheism nor theism is sufficient in Heidegger’s
works; both are outcomes of the inadequacies of metaphysics.
204
GA 9: 145/“Letter on Humanism,” Pathmarks 240. Heidegger writes provocatively on language in
“Letter on Humanism,” Being offers itself to thought: “Such offering consists in the fact that in thinking
being comes to language. Language is the house of being. In its home human beings dwell. Those who
think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home. Their guardianship accomplishes
the manifestation of being insofar as they bring this manifestation to language and preserve it in language
through their saying.” And at the end of the letter Heidegger furthers this point: “With its saying, thinking
lays inconspicuous furrows in language. They are still more inconspicuous than the furrows that the
farmer, slow of step, draws through the field.” GA 9: 364/“Letter on Humanism,” Pathmarks 276.
But in the same letter Heidegger wavers regarding language’s derivation from thought. He writes
“In its essence, language is not the utterance of an organism; nor is it the expression of a living thing. Nor
can it ever be thought in an essentially correct way in terms of its symbolic character of signification.
Language is the clearing-concealing advent of being itself.” GA 9: 326/“Letter on Humanism,” Pathmarks
248-249.” He continues: “The usage “bring to language” employed here is now to be taken quite literally.
Being comes, clearing itself, to language.” GA 9: 192/“Letter on Humanism,” Pathmarks 274. A new
relationship between Being and language requires a new type of thinking beyond thinking as mediation
between language and Being as those offered remarks late in the letter.
Frank A. Capuzzi translates Being as “being” throughout “Letter on Humanism.” I retain his
lower-case configuration solely to maintain his phrase exactly as Capuzzi has written it. The character and
tone of the letter reveals Heidegger’s meaning of “Sein” to be consistent with his other works.
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and to draw out any positive account of Being leads falsely down the path to will to
power and the necessary outcome of all Western philosophical engagement and results in
nihilism as absurdity. To explore silence and its relation to language and Dasein and
secondly, to express how intimate indeed is this relation, we now turn down another
pathway, to nothing, or perhaps better said, to the nameless; we now turn our attention to
the last chapter, or as Heidegger calls it, the last Fuge in the Beiträge,205 entitled
“Seyn.”206

BEITRÄGE
Rather than explicate the Beiträge in all eight of its variations on a theme of
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Rather than exoteric, the Beiträge is esoteric; that is to say, Heidegger postponed its publication until
after his death, keeping it for a small circle of confidents. It is well known that Otto Pöggeler was
privileged an early copy. Less known is the fact that pre-publication typescripts were available among
some Heidegger students. Current debate still centers on the question why it was that Heidegger kept them
from the public: whether they were kept private to avoid the suspicious eye of the Nationalsozialistische
Deutsche Arbeitpartie and editorial conscription or whether their safekeeping indicated their stature as
unfinished or indicated their inability to be read, understood or appreciated in philosophical circles.
Although the Beiträge was kept from general readership, it was still touted as Heidegger’s second
major work for forty years both in German and English circles and long before its official German
publication as Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) in 1989 by Klostermann, GA 65 and its English
debut in December of 1999 as Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and
Kenneth Maly (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1999) or forthcoming publication by Richard
Rojcewicz, Contributions to Philosophy (On the Event) 2009. See Babette E. Babich, Words in Blood, Like
Flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music and Eros in Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger (New York, NY:
State University of New York, 2006) 334.
206
While the previous works or ways entailed a detailed description of the development of Heidegger’s
thought—they were explications of Heidegger’s own process of thinking—the Beiträge is not of the same
genre. Rather than a path of thinking, it is like a performance of Being in eight fugues [Fuge]. Each fugue,
as the musical metaphor implies, reprises the same theme in a different mood to draw out all implications.
Moreover, the eight chapters are suggestive of a musical octave. As a performance the Beiträge moves
with Being rather than representing Being in an oppositional fashion. Perhaps now it is clear to the reader
why indeed the thought of Being now falls silent, giving way to Being as Saying. Beiträge is the
performance of that transformation, while western philosophy is its representation.
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Being, like fugal settings, we will focus on the center207 of its concern: Being. Each fugal
setting attempts to say the same thing, “to grasp the whole once again.”208 While
focusing on Being, we shall see language’s deep abiding relationship, not as a tool, but as
the way of Being as Saying.
In addition to the familiar dialogue issues of Western philosophy and poetry,
explicated in the sections above, Heidegger soon includes a third thematic issue of
technology. When technology occurs in a mode of outstripping Dasein as “machination”
[Machenschaft] and “enframing,” Being is manifested in a way not yet explored.
Already technology has appeared sporadically in this mode in various works and will
continue to appear sporadically.209 Yet “enframing” [Ge-stell] now becomes crucial to
Heidegger’s articulation of how Being manifests itself. “Enframing” is the historical
mode of revealing truth that characterizes this epoch in terms of imperatives and control.
This third theme might include what is known as te&xnh or technology, but “machination”
for Heidegger entails more. “Machination” could be seen as the final effects of will to

207
The word “center” is chosen precisely. Being-as-saying is our central question, located between the
ontic and ontological; historical Being is not a thing among other things, but the center of all inquiry as that
which makes possible all things. While originally the text held this section nearer to the center, FriedrichWilhelm von Hermann set “Das Seyn” as the concluding chapter. He took as his directive the note which
Heidegger, dated 8 May 1939, placed within the first typescript of the “Table of Contents.” The note read:
‘‘‘Seyn’ as Section II [Part II] is not correctly arranged; as an attempt [»…als Versuch] to grasp the whole
once again [das Ganze noch einmal zu fassen], it does not belong at this juncture [gehört er nicht an diese
Stelle.«].” See GA 65: 514/Contributions 365. Also see Babbette Babich, Words in Blood, Like Flowers
for an interesting account of these proceedings.
208
This eighth chapter draws interesting correlations with Descartes’ Rule 8 in the Regulae, wherein
repetition of the previous methodology draws the reader’s mind to be consistent with the matter studied.
This similarity, however, is restricted for Heidegger “Seyn” isn’t simply a repetition, but an attempt to
grasp the whole once again. As such it is not conforming the mind to set matter, but allowing Being to
emerge between.
209
Heidegger wavers in various works whether “enframing” is partial or total.
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power. In its extreme, the will to power built an edifice that precariously teeters under its
own weight. While dangerous, it too reveals. It reveals Beyng [Seyn].210
“Beyng” [Seyn] is the focus of the Contributions [Beiträge].211 While the chapter
on beyng is not a summary or linear logical conclusion of the book, it certainly is its
primary focus with the question of how beyng reveals itself. Earlier we called the
Contributions an esoteric work, which is to say that Heidegger meant the work to remain
outside of the public eye, but more importantly, the Contributions is unusual in its prose
and notoriously difficult to interpret because it is written not as a piece of metaphysical
exposition, but as an enactment of beyng revealing itself.212 The words of the book and
its structure are meant as a way of attuning the reader so that beyng may reveal itself.
Language in the Contributions, then, is the means by which we clear the way so that
beyng may reveal itself. The chapter begins with this line; “Here lie the boulders of a
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Heidegger in the Beiträge reformulates the familiar Sein with the eighteenth-century orthographic, Seyn.
Emad and Maly translate it in the Contributions as be-ing, so as to mark the distinction. Emad and Maly
attribute the shift to the fact that Heidegger means that Being [Sein] demarcates the metaphysically grasped
concept while be-ing [Seyn] indicates the way of historical thinking. William Lovitt in his translation of
“The Turning” likewise uses the term “be-ing.” This latter case is complex and shall be discussed in the
next chapter. “Beyng” has been quite reasonably suggested by Richard Rojcewicz as the term indicating
“Seyn;” we follow his suggestions with the exception of its capitalization, since it is never confused with
any other attributions heretoforth. Still, any translation choice for the word is at best arbitrary. I prefer
Rojcewicz’ distinction, yet avoid its capitalization, since that conveys remnants of the “highest Being” of
philosophical metaphysics. Hereafter, we shall now employ “beyng,” whenever Heidegger uses “Seyn.”
211
GA 65: 511/Contributions 363. In deafeningly clear prose that only an editor could appreciate,
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, writes what he sees as the purpose of the Beiträge in his “Editor’s
Epilogue”: “Following the first, fundamental-ontological [fundamentalontologischen] onset of the question
of being in Being and Time, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)is the first, encompassing
attempt [»der erste umfassende Versuch«] at a second [zweiten], being-historical [seinsgeschichtlichen],
i.e., ‘more originary’ [»ursprünglicheren«] onset [Ansetzung] and elaboration [Ausarbeitung] of the same
question [derselbe Frage], in which the meaning of being—as the truth and essential sway [als der
Wahrheit und dem Wesen], i.e., essential holding sway of beyng [Der Wesung des Seyns]—is inquired into
and this essential holding sway is thought as enowning [Ereignis].” I am in agreement that the Beiträge has
the same goal as did Being and Time: Seinsgeschichte; but I will refrain from defining Ereignis solely by
the terms of truth and thought, for that reasserts Ereignis as the thought of Being. Rather, Ereignis’ domain
lies beyond what the thought of Being could possibly indicate.
212
The editors of the Contributions explain: “The cohesive, systematic, and closely interrelated ‘joinings’
of Heidegger’s ‘being-historical thinking’—which comes ‘alive’ only in enactment-presents the translation
process with the possibility of rethinking, revising, and eventually combining … words in a new way.”
Contributions xviii.
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quarry, in which primal rock is broken ….”213 The boulders are those pieces, which we
have illustrated in the section above as circling between Western philosophy and poetry.
Such a circling or blasting of ordinary ways of thinking of Being, meditative
thinking of Being allows beyng to rise as the “between” [Zwischen], a self-clearing
essential holding sway in which gods and man recognize each other and that they belong
together.214 Beyng is neither the ontic nor the ontological understanding of Being in
Being and Time. It is not unlike the ontological difference. The “between,” however,
broadens the situation beyond the purview of Da-sein.215 The “ontological difference”
has the “quality” of a passage, from the end of metaphysics to the “other beginning;”216 it
is the “basic structure” of Da-sein.217 The effects of the “between” mean abandoning
traditional metaphysical conceptions. Such abandonment stirs a distress [Not] that
attunes the listener to deeper distress [Er-schrecken] of the revealing of beyng. Words
can never suffice to describe or explain this revealing of beyng. Indeed, it is heard as
silence.218 What flows from it, its philosophy—we can call its beyng-historical
thinking—is of the thinking of the other beginning as opposed to Western philosophy.219
Let us explore in depth how beyng-historical thinking appears.
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GA 65: 421/Contributions 297.
This topic of identity as relation is fully explored in Identität und Differenz (1955-57). GA 11/Identity
and Difference.
215
Like the new formulation of Seyn, Heidegger now hyphenates Da-sein in order to indicate a more
originary connection between being and its need of Da-sein to reveal itself. Here too we shall adopt this
new variation.
216
Heidegger never clarified this phrase. While it is clear that the first beginning is that of Western
philosophy, the “other beginning” mostly likely, from my view, is the abandonment of of Being. Between
the two beginnings is the “ontological region” he wishes to explore.
217
GA 65: 469/Contributions 330.
218
To this point Heidegger writes most poignantly: “Only the chill of the boldness of thinking and the night
of errancy of questioning lend glow and light to the fire of beyng.” GA 65: 430/Contributions 303.
219
This is not to indicate that the other beginning is the philosophy of Eastern traditions, for they too are
part of the first beginning. More importantly, beyng-historical thinking is outside traditional Western
definitions of history or Being.
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Beyng-historical thinking does not simply reverse traditional metaphysics, but is a
“de-cision [Ent-scheidung] as projecting-opening [Entwurf],”220 which includes the
reversal of the first beginning. “De-cision” refers to the ongoing strife between “world”
and “earth.” “De-cision” is not the actual cleft [Riss] between the “world” and “earth;”
rather, it emerges from or out of [Ent-] the cleft.221 “De-cision” is the intimacy with
which opponents belong to one another by their common ground. With silence,
projecting-opening is another “characteristic” of beyng. It might be said from traditional
metaphysical terminology, that silence is Being qua being and projecting-opening is
being qua beings, but that would draw us away from beyng. What draws us toward
beyng is the attunement of distress.
Distress [Not] is heard through the totalizing effects of machination, more
precisely called the gigantic [Das Reisenhafte]. Not primarily a magnitude, the gigantic
is the unconditioned domination of representing and producing; the gigantic is the denial
of the truth of beyng in favor of “what belongs to reason” [»Vernünftigen«].222 The
gigantic is neither in control of itself nor is it aware of itself. But its appearance in an
epoch leads Da-sein to distress because Da-sein is losing its false understanding that it
[Dasein] is the center of all meaning and is the master of language.
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Interestingly yet unpersuasively, Parvis Emad holds that Ereignis, this enacting thinking of being as
projecting-opening, is a change in Heidegger’s thinking. We agree with this line of reasoning in the
introductory chapter and cited Richardson’s Preface to Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought.
He continues to equate Heidegger’s change [Wendung] in thinking with “Turning,” by declaring it to be the
turning, [Kehre]. Here we must respectfully differ, citing our earlier careful reading of Heidegger’s
response to Richardson. Thus, we conclude that the “Turning” is historical thinking, given as being’s
history, Seinsgeschichte. See Parvis Emad, “On Be-ing”: The Last Part of Contributions to Philosophy
(From Enowning)” Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, eds. Charles E. Scott, Susan
M. Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu and Alejandro Vallega, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
Uninversity,2001) 230-237.
221
In Heidegger’s terminology, from “de-” the cleft “-cision” between the “world” and “earth” emerges
“de-cision”[Ent-scheidung]. His hyphenation conveys that while emerging out of the strife between
“earth” and “world,” “de-cision” is never separated from the strife.
222
GA 65: 442/Contributions 311.
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This “de-centering” of Da-sein, as I coin the term, is that effect that appears to
Da-sein, as occurring outside of Da-sein’s control. For this reason initial distress [Not] is
felt due its disenfranchisement. But in this initial distress, the deeper distress of beyng’s
refusal as abandonment of beyng [Seinsverlassenheit] is revealed as horror or startled
dismay [Er-schrecken]. Da-sein is shocked in two ways223; first, Da-sein is not the center
of its “world;” secondly, Da-sein can never attain beyng. In the abandonment of beyng,
Da-sein is thrown “between” the “world” and beyng. The effect upon Da-sein is one of
deep distress. The major explication for Heidegger is that Dasein can never attain purely
Being’s domain.
Da-sein is “thrown;” Da-sein is “thrown” free from a being toward beyng.224
While a person first becomes a subject by throwing himself free of “a being” and had
returned to himself, here Heidegger indicates a “thrownness” [Gewörfenheit] that is quite
out of the person’s control and without return. This free-throw occurs in an originary
fashion. And it will always lack a return in this originary sense. For the return
[Rückkehr], while seemingly is a way to know itself, it actually is a forgetting of knowing
of itself. The return is always a concealing, never a revealing.
Da-sein’s lack of ability to return is due to the inability to hold onto any “ground”
of the free-throw.225 Heidegger calls this lack of ground, “Ab-grund.”226 By staying
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Indeed one could draw similar attention to Kant’s shock at the discovery of the antinomy.
GA 65: 452/Contributions 318.
225
The double negation in this sentence is purposeful; we are defined by what we are not in a twofold
sense. We are defined by our inability to return to ourselves entirely and we are defined by the inability to
find a ground while we are “at sea.”
226
The editors of Contributions discuss in the “Translators’ Foreword” their decision to leave Ab-grund
untranslated for the most part as “Ab-ground.” Like the German word “Ereignis,” we shall not translate
“Ab-grund. The words “abyss” or “non-ground” do not reflect properly that Ab-grund is a ground that
prevails while staying away. Contributions xxxi. Heidegger writes in Sections 242 that Ab-grund indeed is
a staying-away. Within its meaning is included the context of space-time and the interesting topic of
224
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away, holding sway beyng is a foundation to Da-sein as a lack. Da-sein hears this lack as
silence and distress is its attunement. Lastly, this free-throw is the source of Da-sein’s
possibility in Ereignis.227 “Beyng is Er-eignis” [Das Seyn ist das Er-eignis], Heidegger
writes unequivocally. Er-eignis “names beyng in thinking and grounds beyng’s essential
holding sway [seine Wesung] in its own jointure [eigenes Gefüge]….”228 Thus beyng
allows itself to be manifested as Ereignis.
In section 267 Heidegger outlines succinctly—in rare fashion—the eight facets of
Ereignis in its occurring.229 As Daniela Vallega-Neu cautions her readers, these are not
separate en-ownings or occurrences,230 but more so different aspects of one occurrence—
the essential holding sway of beyng as Ereignis. Each aspect thinks the occurrence of
beyng entirely while highlighting a particular aspect of manifested beyng. Together all
aspects are a way of thinking the whole once again. What is effective in this procedural
performance is the relatedness of each aspect with the others in their circularity
referentiality, wherein the last aspect is related to the first. Also effective is the way
Heidegger describes manifest beyng as it relates to beings in an unfolding way while
remaining beyng. Analogously said, this octet is a dilated view of beyng which is
“before” time; or perhaps better phrased, it is the condition for the possibility of time.
“Place.” While quite interesting these do not bear directly to our topic. See GA 65: 372-388/Contributions
259-271.
227
While Emad and Maly translates Ereignis as en-owning, I will retain the German, since I hold that
neither “en-owning” is helpful for English readers nor does “happening” or “event” capture Heidegger’s
full intent. See Der Satz vom Grund (1957) GA 10 62/The Ground of Reason 91. Also see Zur Sache des
Denkens (1962) GA 14: 20/On Time and Being 25-26. Heidegger indicates in both of these later works that
“happening” and “event” are inadequate in their meaning, for they retain notions of space and time.
Conversely, Ereignis is the possibility for space and time.
228
GA 65: 470/Contributions 330.
229
Not coincidental, the eight ways correspond to the eight fugues. While all say the same, beyng, each
draws out a differing focal point. Although the current fugue recounts the previous seven, it is not simply a
recap, for it draws out beyng’s uniqueness.
230
Vallega-Neu follows the terminology of Emad and Maly’s Contributions. See Daniela Vallega-Neu,
Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction (Bloomington, IN: Indian University, 2003)
107.
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First,231 beyng is an overall process, more precisely an Er-eignung. The gods232
need beyng and in order for them to be manifested, beyng needs Da-sein to assist. Beyng
needs Da-sein in order for Da-sein to near the ground that holds to the abground, for out
of this relation the gods and Da-sein are gathered. In cruder terms, beyng gathers Da-sein
to listen to beyng so that the gods may have beyng; Da-sein is drawn “in” the “between”
of this gathering process. Beyng gathers.
Second, the Ereignis of the Er-eignung, the event of the overall process, gathers
within it the de-cision [Ent-scheidung]. The de-cision causes distress, which emerges
from the ground of the abground, experienced as the strife between “world” and “earth,”
and allows gods and man to come forth into partedness.233 In other words, the Ereignis
gathers and holds together gods and man coming forth as “separate;” yet this gatheringwhile-separate is the cause of distress. Beyng separates and gathers.
Third, as gods and man are brought forth into partedness, the Ereignis as decision draws them out as countering [Ent-gegnung] each other. As separate-whilegathered, this positioning of gods countering man becomes the bridge over the
needfulness of beyng’s abgrund. One could say that the holding sway of beyng maintains
its hold of the sway through this countering bridge of man to gods. Man and gods span
the tension between gathering and separating.
231

As it will soon become readily apparent to the reader, the eight aspects are densely compact and nearly
impossible to comprehend. The reader might find helpful the concluding image of each paragraph, which
certainly belies the attempt to illustrate Ereignis without representational thinking. But this concession
seems only fair to the reader.
232
Many have wondered what Heidegger might mean by the gods. Much of his latter works makes much
of the gods or divinities as one of the fourfold. Until those latter works are explored, we cannot articulate
here its full meaning. It must suffice for the moment to say that gods in the Beiträge are not Heidegger’s
preference for polytheism over monotheism; instead, the gods are those that need beyng and those that need
Da-sein to assist in their being.
233
All eight aspects of Ereignis are contained within the space of roughly one page. They should recall for
the reader the eight fugues, all within an instant, and yet before time—and how that truly is impossible for
the mind to grasp, since it is that which occurs before concepts and minds. GA 65: 470-471/Contributions
331-332.
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Fourth, the countering of the gods and man is the source of the perceived strife
between “world” and “earth.” The more the needfulness of the de-cision, the greater the
countering must be. Beings are set free of their mere beyngness. Setting-free [Entsetzung] distinguishes beyng from beings. Beings are set free from their lostness in mere
beingness [Vorlorenheit in die bloße Seiendheit] into the non-ordinariness
[Ungewöhnlichkeit] of their being. This occurrence is the attunement of startled dismay,
the originary silence; the secondary and related attunement of distress [Not] is Da-sein’s
experience in the domination of machination234 and the gigantic. Startled dismay shows
itself as a difference between beyng and beings. This difference is not one of two
entities, but rather as an occurrence, occurring in the essential sway of beyng. Man,
distressed by the tension, recognizes he exists in tension—and sets free things.
Fifth, this setting-free is both the withdrawal [Ent-zug] in the domination of
machination and the holding sway of beyng as refusal [als Verweigerung west]. The
setting-free is grasped out of the clearing of the there [Da]. The withdrawal from
machination is secondary to the originary withdrawal of being as silence. The essential
holding sway is not just the beyng of beings because it occurs in the “not” of beings; the
essential holding sway in the beyng of beings is precisely as that which withdraws in the
concealing-sheltering [Verbergen] of truth.235 The more things are set free, the more
machination occurs, and the less beyng is noticed.
These first five aspects all have the same characteristic of “going-out” from
beyng. Beyng “moves out” “beyond itself.” Yet, beyng neither moves, nor moves out,
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Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction 111.
Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction 112.
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and certainly beyng does not go beyond itself. The next three aspects have the countering
“movement.” They gather as one. And yet again, beyng is not one, for it is no-thing.
Sixth, beyng holds sway as simpleness [Einfachheit]. Rather than imagining that
beyng is due to the relation of the “between” between gods and man, we see that Ereignis
is indeed the relation. While beyng appropriates [ereignet] Da-sein, beyng is not the
origin of Da-sein [Das Seyn ereignet das Da-sein und ist dennoch nicht dessen
Ursprung], Heidegger explains.236 Since beyng is not the origin of Da-sein, it is readily
apparent that the issue discussed is not one of relating two entities. The “between” holds
sway without any mediation [unvermittelt]. As unmediated, then, beyng holds sway as
simpleness.
Seventh, the mark of simpleness of beyng is uniqueness [Einzigkeit]. It needs no
differences as it holds sway “in itself” or “from beings.” From this point, then, beyng is
not any kind of being, but is manifested in many ways. Daniela Vallega-Neu elaborates
that while unique, beyng occurs historically, finitely, and determinately in manifold ways
of enowning, concealing, sheltering, forgetting, creating, preserving. Its uniqueness
doesn’t nullify the various modes of beyng, but “it designates this concreteness,
historicality, and finitude in each mode of being.”237 Thus, beyng as a mark of
simpleness is unique, in that beyng designates modes of beyng.
Eighth, beyng’s uniqueness grounds its aloneness [Einsamkeit] and surrounds
itself only with the nothing [das Nichts]. Therefore, it holds sway to any being only
mediately [nur mittelbar] through the strife of the “world” and “earth.” Could we not say
that beyng’s aloneness is the source of silence, which is heard by Da-sein?
236

GA 65: 471/ Contributions 331. This sentence should of itself dispel any notions that Heidegger’s
beyng is the philosophical version of the Christian God.
237
Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction 113.
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Vallega-Neu sets the eight aspects into two groups: those that are involved in
differing and those that are involved in gathering. The first five moments of Ereignis
focus on the differing aspects of beyng while the last three, simpleness, uniqueness, and
aloneness, focus on the gathering aspects.”238 While gathering-differing is beyng holding
sway in its entirety, holding sway can be seen in terms of holding or gathering, on the one
hand; and, on the other hand, sway can be seen as differing. Breaking Ereignis down into
its constituent parts, however, betrays the at-one-ness.
While seemingly without import, this emphasis sheds light upon how beyng can
be both silence and a silence that is heard. Beyng is ambiguous; that is not to say that it
is vague. Rather, beyng is twofold-as-one. This ambiguity is primary to all ambiguity in
beings, namely, beings emerge in the strife “between” “world” and “earth.”
Lastly, beyng and only beyng is and a being is not [daß das Seyn und nur das
Seyn ist und daß das Seiende nicht ist].239 Ironically for this reason, beings, which are
not, hear the silence of beyng, which is. This is yet another way of saying that beings
shun beyng, for they hear nothing and are shocked to find that the nothing is and they are
not. Nearing beyng, beings are brought forth by the silence, which draws Da-sein near to
what it is, to beyng. Da-sein is brought into the open through renounciation. Through
renouncing beings, beyng appropriates Da-sein. Da-sein is not primarily in control in
Ereignis, unlike the Dasein of Being and Time. In Ereignis, Da-sein hears; in Being and
Time, Dasein uncovers.
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Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction 113. Kenneth Maly discusses
the same dynamic as a con-tension between going-out and gathering. See Kenneth Maly Heidegger’s
Possibility: Language, Emergence-Saying Be-ing (Toronto, CA: University of Toronto, 2008) 61.
239
GA 65 472/Contributions 332. The italics are Heidegger’s emphasis. While they are readily seen in the
English translation, the German text maintains them as well.
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From this renouncing-hearing language emerges. For Heidegger language does
not arise from man, nor does man arise from language and still further, language and man
cannot mutually determine each other as is the model for animal rationale.240 Instead,
language emerges from beyng. Not language as assertion, but language as Saying of
beyng [Das Sagen des Seyns]. Language is the resonance that belongs to Ereignis, as the
“enstrifing” [Erstreitung] of the strife between “world” and “earth.” “Language arises
from beyng and therefore belongs to it [Die Sprache entspringt dem Seyn und gehört
deshalb zu diesem],” Heidegger unabashedly writes. “Everything once again depends on
projecting-open and thinking [Entwurf und Denken] ‘of’ being.”241
Just as in all the various aspects of beyng, wherein beings are intimate to beyng,
and gods need Da-sein to offer beyng, wherein beings emerges in the strife between gods
and man—all the while beyng is simple, unique and alone—in the Ereignis, so too
language belongs to beyng in the resonance of the holding sway as the Saying of beyng.
Beyng is manifested as Ereignis; originary language is manifested in the startled dismay
[Er-Schrecken] of the broken boulders of metaphysics and literature, given in a
particularly acute way in our epoch as machination.
As we conclude this chapter, it is important to recall the ever narrowing circling
path that Heidegger has fashioned. From the destructive retrieval of the first beginning of
philosophy and literature to the thinking of Being, Heidegger reached the nihilism of
Nietzsche, only to find Being as Nothing. Then, in the Beiträge Heidegger circled even
closer in the enactment of beyng, wherein Ereignis emerges as the manifested beyng as
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GA 65: 499/Contributions 351.
GA 65: 501/Contributions 352. The parentheses surrounding “of” is Heidegger’s own emphasis. Again,
we should not be misled by the term. For Heidegger “of” means that Da-sein is appropriated by beyng and
belongs to beyng. Meditative thinking also is “of being” as it listens to being.
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itself and projected-open. As Ereignis shows beyng’s relation to the gods and man,
Ereignis too shows the resonance of the holding sway of beyng; originary language
emerges as Silence, the Saying of Being.
Through this complex, if incomprehensible, treatment Heidegger comes to the
realization that instead of Dasein primarily appropriating Being through language in
Being and Time, beyng primarily appropriates Da-sein and language is indeed the
resonance of that holding sway. Rather than language portrayed as part of
anthropological humanism in a constructed metaphysics, language is Saying as Being.
In other words, the conversation of beyng has long ago already begun, the path
was begun before our entrance. Language and beyng have long been part of the human
experience, and yet we, as individual humans, come late and go along with it as it is
already in progress.
How do we access that which houses us? If we were to gaze at Dasein, we miss
the house. We must look to beyng and language. Yet as we gaze closely at beyng and
language as a way, the path, which draws us, also dissipates into nothingness before us.
How could Heidegger best explain this?
This approach certainly has it difficulties.242 To continue our house metaphor, as
we dismantle the house, do we move out of the house? That indeed seems impossible. Is
the house dismantled slowly while simultaneously rebuilding it—all the while we live in
the house? This seems more plausible. And this seems to be Heidegger’s trajectory in
this period. He refashions what we mean by things, highlights poetry as breaking the
242

As many have indicated, the Beiträge is impossibly incomprehensible. It might follow that the above
treatment is also unintelligible. But in many ways, is this not Heidegger’s point regarding beyng? Beyng
is that which lies “before” that which is intelligible. Yet in its manifestation as Ereignis, Being as Saying
becomes comprehensible. It is the dilation of ontological space as Ereignis, of which we have lingered for
a while.
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structures of language while allowing life, fresh meaning, and new thought to emerge,
and most importantly he dwells on beyng as “nothingness.” While “nothingness” is the
absurd culmination of metaphysics, it is also the source of new meaning toward the
thought of beyng as Saying in Ereignis. Heidegger’s point was that in order to listen to
beyng and language, we must first be comfortable with its silence. Now that we are
comfortable with this silence, we can now move in its resonating holding sway in our
next chapter, “Being-Saying.”
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CHAPTER THREE:
From Language and Being toward Being:Saying243

… das Ganze noch einmal zu fassen …244
“Only the chill of the boldness of thinking and the night of errancy of
questioning
lend glow and light to the fire of beyng.”245
From the last chapter we have experienced silence and the broken boulders of the
first beginning. We stay attuned to Ereignis and we moved in its resonating holding
sway. We experienced both our startled dismay and its near, if not utter,
incomprehensibility. We moved from its originary mode as beyng, and saw its
“unfolding” as “Being-Saying.” We have seen also the uncomfortable dwelling with the
Silence of beyng and how that appears as Ereignis. All this “occurred” before language
and beyng unfolds into its ordinary modes of language, Being and beings as Sprache in
time and space.
To appreciate the great strides Heidegger made from 1927 through 1949 we have
traversed much ground, tracing sometimes scant evidence of language’s relation to
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While the term “Being:Saying” most precisely conveys the meaning Heidegger intends, we will
eventually employ the “as” structure to convey it more generally, as given in our title: Being as Saying.
The subtle difference of the latter is its, Being:Saying’s, historical [geschichtlich] rendering.
244
GA 65: 514/Contributions 365. While this was the task of the previous chapter, all the while focusing
on be-ing, now we look at the whole once again, focusing on language.
245
GA 65: 430/Contributions 303.
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beyng. In Being and Time language was most evident as an existential mode of the care
structure as Being-with [Sein-bei], given as discourse [Rede] and its inauthentic
counterpart, idle chatter [Gerede]. This placed language as emerging out of Dasein’s
structural aspect of Being-with others as part of fallenness [Verfallen]. We argued that
language is also deeply immersed in the experience of everyday life as illustrated by
Dasein’s references of “worldhood,” that language is “full” of ontic contents,
interconnected in the referential totality of “worldhood.” As such, language has its roots
in the care structure as projection [Entwurf] as well as fallenness [Verfallen]. Thus,
Being and Time discovered language from “within” Dasein’s existential structure and
from “without” in ontic experience.
But as phenomenology, Being and Time was unable to unfold the analytic of
Dasein. Since Dasein was central to all descriptions of phenomenon and could not find a
way to move beyond itself, Heidegger needed a new approach. To that end, roughly for
the next decade Heidegger developed a new way of thinking, the method of destructive
retrieval, whereby he broke through the structures of language and philosophy to find
nihilism as the avenue toward beyng. This period of Heidegger culminated, we argued,
in the Beiträge, which enacted meditative thinking or as others call it, beyng-historical
thinking,246 in order to near ever closer to beyng, only to find beyng as Nothing [Nichts].
But not simply Nothing, for in its withdrawal, beyng also emerges in Da-sein’s startled
dismay of Ereignis, manifested beyng as itself and projected-open [Entwurf].247 As
246

I opt for the phrase “meditative thinking,” for the reason that what characterizes it best is its move away
from calculative thinking and into a meditative stance. While not at all incorrect, the phrase “beyng
historical thinking” might suggest wrongly to an unknowing reader that what characterizes this type of
thinking is its historical [Read: linear] character. Conversely, Heidegger holds that meditative thinking is a
thinking in Being’s history.
247
The astute reader will notice that Heidegger employs the same term for “projection” in the care structure
of Being and Time and “projected-open” of Ereignis in the Beiträge. Certainly, the two are related, since
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Ereignis shows beyng’s relation to the gods and man, Ereignis too shows the resonance
of the holding sway of beyng: originary language as Silence, the Saying of beyng.
Language in this period was both the means of destructive retrieval toward beyng and the
originary language as Saying of beyng. Originary language emerged out of nihilism, as
the withdrawal of beyng.
Both periods include discussions of language and Being. But language and Being
become more intimately connected as Heidegger’s work progressed through the years,
such that language’s “source” must be found in Ereignis. Now that we have traversed
these waters toward beyng in the Beiträge, asymptotically reaching beyng, the lesson
learned from the Beiträge is that beyng and language can be understood properly only as
traversing “with” beyng, not “toward” beyng. In metaphorical language we must travel
downstream with the current not upstream against the current—beyng is the current.
And yet the difficulty with the Beiträge and its performative esoteric style is its
incomprehensibility. Was it a philosophical foray into experimental thinking for
Heidegger and thus not meant for public discussion? We have already dismissed that
caveat. Still, the peril of discussing the Beiträge with any seriousness is harsh, derisive
criticism from all philosophical sources. Perhaps, for this reason Heidegger kept it out of
the public eye for years. Given its esoteric formula, Heidegger needed a way to express
its newfound insights of Ereignis in ways that would be more accessible. Heidegger
continued in this vein in the decades to come, tracing in varied ways, the way of Ereignis
as it appears to us.

both have “an open directionality.” I would, however, caution the reader not to form an exact identity
between two since the care structure is “of” Dasein while Dasein is only one part “of” Ereignis.
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The next three chapters follow Heidegger on this trail toward Being as Saying.
Whether he explored language and Being, or lo&goj, or language as poetry, or Da-sein,
all paths lead to Being as Saying. These paths are less treacherous and more accessible to
the general listener, unlike the Beiträge. Still, they in historical fashion will speak the
same Being, and perhaps we can then hear more intently.
This present chapter begins with the insights of the Beiträge and flows from the
source of beyng. It begins with the quandary of nothing [Nichts] as originary language in
the projected-open [Entwurf]. With beyng and language so intimately related, we have
found the solution to our question of how language has unity. This unity is originary
language as the Saying of beyng. Saying of beyng is the withdrawal of beyng and is
“heard” as Silence. Now we must proceed to explore further the “essence” of language
that flows from this unity. We must negotiate a path between the care structure and
nihilism, between spoken language and Silence. More importantly, we must speak in a
way that ears may hear.
The title of this chapter, “From Language and Being toward Being:Saying,”
indicates the trajectory of Heidegger’s work in this next period. Like the two previous
approaches, it too has Seinsgeschichte as its concern. Now we must explore how Being
and language for Heidegger is both the way and its steps along the way toward
Being:Saying.
What might be the proper method to explore our question? Phenomenology
started with everyday, ontical life and worked toward the structures of Dasein.
Destructive retrieval seemed the opposite method, taking structures and breaking through
them so as to allow beyng to appear in its originary way. One might suggest that a

91

simple historical, linear approach would best accomplish the task of tracing
Seinsgeschichte. An historical approach seems most plausible. Our historical approach,
however, won’t develop the trajectory in linear fashion as though language emerges in a
uniform way from Being as Saying. Rather, we shall treat each of Heidegger’s works
from 1949 -1976, which either discuss language or is directly relevant to it. What will
emerge in our historical approach is not unlike that of a river—there are eddies, rapids,
seeming doldrums and even backflow—language’s relation to Being develops not
linearly, but in multifaceted ways. The relation between Being and language emerges as
Being allows, not as Dasein would wish.

“The Turning”
Let our first step begin with the Bremen lectures of 1949, specifically with the
“The Turning” [die Kehre].248 Previously we have argued that Heidegger’s focus
throughout his lifetime was the question of Being [Seinsfrage] and in particular,
Heidegger’s concern was to work through his idea that Being “has” a history
248

Two slightly different versions of “Die Kehre” can be found in Klostermann’s Gesamtausgabe. Band
79, Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge, which contains the text as part of the lecture series “Die Kehre,” was
part of a lecture series in December 1-4, 1949 in the Bremen Club. The lecture series was given unaltered
in March 25 and 26, 1950 at Bühlerhöhe under the title, “Insight into That Which is. [Einblick in das was
ist].” This particular lecture was the fourth, entitled, “Die Kehre;” it followed “Das Ding,” “Das Ge-stell,”
and “Die Gefahr.” The ordering of the lectures should offer us an insight into how “The Turning” should
be situated, that together with the way we wrongly conceive of a “thing,” our modern world is beset by
machination, which enframes and leads to danger. And as that danger emerges, so also the saving power
arises. While we wrongly conceive and think in calculative ways, primarily Being [Sein] assists our
thinking in new ways in accordance with Ereignis. Beyng conceals itself as Being [Sein] or, as a favor,
reveals itself in a flash as beyng [Seyn].
A second version of “Die Kehre” is located in Band 11, Identität und Differenz; it separates the
lecture from its series context. Its English translation by William Lovitt can be found in The Question
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. by William Lovitt (New York, NY: Harper-Torchbooks,
1977). The major distinction we shall find is that the two versions differ dramatically in the sole usage of
Being [Sein] in Volume 11 and, in contrast, volume 79 employs the pivotal usage of Being [Sein] in
conjunction with beyng [Seyn].
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[Seinsgeschichte] and as such language is intimately related to Being. Presently we will
argue specifically that the “Turning,”249 [Kehre] is Heidegger’s overall way toward
Seinsgeschichte and “Turning” has particular manifestations, all of which are related to
the overall sense of “Turning.”
Within this lecture Heidegger gives us strong evidence of what he means by “the
Turning” and through it we deduce what he means by Seinsgeschichte. Our argument
hinges on the Beiträge’s usage of beyng [Seyn] in lieu of the earlier usage of Being
[Sein]. While this shift of language from Being to beyng seemed idiosyncratic, it has a
specific purpose in this lecture. To wit, Being [Sein] “has” a history, while beyng [Seyn]
is “without” or “before” history; Being is concealed and revealed in many modes in the
attunement of dismay or need [Not] while beyng is always revealed-as-concealed as the
abandonment of beyng [Verlassenheit], i.e. in the subjective genitive sense, through the
grounding attunement [Grundstimmung] of startled dismay [Er-schrecken]. Seyn is more
originary for Heidegger. It is this movement of terminology from Sein to Seyn that
249

Among Heideggerian scholars this term’s translation and meaning is still vigorously debated. FriedrichWilhelm von Herrmann outlines four ways of interpreting Kehre: in division two of Being and Time, the
Kehre describes the turn from the Zeitlichkeit of Dasein to the Temporalität of Being; the turn from the
fundamental ontology of Being and Time to beyng-historical thinking, generally characterized by the works
of the 1930s and 1940s; within the Beiträge the in-turning [Einkehre] within Ereignis; and the turning from
the abandonment of beyng, which is the focus of this 1949 eponymous lecture. See Herrmann, Wege ins
Ereignis: Zu Heideggers “Beiträgen zur Philosophie” (Frankfurt am Main, DE: Klostermann, 1994) 67-68.
William Richardson includes yet another meaning of the Kehre, the turn [Wendung im Denken] in
Heidegger’s thinking; see William Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought, 1-3. Kenneth Maly
and Thomas Sheehan both dismiss this latter sense of the Kehre as offered by Richardson; see Kenneth
Maly, “Turnings in Essential Swaying and the Leap,” Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to
Philosophy, eds. Charles E. Scott, Susan M. Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu and Alejandro Vallega
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University. 2001) 150-157; Thomas Sheehan, “Kehre and Ereignis: A
Prolegomenon to Introduction to Metaphysics,” A Companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics,
ed. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried (New Haven, CN: Yale University, 2001) 3-16.
Finally, Emil Kettering and Bret Davis, following Kettering’s argument, interpret the Kehre
overall as the double-structured relationship between being and man as the matter of Heidegger’s thought
throughout all of Heidegger’s works, whether unsuccessfully so in the early or effectively so in the latter
works; see Kettering, NÄHE: Das Denken Martin Heideggers (Pfüllingen, DE: Neske, 1987) 328-330; Bret
W. Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University,
2007) 322. I find, however, that Davis’ relation of the Kehre to the will to be ungrounded in Heidegger’s
own works; see Heidegger and the Will 60-65.

93

illustrates the “Turning.” It is the question how might Being might properly be
“thought.”
Following Emil Kettering we argue that the “Turning” as the double-structured
relation between man and beyng is the self-same matter of Heidegger’s concern
throughout all of his life’s work. How Heidegger envisioned that relation has varied, but
it was always the same Seinsfrage: how is it that Being “has” a history. Certainly, this
does not preclude any of the four senses—from the Zeitlichkeit of Dasein to the
Temporalität of Being; from fundamental ontology of Being and Time to beyng-historical
thinking, the in-turning [Einkehre] within Ereignis; and the turning from the
abandonment of beyng—that Herrmann delineates, for they are steps toward a fuller
appreciation of how deep and pervasive the Kehre is involved in Heidegger’s project.
Nor would I entirely dismiss Richardson’s notion that Heidegger changed his thinking,
for if the Kehre is properly thought, if Da-sein is open to Ereignis, it will induce a change
in Da-sein. Richardson’s notion is tertiary, though; Herrmann’s four senses are
secondary and illustrate the primary notion that Being “has” a history.
All conceptions hinge upon the fact that Heidegger can show that Seyn is
somehow distinguished from Sein, but also it is the case that Seyn is Sein. This seems
contradictory, or perhaps vague. It is, however, neither. It is ambiguous, that is to say,
that such an ambiguous position is Heidegger’s exact point and the key to understanding
the Seyn/Sein distinction; because Being is ambiguous as holding sway, all its
formulations in the history of Being250 unfold as holding sway.

250

To say that all beings unfold in a historical way, is not to invoke a Hegelian understanding of history;
rather, beings are “seinsgeschichtlich.” Robert Bernasconi explicates well the difference in understanding
of history between Hegel and Heidegger. For Heidegger the history of Being is a destiny [Geschick]. We
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Seinsgeschichte shows holding sway throughout all formulations as identity and
difference. This identity/difference formulation is best contrasted in one sentence early
in this lecture. It describes the holding sway of Seyn/Sein. It reads as follows:
Weil jedoch das Seyn sich als Wesen der Technik in das Ge-Stell geschickt
hat, zum Wesen des Seyns aber das Menschenwesen251gehört, insofern das
Wesen des Seyns das Menschenwesen braucht, um als Sein nach dem
eigenen Wesen inmitten des Seienden gewarht zu bleiben und so als Seyn
zu wesen ….252
Nevertheless, because beyng as the “essence” of technology has adapted
itself into Enframing, the “essence” of humanity belongs to the holding
sway of beyng in so far as the holding sway of beyng needs the “essence”
of humanity in order to remain preserved as Being according to its own
holding sway in the midst of beings and, therefore, to hold sway as
beyng.253
The “Being/beyng” [Sein/Seyn] identity/difference distinction is a crucial step in this
section.254 Heidegger makes the distinction of beyng [Seyn], occurring as beyng’s
abandonment, and Being [Sein], holding sway in the midst of beings; and yet Heidegger
maintains the identity of Being [Sein] as holding sway in the midst of beings is beyng
[Seyn]. Thus, beyng turning in [einkehren] as abandonment and turning as projectedopen, heard as Silence in the Beiträge, now turns in the midst of beings as Being as
Saying. This deft move is not the orginary turn of holding sway manifested as Ereignis
will discuss this fully in chapter nine. See Robert Bernasconi, The Question of Language in Heidegger’s
History of Being (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1985) 30.
251
Heidegger italicizes “-wesen” of “Menschenwesen.”
252
GA 79: 69/“The Turning,” The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. and intro. by
William Lovitt (New York, NY: Harper-Torchbooks, 1977) 38.
253
The translation is my own. While Lovitt’s translation is fine for the most part, he fails to distinguish any
of the many deliberate distinctions between Heidegger’s usage of Seyn and Sein. Also, in lieu of “essence,”
which has deep metaphysical overtones, I translate “Wesen” as “holding sway” for beyng and yet retain the
term for humanity and technology, for the sole purpose of highlighting beyng. Overall, this terminology in
our translation is more consistent with the Beiträge in the last chapter.
254
Unfortunately, this distinction can only be maintained within this lecture. While this lecture and the
section of the Beiträge entitled, “Being” maintain a consistent distinction, other later works will not
illustrate such a distinction. This momentary crucial distinction loses its importance when engaging in
Seinsgeschichte. Moreover, Heidegger will arrive at a stage in his career when he will dismiss all terms for
Being as still steeped in the first beginning of philosophy; to illustrate that point he will opt for “Being,”
indicated as “Being.” “Zur Seinsfrage” (1955) is such a work.
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in the Beiträge, but it is the key, we argue, to Heidegger’s lifelong pursuit of
Seinsgeschichte.
Heidegger elaborates how beyng, “the source” of time and space, is Being “in”
time and space. It occurs through the dangerous-saving255 “enframing” [Ge-stell]; for
this reason such a distinction, up to now, has not been noticed. Heidegger discusses its
occurrence: “Yet probably this256 turning—the turning of the abandonment of beyng into
the safekeeping belonging to the holding sway of Being—will finally come to pass only
when the danger, which is in its concealed essence ever susceptible of turning, first
comes expressly to light as the danger that it is.”257 Enframing danger also brings forth
light.
Careful attention to this sentence is needed. What is the turning of the
abandonment of Being? Abandonment [Verlassenheit] of beyng is the originary Kehre as
in-turning [Einkehre], consistent with the sixth Ereignis aspect in the Beiträge. From this
originary “in-turning” as abandonment of beyng, Dasein notices this abandonment and
for this reason Dasein is needed, described as the first Ereignis aspect in the Beiträge.
Dasein notices the abandonment of Being [Sein], but it is not primarily Dasein’s doing. It
255

Richard Rocjewicz argues that enframing does not save, but what saves does grow there. With Ted
Kiesel, I maintain that enframing does indeed include both a danger and a saving power, in the sense that
the danger is the saving power in so far as the danger brings the holding sway of the saving power.
Heidegger writes in GA 79: 72: “Die Gefahr ist das Rettende, insofern sie aus ihrem Wesen das Rettende
bringt.”
256
GA 79: 71. The italics is not contained within the text of Heidegger’s “Die Kehre” in volume 79: 49; it
is retained in volume 11; William Lovitt’s translation of “The Turning” in The Question Concerning
Technology and other Essays, derives from GA 11. Neither Lovitt’s translation, nor Heidegger’s text in GA
11: 57 contain the distinction between “Seyn” and “Sein.” Other differences within between volumes 11
and 79 include: no hyphen in “Ge-stell while 79 maintains “Ge-Stell;” “entsprechenden” is italicized; a
phrase in Band 79: “was ein völlig anderes Ereignis ist als der Vorgang,” is different in Band 11: “was
ereignishaft etwas ganz anders ist als der Vorgang.”
257
GA 79: 71/“The Turning” 41. The German text reads as follows: “Vermutlich aber ereignet sich diese
Kehre, diejenige der Vergessenheit des Seins zur Wahrnis des Wesens des Seyns, nur, wenn die in ihrem
verborgenen Wesen kehrige Gefahr erst einmal als die Gefahr, die sie ist, eigens anwest.” In this sentence
volume 11 italicizes “diese”; “Seyn” is absent; where Band 79 has the phrase: “eigens anwest,” volume 11
inserts: “eigens ans Licht kommen.”
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appears as that primary beyng/Being showing itself in the very way it shows itself as
abandonment, heard as Silence.
From Dasein’s vantage point then it appears as the oblivion [Vergessen] of Being
is not like forgetting things or having a lapse of memory. Instead, the oblivion of Being
is that concealedness which is the source and foundation of all unconcealedness or truth
[a0lh/qeia].258 Is it too much of a stretch to say that abandonment is closely related to
originary concealedness or Saying heard as Silence? I argue, “No.” It is the identical
concealedness, but it has a different aspect; it is now “has” a history.
One could effectively argue that in no way could Heidegger prove such a point.
Heidegger would not deny such an objection. But Heidegger’s claim here is not unlike
Kant’s claim that while we do know that something (=X) affects us, we cannot know
what it (=X) is in itself, which indeed affects us. Heidegger holds that Sein is that which
we recognize while Seyn is the term that indicates that which is “beyond” Da-sein.259
Da-sein is needed for Seyn to manifest itself as Ereignis. The Seyn/Sein
distinction, then, is Heidegger’s way of demarcating the fact that Dasein is needed in
Ereignis. And Heidegger’s point to show that Seyn and Sein are the self-same
manifestation in Ereignis shows that Da-sein is not the sole, nor the primary “actor” in
Ereignis. Seyn’s abandonment heard as Silence is the nearing of Sein here [Da].
As abandonment of Seyn as heard as Silence [Stille], it is Saying.260 As the
holding sway amidst beings Sein is heard as Saying. Both are originary language.

258

This is Lovitt’s editorial note. See The Question Concerning Technology 36.
The above sentence is meant merely as an analogical device. “Seyn” is in no way “beyond” nor does it
“cause;” both of these terms indicate relational activity that flows out of the originary holding sway, as it
were, far downstream.
260
While Heidegger does not explicate this specific point in this lecture, it can be inferred from he has
written elsewhere. We have seen this in GA 65: 470-471/Contributions 331-332; we will soon look closer
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Silence and Saying are the self-same and yet, Silence is different from Saying. As
originary language, words never suffice to define. What Silence and Saying can convey
is that Silence or Nothing is heard as the abandonment of beyng [Seyn] while Saying is
how it is given.261
This turning is beyng [Seyn] as it brings itself and its holding sway to language
[Sprache bringt] as Sein. Without language every purposeful deliberation
[Überlegenwollen] remains without its way [Weg] and its byway [Steg]. Without
language, looking out [sich umtun] to every dimension of ontology would not occur.
Without language, Sein’s “ability to be effective [wirken]” would be lacking.262
The turning of beyng, then, is what brings forth this language understood in the
broadest sense. Without this language deliberation cannot ever be attempted. Without
this language, it seems “ontological space” is thwarted. Beyng’s holding sway offers this
“ontological-space-as-language” by its “action” of holding sway.
These sentences follow the German text more faithfully than does Lovitt’s
translation. While it is clear in the text that through beyng’s holding sway language is
given, it isn’t at all clear how this language should be “thought.” It isn’t simply language
as speech, but rather language as broadly held as all forms of utterances. This is correctly
conveyed by Lovitt’s addition of the English word, “utterance;” even though the German
does not indicate it here. Later263 Heidegger makes it clear that by use of the word,
“language,” he intends far more than ordinary speech, a word, and even an utterance or

at these later works which includes the Saying of Being as Silence: GA 13: 147/“Hebel—Friend of the
House” 99; GA 12: 186/“The Nature of Language” 92; GA 10: 140/The Principle of Reason 94.
261
In other later works Heidegger oftentimes employs the colon, e.g., Silence: Saying: Nothing. The colon
in modern script effectively conveys that the relation of identity and difference. See GA 12: 190/“The
Nature of Language,” On the Way to Language 95; GA 11: 71/Identity and Difference 64.
262
GA 7: 71/“The Turning,” The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays 40-41.
263
We shall shortly discuss this in “Language.”
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gesture. Originary language is the Saying of Being and is the “reason” that ordinary
means of communication occurs.
Heidegger continues to clarify what he intends with the word, “language.”
Language is never primarily the expression of thinking, feeling, and willing [niemals erst
Ausdruck des Denkens, Fühlens und Wollens]. Rather, language is the primal dimension
[anfängliche Dimension] within which man’s essence is first able to correspond
[entsprechen] to Being and its claim [Anspruch] and is first able to belong [gehören] to
Being. This primal corresponding, [dieser anfängliche Entsprechen] expressly carried
out, is thinking [Denken].
We must not presume that thinking here is simply what we commonly hold
thinking to be; language most certainly is not an outward expression of thinking.
Heidegger will convey what he means by that word momentarily. More importantly,
Heidegger holds that this type of language is that which links man’s essence to Being and
is appropriated to, or belongs to Being. This belonging allows man’s essence to listen to
Being; this “listening” Heidegger calls thinking.
Through thinking, we first learn to dwell in the realm in which there comes to
pass [sich ereignet] the entwining [Verwindung]264 of the destining of Being [des
Seinsgeschickens], the entwining of Enframing [des Ge-Stells]. Heidegger holds that
thinking [Denken] leads man to proper dwelling.265 Such dwelling is brought about
primarily through Being and secondarily by man; the Silence of Being draws man to his
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“Verwindung” is oftentimes translated into English as “twisting.” While Lovitt translates Heidegger’s
“Verwindung” as surmounting, I choose entwining. “Verwindung” for Heidegger is not so much an
“overcoming,” which “surmounting” implies, but a thorough twisting or binding. I choose a positive
attribution to indicate both the strangling danger, but also the strength of the saving power.
265
This will be the subject matter of two Heideggerian lectures in the following years: “Bauen Wohnen
Denken” and “...dichterisch wohnet der Mensch....”
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ownmost “self” and chooses to listen and respond accordingly. In Enframing, Being
“speaks” most loudly and man hears the danger more readily. The effect will be a
twofold entwining as one of the destiny of Being and of Enframing. One should correctly
assess that they correspond in some fashion.
Beyond the process of corresponding, though, questions abound. The lecture
delineates what technology is, how it is not entirely within our control, how it leads to
danger and why as this danger it remains the saving power.266 What remains unanswered
is to what extent is man involved and to what extent is Being involved in this entwining?
How is thinking related to language overall, and to its articulation in particular? How is
language related to proper dwelling?
While the reader might wish that Heidegger would address these questions
directly, it shall not be the case that Heidegger addresses them at this given time. Rather,
our next step along the pathway of Being and language is looking directly at things in
“The Thing” [Das Ding]. 267 After the Bremen lectures, Heidegger wrote a few smaller
works, which do not bear greatly on our topic of Being and language. In 1949 Heidegger
wrote “The Pathway” [Der Feldweg], which we discussed briefly in our introduction; he
also wrote a new introduction to an earlier work, “Introduction to ‘What is
Metaphysics,’” wherein Heidegger places metaphysics in its proper setting of Being.
Within it Heidegger writes that we need to view all: “… beings as beings appear in the
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All these issues are quite interesting; certainly apt subject matter for modern man, yet they are not
entirely within the scope of the topic of Being and language. What is germane to our topic is that they are
all forms of language as Being as Saying.
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“Das Ding” was presented originally as a lecture at the Bayerischen Akademie der Schönen Kunste on
June 6, 1950. The original text was published in the Jahrbuch der Akademie, Band I, Gestalt und Gedanke
1951, 128ff. Later it was incorporated into Klostermann’s Gesamtausgabe, GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze.
The English translation, located in Poetry, Language, Thought, is the work of Albert Hofstadter.
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light of being.”268 Refocusing our sight onto beings as they appear in the light of Being is
the method by which the relation of language and Being will indeed come to light.

“The Thing”
Before we step forward into Heidegger’s major work on language, we must
comment on how Heidegger envisions things as nestling the fourfold in “The Thing.”
Within “The Thing” Heidegger seeks the relation between Being and man vis-à-vis other
beings. Like “The Origin of the Work of Art,” “The Thing” explores how things appear
to us not only as blocks of matter, but also speaks to us of a deeper, more primal relation
[anfängliches Entsprechen] between Being and man. Specifically, “The Thing” discusses
how things are defined more by the fourfold. Like the simple complexity of the Ereignis
in the Beiträge, we shall see that there is simplicity and a multifaceted dimension to a
thing.
“The Thing”269 moves toward the “thingly” side of things through which Being
comes to light. Perhaps not directly pertinent to our topic, we find that while focusing on
the elements which comprise a thing as we did with the aspects of Seyn in the Beiträge,
new light is cast onto the relationship between a thing and Being. Since Dasein is
involved in this relationship, light shines too on the relation between language and Being.
268

GA 9: 366/“Introduction to ‘What is Metaphysics,’”Pathmarks 278. Heidegger’s phrase details the
ways beings were discussed in the history of philosophy—in materialism or spiritualism, as matter or force,
as becoming, as representation, will, substance, subject or energeia, even as eternal recurrence of the
same—each time … “erscheint das Seiende als Seiendes im Lichte des Seins.”
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“Das Ding” was originally part of the Bremen lectures, but also was offered in adapted form a number
of times afterwards in 1950 as a single lecture: in the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts, June 6 and in Icking,
June 10, 1950. The German text of the Bremen lecture is located in GA 71, while this adaptation can be
found in GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze. Albert Hofstadter’s excellent English translation of the selection in
GA 7 can be found in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. and intro. Albert Hofstadter (New York, NY:
Harper-Colophon, 1971) 165-186.
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In short, a thing is not simply a thing that persistently stays; it is a gathering of the
fourfold [Geviert]: of earth and sky, divinities and mortals. Language as a
correspondence of this gathering [Entsprechen] is involved in this gathering.
This gathering is taking a step backward from representational thinking as given
by the first beginning of Western philosophy of what makes the jug a jug: from Plato’s
ei]doj through the res of the Latin Romans to Kant’s thing “in-itself” [Ding an sich].270
Moreover, gathering backs away from metaphysical causality. The term “gathering”
suggests a tightening of loose ends that are interrelated271; as such Heidegger’s word
suggests that a thing is not a solid, inert block of dead matter, but interwoven elements,
including active involvement by mortals. At the same time the thing “gathers” these
elements and Being is shown through this gathering.
For example, the jug is not so much a singular inactive thing, as much as it
gathers the fourfold into a single time-space; the jug stays as gatherer. True, the jug is a
vessel for liquid containment, but it also contains the earth from which it was made, the
changing process of earth into a shape, the mortals’ intentions of creating it, the
fundamental awareness272 together construe the possibilities of the jug. The jug is more
of emptiness than solid block. Empty, the jug gathers many-into-one. “This manifold-
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Slavoj Žižek, insightfully, though not without some problems, compares Heidegger’s discussion of the
“thing” with Kant’s “Ding an sich.” Žižek concludes that Kant’s “Ding an sich” is nothingness. This
nothingness would not be akin to Heidegger’s Silence, but some correlation could be drawn between
Heidegger’s “Stillness,” as described below on page 105. See Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The
Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London; New York, NY: Verso, 1999) 51.
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An interesting comparison can be made of Nietzsche’s description of Wagner as a contra-Alexander
with Heidegger’s notion here of “gathering” of interrelated loose ends.
272
For the term, “divinities” in the fourfold, I construe it broadly here as possibility; later it will be
discussed in all of its ramifications.
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simple gathering is the jug’s presencing [Wesen],”273 explains Heidegger.274 As a
manifold-as-singular, the jug gathers-as-presencing. In a nicely crafted set of sentences,
Heidegger summarizes the presencing of the jug: “Preceding everything that is present
[allem Anwesenden zuvorkommend], they are enfolded [eingefaltet] into a single fourfold
[einziges Geviert]. In the gift of the outpouring [Gusses] dwells [weilt] the simple
singlefoldness of the four [die Einfalt der Vier].”275 A “thing” as enfolding the fourfold
appears as a thing, in this case, a jug.
The jug, as gathering presence, is Heidegger’s avenue to review “world.” “The
thing things the world, [Das Ding dingt Welt]”276 Heidegger elliptically writes, elliptical
not for evasion, but for an account of what happens. The thing stays, i.e., gathers, the
fourfold’s happening into the oneness of the “world.” When we think of the jug merely
as a jug, we277 save or preserve [schonen] the presence of the jug in the region, from
which it presences [west]278 and preserve the jug into a particular space and time, we fix
it out of which it was an original presencing of the fourfold. This fixity is the nearing of
the “world.” Heidegger holds that the nearing of the “world” is the process of the
fourfold; he outlines the process: “As we preserve [schonen] the thing qua thing, we
inhabit [bewohnen] nearness [Nähe]. The nearing of the nearness [Das Nähern der Nähe]
is the true and sole dimension [eigentliche und die einzige Dimension] of the mirror-play
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Now that the topic of discussion is regarding beings, we replace “essence” with “presencing.” Essence
conveys static reality, while presencing suggests an active, on-going process, more in line with the term
“holding sway.”
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GA 7: 176/“The Thing,” Poetry, Language, Thought 174.
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GA 7: 175/“The Thing,” Poetry, Language, Thought 173.
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GA 7: 182/“The Thing,” Poetry, Language, Thought 181.
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We save the jug in so far as we, mortals, are part of the fourfold; Da-sein is active in worlding as an
existential effect of the care structure. Finally, the thing as gathered nears “world.”
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We insert the example of the jug into Heidegger’s original sentence so as to make it more tangible. See
GA 7: 182/“The Thing,” Poetry, Language, Thought 181.
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[des Spiegel-Spiels] of the world.”279 By fixing things as things, we inhabit the “world,”
which “nears.”
While nearing seems to be ascribed positively as coming close to Being, instead,
nearing is akin to the jug’s lack, its emptiness. The “mirror-play” clues us into the fact
that this fixing a thing as thing is closer to a representational illusion. But Heidegger is
calling us to dwell, not inhabit the “world.” Inhabiting the world, man resides within a
given world; man simply needs to represent it accurately. Dwelling, man is part of the
world’s gathering.
This dwelling is not a mere shift of attitude, though it does indeed shift our
attitude [Einstellung]. Indeed, this dwelling is a step back from the attitude of
representational thinking [vorstellenden Denkens]; but it is also a step forward into a
residence of co-responding [Aufenhalt in einem Entsprechen] with the “world.” No
longer should we see things as objects, viewed by subjects. A thing is a gathering of the
fourfold. But, nevertheless, a thing of fourfoldness nestles or minimizes [gering]280 itself
as one thing in the world.
Heidegger explains further this occurrence. While things are simplified as part of
the “world,” they are still a gathering of the fourfold. The appearance seems otherwise;
the relational seems dependent on the unity of the thing.281 Moreover, compare this
depiction of things and their “formation” with that of “ready-to-hand”/“present-at-hand”
in the phenomenological description of Being in Time. While Dasein is central in Being
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GA 7: 182/“The Thing,” Poetry, Language, Thought 181.
GA 7: 184/“The Thing,” Poetry, Language, Thought 182. While Hofstadter translates “gering” as
“cojoin”; it seems that Heidegger’s meaning should convey, as the German word typically does, something
“insufficient.”
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and Time to the gathering of the totality of references, mortals282 are one of four major
aspects of the thinging of things.
Certainly the two descriptions have commonalities, but after “The Turning”
man’s involvement in “worldhood” is curtailed. How does the thinging of things occur
without Dasein’s primary influence? Heidegger explains it in this fashion. Though,
while a “thing” is a gathering of the fourfold, all of a sudden [jäh vermutlich], as the
“world” worlds, the simplicity283 of the thing wrests itself284 from the fourfold; and a
thing things.
To explain this conundrum contained in thinking of a thing, Heidegger turns to
language. In this relationship between man dwelling and the world worlding, where
things gather from the fourfold, where oneness is also a relation of fourfoldness, language
as correspondence [Entsprechen] is operative. Thus, a thing’s essence is a holding sway,
which follows language [Entsprechen], which in turn, follows beyng’s holding sway.
This is not a linear progression, nor a phenomenology, but a holding sway unfolding. It
is not linear because it is “before” time and space; it is not an existential phenomenology
because it is not solely within the human domain. How should this holding sway
unfolding look?
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We cannot here in the space allotted draw out the spectral differences among Heidegger’s “Dasein,”
“Da-sein,” “man” and “mortals.” We shall, for the sole purpose of this section, define them in the broadest
context possible, as roughly referring to man.
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Heidegger employs the Old German terms “ringing” [Gering] as part of the semblance of the one thing
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182/“The Thing,” Poetry, Language, Thought 180.
284
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thing, as free in the open, is still conforming to the fourfold.
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Heidegger wants to convey this unfolding situation such that man has part in the
relationship of the worlding of the world, but too, that the situation is beyond man’s
control. But more than a faculty of man, language now is meant as the means by which
the correspondence [Entsprechen] of the holding sway of Being “is.” Language in this
sense, then, is near to the neighborhood of man’s being. Heidegger has come to a new
path in his understanding in the relationship between language and Being. Language
certainly is more originary than linguistics. Let us turn more directly to language.

“Language”
Heidegger turns toward language’s role in “worlding the world” [das Welten von
Welt]285 in “Language” [Die Sprache].286 This lecture works carefully through a complex
set of relationships: the relationship between Being as originary call, the gathering rest of
the fourfold into the thing, language as the bidding call of Being, and man who hears this
call and responds. Metaphorically speaking, from the “thingly” side of things, we step
toward the “Being” side of Saying and directly into a dense account of language. These
are not dialectically related; rather, Heidegger is unknotting their heretofore common
dialectic understanding.
Heidegger does not ask the question: What is the essence of language? Rather,
Heidegger asks in what way does language occur as language. In short, language speaks
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GA 7: 181/“The Thing,” Poetry, Language, Thought 180.
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[Die Sprache spricht]. Ordinarily we think of speech as the audible expression and
communication of human feelings [Gefühle].287 This idea of speech as an utterance is the
most common. It already presupposes the idea of something internal that utters or
externalizes itself. Speech is also regarded as an activity of man; though, this seems to
contradict Heidegger’s earlier claim that language speaks. Lastly, human expression
occurs as representation and presentation [Vorstellung und Darstellung] of the real and
the unreal [Wirklichen und Unwirklichen].288 All these descriptions are in conjunction
with that, which we associate to be linguistic phenomena.
But when we listen to a poem, we listen. But what do we hear? We hear
something else going on. There seems to be more than linguistic phenomena occurring.
According to the ordinary account of language, we hear ourselves speak and we hear of
our experiences, feelings, our representations. A poem, however, speaks more than
simply the things of our world. For this reason, Heidegger sees a poem more that other
forms of language readily able to help us in our first steps toward the discovery of how
indeed does language speak.
Heidegger, like Plato, wonders what might be binding in that bond [Bündinge
jener Bindung] between words and what they evoke;289 but unlike Plato Heidegger
envisions something nearer. We listen to what is spoken in Georg Trakl’s poem, “A
Winter Evening” [»Ein Winterabend«].290 We hear more than what we already knew of
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things and the world. Accordingly, we can say that language speaks and is neither
primarily an expression nor is it an activity of man.291
As the objects are named, e.g., snow, threshold, pain, the poem does not apply
words as much as it calls “into” the word [ruft ins Wort]. “The naming calls [Das
Nennen ruft].”292 Calling brings closer the presence. But this simply isn’t bringing
closer. Calling is also a calling out into the distance, in which what it called remains, still
absent [In die Ferne, in der Gerufenes weilt als noch Abwesendes]. Nor is calling a
wresting [entreißt] that calls away from remoteness, for the call calls into itself [ruft in
sich], always there and here [hin und her]:293 there, always absent; here, calling into
presence. As such calling is twofold, a reaching out to what is absent, and drawing the
absent near while it remains absent. Heidegger asks what is more present: the so-called
items at hand, or the presence of what is called and remains absent. Heidegger holds the
latter.
What does this drawing near entail? The call bids things to come. Not to be
present among things present [Anwesende unter das Anwesende], as the laptop beneath
the fingertips of the person composing. The call bids things to come into a place of
arrival [Ort der Ankunft],294 which is also called, as a presence sheltered in absence
[Abwesen geborgenes Anwesen]. It invites things in such a way that they may bear upon
men as things. Heidegger describes the entire process: “In the naming, the things named
are called into their thinging [in ihr Dingen]. Thinging [dingend], they unfold world [ent-
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falten sie Welt], in which things linger [weilen] and so are the abiding ones [je die
weiligen sind].”295
In calling, the poem as language names and sounds the world-fourfold here [WeltGeviert her];296 and thusly, the poem calls world to the things there [zu den Dingen hin].
The poem calls things to the world and the world to things. Things are neither called to
the world of metaphysics, nor to the physical cosmos, nor to the totality of things, rather
things are called to the world-fourfold. The poem as language calls the fourfold to rest
into things while, nevertheless, remains the fourfold. So too language as Saying [Sagen]
as poem, which names the world, calls to itself here and there [her und hin]. And so we
can understand now Heidegger’s terse sentences: “The world grants to things their
presence. Things bear world. World grants things.”297 Language of the poem calls
things to come to world and world to things.
But world and things do not stand as two entities beside one another
[nebeneinander]. More precisely, the two biddings are different [geschieden], but not
separated [getrennt]. Nor are the biddings merely coupled [gekoppelt]. They
interpenetrate each other [Sie durchgehen einander] and traverse a middle [durchmessen
die Zwei eine Mitte]. In the middle they are one [In dieser sind sie einig]; they are
intimate [innig], but not as a fusion [Verschmelzung]. A fusion has no divisions. Rather,
between of world and thing [im Zwischen von Welt und Ding] prevails [waltet] as dif-
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ference [Unter-Scheid].298 World and things, then stand as an intimate gathereddifference.
Heidegger continues to discuss this difference and what it entails. The intimacy is
presencing [west] of the between, presencing in the dif-ference [west im Unter-Scheid].299
Dif-ference does not mediate after the fact by connecting world and things, but by being
the middle. It first determines the world and things in their presence, “i.e., in their being
toward one another, whose unity it carries.”300 Difference doesn’t mean a distinction as
much as unity-in-distinction. As Heidegger writes, “The dif-ference for world and thing
disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world; it disclosingly appropriates world
into the granting of things.”301 Dif-ference is not a distinction nor is it a relation [weder
Distinktion noch Relation]. In the best case, it is a dimension for world and thing
[Dimension für Welt und Ding], not a dimension of space-time, but the dimension [Die
Dimension].302 What is really called in the bidding that calls thing and world is the
authentic calling [eigentlich Geheißene], the dif-ference.303
The imagery of Trakl’s poem becomes the vehicle whereby the poem poses both
aesthetically as imagery of things in the world and structurally as Heidegger’s dif298

The actual German sentence is somewhat varied from that of the above translation: “In der Mitte der
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‘dif-’ prevails the ‘-ference,’” would make little sense. The point best made is that the separation carries
the intimate unity. GA 12: 22/“Language,” On the Way to Language 202.
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Way to Language 202.
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Holfstadter translates “ereignet” as “disclosingly appropriates.” While certainly correct, its translation
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verifying its specialized meaning as given in the Beiträge. GA 12: 22 /“Language,” On the Way to
Language 202-203.
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agreement.
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ference. Heidegger discusses the imagery of the threshold of the door between the inside
of the house and the outdoors. Dif-ference, then, is the threshold [Schwelle] of the door:
it is the sill that bears the door as a whole. It holds the middle in which the outside and
the inside [das Draußen und das Drinnen], penetrate each other [einander
durchgehen].304 The middle never wavers; always it separates while unifying.
With the threshold imagery is included the pain [Schmerz]. Ostensibly, the pain
belongs to the wanderer, who nearly walks through the threshold, but upon seeing
longed-for food on the table is frozen. Pain blocks his way, as if the entrance were not a
door, but a stone barring his way. Due to pain, the threshold is noticed.305 Were the man
simply to enter the house, the threshold would have been unnoticed.
Notice how man is now simply part of the equation of dif-ference. For Heidegger
the pain is the rift [Er is der Riß]. “Pain rends [Der Schmerz reißt],”306 he pens. What
should not be overlooked is the obvious fact that man feels pain. While things and world
penetrate each other and hold together as separated, they are simply absent without the
correlating pain of man, certainly given in sensation, but broadly construed to encompass
psychological, mental and sprirtual pain. In pain, man now notices intimately the
intimate dimensions of the threshold. The pain is the joining of the rift. Heidegger then
concludes that pain is the dif-ference itself.307 The pain of man indicates the dif-ference;
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while always there, now it is problematized. It is the problem of the central, indeed
primary, role of the original call [Das ursprüngliche Rufen], Saying.
The original call [ursprüngliche Rufen] seems to flow in the following non-linear
fashion. The simplicity of the intimate bidding [des innigen Heißen] which calls the difference and does so by leaving it unspoken [ungesprochen] and authentic [eigentlich].
This bidding is the nature of speaking and we can find it in Trakl’s poem. It is also in
speaking’s nature to bid; the bidden is man.308 The primal calling draws man to the difference in pain. Dif-ference lets the thinging of the thing [das Dingen des Dinges] rest
[beruhen] in the worlding of the world [im Welten der Welt].309 In this process,
Heidegger attempts to explain how man fits into this occurrence: the “bidding of
language commits the bidden thus to the bidding of the dif-ference.”310 In other words,
language commits man to the dif-ference, who, in pain, sees things resting in the world.
In resting, the Stillness311 is kept. There the dif-ference stills the thing as thing in
the world. The dif-ference stills in two ways. It “lets things rest in the world’s favor
[Gunst].” And it lets the world suffice itself [sich benügnen] in the thing. This double
stilling takes place as: Stillness [die Stille].312
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Stillness does not mean that it is simply without sound. In the Stillness the difference gathers the things and the world out of itself as it calls them into the rift that is the
dif-ference itself.313 Stillness is the unity. Heidegger elucidates: “Language speaks in
that command of the dif-ference calls world and things into the simple onefold of their
intimacy. Language speaks as the sounding of Stillness.”314 This sounding is not
anything human and yet it is also of the human. Sounding is not human in that it stems
from Being, yet sounding is of human in that it is heard through humans. In this sense it
is “linguistic” [»sprachlich«],315 i.e., having taken place [ereignet] out of the speaking of
language [aus dem Sprechen der Sprache].316 What takes place [Ereignete] is the
presencing of man thus brought into his own through language. Stillness presences man.
Heidegger draws out these implications: “Such an appropriating [Ereignen] takes place
[ereignet sich] in that the very nature,317 the presencing, of originary language needs and
uses318 mortals in order to hear the peal of Stillness. Only as men belonging within the
peal of Stillness are mortals319 able to speak in their own320 way [auf ihre Weise] in
spoken language.”
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GA 12: 27/“Language,” On the Way to Language 207.
Heidegger emphasizes this entire sentence in italics: “Die Sprache spricht als das Geläut der Stille.”
GA 12: 27/“Language,” On the Way to Language 207.
315
Heidegger places the word, “sprachlich” within quotation, so as to indicate he is not referring to the
study of linguistics; instead, the sounding is of speech. GA 12: 27/“Language,” On the Way to Language
207.
316
GA 12: 27/“Language,” On the Way to Language 208.
317
Heidegger italicizes Wesen. GA 12: 28/“Language,” On the Way to Language 208.
318
While Heidegger places “braucht” in italicized form, Holfstadter places both “needs” and “uses.” The
effect of Hofstadter’s emphasis is that need and use are part of Stillness. I would retain only Heidegger’s
emphasis, since it implies that Stillness and need are intimately related. Furthermore, the English word
“use” adds what Heidegger doesn’t write.
319
Presently we must comment on Heidegger’s meaning of the two terms, “men” and “mortals.” While
“men” indicates the everyday term, “mortals” indicates one element of the fourfold. While all mortals are
men, not all men are mortals, in the sense that, to quote “The Thing:” “mortals are mortals—not because
their earthly life comes to an end, but because they are capable of death as death. …” viewing the shrine of
Nothing. In short, some men choose not to view the shrine of Nothing. See GA 7: 180/“The Thing,”
Poetry, Language, Thought 178.
314
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From the Stillness, we are able to speak. All spoken language is drawn from
listening to Stillness. Authentic hearing holds back its own saying.321 Called out of the
dif-ference, mortals speak on their own part by responding [Entsprechen].322 Yet poetry
seems to hold a priority of speaking Stillness. Poetry is never merely a higher mode of
everyday language for Heidegger. Rather, everyday language hardly sounds a call any
longer. It is like a forgotten and used up poem. This fault lies with man. Heidegger
explains: “The speech of mortals rests in its relation to the speaking of language.”323
Mortals rarely abide in the Stillness; they break the Stillness.
How does the broken Stillness shape the mortal speech of verses and
sentences?324 We are still uncertain, but certainly we must never regard utterance
[Verlautbarung] or expression [Ausdruck] as the decisive element [das maßgebende
Element] of human speech [des menschlichen Sprechens].325 In broken Stillness, man
speaks with broken language that did not listen and could not respond.
Yet, having listened to the command man responds. Every mortal spoken word is
spoken by cor-responding [ent-spricht] in a multiple sense [mehrfältigen Sinne]. It is
listening and it is speaking. Most importantly cor-responding lies “in the form of which
the Stillness of the dif-ference calls world and things into the rift of its onefold

Soon in this essay Heidegger will even claim that mortals cannot hear because they break the
Stillness. It would seem, rather, that men break the Stillness, while mortals attend to it.
320
Likewise, “ihre” is italicized.
321
Heidegger’s text reads as follows: “… echte Hören halt mit dem eigenen Sagen an sich.”
322
Please note the variation of “responding” [Entsprechen] from “primal corresponding,” [anfängliche
Entsprechen], which is thinking [Denken]. The latter clearly is more primordial, and is necessary for the
former to occur. Compare GA 7: 71/“The Turning,” The Question Concerning Technology 40-41.
323
“Das Sprechen der Sterblichen beruht im Verhältnis zum Sprechen der Sprache.” GA 12:
28/“Language,” On the Way to Language 208.
324
Heidegger is placing again on the table the discussion that once was part of the distinction of discourse
[Rede] and idle chatter [Gerede] in Sein und Zeit. But here the distinction is deeper. How deep does
Heidegger intend here? We must await his analysis.
325
GA 12: 28-29/“Language,” On the Way to Language 208-209.
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simplicity.”326 Man speaks by hearing. Hearing keeps itself listening, reserving,
restraining, not just to hear the command afterward, but also to anticipate
[zuvorzukommen] it.327
In summary fashion, as if all could be nestled into four sentences, Heidegger
writes: “Language speaks. Man speaks only as he responds to language. This responding
is a hearing. It hears in so far as it listens to the command of Stillness.328 In these four
sentences Heidegger described what could be called the path of language as a whole.
While it has steps along the path, Heidegger’s “Language” offers the reader an eagle’s
eye view of the whole. Language emerges as “Being: Saying” from which all languages
flow.
Now that we have listened to “Language,” we can gauge whether this section ran
like raging rapids or dragged ceaselessly like the doldrums. In either case, we have heard
Heidegger’s account of how originary language heard as Silence is communicated as
Saying as the gathering of the fourfold into things and world. In pain, man notices this
dif-ference and listens to the Stillness. In hearing, man cor-responds and human
language emerges.
We have seen this path as a whole, but Heidegger still needs to flesh out a number
of particular elements in that path. In the next few years he again looks to the
philosophers before Socrates and literature, but not to reach beyng as toward the
Beiträge, but to move with beyng and to add details to particular steps. Neither
employing merely phenomenology narrowly defined nor his destructive retrieval, he
326

GA 12: 29/“Language,” On the Way to Language 209.
GA 12: 29/“Language,” On the Way to Language 209.
328
GA 12: 30/“Language,” On the Way to Language 210. The text is more poignant: “Die Sprache spricht.
Der Mensch spricht, insofern er der Sprache entspricht. Das Entsprechen ist Hören. Es hört, insofern es
dem Geheiß der Still gehört.”
327
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applies both in a way that could best be described as being-historical thinking and looks
toward the unfolding of Being:Saying.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
From lo&goj toward Being:Saying

“The discussion, as corresponds to a way of thinking, ends in a question. It
questions and looks for the location of the gathering site.”329

While we have seen Heidegger’s path as a whole, we now need to investigate
various steps of the “Being:Saying” path. As the path appears now, it still looks similar
to other pathways of Being in the philosophy of the first beginning. Heidegger still needs
to flesh out a number of particular elements in his path in order to fully distinguish what
he intends by Being:Saying.
Searching for an answer to the question of Being and language, Heidegger
rethinks his path in the first few years of the 1950s. Heidegger again looks to the
philosophers before Socrates, interspersing their insights with issues of dwelling,
thinking, technology and language, but not as a way to reach Being or look “toward”
beyng as he did in the Beiträge, but rather to move “with beyng” and to add details to
particular steps, but most importantly to find a site for discussion. Neither employing the

329

GA 12: 33/“Die Sprache in Gedicht,” On the Way to Language 159. Our translation alters the accepted
translation slightly, yet the meaning is consistent with Heidegger’s text: “Die Erörterung endet, wie es
einem Denkweg entspricht, in eine Frage. Sie frägt nach der Ortschaft des Ortes.”
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methods of phenomenology narrowly defined330 nor his destructive retrieval, Heidegger
applies both in a way that looks toward the unfolding of Being as Saying.

EARLY GREEK THINKING

“Logos”

Heidegger soon takes up the issue of proper thinking vis-à-vis Being. Heraclitus’
lo&goj becomes for him the way of exploring how speech as verbal communication
wrongly became the primary, perhaps the sole, understanding of language. By exploring
this movement, Heidegger too wants to incorporate Heraclitus’ “flux” as part of the
unfolding of Saying. If ideas are innate or unchanging, then the thought of Being leads
us to false conceptions of Being as innate and unchanging, as presence or as the Supreme
Being. On the other hand, if ideas are part of the flux, then they too must be changeable.
To what extent do our notions of ideas lead us to notions of Being. During this period
Heidegger, then, engages the question how thinking of Being leads toward or away from
Being.
Within fragment 50 of Heraclitus’ work Heidegger explicates how such a shift in
language seemed to have occurred. The essay, “Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)”331
illustrates the path of lo&goj. Lo&goj has moved from its original meaning as laying

330

The ways that phenomenology is defined are varied. We shall take up this issue in later chapters.
Nevertheless, it will suffice for our purposes here that Heidegger amends his phenomenological approach
in the later years of his work.
331
This essay can be found in GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze. David Krell translated the text into English
under the same title, “Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50).” Its text is part of a collection entitled, Early
Greek Thinking. Originally this essay was presented as a lecture to the Bremen Club on May 4, 1951.
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something in relation to another into the current meaning as speaking and reason. While
Heidegger takes certain liberties with the translation, his question is quite apt for our
project: How does lo&goj as “relational placing” turn into speaking?
Lo&gojas “relational placing” was originally revealing the concealment of that
which could be called “One is All.” Lo&goj revealed Being. Now lo&goj is seen as an
effect of that revealing in spoken language. Lo&goj is now word. Heidegger retrieves
the original sense of lo&goj by massaging the contents of fragment 50, not unlike a
destructive retrieval, but with a different intent. Heidegger intends to release the
relationship between speaking and originary Saying through a discussion of lo&goj. One
translation reads:
When you have listened [a0kou/santaj] not to me but to the Meaning [lo&gou],
it is wise within the same Meaning [o9mologei=n] to say: One is All [ 3En Pa/ta].332

Immediately Heidegger highlights that the solution to the riddle of fragment 50 is
achieved not by listening to man as speaker, but listening to the meaning conveyed.
Heidegger removes man from the place of centrality.
Having made that simple, yet profound shift, Heidegger then “listens” directly to
lo&goj. Heidegger understands lo&goj to be derived from le/gein and the proper sense of
le/gein is “to lay.” Heidegger holds that le/gein lends itself to the German, “legen,”
which means: to lay down and lay before. This properly means, for Heidegger, that

332

See Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, DE: Weidmannsche Verlag, 1951.) 28B8,
line 17. Richard D. McKirahan translates it thusly: “Listening not to me but to the LOGOS it is wise to
agree that all things are one.” See McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett,
1994) 10.47. Heidegger capitalizes the “eta” and drops the copulative: 3En Pa/nta.
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le/gein primarily means the “laying-down and laying-before which gathers itself and
others [sich und anderes sammelnde Nieder- und Vorlegen].”333
As such a “laying down,” lo&goj is a saying aloud. How does this “laying” come
to mean saying and talking? “Legen” is related to “lesen,” a “bringing together” in the
sense of collecting and bringing together in a reading. We read what is given before us.
Thus laying down is related to reading. What seems to be a stretch of the imagination for
the modern reader is drawn out by Heidegger.
Heidegger explains further that gathering [die Lese] is already included in laying
[die Lege]. Gathering and laying are related, not as two different activities, but one and
the same process. If you will, the enfolding of the unfolding and the unfolding of the
enfolding are the same process. Every gathering [Lesen] is already a laying [Legen].
Every laying is of itself gathering.
Since “gathering” and “laying” are the same process, Heidegger draws them
together and calls it a “letting-lie-together-before” [beisammen-vorliegen-Lassen].334
This new characterization of language as lo&goj extends into the uttermost possible
essential origins of language and to the uttermost ordinary extension of language. As
lo&goj, language spans more “territory than common language.” If originary language
focuses on the swaying of Being as holding sway, then everyday language highlights the
holding of the sway of Being as holding sway. But more accurately, originary language
is holding sway and subsequently, common language relates that holding sway. Thus, all
types of language must be seen in this light, as flowing from this “letting-lie-togetherbefore.”

333
334

GA 7: 214/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 60.
GA 7: 216/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 62.
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The full extension of language ranges from originary language to everyday
language, but this fact is hidden. There is more to language as such, then, by what
Heidegger explains in these terms. It includes hiddenness. This “letting-lie-togetherbefore” is hidden or sheltered in protection [Hut] as unconcealment [Unverborgenheit] in
common language. Everyday language receives its essential form of “letting-lietogether-before” as unconcealment [Unverborgenheit].
But the unconcealing of the concealed into unconcealment is the very presencing
of what is present [Anwesen des Vorliegenden in die Unverborgenheit]. We call this
“what is present” the Being of beings, or more precisely, the Saying of Being [Sagen].335
Heidegger then sees the unconcealing as a way of revealing; its laying is as showing or
Saying. But the reader should be wary that the Saying of Being is a content or a “what;”
Being is not reified. Saying of Being is as unconcealing of the concealed into
unconcealment.
Heidegger next relates originary language to common language. The originary
meaning of common speaking [Sprechen] in language is Saying as “letting-lie-togetherbefore” as gathered and gathering. Language, then, is determined neither by a
vocalization [fwnh/] nor by signifying [shmai/non], but by the Being of beings. Common
language derives its speaking from Being.
This relation is not incongruent with Being and Time, Heidegger relays. Within
its pages, Being appears and comes forward to its own luminous self-showing;336 lo&goj
brings by itself that which appears and comes forward in its lying before us to
335

Heidegger condenses this into one brief, copulative sentence: “Sagen ist le/gein.” [Saying is le/gein.]
GA 7: 218/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 64. While Krell translates “Sagen” as an infinitive—“to say,” I
prefer to translate it as a gerund—“Saying,” since it retains the gathering-laying meaning better far better
than a timeless infinitive.
336
GA 7: 218-219/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 64. See Being and Time, §7b.
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appearance. What Heidegger does not explicitly say in Being in Time, though, is that
Dasein has discourse because Dasein is of Being. Discourse then, can be seen related as
part of the “there” of Dasein. As such, there is a stronger relation between relationality in
“worldhood” and “Being-with” than Being and Time indicates.
If this Saying is appearing, then how is listening related? What is hearing
[Hören]? If saying is not characterized as a vocalization, then neither can corresponding
hearing occur as registering a reverberation meeting the ear. As we all know, this does
occur as the ears sense auditory sounds. Hearing, primarily so, is this gathering of
oneself directed to, and maintaining, the hearkening attunement [wenn ihr euch im
horchsamen Gehören aufhaltet]337 to Being. Poetically, Heidegger expresses this simply:
“We have ears, i.e., our bodies are equipped with ears, because we hear.”338 To what
must we direct our attention? We must be attuned properly to 3En Pa/nta.
3En Pa/nta, however, is not what the lo&goj relates as a maxim or gives as a
meaning to be understood. Nor is 3En Pa/nta what339 lo&goj pronounces. It both cases
we hear 3En Pa/nta as two entities. But neither of them is an entity. 3En Pa/nta suggests
the way in which lo&goj essentially occurs; it occurs as “One: All, All: One.” [Eins:
Alles, Alles: Eins]340 3En is the unique, unifying One. It unifies by gathering and lets it lie
before us as a whole, Pa/nta. 3En Pa/nta lets lie together before us in one presencing of
things which are usually separated from, and opposed to one another, such as day and
night. Lo&goj essentially occurs, then as that which “lets-lie-together-before.” What
does it let-lie-together-before? Pa/nta. This unifying rests in le/gein.
337

GA 7: 222/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 67.
GA 7: 220/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 65.
339
Heidegger italicizes “was” and Krell retains this emphasis. The point not to be missed is that lo&goj is
not an entity either.
340
GA 7: 224/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 69.
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This resting is neither a mere comprehensive collecting nor a mere coupling of
opposites which equalizes all contraries. Heidegger draws emphasis: “Lo&goj is in itself
and at the same time341 a revealing and a concealing. It is 0Alh/qeia.” Unconcealment
needs concealment, lh/qh, a forgetting or concealing. From concealing arises
unconcealing, its negation; the alpha privative is dependent upon its root. 0Alh/qeia,
though, occurs as both a revealing and a concealing. It does not occur as opposites.
Therefore, not as arbitrary opposites, but as originary opposites of “presence” and
absence; le/gein as presencing342 rests as a gathering. Heidegger can thusly say that 3En
Pa/nta says what lo&goj is: lo&goj says how 3En Pa/nta occurs [west]. Both are the
same [Selbe].343
Then within the fragment, whatever occurs in the le/gein of the “Meaning” [lo&gou] and
in the le/gein of the “same Meaning” [ 9omologei=n] have a primordial origin—and this in the
simple middle region between both. Heidegger wonders whether this middle region between
both is the path for mortal thinking.”344
Heidegger ventures an answer that will be addressed more fully in a later essay on
Parmenides, “moi=ra.” Yet his answer here is helpful in envisioning the path overall. In the
thinking of Heraclitus, Being (presencing) of beings appear as lo&goj, as the Laying that gathers.
Presencing appears and disappears as quickly as lightening. But the lightning-flash that flashes
between the “Meaning” and the “same Meaning” remains unforgotten. Heidegger calls this
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GA 7: 225/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 71. Heidegger’s text reads: “Der Lo&goj ist insich zumal ein
Entbergern und Verbergen.” Only “in sich zumal” is italicized both in Heidegger’s text and Krell’s
translation, indicating the simultaneity character of the revealing and concealing.
342
Again the reader should be cautioned to hold provisionally these words of “presence” and “presencing,”
for they are still reminiscent of metaphysical thinking. Eventually, Heidegger and we will replace these
term with “holding sway.”
343
GA 7: 226 /“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 71.
344
GA 7: 230 /“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 75.
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flash, Zeus345 and, at other times, moi=ra or fate. In either case, Heidegger conveys both
quickness and inevitability. This flash, when sent, steers all things as the totality of beings
present “in” Being.346 And when the flash disappears and is once again hidden, the conception
of lo&goj is transformed from the “Meaning” to the “same Meaning.”
Thus for Heidegger the conception of lo&goj has changed and its essence is now
brought forth as the Laying that gathers. As that which is holding sway, both holding and
swaying together are one, yet lo&goj is perceived and heard most often as merely a
stationary item. Yet its primordial essence as laying that gathers, as holding sway, brings
to language the means to secure Being within the essence of language as holding sway
instead of thought as conception.
Securing Being within the essence of language instead of prioritizing Being as
relayed through conceptual thought is a significant realization for Heidegger. Lo&goj,
meditatively thought as the laying that gathers, becomes the essence of “Saying” [die
Sage]. Language now becomes Being as Saying. Language would be the gathering
letting-lie-before of what is present in its presencing.347 Language becomes pivotal for
Heidegger’s understanding of Being.
But, as Heidegger notices the quickness of the lightening of lo&goj, it abruptly
vanishes. No one held onto its streak of light and the nearness of what it illuminated. In
its disappearance what we call ordinary language remains. Consequentially, ordinary
language is still seen as expression and unconcealment is quite different from Being as
Saying, the unconcealing concealing.
345

This lightning-flash [Blitzen] offers a clue to what Heidegger means of the divinity in the fourfold.
Hazarding speculation, one might offer the following suggestions: change of insight, change of paradigm,
change-seen-as-changing.
346
GA 7: 228/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 73.
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GA 7: 233/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 77.
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Heidegger cautions us that we see this lightning only when we station ourselves in
the storm of Being. In the storm our ordinary language and originary language coalesce.
All too briefly, ordinary language is seen for what it really is. We, however, drive the
storm away. We organize and calculate, plan and build edifices to have the appearance
of calm. Ordinary language remains. But this calm [Ruhe]348 is not the tranquility
[a0taraci/a] of Epicurus or the Stoic Epictetus.349 That, for Heidegger is only anesthesia
[Betäubung], a deadening of anxiety in the face of thinking.350 Heidegger’s calm is
everyday life after the storm of Being appears suddenly, and , just as suddenly
disappears.
But to what extent is Heidegger’s exploration metaphorical? The latter
description of Zeus makes it seem so. Yet his point is not metaphorical—Being is not
grounded in conceptual thought. Being now appears as lo&goj, as that which “lets-lietogether-before” and Being appears as that which recedes. Perhaps for this ostensibly
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One wonders whether Heidegger intends quite the full meaning that Krell’s translation implies. Krell’s
“tranquility” for Heidegger’s “Ruhe” certainly has overtones of the Stoic tranquility, 0ataraci/a. Such a
translation seems implausible, for Heidegger wants to distinguish his thought from those “materialists” who
would hold matter as simple and “lifeless.” On the other hand, lekta, the Stoic “sayables” lie between mere
vocal sounds and the world. This would not be incongruent with Heidegger’s approach to language.
Likewise, one should make mention of Schopenhauer’s image of tranquility and Nietzsche’s
reference to it. Schoperhauer understands that everything that happens, happens necessarily. Such a
fatalistic realization is a source of comfort and tranquillity for Schopenhauer, for nothing can be done. See
The World as Will and Representation, trans. by E F J Payne (Dover, MA: Dover Press, 1969) § 56.
Furthermore, Schopenhauer’s notion of the painless condition is the “aesthetic state.” Nietzsche likens
Epicurean a0taraci/a to Schopenhauer’s “aesthetic state,” but characterizes it as rapture, the opposite of
Kant’s disinterested delight. Heidegger holds that Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer, misunderstands
Kant’s doctrine of beauty. See Nietzsche: I The Will to Power as Art, trans. David Farrell Krell (New
York, NY: Harper & Row, 1961) 92-114.
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0Ataraci/a or tranquility was a strong value, even the “sum and end of a blessed life” for Epicurus,
such that withdrawal and disengagement from society was encouraged. See Epicurus: “Letter to
Menoeceus,” Greek and Roman Philosophy after Aristotle, ed. Jason L. Saunders (New York, NY: Free
Press, 1966) 51.
Likewise Epictetus, the Roman Stoic, encouraged freedom from perturbation. See Chapter 2,
Book 2, The Discourses of Epictetus, trans. George Long (London, GB: Elibron Classics-Adamant Media,
2005) 133-137.
350
GA 7: 233/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 77.

125

contradictory reason, does man hide from the storm of Being. We cannot grasp it; nor
can we perceive it.

DWELLING

“Building Dwelling Thinking”

Rather than building edifices that block the storm of Being, Heidegger directs our
attention toward dwelling that draws us and keeps us close to Being and its storm. The
lecture “Building Dwelling Thinking” [Bauen Wohnen Denken]351 leads us nearer to true
thinking as dwelling. Rightly, Hofstadter wants the reader to notice the title’s lack of
commas, indicating the closeness of the terms. The terms indicate a proper building,
which arises out of a proper dwelling, which in turn, arises from proper thinking. This
relationship is neither causal nor linear; but all three together mutually enhance the
proper attunement. Indeed, the proper attunement is the mutuality of their “Saying”
relationship. It is a matter of drawing near, not grasping.
The relation between Saying and language stands as the focus of this lecture.
Immediately Heidegger criticizes the common understanding of language and man’s role
in its formation. “Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while
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This lecture was offered at the Darmstadt Symposium II on “Man and Space,” August 5, 1951; the text
of which is printed in its proceedings, Neue Darmstädter Verlagsstalt (1952) 72ff. Klostermann includes it
in GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze.
Two English translations are available. The earlier, found in Poetry, Language, Thought, is
translated by Albert Hofstadter. The second is translated by David Farrell Krell as part of Basic Writings.
Neither text is wholly satisfactory; Hofstadter translates “Wesen” as “nature” while Krell translates it as
“essence.” Perhaps unavoidable, both translations seem to err on the side of common understandability at
the expense of Heidegger’s nuances. I would prefer to translate “Wesen” provisionally as “presencing,”
eventually employing the more precise phrase of “holding sway.”
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in fact language remains the master of man,”352 Heidegger provokes us. Man’s false
sense of identity as the center of the all things is part of the difficulty. This subversion of
dominance [betriebene Verkehrung dieses Herrschaftsverhältnis] over language drives
man into alienation [Unheimische].353 Instead, language is the highest and everywhere
the first [… ist die Sprache der höchste und der überall erste].354 This is to say that
language is far broader than a tool of man. Understanding language and all things as
mere tools has led us into the current predicament; we build in a “means-end Schema”
[Zweck-Mittel-Schema]355 which alienates.
But if we were to listen to what language says, we would hear a different tone.
We hear that building is really dwelling [Wohnen]. We hear that dwelling is the manner
in which we live, not as occupants, but as dwellers. “To be a human being,” writes
Heidegger, “means to be on earth as a mortal [Sterblicher].” The basic character of
dwelling is sparing and preserving [Schonen], which is to say that mortals dwell in the
way they preserve the fourfold in its essential being, its presencing.356
But language [Sprache] withdraws [entzieht] from man in its simple and highest
speech [Sprechen]. Within this sentence Heidegger indicates in typical German usage
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Both Heidegger and Hofstadter emphasize through italics the two dramatis personae, man and language,
in this relationship. GA 7: 148/“Building Dwelling Thinking”146.
353
Heidegger’s dialogue partners appear to be Marx and Freud. While Freud’s complex of Thanatos and
Eros driving a person’s personality seems more consistent with “de-centering” Dasein than would the
dialectic materialism of Marx. Both Marx and Freud, however, understand man to be alienated from his
true nature. On this latter point Heidegger is in agreement.
Mastery is a central issue for Derrida and deconstruction, whether man would be the master of his
world or philosophy would be a mastery of information. The relation between psychology and humanism,
on the one hand, and the world, on the other, is a common theme of post-modernity. For an insightful
discussion on the relation on this problem, see David Wood, Thinking After Heideggger (Malden, MA:
Blackwell, 2002), especially chapter 6, “Heidegger after Derrida.”
354
Heidegger is referring to originary language. GA 7: 148/“Building Dwelling Thinking,” Poetry,
Language, Thought 146.
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that there indeed is a difference between language, which remains, and speech.357
Speech’s primal call [anfänglicher Zuspruch] is not incapable of speaking, simply it falls
silent [sweigt]. It is this silence which man fails to heed.358 Consequently, without
heeding the Silence, building as dwelling unfolds into the building that cultivates
growing things reverts into the building that erects buildings.
Heidegger employs another image to help the reader to hear properly. Like the
jug, famously defined by its double negativity in “The Thing,” the bridge is the image
which allows man to ponder anew thinking-dwelling-building. The bridge gathers
[versammelt]. That is to say the bridge is not so much a means to cross over to the other
side of the river, as it is the passageway between two sides, drawing the two sides
together, allowing the passage of mortals. True, the bridge is both a means, a “tool” or an
instrument for use, and “symbol,” but Heidegger draws tool and symbol together. The
object doesn’t arrive first, then afterwards the symbol for which it stands. Rather, both
emerge together. The need for gathering-passage is at the same time the bridge built over
a river.
This gathering-passage of the bridge is another way to meditatively think, not
things, but the fourfold. Heidegger draws out this image in a number of sentences: “The
bridge gathers the earth as landscape around the stream;” “The bridge lets the stream run
its course and at the same time grants mortals their way;” “The bridge gathers, as a
passage that crosses, before the divinities—whether we explicitly think of, and visibly
give thanks for, their presence, as in the figure of the saint of the bridge, or whether that
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The reader should not be discouraged by Heidegger’s shifting of terms and meanings, for he is trying to
untangle the various ways that we call language and how we use language to decipher its primary
relationship to Being.
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divine presence is obstructed or even pushed wholly aside.” “The sky provides rain or
drought; the water rushes as a torrent or slowly meanders beneath the bridge in a
drought.”359 These sentences help the reader to “rethink” the bridge as means and
symbol, which gathers the fourfold into a passage. We as mortals, perhaps unaware, are
thankful360 for its granting of the safe passage from one place toward another.361
Now Heidegger would like to draw us to the “thankful part” of thinking. As
joiner of places and granting passage, the bridge leads us to the proper understanding of
building as a first-rate letting-dwell [ausgezeichnetes Wohnen-lassen]. Building
accomplishes its essential process by the raising up of locations. But if and only if we are
capable of dwelling, then can we properly build.362 Building also includes man’s inward
building of places, turning inward [»in sich gehen«], assessing inward difficulties often
relegated to the science of Psychology; even then mortals preserve the fourfold.363
Heidegger’s major thesis in this lecture is that this preserving, even perhaps
flourishing letting-dwell in the fourfold is not primarily the work or construction of man.
Rather it flows out of the proper hearing of the silence of language as Saying as it keeps
silent. While man as mortal has a part in the building, building-dwelling-thinking occurs
through listening. Only in that fashion, Heidegger maintains, can man truly live.
359

GA 7: 154-155/“Building Dwelling Thinking,” Poetry, Language, Thought 152-153.
While “thanking” seems to be an odd, if off-handed comment in this discussion, we shall see that
Heidegger in the next few years holds that thanking is a major constituent of thinking.
361
Notice how gathering replaces the usual metaphysical words for substance or identity. Moreover,
Heidegger intends to supplant both Cartesian space and Hegel’s gathering linearly of the many into one as
sublation/Aufhebung. Heidegger’s non-linear, non-spatial gathering gather while maintaining difference is
quite different; from it, linear time and dimensional space flow.
I have replaced Heidegger’s “Ort” [space] with place, the latter of which is intimately connected
to human influence. Heidegger would understand both “place” and “space” as having a human
characteristic. While Hofstadter correctly translates it as “space,” Heidegger’s nuance seems to fall on deaf
ears today. Modern metaphysical structures define space objectively, i.e., without any connection to a
subject. For this reason I choose the term, “place,” which seems least prone to this understanding.
362
Heidegger is emphatic on this regard. To this end, both he and Hofstadter employ italics. GA 7:
162/“Building Dwelling Thinking,” Poetry, Language, Thought 160.
363
GA 7: 159/“Building Dwelling Thinking,” Poetry, Language, Thought 157.
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“… Poetically Man Dwells …”

A few months after Heidegger presented “Building Dwelling Thinking,” he
offered another on the same topic of dwelling, entitled “... dichterisch wohnet der Mensch
....”.364 One might phenomenologically describe these two works as a credo for authentic
living;365 in part they are. One could also view them as Heidegger’s highlighting his
thinking of Being approach. Again, this is the somewhat the case. But what emerges as
the primary focus for Heidegger is Being as Saying, of which a proper understanding of
language is key.
Heidegger sees man, for the most part, as not hearing language properly and, thus,
not understanding language properly. Man is impressed with his great strides in
communication: clever talking, writing, and broadcasting of spoken words. These strides
are all for naught. Man gesticulates [gebärdet]366 as though he were the shaper and
master of language [Bilder und Meister], while in fact language remains the master of
man. When this relation of dominance [Herrschaftsverhältnis] gets inverted [sich
umkehre], man hits upon strange maneuvers [seltsame Machenschaften].367 Man expends
364

The Bühlerhöhe was the location for this rendition of the lecture, given on October 6, 1951. Its text was
printed Akzente, Zeitschrift für Dichtung, no. 1, 1954, 57ff. It is also contained in GA 7, Vorträge und
Aufsätze. The wholly sufficient English translation, “… Poetically Man Dwells …” is found in Poetry,
Language, Thought with Albert Hofstadter as its translator.
365
Certainly a simplistic, and for this reason, a false understanding of Heidegger as a mere advocate for
authentic living has been postulated. Among Heidegger’s harshest critics dismiss him on this account. See
Theodor W. Adorno’s The Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (Evanston, Il:
Northwestern University Press, 1973).
366
The nuance of this word should not be lost; “Gebärden” means to gesture, motion, indicate with signs
something. The meaning conveyed is that man is frantically trying to give an appearance.
367
These terms: “Bilder und Meister” and “Herrschaftsverhältnis” are these same used “Building Dwell
thinking” and now introduces the new theme of “machination” [seltsame Machenschaften] as the
consequence of inverting our relationship with language. GA 7: 193/“… Poetically Man Dwells …,”
Poetry, Language, Thought 215.
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a great deal of effort, trying to assert his dominion: we insist that we are masters, our
language is but our tool.
Language, however, is the highest and everywhere the first. While language
always beckons us, man as a whole does not hear. But a few, who listen to silence, attend
to its call. For Heidegger, these are the poets. They respond properly by listening. A
poet is not necessarily one who writes poetry, but one who, in attending to silence, hears.
As one who hears, the poet beckons others. In hearing, then, we can dwell in thinkingdwelling-building. In its proper meaning, poetry368 is thinking-dwelling-building.
Heidegger further explicates: “But poetry, as the authentic gauging of the dimension of
dwelling, is the primal form of building. Poetry first of all admits man’s dwelling into its
very nature, its presencing being.” Poetry is the original entrance into dwelling,369 from
which we build accordingly.
Authentic building—whether of ourselves, our thinking, or our places, indeed our
lives—occurs in as much as there are poets, who draw us to language’s silent call.370
And yet, reciprocally, there can be no poets unless there is authentic dwelling. And so,
Heidegger concludes this mutual relationship, of poetry and dwelling belonging together,
each calling the other, in elliptical fashion: “… poetically, man dwells ….” Language’s
silent call beckons, the poet hears and dwells in the silence. His utterance [Wort] follows
that poetical dwelling. In like fashion, man follows the poet’s word; this is authentic
building.

368

While poetry enjoys a privileged centrality over language to the proper dwelling in this 1951 essay, later
Heidegger will understand poetry as failing to reach Being, as does language in general. Originary
language, then, takes precedence.
369
Poetic dwelling is dwelling because it attends to the silence of language. GA 7: 193/“… Poetically Man
Dwells …,” Poetry, Language, Thought 215.
370
GA 7: 206/“… Poetically Man Dwells …,” Poetry, Language, Thought 227.
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THINKING

Was heisst Denken?

While building and dwelling seemed clear, thinking for Heidegger still needed
more discussion. In the following years Heidegger presented, before his formal
retirement, two sets of lectures in the winter semester of 1951-52 and summer semester in
1952. These lectures were published as Was heisst Denken?371 This work is the only
systematic presentation of Heidegger’s later thinking of the 1950s. Heidegger dedicates
the first set of lectures on what he holds to be thinking, and then he discusses thinking
from the vantage point of language—to continue the hermeneutic circle. While it doesn’t
advance our understanding of the path thus far, the work is helpful as a way because its
discussion throws brighter light onto Heidegger’s path as a whole; we begin to see
Heidegger’s approach developing. The approach of first set of lectures has best described
as thinking of Being, taking of Western philosophical concepts in order to find Being in
its proper realm; interestingly, the second set takes an approach that has a more
meditative tone of Saying of Being in Ereignis.372

371

Was heisst Denken? was published by Niemeyer Verlag in 1954. This English edition was published in
1968 by Harper and was translated with an introduction by J. Glenn Gray as What is called Thinking. Its
German text is Volume 8 of the Gesamtausgabe.
Heidegger read the final lecture after the summer semester ends, at “Colloquium über Dialektik”
in Muggenbrunn on September 15, 1952. Its text, focusing on Hegel’s Dialectic, can be found in Hegel
Studien 25 (1990): 9-40.
An essay of the same name, “Was heisst Denken?” (1952) is a condensation of these lectures. The
German text of this essay is found in GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze. Translated into English in 1968 as
“What calls for thinking,” by Fred Wieck and J. Glenn Grey, the essay is part of Basic Writings.
372
See J. Glenn Gray’s “Introduction,” Was heisst Denken? viii. In the present lectures Gray notices a
Heideggerian development toward the conception of language as “that sphere in which man can dwell
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Within the text What is called Thinking? Heidegger discusses Being and thinking.
Heidegger draws out the ramifications of two main relationships: between Being and
thinking and between originary language and ordinary language. But as the reader might
gather, the two relationships are really the same relationship from a different hermeneutic
vantage point. Somehow, Being and language are interrelated more intimately than
Being and thought in some ways; yet in other ways, Being is more intimately related to
language. More precisely, Being is originary language.

EARLY GREEK THINKING II
“moi=
moi=ra”
a

To illustrate his point that Being and language are related, Heidegger looks to
Parmenides. Heidegger begins again with a discussion of thinking. Like Heraclitus,
Parmenides helps us to think anew the relationship between Being and thinking. While
thinking upon Heraclitus, fluidity of thinking developed for Heidegger; now looking
toward Parmenides enables Heidegger to finding unity in the midst of that fluidity. In
particular Heidegger employs Parmenides’ fragment VIII. Its discussion is best
understood from a contemporaneous essay, “moi=ra”373 (1951). We shall interpret its

aright and make clear to himself who he is.” I take Gray’s phase “conception of language” to describe the
same genre as what Richardson calls “thinking of Being.” Both use the controlling image of
conceptualizing to forward the argument; thus, I would contend Heidegger is indeed moving toward
language as that sphere in which man can dwell aright (on this point I agree with Gray); however, I would
disagree that, as such, it is a conception of language. Rather, such phraseology is exactly what leads man
not to dwell aright, or more precisely such conceiving leads man astray. In its place, the “sphere” is
Ereignis, which leads man to dwell rightly.
373
This essay, “moi=ra: (Parmenides, Fragment VIII, 34-41) is found in Vorträge und Aufsätze. The
English is translated by Frank A. Capuzzi and is included in Early Greek Thinking. As proffered by the
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pages before continuing onto What is called Thinking?, for it has the necessary step
toward meditative thinking.
In “moi=ra” Heidegger’s holds that thinking and Being are the same. He employs
a rather unique translation of Parmenides, which is not without contention. But
Heidegger is not so much concerned with textual accuracy, but more so with stylizing its
content in a new way.374 Heidegger’s understands that Being and thinking are the same
in the sense that there is always a gathering-separation between thinking and Being. Both
must retain their difference as gathered.
Western philosophy has erred by subsuming one as the other in varying ways.
For Heidegger thinking is not the whole of Being. By naming the essay “moi=ra,”
Heidegger wants to infer that this gathering-separation of thinking and being is fateful
(moi=ra), that while separate they are gathered throughout one’s portion of life—in
creation, sustaining, and destiny—fateful, but not fated. That is to say, to indicate the
relationship between Being and thinking as a gathering-separation is to indicate that the
destiny of Being [Geschick] is always as holding sway. The fact that Being is a holding
sway doesn’t dictate the details of man’s life, as in the case with the Fates of Greek
mythology. But as Being is holding sway, so too is the case for man’s “essence.”
Fragment VIII elaborates on the briefer Parmenidean fragment III upon which
Heidegger’s thesis Being as gathering-separation hinges. Fragment III reads as follows:
To/ ga/r a0uto/ noei=n 0sti/n te kai ei]nai.

German edition, this essay is an undelivered portion of the lecture course Was heisst Denken? In an earlier
essay Heidegger described moi=ra as Zeus; see GA 7: 228/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 73.
374
Such was the case with Heidegger’s treatment of Nietzsche; few Nietzschean scholars would take kindly
to Heidegger’s rendition of Nietzsche.
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For thinking and being are the same.375
While Parmenides holds together being and thinking, later thinkers have separated and
opposed them. Others have combined them in such a way that equates them. In
particular Heidegger takes exception with Berkeley and Hegel. Berkeley’s assertion that
esse=percipi—and Hegel’s Logic proclamation that the real is the rational,376 which, for
Heidegger, is the unconditioned realization Berkeley’s proposition in modern times—has
subordinated Being to thinking. Heidegger examines Berkeley’s phrase carefully. While
Berkeley places Being as esse before thinking as percipi, Parmenides (Fragments III and
VIII, 34-41) orders his phrase such that noei=n (thinking) precedes ei]nai (Being) in both
fragments. This would seem to signify that Parmenides grants priority to thinking, while
Berkeley grants priority to Being. Actually the situation is reversed, Heidegger claims:
“Parmenides consigns thinking to Being, while Berkeley refers Being to thinking.”377
What Heidegger insists is that the esse=percipi equation is no mere equality, but that the
first term of the comparison has everything that the second is, yet the first is more
encompassing. Through this examination Heidegger intends both to illustrate Western
philosophy’s error in understanding thinking and to show another way of thinking of
Being.
This way of thinking is illustrated in lines 34-41 of fragment VIII. Heidegger
notices that instead of ei]nai for Being, Parmenides now uses eo2n, “being” [»das
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Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, DE: Weidmannsche Verlag, 1951.) 28B3. The
English translation is the alternate version, taken from Richard D. McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994) 11.3.
376
See Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 46, ed. Robert M. Hutchins
trans. T.M. Knox (Chicago, IL: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952) 6: “What is rational is actual and what is
actual is rational.” The German text is more illuminating in its precision: “Was vernünftig ist, das ist
wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig.” See Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Hrsg.
Johannes Hoffmeister, 4. Aufl. (Hamburg, DE: Meiner, 1955) 14.
377
GA 7: 242/“moi=ra,” Early Greek Thinking 84.
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Seiend«],378 which enunciates better the ambiguity of the duality of Being and beings.379
By doing so, says Heidegger, Parmenides illustrates that thinking arises only because this
duality between Being and beings exists first; thinking then, is on the same side as this
duality. Then, duality between Being and beings needs thinking to express this
difference.
As such thinking [Denken] always emerges as “something said” [Gesagtes] and
so rests [beruht] in le/gein. This is to say that, for Heidegger, noei=n as the “taking heed
of” [in-die-Acht-nehmen] is grounded [gründet] in and comes to presence [west] from
le/gein as “letting-lie-before” [Vorliegenlassen].380 We find ourselves in similar territory
as we found ourselves in “Logos.” Like the beyng/Being [Seyn/Sein] distinction of
section 267 of the Beiträge, this distinction of noei=n /le/gein indicates for Heidegger a
twofold, holding sway, “nature.” Noei=n “allows” the “holding” all the while le/gein
“allows” the holding sway. Thinking, as “taking heed of” comes to presence in le/gein.
Thinking is twofold because “logos” is twofold, because Being is twofold.
The key to Heidegger’s trajectory is that every utterance and every silence is
already something said, though the reverse does not always hold. To risk misleading the
reader, we could describe it in terms of “causality.” Utterances emerge as something said
because thinking is already something said. Now we can see how thinking for Heidegger
falls under the rubric of language. Thinking emerges as “something said” because it
speaks of the difference between Being and beings. But this way of description leads us
away from Being and thus, we must always hold Being and thinking together, yet all the
while maintain their distinction. This nimble reordering of thinking and Being is now
378

Heidegger uses this exact phrase, »das Seiend«. GA 7: 247/“moi=ra,” Early Greek Thinking 88.
GA 7: 247/“moi=ra,” Early Greek Thinking 88.
380
GA 7: 248/“moi=ra,” Early Greek Thinking 89.
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restructured as a type of Being as Saying; as holding sway Being as Saying is of
gathering [gathering]-separateness[sway].

THINKING II

What is Called Thinking?

What is the nature of this gathering? For a treatment of this issue, we now return
to What is Called Thinking? For Heidegger thinking and Being belong together, but they
are not a conjunction. Likewise, for Heidegger thinking, [noei=n], taking-to-heart [in-dieAcht-nehmen],381 is not determined by saying, [le/gein]. Rather, thinking [noei=n] belongs
to Being to the extent that thinking is our response to the call of Being. In that sense
thinking and Being belong together because Being needs man to listen so that the gods
may have Being—all the while, thinking flows382 from Being, which is Silence.
In lecture ten of the summer semester, the pertinent discussion arises on the
twofold character of Being and, subsequently, thinking. Both are expressed linguistically
by participles; and thusly, ordinary language’s relation to originary language is
illustrated. Participles take part in both nominal and verbal meanings. Ordinary
language expresses participles because Being and thinking are two-fold—all the while
the two meanings refer to each other. These words are participles “because what they

381

Notice how this phrase does not square with what would be called thinking of being. It is contained
within the second, summer semester lecture. See GA 8: 206/What is Called Thinking? 203-204. Heidegger
equates taking to heart with “letting-lie-before-us’ [Vorliegenlassen] in previous works. Both phrases have
beings in Being [Seiendes seiend] as its reference. See GA 8: 228/What is Called Thinking? 224.
382
Again, the term “flowing” does not mean that the relationship is linear or causal; rather “flow” indicates
that we are moving with Being and not toward or against it.
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state, [their saying: ihr Sagen] is always applied to what is in itself twofold [sich
zweifältig],” Heidegger notes.383 These words indicate both qualities of being stationary
and having movement. Because ordinary language flows from originary language,
ordinary language has a twofold character, which is best reflected as a participle.
Heidegger holds that the place of language inhabited properly, however, is
usurped by common terms. The common speech [gewöhnliches Sprechen] becomes the
current speech. We meet it on all sides, and since it is common to all, we now accept it
as the only order to inhabit the formerly habitual proper speech of language. Thus, the
commonness of language masks that there might be something awry.
But when we play with language, i.e., look at language as language, certain
markers emerge that indicate language’s proper place. Language is a complex set of
rules, not unlike a game. When we attend to this game of language [Wortspielerei],384 we
hear what language really says when it speaks.385 If we succeed in hearing what language
really is saying, then we come closer to the matter at hand. By looking at the game of
language as a game, we learn about it as well as its limits and possibilities. By simply
playing the game, we manage to learn only about elements within the game, not about the
game itself. Heidegger expresses this situation thusly: “To speak language is totally
different from employing language. Common speech merely employs [benützt]
language.”386 Language [Sprache], then, is not merely the field of expression
[Ausdrucksfeld]. Neither is it the means of expression [Ausdruckmittel]; nor is it simply
383

J. Glenn Gray’s translation captures Heidegger’s meaning, not the literal sense. See GA 8, Was heisst
Denken?: 224/What is Called Thinking? 221.
384
Wittgenstein too speaks of language game(s) [Sprachspiel]. Wittgensteins’ point is similar to
Heidegger’s discussion here, that language does not emerge as some kind of rationation. See Ludwig
Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. Wright, trans. by Denis Paul and G.E.M.
Anscombe (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1969) §§ 475, 509 and 524.
385
GA 8: 123/What is Called Thinking? 119.
386
GA 8: 133/What is Called Thinking? 128.
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the two together. Thought and poetry never simply use language; rather, they are, as
Heidegger writes, the “originary [anfängliche], the essential [wesenhafte], and therefore,
the final [letzte] speech that language speaks through the mouth of man [durch den
Menschen spricht].”387 In short, by looking at language and thought we travel “with”
Being, by employing common language we travel “away from” Being in cul-de-sacs.
To come closer to Being, we look at words in new ways, not unlike destructive
retrieval. Removing ourselves from the game, from the sphere where speech meets with
understanding or lack of understanding, we hear the pure resonance beyond mere
sound.388 In a nicely illuminating set of sentences, Heidegger explains: “Words are not
terms, and thus are not like buckets and kegs from which we scoop a content that is there.
Words are wellsprings that are found and dug up in the telling, wellsprings that must be
found and dug up again and again, that easily cave in, but that at times also well up when
least expected. If we do not go to the spring again and again, the buckets and kegs stay
empty, or their content stays stale.”389 Returning to language isn’t simple informative,
returning to language is necessary in order to keep language as language indeed is.
And so we utilize this returning to language with the word, “thinking.” If we ask
what the word “thinking” designates, we go back into the history of the word. In order to
reach the realm of speech from which the words “thought” and “thinking” speak, we
must become involved with the history of language. That history has been made
accessible by the scientific study of languages called linguistics.390

387

What is most interesting in this sentence is the claim that thinking and poetry are threefold: beginning,
presence, and end of all speaking via humans. GA 8: 132-133/What is called Thinking? 128.
388
GA 8: 134/What is Called Thinking? 130.
389
GA 8: 135/What is Called Thinking? 130.
390
GA 8: 135/What is Called Thinking? 131.
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Etymologically, thinking has similarities with thanking as shown in the Old
English root word “thanc” [Gedanc]. “Thanc” is imbued with the original nature of
memory, the inclination of holding that which is not its own. In recalling such a
situation, the heart turns toward all that is in being in response.
Thinking, then, is both a holding and a thanking; it is a response of that which it
already holds. For Heidegger this sense of gratitude, this intention, is always included in
the proper sense of thinking as its originary memory; as such memory is the gathering
aspect of thinking.391 Originary thinking is the gathering of the constant intention—the
inclination with which the inmost—of everything that the heart holds in present being.
What Heidegger calls thinking, then, includes memory, devotion, and thanks in its
essential sphere [Wesensbereich von Gedächtnis, Andacht und Dank].392 As such
thinking is always already a “Saying” of language, a gathering separation. Thus, thinking
is dependent on Being as Saying.
As we turn from thinking as language, and look to common language as language,
we should carry with us the same holding sway, the gathering separation of thinking as
Heidegger described earlier. Common language, even interpretation [Auslegung] of
texts, is always a dialogue [Gespräch]. Common language is a dialogue393 with another
person; interpretation is a dialogue with the work. But it is more; it is a dialogue with the
originary Saying, and it is, for this reason, the realm of language. Speakers in the
dialogue involve each other in that394 realm and abode about which they are speaking,

391

GA 8: 143-147/What is Called Thinking? 141-149.
GA 8: 167/What is Called Thinking? 163.
393
From poetry as authentic language, Heidegger now explores dialogue as the “essence” of language and
Being. Both have the character of lo&goj.
394
Both Hofstadter and Heidegger retain this emphatic use of the italics to indicate the abyss of originary
silence. Confer with “Alétheia,” (1943) wherein Heidegger discusses multiple interpretations; they lead to
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and lead each other to it. “Such involvement,” insists Heidegger, “is the soul of dialogue.
It leads the speakers into the unspoken.”395 The vast array of interpretations of a text, like
dialogue, leads to originary Saying.
Not simply is it the case that a text has a wide range of interpretations; it is also
the case that every word has a wide range of meanings. Heidegger calls this the mystery
of language [Geheimnis der Sprache]. It is twofold. Language is a mere [bloßen] system
of signs [Zeichensystem], uniformly available to everybody, and in this form
[gleichförmig] is enforced as binding [verbindlich durchgesetzt wird]. Language also “at
one great moment [die Sprache in einem großen Augenblick] says [sagt] one unique thing
[Einziges], for one time only [ein einziges Mal], which remains inexhaustible [das
unerschöpflich bleibt] because it is always originary [weil es stets anfänglich ist], and
thus beyond the reach of any kind of leveling [deshalb unerreichbar für jede Art von
Nivellierung].”396 Language, while seemingly manifold, is also one. Ordinary language
can be seen as a structured, uniform system because it flows from originary language.
Thus, we see the influence of Parmenides.
But ordinary language gets caught halfway. Mediocrity becomes the rule.
Custom attaches itself to the rule. Common speech fails, then, to show language’s full
range. Language in its full range can be likened to moving [bewegen] on shifting ground
[schwankenden Boden] or moving on the “billowing waters of the ocean [Wellengang
eines Meeres.”397 Belying its proper light, ordinary language seems unchanging.

the threat of relativism, and thus, lead to nothing, i.e. to Being as Ereignis. See GA 7, “Alétheia: Heraklit,
Fragment B16: 268-269/“Alétheia,” Early Greek Thinking 105-6.
395
GA 8: 182/What is Called Thinking? 178. The German text reads as follows: “Dieses Sicheinlassen ist
die Seele Des Gespräches. Es führt die Sprechenden in Ungesprochene.”
396
GA 8: 195/What is Called Thinking? 191.
397
GA 8: 196/What is Called Thinking? 192. The reader should notice the term, moving, “bewegen;”
language is moving, shifting, billowing akin to the sway of Being.
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Conversely, the essential nature of language is illumined by the relatedness of
what lies there before us [le/gein] to this letting-lie-before-us [lo&goj].398 Le/gein is a
telling, which is the matter of language [Sagen ist die Sache der Sprache.]: it tells. What
does language tell? What language tells us, is what it speaks and what it keeps silent
[schweigt]; it tells what it is.399
Language keeps silent regarding the veiled nature [das verhüllte Wesen] of le/gein
and noei=n; they correspond [entsprechen] to the unconcealed [Unverborgenen] and its
unconcealedness [Unverborgenheit]. Therefore, the essential nature of thinking cannot
be adequately defined by le/gein, taken alone, nor by noei=n alone, or again by both
together taken as conjunction. Somehow noei=n, taking-to-heart [in-die-Acht-nehmen], is
determined by le/gein.
This means two things for Heidegger. First, noei=n unfolds [entfaltet sich vom her]
out of le/gein. Common language and the understanding of the dynamic between
language and knowing set language as either flowing out of thinking or they codetermine one another. Taking [nehmen] is not grasping, but letting come what lies
before us. Second, noei=n is kept within [eingehalten im] le/gein. The heart into which it
takes things belongs to the gathering [Versammlung] where what lies before us
[Vorliegende] is safeguarded [geborgen wird] as such.
The conjunction [Gefüge] of le/gein and noei=n is the fundamental characteristic
[Grundzug] of thinking which here moves [regt] toward its essential nature.400 Thinking,
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GA 8: 204/What is Called Thinking? 202.
GA 8: 208-209/What is Called Thinking? 206.
400
Two paragraphs above, we cited Heidegger, explaining that the essential nature of thinking cannot be
characterized by a conjunction of le/gein and noei=n, while here we note Heidegger’s saying that their
conjunction is the fundamental characteristic, which then leads into its essential nature. The subtle
399
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then, is not a grasping [Greifen], neither the grasp [Zugriff] of what lies before us, nor an
attack [Angriff] upon it, insists Heidegger. In le/gein and noei=n, what lies before us is not
manipulated by means of grasping [mitt Griffen be-arbeitet]. Thinking is not grasping
[Be-greifen] or prehending. The Greeks knew nothing of the grasping concept [Begriff]
when they thought of thinking unfolding essence [Wesensentfaltung]. The reason is not
at all that thinking was then developed [entwickelt] from that time into mature thought in
the Enlightenment. Rather, evolving thinking [entfaltende Denken] of the Greeks is not
yet confined within false limits.
Le/gein and noei=n, both, by virtue of their conjunction Heidegger once called
a0lhqeu/ein: to disclose and keep disclosed what is unconcealed [entbergen und
entborgenhalten das Unverborgene].401 We shall return to this theme of a0lhqeu/ein
shortly, but let us for the moment, remain with thinking.
In conclusion of this lecture series, What is Called thinking?, we return to the
question we asked at first when we found out what our word ‘thinking’ originally means.
Thanc means memory; thinking that recalls—thanks. Can we take this gift of thinking
into its hands, that is, take it to heart, in order to entrust it in le/gein, in its telling
statement, to the original speech of language? [in einem Sagen dem ursprünglichen
Sprechen der Sprache anzuvertrauen]”402 In other words, can we allow thinking to once
again reside in language? We shall see. To answer this question we must turn once again

distinction is important to notice: their conjunction is not the essential nature of thinking, but leads into it.
See GA 8: 215/What is Called Thinking? 211.
401
GA 8: 211-215/What is Called Thinking? 208-212. Herein is a clue that Heidegger moves beyond
thinking of Being toward Saying of Being. Another clue lies in the use of unfolding; unfolding occurs not
as development over time, progressing ever concisely. Rather, it unfolds as shining forth, not solely
through Dasein, but more so through Ereignis. We shall delve into ἀληθεὺειν and Ereignis as our next
route of discussion.
402
GA 8: 247/What is Called Thinking? 244.
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to things, but in the form of technology, wherein we see a fuller picture of the
relationship between thinking, language, Being and man.
While there were a number of essays and lectures offered in early to mid 1950s,403
some ventured into old territory, perhaps to elaborate or tarry a little longer on topics we
have already discussed. While they are interesting, and thus always helpful, we turn
down the route of machination and danger, wherein Being shines forth through the
danger and saving power of technology.

TECHNOLOGY
“The Question Concerning Technology”

Perhaps more than any other later work of Heidegger, “The Question Concerning
Technology” [Die Frage nach der Technik] is known best; it became so perhaps for its
timely topic in the 50s of the strangling fear of the Cold War and the atomic bomb.404
Even if that were the case, for Heidegger such would be evidence, not of current events,
but of Being’s shining forth.
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These include many creative works within volume 13 of Gesamtausgabe, Aus der Erfahrung des
Denkens. Also included in this period are two lectures from GA 7. Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra (1953)
translated as Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?, which was a lecture given to the Bremen Club, May 8, 1953.
The English version is translated by Bernd Manus. This version is taken from Review of Metaphysics, XX
(March, 1967), 411-31. Another lecture, Wissenschaft und Besinnung (1954) translated as Science and
Reflection was offered in Schauinsland, May 15, 1953 and again in August 1954 in preparation for a
conference “Arts in the Technical Age” in Munich. The English translation is found in the compilation of
technology essays, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. It is translated by William
Lovett.
404
“Die Frage nach der Technik” (1953) is contained in GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze. William Lovitt’s
translation, “The Question Concerning Technology” can be found both in Basic Writings (1993) and The
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1977). This lecture was quite popular in Heidegger’s
time and was repeatedly offered: in Munich Academy, November 18, 1953, in Freiburg, February 12, 1954,
at the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts, November 18, 1955.
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“The Question Concerning Technology” becomes Heidegger’s focal avenue to
describe how Sein draws near to Da-sein in Ereignis.405 Like “The Thing,” it seeks the
relation between Being and man via other beings. The relation between man and Being
and Being’s openness occurs in the dangerous-saving event of enframing406 [Ge-stell]
through machination [Machenschaft]. Enframing and technology become the parameters
of thinking as truth for Heidegger, and are the center of this essay, but within its pages
Heidegger also further charts out language’s relation to truth as revealed through
Ereignis.
Today perhaps more than ever technology [Die Technik] is a way of revealing
[eine Weise des Entbergens].407 It is no mere means of revealing. Rather, technology
holds sway [west] where truth [Wahr-heit] occurs in the region [Bereich] where revealing
[Entbergen] and unconcealment [Unverborgenheit] takes place [geschieht] in a0lh/qeia.
Since the time of Plato technē [te&xnh] belongs to bringing-forth, to poiēsis [poi/hsij];
and is linked to knowledge or epistēmē [e0pisth/mh]. But today technology reveals by
challenging [Herausfordern] and provoking, unlike poiēsis [poi/hsij].408
Today things relay their meaning in the fact that they serve some end. All things
including Da-sein are standing-reserve [Bestand],409 i.e., they derive their meaning
according to their availability to serve an end. This gathering of man as standing-reserve
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It might be said that this lecture is Heidegger’s answer to dialectic materialism as offered at the time in
Marxist philosophical circles. More importantly, Heidegger is working out a new way of understanding
how the “world worlds,” or in layman’s terms, what comprises all that we conceive of when we speak of
the world.
406
Earlier we capitalized “Enframing,” for the neologism was unique. Now that it has become
commonplace in our pages, we shall treat it as any other common noun.
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GA 7: 13/“The Question Concerning Technology” 12. Hereafter, we ascribe “QCT” for “The Question
Concerning Technology.”
408
GA 7: 14/QCT 13.
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GA 7: 17/QCT 17.
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is enframing [Ge-stell].410 While man for the most part had been defined historically as
that which gathers and orders things and was unfolded [enfalten] as disposition [Gemüt].
Now man, Heidegger holds, is now revealed as gathered standing-reserve.
As gathered, man no longer is seen as the prime agent of freedom, willing or
causing. Rather, man is now defined as being affected by technology. There technology
appears as a threat to man’s existence and could deny him his ability to enter into truth.
It is dangerous. And where enframing reigns [herrscht], there danger [Gefahr] exists in
the highest sense.411
Yet this enframing that locks man in a dehumanizing control also reveals a deeper
truth, into an originary revealing [ursprünglicheres Entbergen]. The ensuing danger of
the inability to control technology, leads man to realize that he is not in control. Thus,
enframing also spawns a saving power; it leads to a deeper understanding of man and
Being in the relationship of the fourfold. While Heidegger has described the danger in
other essays,412 he brings the theme to full light by employing full usage of Hölderlin’s
poem, “Patmos.” The verse reads as follows:
Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst
Das Rettende auch.413
But where danger is, grows
The saving power also.414
Through this verse Heidegger describes the danger that technology wrought as enframing
[Ge-stell], but with it a corresponding power that saves. Only through the extreme
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GA 7: 20/QCT 19. What is interesting is Heidegger’s conjunction of enframing and attunement. While
both unfold the originary gathering, now through technology enframing is the primary mode of unfolding.
411
GA 7: 29/QCT 28. Both Lovitt and Heidegger highlight “danger” through italics.
412
Recall, for instance, “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” GA 4: 38/Elucidations 56.
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Friedrich Hölderlin, “Patmos,” verse 28. Sämtliche Werke (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 1943) 379.
414
Lovitt’s translation is quite sufficient for our purposes here.
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danger does the saving power emerge. Heidegger concludes that the saving power is that
man is being drawn close to Being, that “poetically man dwells upon this earth.”415
Lovitt, in his introduction interprets this to mean that in enframing [Ge-stell] the
reciprocal relation between Being and man, man is drawn to light and emerges in
fulfillment through language.416 Thus, through the enervating effects of enframing [Gestell] man turns to language to seek out that relationship. While hardly a conclusive
essay on language, “The Question concerning Technology” draws Heidegger’s attention
more convincingly toward language, for not Dasein, but Ereignis becomes the focal point
of Seinsgeschichte. As such, language as Saying moves clearer as the avenue toward that
light.

415

GA 7: 36/QCT 34. The reference is of the previous essay “… Poetically Man Dwells…;” the allusion
solidifies the fact that this essay’s concerns are those of proper dwelling, thinking and building. In danger
we are drawn toward proper dwelling in Ereignis.
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Lovitt, “Introduction,” The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays xx. In another vein,
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poetical occurs in all art through beauty. See Richard Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, A Reading of
Heidegger (New York, NY: SUNY, 2006) 186. Our point here is not whether poetry or common language,
truth or beauty is the proper means of dwelling; rather, our point is precisely that all of these are part of
language most proper, i.e., originary language, Being as Saying, heard as Silence, which draws man near.
Both translators would certainly agree that the Greeks did not bifurcate truth from aesthetics, since both
were part of an overall disclosiveness. Part of the disclosiveness and covered under the rubric of
production for Plato and Aristotle are te&xnh, a craft or a knack, and poi/hsij, a creation. Types of
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virtue to discern the means and ends. Lovitt and Rojcewicz, then, both are interested in disclosiveness as
conveyed by Heidegger. For an illuminating discussion on this last point, see William McNeill’s section
entitled, “Dispersions of Vision: Theory, Praxis, Techne” in The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle,
and the Ends of Theory (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 1999) 63-71 or Heidegger’s 1946 “Letter on
Humanism,” GA 9.
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ON THE WAY TO LANGUAGE
“Language in the Poem”

Language’s various voices of poetry and dialogue are next discussed in the
volume Unterwegs zur Sprache, On the Way to Language; language now wholeheartedly
preoccupies Heidegger’s time and thinking. “Die Sprache im Gedicht,” “Language in the
Poem” 417 and “Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache,” “A Dialogue on Language”418
were both written in 1953 after technology became problematized for Heidegger. It
seems that technology places us straightaway on the way to language as Being as Saying.
What is most interesting within these essays is the way Heidegger develops
language as a response to the originary call of Saying. All common languages are
elaborations of that original saying. We knew this from What is Called Thinking?.
Heidegger attempts to enact here—what he learned there—in essays that reflect the
dialogic and creative dimension of language, which “flow out” from Being, not against it.
Poetry and dialogic structure enable us to see better the essence of language than mere
prose or thought.
Also within the essays Heidegger discusses art and aesthetics. Heidegger’s point
is that Saying is beyond the metaphysical structures of aesthetics and beyond narrow
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This essay was published as a part of the volume, Unterwegs zur Sprache by Verlag Günter Neske in
1959. Included within the essay is “Eine Erörterung [a discussion] von Georg Trakls Gedicht.” Originally
this essay first appeared, though, in Merkur, 1953, under the title: Georg Trakl. Eine Erörterung seines
Gedichtes, No. 61, 226-258. The English translation by Peter D. Hertz follows “Die Sprache im Gedicht”
as one of six lectures under the title, On the Way to Language (San Francisco, CA: Harper-San Francisco,
1971).
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This essay was inspired by the occasion of a visit by Professor Tazuka of the Imperial University,
Tokyo. It was published in Unterwegs zur Sprache and was entitled, “Aus einem Gersprach von der
Sprache. Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden (1953-1954). Peter D. Hertz’s translation, “A
Dialogue on Language,” can be found in On the Way to Language.
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phenomenology, and language is not a matter of performing aesthetics, but it is a matter
of man as message-bearer, relaying aright the message of Being as Saying, which
includes all of the above.
The opening lines of “Language in the Poem” are quite helpful toward
Heidegger’s understanding of language: placing [in den Ort weisen] and the heeding [das
Beachten des Ortes] are both preliminaries of discussion [Erörtern], for language gathers.
Discussion is a way of thinking [einem Denkweg] as questioning. It questions and looks
for the location [Ortschaft] of the gathering site [Ort].419 By questioning the site more
carefully, Heidegger holds that we can hear originary language’s call of silence.
By the term “discussion,” Heidegger means all instances of language expressed
by gathering into a site, poetry does this best through waves and rhythm. Through the
instances of language we can hear the originary language as the silent call of Being.
Heidegger’s point is best expressed by this phrase: “The dialogue of thinking [Gespäch
des Denkens] with poetry aims to call forth the presencing of language, so that mortals
may learn again to live within language [in der Sprache zu wohnen].”420
Discussion gives thinking to the site. It draws us where it own presencing can be
seen. The site gathers, and through it gathering light is seen. Heidegger describes the
site thusly: The site’s “gathering power penetrates and pervades everything [Das
Versammelnde durchdringt und durchwest alles]. The site, the gathering power, gathers
in [holt zu sich ein] and preserves all it has gathered [verwarhrt des Eingeholte], not like
an encapsulating shell [abschließende Kapsel] but rather by penetrating [durchscheint]
419

GA 12: 33/“Die Sprache in Gedicht,” On the Way to Language 159.
GA 12: 34/“Die Sprache in Gedicht,” On the Way to Language 161. Both Peter Hertz and Heidegger
emphasize “Wesen.” Rather than Hertz’s translation of “Wesen” into “nature,” I use “presencing” so as to
avoid the metaphysical connotations, of which both Heidegger and Hertz wish, but also more emphatically
to place the reader in a context of dwelling aright in the holding sway of Being.
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with its light [durchleuchtet] all it has gathered, and only through this releasing it
[entläßt] into its own presencing [sein Wesen].”421 In other words, discussion as
gathering allows the holding sway to occur. It gathers by shining through all.
The poem viewed as a discussion draws us toward the site of gathering. And by
discussing a poem, we are drawn to what the poet hears. But the poet’s statement [Das
Gedicht] remains unspoken. For none of the words or meanings, individual poems, nor
their totality relay the poet’s site. Yet, Heidegger insists “every poem speaks from the
whole of the one single statement [aus dem Ganzen des einen Gedichtes], and in each
instance [jedesmal] says that statement. From the site of the statement there rises
[entquillt] the wave [Woge] that in each instance moves [bewegt] his Saying as poetic
saying [das Sagen als ein dichtendes].”422 Somehow, someway the unspoken whole
shines through each instant, though each instance is not the whole.
Heidegger peers fully into the details of Trakl’s poem, though for our purposes we
need only discuss Heidegger’s discussion as a whole, for his point is not the instances of
the poem, as was the case with Hölderlin’s “Patmos” or Georg’s “Winter evening.” We
look at the gathering site of the whole. Heidegger notes that Trakl does not use the word
spiritual to describe his meaning, for that would hearken back to a metaphysical
distinction of spiritual in contradistinction to the material. As gathering site this
distinction is null and void; it bridges the gulf [Kluft] between [zwischen] the
suprasensuous [Übersinnlichen] (nohto/n) and the sensuous [Sinnlichen] (ai0sqhto/n).423
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GA 12: 33/“Die Sprache in Gedicht,” On the Way to Language 159-160.
GA 12: 33-34/“Die Sprache in Gedicht,” On the Way to Language 160. This enigma of the site is the
crucial element of what will become the defining characteristic of Ereignis.
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It encompasses all that aesthetics and spiritual of metaphysical language had intended but
it does more.
How do we describe this gathering site via poetry? The poet first listens. The
poet’s work is to respond to the silence; the poet’s work, then is to “say after” [nachsagen] and to say again that has been separated into a gathering. The poet’s language in
the poem “becomes a saying-after [wird so zur nachsagenden], it becomes [wird]: poetry
[Dichtung].” By saying what was heard, the poet puts into words what was heard as
silence.
The spoken words [Gesprochenes] shelter [hütet] the poetic statement as that
which by its presencing remains unspoken [als das wesenhaft Ungesprochene]. In this
manner, the saying-after, thus is called upon to listen [ins Hören gerufene Nachsagen].424
Within the words of the poem lie sheltered the unspoken silence, which the poet heard.
For Heidegger, then, Trakl’s poem draws us to that which Trakl originally heard
as silence. We attend to that clear silence. For this reason Heidegger sees Trakl as a poet
of note. The poet listens to the silence of the Saying of Being. In this sense the poet
speaks in the poem, the whole within the instances, he gathers the site of hearing.
In a similar way Heidegger tries to gather the site of hearing in another essay, “A
Dialogue on Language.” Its conceit is a dialogue; like poetry dialogue is another type of
discussion. And so we see that discussion is a broad term describing as ordinary
language as it relates to originary language. As a dialogue between two men of differing
mother tongues Heidegger highlights that all ordinary languages listen to the originary
silence. But in this essay, he explores how the differing languages, while listening to the

424
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same originary silence, can be so diverse—and in their diversity, how might they be able
to communicate.

“A Dialogue on Language”

The point of departure for “A Dialogue on Language” is aesthetics. Although
aesthetics are a Western concept and Japanese are hesitant to employ such Western
conceptual structures, they do employ aesthetics in order to discuss art and its concepts
while dialoguing with Westerners. Heidegger sets out a way to find out to what extent
judgments and concepts are engaged in aesthetics and language.
The inquirer asks whether a true encounter [wahrhafte Begegnung] with European
existence [Dasein] is taking place [geschieht], in spite of all assimilations and
intermixtures [Angleichungen und Vermischungen].425 The Japanese man responds that
he has the constant sense of danger [Gefahr] that he will be led astray by Western
concepts. The inquirer indicates that there is a greater danger, that, as he says, the
“danger of our dialogues was hidden [verbarg] in language itself, not in what we
discussed, nor in the way in which we tried [versuchten] to do so.”426 Heidegger’s
concern is that the language of dialogue, in fact all language destroyed [zerstörte] the
possibility of saying what it was about. If language is the house of Being and man dwells
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GA 12: 83/“A Dialogue on Language” On the Way to Language 3.
GA 12: 85/“A Dialogue on Language,” On the Way to Language 4. Both Heidegger and Hertz
emphasize “what” [was] and “how” [wie] were not the site of the danger, but within language itself.
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in that house, then people of differing language, live in different houses. And so,
dialogue would be nearly [beinahe] impossible.427
But this distinction is still metaphysical. In the words of the Japanese man: it
“rests on the distinction between sensuous and the suprasensuous, in that structure of the
language [Bau der Sprache] is supported by the basic elements of sound and script
[Grundelemente Laut und Schrift] on the one hand, and signification and sense
[Bedeutung und Sinn] on the other.”428 This occurs in the film, Rashomon, wherein
Westerners believe they understand and captured the spirit of the Japanese world, but
filmmaking is itself originally a Western technique. It also occurs in the case of
gesturing. While we might be tempted to hold that a gesture is deeper than this
distinction, that it holds the gathering of a bearing,429 Heidegger still insists that gestures
still are steeped in the world. A gesture bears only one side of the encounter.430
In these examples, Heidegger leads the reader and the dialogue to what the West
has experienced as nihilism. The discussion of nothingness becomes the jointure
between the East and the West, between differing languages and “worlds.” In the words
of the Japanese man, Heidegger writes: “We marvel to this day how the Europeans could
lapse [verfallen] into interpreting [deuten] as nihilistic [nihilistisch] the nothingness
[Nichts] of which you speak in that lecture [What is Metaphysics? (1927)]. For us,
emptiness [Leere] is the loftiest name [höchste Name] for what you mean to say with the
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GA 12: 85/“A Dialogue on Language,” On the Way to Language 5. Heidegger here is referring to his
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word ‘Being’ [»Sein«] ….”431 When the West sees nothingness as lacking all
importance, it employs metaphysical interpretation.
But Heidegger intends here neither a destruction nor a denial of metaphysics, but
rather a new way of thinking. The dialogue partners turn to what they call the nature of
language, the presencing of language [Sprachwesen.]432 The Japanese man searches
himself for a Japanese equivalent; he shuts his eyes, he becomes silent, then he reports
that there is such a word in Japanese.433 But this word cannot be anything linguistic
[Gespräches], not unlike the “house of Being” phrase, not unlike the Japanese word “Iki,”
but those phrases and even metaphysical words are merely hints [Winken] toward the
presencing of language [Sprachwesen.] But even hints are enigmatic. They beckon to us
[Sie winken uns zu]. They beckon away [Sie winken ab] and they beckon us toward [Sie
winken uns hin] that which calls us.434
Hints, then, have a two-fold character that leads to the two-fold character of Being
from beings. As such then, they are not mere images, which are representations; hints
rather, include within themselves the self-same two-fold character of Being of holding
sway, of gathering/separateness. What relays this two-fold nature to human nature is
language. Between humans and the two-fold character of Beings and beings lies
language in a hermeneutic relation. Not hermeneutics simply as interpretation
[Auslegen], but also that which lies before it [vordem schon] as the bearer of message and
tidings [das Bringen von Botschaft und Kunde]. Heidegger, using the inquirer’s voice in
431

GA 12: 103/“A Dialogue on Language,” On the Way to Language 19.
GA 12: 108/“A Dialogue on Language,” On the Way to Language 23. While Heidegger italicizes
“wesen” to indicate its latent western connotations, Hertz drops the nuance. For this reason we include
both phrases to indicate the holdover, yet leading toward a new way.
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the dialogue, writes: “Language defines the hermeneutic relation.”435 As such, inquiry
has the proper tone of the two-fold character of Being.
In this hermeneutic relation, between the twofold and language, man realizes his
true holding sway nature by corresponding [entspricht] to the call of the two-fold
[Zuspruch der Zwiefalt], and bears witness to it in its message. Language is larger than
man; and man by bearing witness to it is never simply a thing, like a commodity.
Language is a relation. Man can never experience this two-fold relation directly, for it is
between.436
Language, then, is not merely a matter of expression or linguistics, but more so
language “is in its relation to the nature of Being, that is to say, to the sway of the twofold/auf die Sprache in ihrem Verhältnis zum Wesen des Seins, d. h. zum Walten der
Zweifalt.”437 While language is not metaphysical, it makes its appearance in the
metaphysical. Likewise, while language is not an expression of either vocal utterance or
inwardness, it makes its appearance there as well. It is not so much experience [Erlebnis]
or thought, traditionally thought, language is more so language when it occurs as Ereignis
and as such it remains unthought in every respect [bleibt … nach jeder Hinsicht
ungedacht].438
The site of this Ereignis—where man is the message bearer of the message which
the two-fold’s unconcealment speaks to him—is found in the Japanese terms, “Ku” or
emptiness and man walks the boundary of the boundless [der Mensch als der
435
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Botengänger der Botschaft der Entbergung der Zweifalt zugleich der Grenzgänger des
Grenzenlosen].439 Man walks the boundary, that is, man listens to silence of the two-fold.
Our relation to the silence is not a matter of aesthetics, though the language of
aesthetics is the best linguistic way to convey it: “it is the pure delight of the beckoning
stillness,” says Heidegger in the voice of the inquirer.440 In Occidental terms, the essence
of language comes as near as it can to the silence.
Heidegger, then, offers an East Asian rendition of the nature of language in the
voice of the Japanese man. Language is “Koto ba,” where “ba” signifies the petals which
flow from “Koto.” “Koto” includes what we what might call grace or “charis.” “Koto”
would be the happening or the saying of the holding sway, between ai0sqhto/n and
nohto/n, between aesthetics and knowing, of which the petals flow. Saying, then, is not
the name for human speaking but that which hints and beckons, like a saga
[Sagenhaft].441
Upon reflecting further Heidegger transforms the question of the presencing of
language into a reflection on the holding sway of Saying [Wesen der Sage], Saying’s
“presencing.” The discussion is not about the presencing of language but its source
[Quell] as the darkness surrounding the path [Dunkel um den Weg], which is the
presencing of Saying as silence.442
In order to discuss most properly language, it is portrayed best as a dialogue. If
we speak about [über] language, it turns into a thing, and then its reality vanishes. To
439
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avoid this we take a position above language instead of hearing from it. Then we would
be speaking from [von] language and therefore, called from out of [von … her]
language’s reality and led to [dahin] its reality. A dialogue achieves this. But this is a
dialogue about language from language. This is the hermeneutic circle and we can never
avoid it; it is inevitable [unausweichlich].
But the hermeneutic circle always remains superficial [vordergründig bleibt], for
the hermeneutic circle does not mean that it gives us originary experience [ursprünglich
erfahren] about the hermeneutical circle. Thus, Heidegger, in the voice of the inquirer
says that he would avoid speaking about the hermeneutic circle as a presentation
[Darstellung] as he would avoid speaking about [über] language.443
To avoid these ways Heidegger must reach a corresponding saying of language
[entsprechen Sagen von der Sprache zu gelangen], which is what a dialogue does. But
Heidegger takes exception with what has been called Plato’s Dialogues, for they do not
remain appropriated to Saying. Nor does any simple dialogue between two persons have
this deeper sense of dialogue. In any dialogue, Saying brings about the real dialogue.444
Heidegger describes this situation in the subjunctive mood, not meaning a contrary to fact
situation, but as a condition of possibility.445 This does not speak “about” [»über«]
language but of [von] language. It matters not that the dialogue is spoken or written.
What matters is that the dialogue remains constantly coming [fortwährend im Kommen
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bleibt]446 with a character more of silence than of talk [mehr geswiegen als geredet
würde]. If fact, being silence of silence [Schweigen zuschweigen] man is appropriated.447
This veiled relationship [verhüllte Verhältnis] regarding silence or the message
and man or the messenger plays [spielt] everywhere, Heidegger notices.448 Indeed this
relationship is a connection of being-toward-each-other [Zueinanderwesen] is not unlike
the intermingling [Ineinanderduften] of two scents in an orchard. The two scents for
Heidegger are the presencing of language and the holding sway of Being. He concludes
this remarkable comparison with these words: “the being-toward-each-other of vastness
and stillness in the same Ereignis of the message of unconcealment of the two-fold.”449
Thus, Heidegger has brought us toward a new pathway. Language is no longer a
tool, nor is it simply that which allows Being to emerge. Intimately, language and Being
are now gathered as Ereignis. By looking at the whole once again, we see that beyng and
language are indeed far closer than once thought. Through lo&goj and meditative
thinking we have taken great strides toward Being as Saying. But Heidegger takes us
farther still. For he will lead us toward Being:Saying. While to certain ears this may
sound the same: Being as Saying and Being:Saying, “A Dialogue on Language” may help
those ears to hear the closer relation, the deeper tone of Being:Saying. And so we move
directly on the way of language toward Being as Saying. We circle once again.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
From Sprache toward Being:Saying

“Wenige sind erfahren genug im Unterschied
zwischen einem Gegenstand der Wissenschaften
und einer Sache des Denkens.”450
We have investigated in detail Heidegger’s path of lo&goj in the early 1950s from
thinking of Being to Being:Saying in the last chapter. But the investigation ended in a
question. We now need to recircle the path, in hopes of finding the site of language and
Being. While it seems that Heidegger continues to follow the path through the remaining
years, what emerges is a new stride. Like any stride having one step that is passing away
and one step that is emerging, we see Heidegger moving from a “logos” understanding of
Being:Saying and toward a relational understanding of language as Being:Saying.
And so we continue our historical pathway through Heidegger’s later works.
Heidegger again looks to thinking, language and dwelling, but as a type of meditative
thinking that moves “with beyng” and ponders originary language vis-à-vis technology.
Heidegger circles his way through the thicket of Western philosophy to find a path
toward language and Being. But unlike that period of destructive retrieval in the 30s and
450

GA 13: 77/“The Thinker as Poet,” Poetry, Language Thought 5. Our translation alters the accepted
translation slightly: “Few are experienced enough in the difference between an object of scholarship and a
matter of thinking.”

159

40s, this period of meditative thinking Heidegger uses comparison as a way to find the
close connections and relationships. Heidegger’s new way includes Gelassenheit,
“letting-go” or releasement toward things into the mystery of the unfolding of Being as
Saying. Neither passive nor controlling, this new path is drawn as man converses with
Being. Reason and identity are refocused in light of this new path. Both emerge as
twofold because Being as Saying is twofold. Thus, we review what we mean by
philosophy and its principles. No longer a matter of scholarship, philosophy needs to
become a matter for thinking.

PHILOSOPHY

“What is Philosophy?”
In August, 1955 Heidegger presented “Was ist das-die Philosophie?.”451
Presented in easy prose for the general public, the lecture places his idea of what
philosophy should be, not as a fixed project, but as an inquiry into the relationship of
Being and beings, centering on originary language. Philosophy, then, is correspondence
[Ent-sprechen]452 which speaks in so far as it considers the appeal of the Being of being.
Philosophy listens to the voice of the appeal.453 This corresponding is a speaking. It is in
451

Heidegger was invited to present this lecture in Cérisy-la-Salle, Normandy in August 1955. The text
was first published under the title “Was ist das—die Philosophie?” by Pfüllingen, DE: Günter Neske, 1956.
It is also included in Klostermann’s Gesamtausgabe, Band 11. The English text is published as a small
monograph with the German text side by side under the title “What is Philosophy?,” trans. Jean T. Wilde
and William Kluback (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). Our pagination follows the
Klostermann Gesamtausgabe, followed by Wilde’s translation.
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philosophy. Heidegger intends to show that any philosophy must, like language, correspond to Being.
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GA 11: 21/“What is Philosophy?” 75-77.
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the service [Dienst] of originary language.454 Heidegger now, at the service of originary
language is presenting the matter of thinking, not in academic circles, but mixed
audiences, to the speakers of ordinary language. In the service of originary language
Heidegger moves out of the narrow confines of academic halls toward the general public.
Heidegger explains what originary language means to the general audience, that
our current conception [Vorstellung] of language has undergone strange changes
[seltsame Wandlungen]. As a consequence, language appears as an instrument of
expression [ein Instrument des Ausdrucks]. To understand this we must probably enter
into a conversation [Gespräch] with the Greek experience of language as logos. Why?
Because without a sufficient consideration of language, we never truly know what
philosophy is as the distinguished co-respondence, nor what philosophy is as a distinctive
manner [Weise] of language.
For this reason we look to poetry. But poetry is in the service of language in an
entirely different way from philosophy’s thinking. Therefore, we need to discuss the
relationship between thinking and poetic creation [Denken und Dichten]. Heidegger
writes: “Between these two there exists a secret kinship [waltet eine verborgene
Verwandtschaft] because in the service of language both intercede on behalf of language
and give lavishly of themselves. But between them an abyss or gap [Kluft] exists, for
they “dwell on the most widely separated mountains.”455
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Heidegger emphasizes “Sprache” and Wilde and Kluback follow, so as to illustrate that we are not
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MEDITATIVE THINKING

Discourse on Thinking

A few months later, on October 30, 1955, Heidegger offered another speech,
again to a general audience in Messkirch for the 175th birthday of Conradin Kreutzer
under the title, “Gelassenheit.”456 Within this speech Heidegger attempts to present his
way of thinking, using the occasion of the commemoration as a way to show how it, in
common language, includes thoughtlessness [Gedankenlosigkeit], which occurs as a
flight from thinking [auf der Flucht vor dem Denken].457 Calculative thinking is one such
flight; meditative thinking [besinnliche Denken] in particular is what Heidegger wishes to
address as a flight from thinking. Contemplation, beyond the reach of ordinary
understanding, seems best to describe what Heidegger means here by meditative.
While calculative thinking has been addressed by Heidegger as too utility
oriented, contemplation is too distant. We should dwell on what lies closest. What lies
closest?—man himself. Heidegger explains: “Man is a thinking, that is, a meditating
being./der Mensch das denkende, d.h. sinnende Wesen ist.”458 The point is that man does
not do thinking, but is a thinking being as meditative presencing.
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This speech was originally published by Günter Neske Verlag under the title of Gelassenheit and can be
found in volume 16 of Klostermann’s Gesamtausgabe with other speeches, most of which are political in
nature. This English translation is published by Harper & Row, 1966 under the title Discourse on
Thinking. The translators are John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. See Discourse on Thinking, (New
York, NY: Harper-Torchbooks, 1977) and GA 16, Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges: 224.
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GA 16, 519/Discourse on Thinking 45. Both Heidegger’s text and that of Anderson and Freund use
italics, in order to show common language is derivative of originary language. Thus on common languahe
as thoughtlessness, thought flees.
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GA 16, 520/Discourse on Thinking 47. The emphases in the English text follow Heidegger’s text.
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Technology has disabled our true thinking presencing; we calculate or
contemplate. One leads us deeper into the technical and the other flees it. But neither
can address the dangers of technology, like atomic energy. Neither reaches the ground,
for both are part of this new relation of man to the world. For example, nature has
changed for us; it now becomes a source for energy and power. The power concealed in
technology determines the relationship. The world becomes uncanny, strange; and more
importantly, man is unprepared for this transformation and we are ill-prepared for our
inability to confront it.
To confront properly this uncanniness, meditative thinking must awake to
technology, not flee from it. This meditative thinking [besinnliche Denken] demands that
we engage what doesn’t seem to go together.459 But it does not engage like calculative
thinking would engage. Rather, meditative thinking engages differently. Heidegger
outlines how meditative thinking engages by not engaging: “We let technical devices
enter our daily lives, and at the same time leave them outside, that is, let them alone, as
things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent upon something higher.” This
comportment is “Gelassenheit zu den Dingen,” a releasement toward things.460 This
“letting go” is not the tranquility of the Stoics, nor exactly is it Meister Ekhhart’s letting
the world go and giving one self to God. The comportment is one of letting the world go
and giving oneself to things and openness to the mystery [die offenheit für das
Geheimnis] of the hidden meaning in technology.461
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GA 16, 526/Discourse on Thinking 53.
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Meditative thinking, which is both of these engagements together—releasement to
things and openness to the mystery—allows us to dwell anew and allows man to live in a
technological world without being threatened by it. Dwelling anew leads us to a new
path.
Dwelling anew asks us to engage meditative thinking so that we might hear the
call through technology and the world, letting go toward things and open ourselves to the
mystery. While Heidegger doesn’t explain fully what he means by the mystery. His
language leads us to surmise that he is speaking of Ereignis. Perhaps Heidegger avoids
using “Eriegnis” because he is using common language for a general audience. In any
case, he does offer the possibility of a new path, by which we dwell.

The Principle of Reason

From the public realm Heidegger moves back into the academic world with two
comprehensive works that discuss thorny issues. These issues would be what philosophy
calls reason and substance. For meditative thinking [besinnliche Denken] to become a
possibility, Heidegger must help us to rethink both thinking and things. While he has
been doing this already, within these two years between 1956 and 1957 Heidegger leads
us to meditative thinking through a thorough disengagement with Western “reason” and
“substance.” Two major works, Der Satz vom Grund and Identität und Differenz, with a
few smaller essays, show this path to meditative thinking.
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In the Winter semester 1955 Heidegger offered the course entitled, Der Satz vom
Grund, part I.462 This work addresses Leibniz’ principle of reason: “Nothing is without
reason.” Hence, the English title, The Principle of Reason refers specifically to Leibniz.
Yet, Heidegger’s title indicates, that while addressing Leibniz, the topic is broader than
reason; Heidegger is addressing the issue of reason’s foundation. In many ways, it could
be said that Heidegger’s dissenters have found Heidegger’s way thus far without reason.
That is to say, Heidegger’s Seinsfrage is an empty project and his turn toward
Seinsgeschichte is a blind alley. But Heidegger is illustrating that there indeed is a need
to move out of the conceptual framework of the Western tradition.
Ironically, Heidegger wants to show that reason and questioning of the Western
tradition itself need a ground: Being. As so in typical fashion, Heidegger kneads
language to evoke new ways of dwelling that illustrates his point. Heidegger reshapes
the phrase into something quite different: Nothing is … without reason.463 While the
words and their order in the sentence are exactly those of Leibniz,464 Heidegger makes
much of the sentence’s new meaning. Placing reason within the realm of Being,
Heidegger subjugates reason’s power and limits it within Being’s realm. But Heidegger
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Der Satz vom Grund is a published manuscript (1957) of a one-hour lecture course, offered at the
University of Freiburg in Winter 1955 and Summer 1956. Heidegger offered an address with the same title
and abbreviated contents at the Bremen Club, May 25, 1956 and at the University of Vienna, October 24,
1956. The German text is contained in volume 10 of Gesamtausgabe. Reginald Lilly’s English translation
is entitled, The Principle of Reason (Bloomington, PA: Indiana University, 1991).
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The presentation of the sentence is entirely my own. By grouping the first two words, “Nothing is” we
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“before” reason or “without reason.” The meaning of the latter phrase is our current topic.
While Reginald Lilly translates “Seyn” as “Being,” we shall retain our distinction of “Being” as
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464
It should be noted that Leibniz’s sentence was first cast in Latin: “Nihil est sine ratione.” Its English
rendition, “Nothing is without reason,” for our purposes is quite adequate.
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doesn’t want simply to undermine Leibniz or reason, Heidegger wishes us to look at both
renditions in tandem. In this tandem view, a shift is noticed.
From Leibniz’s to Heidegger’s new rendition there is a shift that helps us to
dwell. It is a leap from the first to the second rendition. Within this leap we find
interesting possibilities for language: it is both a tool (first) and that which opens new
possibilities. With Being, language shows us reason’s realm. Reason dwells within
Being and language. Being, originary language, as both stationary and moving, it is the
ground, without ground. Thus, Leibniz’s principle leaps out from that fundamental
principle about beings toward the principle of reason as an utterance of being.
Those skeptical of Heidegger’s discussion465 use equivocation as their means of
attack; they see that Heidegger abuses language for his own purposes. But Heidegger
notes that such ambiguity of language is deeper than mere fallacy. The fact that
ambiguity already occurs in ordinary language is indeed the clue illustrating that Being
and originary language is always two-fold.
This two-foldness of Being, its Geschick, unfolds into ordinary language. We
ordinarily think that language is historical; and therefore, many meanings inevitably
occur. But Heidegger reverses this understanding. Since Being is two-fold as Saying in
Silence, ordinary language flows from originary language. Heidegger writes: polysemy
is always historical polysemy. It springs from the fact while speaking of language, we
noticed the two-foldness of being [Seinsgeschick]; Heidegger writes that we are “struck,
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Rudolf Carnap accuses Heidegger of employing metaphysical pseudo-statements in lieu of truthstatements. As such Carnap agues that Heidegger is offering non-sense. See Rudolf Carnap, “The
Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language,” trans. Arthur Pap in Logical
Positivism, A.J. Ayer (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1959) 69.
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that means addressed [d.h. angesprochen sind], differently by the Being of beings [Sein
des Seienden].”466
This two-foldness of Being is that which has been called “ground.” It is that of
which is conceived in Western philosophy as reason, as the fundamental principle of all
beings in Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza. But rather than conceiving of reason, man is
actually being addressed by the Being of being. As being an addressing, the Being of
beings also is Saying. Due to the “Saying” of Being reason can be conceived as the
fundamental principle about beings. Thus, this principle leaps out from being the
fundamental principle about beings as the principle of reason into an utterance of
being.467
Thus, when we think of what is the foundation or ground, we think first of
something upon which another rests: a basis, a principle, a reason. But now Heidegger
has drawn us to understand that Being is the “ground of all beings,” not as a thing, but as
an utterance of the unfathomable Silence. Heidegger affirms this point in the following
words: “The Geschick of being is, as an appeal and claim, the verdict on the basis of
which all human speaking speaks.”468 This is to say that it is precisely because Being is
two-fold, can Being be the Being of beings. For this reason, we can say something exists
rather than nothing at all. In this sense, then, there is something rational in things: reason,
cause, principle.469 It is the two-foldness of the groundless ground of Being.
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Yet two-foldness is hidden: Being appears as Silence. As Silence it is a Saying.
As Saying as Silence, Being draws man to its Silence and upon hearing man speaks of
that which he hears. In contrast, Leibniz speaks of reason as the ground of all beings.
What is clear to Heidegger in this last statement is that: “[t]he principle of reason is an
uttering [Sagen] of Being.”470 But the principle of reason or the ground of beings
remains as a remove from Being. Being is the abyss [Ab-grund] in a concealed manner
[Verborgenerweise], from which reason and principles emerge as what man hears.471
What man hears is not simply from his ears, but man hears also of a belonging to
which man is attuned. Heidegger expresses hearing in this fashion:
This hearing [Gehör] has something to do not only with the ear, but also
with a human’s belonging [Zugehörigkeit] to what its [his] essence is
attuned to. Humans are at-tuned [ge-stimmt] to what de-termines [bestimmt] their essence. In this de-termining, humans are touched and called
forth by a voice [Stimme] that peals all the more purely the more it silently
[lautloser] reverberates [hindurchklingt] through what speaks
[Lautende].472
Hearing is belonging; and belonging is relational. Our hearing is attuned to the utter
silence of Being, heard as Silence. Thus, common hearing included in ordinary
conversational language is broader than ordinary hearing, broader than the faculty man
uses. We hear the silence of Being as originary language. To it do we belong. Language
in this sense houses man. We belong to it.
Might we again ask what is the principle of reason? Heidegger would answer that
Being as Saying is the groundless grounding of beings. Being as Saying is that, which
we call the abyss. Rather than reason being the fundamental principle of all beings,
470
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Being grounds reason. It includes that which Aristotle calls “o@n h]| o@n,” Spinoza calls
“Natura,” and Leibniz calls “Ratio.” And Being, which silently calls out, is what in the
Western philosophical tradition was heard as reason. Being calls.

“On the Question of Being”

But what sort of language could properly be used to indicate either Being or its
call? Heidegger engages this question between winter and summer semesters in 1955,
when he wrote “Über ‘Die Linie’” for the Ernst Jünger Festschrift.473 It is the occasion of
Heidegger asking, again, what language could be used when discussing Being in light of
nihilism, that is, Being across the line from beings. The question of Being dies,
Heidegger remarks, if we stay within the language of metaphysics.474
As we have seen Heidegger prefers “presencing” [Anwesen] of Being as opposed
to Being’s being “present” as an essence [Wesen]. This presencing is directed toward the
human “essence,” insofar as its presencing is a call [Geheiß] that on every occasion calls
upon the human “essence” [Menschenwesen]. The human “essence” rather than
“essence” as such is hearing [Gehör], because the essence of human beings belongs to
this call, to the approach of presencing [ins Anwesen].475 The call and the hearing belong
together each time Being presences. But would this be Being, since the call and the
hearing always belong together? No word can adequately convey this.
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It was later published as “Zur Seinsfrage.” Its text is found in volume 9 of Gesamtausgabe,
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Heidegger offers his final ascription for Being, i.e., Being crossed-out: being476
[Sein]. The purpose of crossing out of Being is twofold. Simply, to indicate that no
word, no sign, can convey Being as Being presences. But more importantly, the crossing
points toward the four regions of the fourfold and their being gathered in the locale of this
crossing through.477
Heidegger explains how the call and the hearing belong together so intimately that
one can never separate Being from the human, though Being is not simply of the human.
Since man as one the fourfold is needed to bring the zone of Being into presencing, man
and Being can never be separated by a clear line. Rather the line between man and Being
must lie elsewhere. The location or zone of the line, then, would be the locality of the
essence of consummate nihilism.478

Identity and Difference

From the discussion of the Western tradition of reason and Being in relation to
consummate nihilism, Heidegger explores the tradition’s conception of “substance,”
which has emerged rationally. Now that reason is “placed” in its proper relation to
Being, so too must we “place” a substance in its proper relation to Being. Between the
years of 1955-1957, Heidegger worked on what he considered to be the most important
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work since Being and Time, namely Identität und Differenz.479 Within its fifty-some
pages Heidegger delves into the relation between Being and man vis-à-vis things. Once
Heidegger called this relation the ontological difference; now he calls it Ereignis. With
Ereignis as his guide, Heidegger explores once again what the “nature” of a thing is.
With his new terminology, Heidegger tackles the nagging problem of “substance.”
Rather than employing either the Aristotelian terminology of substantial being or
the Leibnizian problem of singular unity of Being as ratio, Heidegger employs identity
and difference to discuss relational unity of Being to beings. Invoking Parmenides,
Heidegger notices unity has always been thought in terms of identity: A=A. Identity was
sameness, but Heidegger notices “sameness [Selbigkeit] implies the relation of ‘with,’
[»mit«];”480 that is to say, between the two “A”s in the equation, something else works
between them to show identity. Thus, identity emerges from issues of duality, between
“One and Many,” Being and beings, between subject and object. Throughout the history
of Western philosophy the solution always included a mediating third thing, or mediation
of synthesis. Since German Idealism from Leibniz to Hegel, identity appeared as an
abstract unity between two things.
The principle of identity, however, speaks not of abstract unity, but of the Being
of beings. We are related to beings of every kind; identity makes its claim on us. This
479
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claim of identity speaks.481 It speaks in the sense that everywhere identity is a basic
characteristic in beings; all beings have Being.
From Parmenides onward, Western philosophy heard the claim of identity as: the
thought of Being is the same as Being; that is, they are identical. What was heard was
that thought and Being belong together [Zusammengehören] as in Leibniz.482 And thus
the project was always the attempt to connect them. For German Idealism, the
connection was a unifying, authoritative synthesis, which mediated the unity of the
manifold. Heidegger comments: “Philosophy represents this belonging together as nexus
and connexio, the necessary connection of the one with the other.”483
But one can also look at the belonging together [Zusammengehören].484 And thus
the together is determined by the belonging. The reference here helps us to notice that it
is no longer the unity of the together, but rather we need to experience this togetherness
in terms of belonging. What would belonging mean in this case? How would the
belonging of beings, man and Being appear? This leads us to new pathways.
Man belongs to Being as the totality of beings belongs to Being. But man also
belongs to Being in that uniquely man listens to Being because man is appropriated to
Being. Being, in turn, belongs to man in that Being is present only when man is open to
its holding sway. We see, then, both man and Being are appropriated to each other
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[einander überreignet].485 They belong to each other. We need to look closer at this
“belonging-to-each-other” [Zu-einander-gehören].
To look closer we must spring away from traditional metaphysical formulations.
It springs away from man as rational animal. It too springs away from Being as the
ground in which every being is grounded. We spring into the abyss [Abgrund]; only then
can Being be present as holding sway [als Sein Wesen, d.h an-wesen].486 Heidegger
describes this springing: “This spring is the abruptness of the unbridged entry into that
belonging which alone can grant a toward-each-other of man and Being and thus the
constellation of the two.”487 This “unbridged entry” of mutual appropriation is from their
active presencing, that is, not their passive natures of Western metaphysics. Into that
active entryway, can we experience thinking as meditative thinking.
This springing comes not from ourselves. Due to the totality of technology
[Vorstellung vom Ganzen der technischen Welt] we reduce everything to man and we fail
to hear the claim of Being [Anspruch des Seins]. All things appear as part of the
calculable. Being is challenged, but man too is now challenged, for man must now place
himself as part of that calculative horizon. This mutual challenge [wechselseitgen
Herausforderung] is what Heidegger calls enframing [Ge-stell].488 This framing no
longer appears as something that is present. Anything present comforts us because we
grasp or control it. For this reason enframing startles us because it is not of our doing.
Man is delivered over to this awareness of lack of control. Lack of control delivers us
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over to silence; silence is the call of Being. Man and Being are delivered over to each
over [einzukehren]. This is the event of the appropriation, the Ereignis.489 Springing
emerges from Ereignis.
We can no longer speak of this way of springing in terms of thinking via lo/goj
or Tao; rather it must be in terms of meditative thinking. It is not a happening as an event
would occur, not occurring in time as a series of numerical events. Ereignis occurs as the
singulare tantum,490 where Being and man are drawn together. What we experience at
the danger of technology is the prelude [Vorspeil]491 of Ereignis. The saving grace of the
Ereignis is never produced solely by man; its transformation [Verwindung] by virtue of
the happening of the Ereignis [brächte die ereignishafte] will bring back technology into
the servitude of man.492 In this vibrating [schwingende] Ereignis, man and Being reach
their active “natures” and shed the qualities accrued in metaphysical speculation.
To think meditatively of the transformation in the Ereignis as self-vibrating, that
is, active, is to contribute partly to Ereignis’ transformation. Thus, Ereignis never occurs
without man’s involvement. Meditative thinking receives the tools for thinking this selfvibrating realm from language,493 for language is the most receptive of this self-vibrating,
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this holding sway. In as much as we dwell in this holding sway we are given over to
language.
How does identity relate to Ereignis? Identity isn’t this or that equated by a third
thing. Identity occurs in its presencing of the abysmal Ereignis. Inactive notions of
“substance” now give way to active holding sway in the Ereignis. The principle of
identity now entails a springing. This springing into the essential origin of identity is the
transformation into meditative thinking.
From this vantage point of identity, we can move toward Heidegger’s second
section of Identity and Difference, “The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics.”
It entails a “truer look” into difference in light of the identity as given via Ereignis.
Hegel imagined thinking as the absolute idea and Being as the absolute self-thinking of
thinking; this is philosophy for Hegel. He also imagined the history of philosophy in a
historical relation in a dialectical process throughout time, though this relation is merely
speculative. Yet, if all philosophy and the history of philosophy are externally related as
beyond the overall control of man, that is to say transcendentally related, then how can it
relate internally, that is, related to the world? And conversely, if they are related
internally, then how could they relate externally? As absolute concept thinking of itself,
even in time, it thinks only of itself, namely the same. Being, thought, beings are all the
same for Hegel, could we not say? And so German Idealism has become onto-theological. Whence comes difference?
Heidegger understands the conversation with the history of philosophy not as
Hegel’s negating elevation of Aufhebung, but as a step taken back. We step back from
thought as Being, to the question of what indeed gives us thought. We step back to the
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realization that there is a difference between Being and beings. The difference is the
ontological difference [Differenz], which is unthought. We now ask why that difference
had disappeared. The abandonment [Vergessenheit] of that difference is what we look
toward.494 Forgetfulness in terms of concealment lh/qh495 is our quandary now.
Only when we think of Being and its difference with beings can we address this
issue. If we represent difference as a distinction between Being and beings, it appears as
yet another thing, even if it is a distinction of understanding. Instead, we encounter the
difference so encompassingly that we do not notice it; it appears as nothing. It is
concealed in beings. Being is the Being of beings.
Metaphysics see beings as such, i.e. in general and as a whole; metaphysics thinks
Being as the ground giving unity of what is most general and Being as the unity of all that
accounts for ground, the “All-highest.” For metaphysics Being occurs variously as the
first ground, u9pokei/menon, first cause, causa sui, even as lo/goj, substance, and subject.
Metaphysics has the problem of presenting Being in either onto-logical or theo-logical
frames.496 Let us look closer at the phrase Being of beings.
Being of beings—What could this “of” mean? Is it taken as the objective genitive
sense, that beings are the beings or the objects of Being? Or is it taken as the subjective
genitive sense or genitive of origin, that Being is the source of beings.” For instance, in
494

GA 11: 59/Identity and Difference 50. Stambaugh translates “Vergessenheit” as “oblivion.”
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the case of the phrase, “a house of cards,” a house could contain cards within it
objectively, but more often the meaning is that the house of cards is taken as the house
made of cards. Neither of these senses seems to convey what Heidegger intends.
Rather, Being of beings means “Being,” which “occurs” transitively in beings.497
Being doesn’t leave someplace and go over to beings. Being moves transitively, in that it
comes over unconcealingly and arrives as something of itself as unconcealed only by that
“coming over.” While Heidegger’s language is spatial; it is only metaphorical language.
Space and time emerge only “after” Being. Arrival in this language schema means to
keep concealed in unconcealedness: therefore to abide in this keeping: to be a being.498
What does it mean to be the Being of beings? Heidegger’s next description is
quite dense and crucial. First we shall offer it as Heidegger does, unaided, and then in the
next paragraph, we shall unpack it. Heidegger calls this concealing of Being, the
“unconcealing overwhelming.” [entbergende Überkommnis].499 Beings appear or arrive
[Ankunft] such that Being keeps itself concealed in unconcealedness.500 Beings appear as
present and differentiated [Unterschiedenen] in the sense that they are all the “Same”
[Selben] in the differentiation [Unter-Schied], which grants and holds [hält] apart
[einander] the “between” [Zwischen].501 Within the “between,” the “unconcealing
overwhelming” and the “arrival” are held toward one another as “borne away from” and
“toward one another” [auseinander-zueinander]. The difference of Being and beings as
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the differentiation of overwhelming and arrival: [is] the perdurance [Austrag] of the two
in unconcealing keeping in concealment [der entbergend-bergende Austrag beide].502
Thus we think the difference between Being and beings without making it
disappear. We follow the difference. What is held apart is held in the tension of
perdurance: not only does Being ground beings as their ground, but beings in their turn
ground, cause Being in their own way—they are the fullness of Being. Within the
“between” Being and beings are held constant, that is, the holding endures. The holding
endures both as a holding together and a holding apart. And so Being appears as
conspicuously absent and beings appears as the same, different things in the world.
Being is perduring.
“Perduring” [Austrag] is the crucial hinge for Heidegger. While Heraclitus
helped Heidegger to understand that Being is holding “sway,” Parmenides now helps
Heidegger to understand that Being is as a “holding” sway. We have often employed this
phrase, holding sway. Now we are able to fully appreciate the “holding” of the holding
sway as “perduring” [Austrag]. Perdurance as holding is a circling: Being and beings
around each other.503 One comes over the other; the other arrives in the one in reciprocal
reflection.
In reflection, Being becomes perduringly present in beings as lo/goj in the sense
of ground, as the gathering of what unifies the 3En is twofold: it is the unifying one as
primal and universal; it is the unifying one as the All-highest, like Zeus. Lo/goj grounds
and gathers everything into the universal and into the unique.
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GA 11: 71/Identity and Difference 65. Stambaugh follows Heidegger’s emphasis; we follow suit.
GA 11: 75/Identity and Difference 69. Heidegger’s text reads as follows: “Der Austrag ist ein Kreisen,
das Umeinanderkreisen von Sein und Seiendem.”
503

178

This same lo/goj contains within itself the essential origin of the character of all
language, and thus determines the way of utterance [die Weise des Sagens] as a logical
way in the broader sense. From originary language emerges lo/goj. Lo/goj, then, is the
“essence” of language. Lo/goj as language is the site of Ereignis.
Our Western languages are languages of metaphysical thinking, each in its own
way. Heidegger wonders whether the nature of Western languages is in itself marked
with the exclusive brand of metaphysics, and thus marked permanently by onto-theologic. Perhaps these languages offer other possibilities of utterance—and that means at
the same time of the telling silence. Thoughtful utterance as meditative thinking has
allowed us to follow this pathway.

LANGUAGE
In next few years Heidegger maps out language. Language had always stirred
interest for Heidegger, but in the mid 1950s language took on significant importance on
his road map toward Being as Saying. Three works specifically allow us to draw the
contours of its trajectory: “Hebel—der Hausfreund,” “Das Wesen der Sprache” and
‘“Dichten und Denken. Zu Stefan Georges Gedicht ‘Das Wort’” while a fourth, “Hegel
und die Griechen” can succinctly convey what language is not. We turn down the direct
path toward the “nature” of language.
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“Hebel—Friend of the House”
In 1957 Heidegger composed “Hebel—der Hausfreund.”504 This creative work
highlights language as the friend of those who dwell; language both shows and reflects,
but also accompanies humanity. While representing, language also gathers; in gathering
language makes the world inhabitable. Language, like the poet, is a friend who makes
life inhabitable.
We discuss language first in its common understanding. It is commonly
understood that every language has unique characteristics that make life most
comfortable. For each region a language fits its people. Dialects arise that reflect the
living patterns, even the personalities, of the people speaking it. Heidegger phrases the
importance of dialects as a mysterious wellspring: “Dialect [Die Mundart] is the
mysterious wellspring [geheimnisvolle Quell] of every mature [gewachsenen] language.
Whatever is contained in the spirit of a language [Sprachgeist] flows out to us [zuströmt]
from the dialect.”505 Heidegger understands that the experienced dialect contains the
spirit of language; it could be said that the dialect is lived language. Thus, lived language
is the common understanding of language.
In the midst of lived language, dialects both intensify language and simplify our
life. Dialects are ennobling [Veredeln] such that they transform what happens [geschieht]
and makes it poignant by way of an intensified [gesteigerte] language. Poetically,
Heidegger explains: that both characteristics of dialects “transform everything into the
504
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soft glow [milden Glanz] of the peacefully sounding word [ruhig klingenden Wortes].”506
Like the house, which is only a house in its dwelling, language become language only
when it is inhabited. Even more so, as a house in its living allows [wohnenlassen] us to
dwell, and awakens [weckt] and assures [gewährt] ever more original [ursprünglichere]
possibilities [Möglichkeiten] for dwelling—so too does language in its multiplicity and
rich transformations of living allows us to dwell.507 In short, lived language houses all
that makes a person human; and in living the language, humans make language into a
dwelling of incomparable wealth.
Language makes life rich in its rich multiplicity. It accompanies us along the way
like a house-friend. Heidegger writes, “The house-friend neither wishes to instruct
[belehren] nor to educate [erziehen].”508 The house-friend journeys along. Similarly
with language; it is a fellow sojourner. We dwell in language’s splendor, bask in its
warmth and enjoy its friendly company in “world.” Language is comfortable [heimlich].
But language too can grow into a cold structure in “work.” Without dialects and
regional personalities, indeed, without the differences of each person in a region, his or
her quirks, the unique turn of phrase, the cadence that singles out that person, language is
a mere container. If language were to instruct, it would become formal and therefore, not
a suitable dwelling place. Supplanting language as friend, language as “work” drives us
toward calculative dwelling. Ultimately, language becomes a “language machine”
[Sprachmaschine], language without human contact; in enframing, the language machine
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has become a frozen actuality [verwirklicht].509 Language in “work” becomes like a
lifeless tool. A “meme” is a current example.
Consequentially, we take language as the instrument for communication and
information [Verständigung und der Information]. “This notion [Diese Vorstellung] of
language is so familiar [geläufig] to us that we scarcely notice [kaum bemerken] its
uncanny power [unheimliche Macht],510 Heidegger explains. In this event, technology
controls language and the mode of living. Language here is uncomfortable [unheimlich].
How do we bring language to be a friend once again? Whenever talk [Rede] is
one of deeper relations, language at once [sogleich] enters [eintritt] in—the poetic [die
poetische]. The poets offer us hope as it draws us deeper into life. Dramatically
Heidegger refers to Goethe in a rare gesture. Without instructing and as a companion,
language is able to re-entrust [zurückzubergen] the calculability [erechenbarkeit] and
technology of nature into the open mystery [offene Geheimnis] of a newly experienced
[erfahrenen] naturalness of nature.511 The poets draw us deeper into life and “bring to
language” [zur Sprache bringen] what language is in its essence.
Let us consider what Heidegger means by the phrase “bring to language.” If we
look thoughtfully [bedachtsam], with regard to the bearing [Gewicht] of its words,
language acquires [gewinnt] a deeper sense [tieferen Sinn]. Then, “to bring to language”
means that we lift up what was unspoken and let it appear. “If we thoughtfully consider
[bedenken] the character of saying [Sagen] in this regard [Hinsicht],” Heidegger writes,
“it becomes apparent [zeigt sich] that language [Sprache] shelters within itself [birgt … in
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sich] the treasure [Schatz] of everything essential [alles Wesenhaften].”512 In this way the
poet allows the written language to resonate [erklingen] as pure echo [reines Echo] of the
riches [Reichtums] of the dialect [Mundart].” “To bring to language,” then, means that
the poet draws out of language what it already has, yet unhidden, into light; it resonates
with the dwelling of the village.
Whenever a person speaks, she speaks only so long as she always already gives
ear [hört] to language. She speaks what she hears as she dwells. She hears of her
family’s needs, hears anger at injustices, hears the deafness of the manipulative neighbor.
But she hears because she gives ear to language.
Likewise, even the mishearing [Überhören] of language is still a kind of hearing
[eine Art des Hörens]. Each person speaks from within [heraus] that language to which
his essence is commended [gesprochen ist]. This language is the mother tongue [die
Muttersprache].513 Heidegger writes with emphasis: “It is language, not man, which
genuinely speaks [Eigentlich spricht die Sprache]. Man speaks only to the extent that he
in each case co-responds [ent-spricht] to language.”514
In this short, but dense, important work on language, Heidegger helps us to see
clearer that we are not the masters of language, but we do influence our living by
listening closely to language. And by listening closely to it, language breaks open a
pathway into new possibilities between “work and world.” Between the spiritual and the
sensuous, between instruction and poetry, says Heidegger, lies the path of language.515
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The sensuous for Heidegger are voice and script [Laut und Schrift], yet always
within them a non-sensual meaning is told and appears [darin je und je ein Sinn verlautet
und erscheint] that is not sensual. As sensual-with-meaning, the word traverses the
expanse of the leeway between earth and sky and inhabits the house of the world.516
Language, like Being and things, traverses expanses, gathers as it separates. Language,
then is not best as poetry or spiritual alone; rather language, is most properly language
when it is “between” instruction and poetry. There language accompanies us both in the
comfort and discomfit.
Heidegger, preferring Hebel over Goethe517, concludes with an injunction: Johann
Peter Hebel, the poet, lucidly wanders (wandert hellen Sinnes) upon pathways so that we
can experience language. We can follow likewise, if we seek the friendship of the poet,
who is friend to the house of the world.518

“The Nature of Language”

Continuing to undo the contrast between the language of the poet and the
language of metaphysics, we look to another work, “Das Wesen der Sprache” or “The

is language.” Could we say that language lies between the Nietzschean Dionysian and the Kantian
sublime?
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Nature of Language.”519 This essay addresses the side of language that is affected by
experience of language as tool. It delves into the issues of linguistics and philology as
comprising a branch of metaphysics; hence, the term “nature” is summoned. Language
as metaphysics serves as a negative example, illustrating that experience alone cannot be
the source of language.
As a point of departure Heidegger reflects on experience: we see experience as a
thinking experience. Language touches everything we think about and all that we
perceive. Likewise, we experience language as touching at times the nexus of our
innermost life, which seems to elude words. But how can this be the case that an
experience eludes words, if experience were the sole source of language?
On the other hand, if experience could only gather data within and about
language, then can we claim that language is the source of experience? If language were
the source of experience, then experience would fit into the pre-established structure of
language. But how can this be true that new experiences are already given?
Thus, the quandary of language continues at the linguistic level. If words in
language were mere names, then they would merely point; if they are signs, they contain
no new information. If words were always and only particular, they could never point or
communicate. As components of ordinary language, much depends on how we think of
the words and what they say. We cannot decipher what words say by merely using them
in the language, for it seems that words have the baggage of metaphysics. As such,
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experience can never help us to reach the proper sense of language in its relation of words
and things.
And still, poetry leads the way toward the nature or source of language. Circling
to poetry,520 Heidegger introduces Stefan George’s poem, “The Word” as a way to
investigate words. Heidegger gives ear to a poetic experience with the word in a new
way, and traces it in thought. The stanza of interest is the last:

So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks off no thing may be.
So lernt ich traurig den verzicht:
Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht.521
In renunciation, the poet in the mood of sadness and with his senses sees.522 One
might assume the poet sees because of his eyes, but Heidegger intends that he sees
because he renounces the truth of metaphysics. The poet undergoes his sad experience
due to the relation of word to thing. The word itself is the relation [Verhältnis] which, in
each instance, says Heidegger, retains the thing within itself in such a manner that it “is”
a “thing [Ding].”523 This seems like a traditional correspondence theory of truth and
language, but soon we see that Heidegger means something quite different. In fact, it is
precisely the realization that there is not a one-to-one correspondence of word to thing,
this lack of ground, which draws the poet into sadness.
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Beyond experience, through renunciation, Heidegger comes to the realization that
the relation between word and thing lies in language. The being of anything that is, then,
resides in the word [wohnt in Wort], concludes Heidegger.524 And so we as readers are
bought to a thinking experience though language. Through language we can have
experiences and shared experiences, thoughts and shared thoughts, and dwell in a shared
“world.” By doing so Heidegger directs us to the neighborhood both of poetry and
thinking that lies in language. We come to this not though experience or thinking, but
through meditative thinking.
This meditative thinking [sinnende Denken] on language goes deeper than
etymological analysis; it searches out the radix, the root of all that is.525 It trawls for
deeper depths. This root relation between word and thing announces itself in a single
word. For Heidegger, the provisional word is lo/goj. Lo/goj speaks simultaneously as
the name for Being and for Saying.526 For Heidegger meditative thinking has discovered
that lo/goj is not separate from Being, but lo/goj is that which expresses both Being and
Saying.
Heidegger next reflects upon the way of movement of lo/goj itself as the root of
all that exists. To a modern mind “way of movement” means that the object of
knowledge is part of the method. But for meditative thinking [sinnende Denken] the way
belongs, not in the object of knowledge, but in the region [Gegend] of language.527 When
we think of a way as a distance connecting places, we wrongly conceive of the way.
524
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Not connecting distances, the region is the clearing that bring to the open where
all was concealed. The way is without places, distances or times. The character of this
region as a concealing and freeing [Freigebend-Bergende] is this way-making movement
[Be-wëgung], which allows all those ways of concealing and revealing. The way as waymaking is not of movement, but of concealing-revealing. As the way-making movement,
it is the source of all the unfolding ways of concealing and revealing.528
The way reaches [langt] us, by letting us reach it though its touching us; it touches
us by being our concern. Reaching us can be thought of in an ordinary sense of spanning
distances, but Heidegger means it in a deeper sense, as a summoning, a calling, a
sheltering, and a holding. The way calls us as Silence.529 Renunciation of language as
leading us to the way is way-making itself. Thus, Heidegger explains that the
summoning [Das Be-lang] or the seeing of the “Need” [die Eignis (der Brauch)]530
belongs to Saying of language [das Sagen der Sprache]. But even these words do not
convey properly meditative thinking, for the region is the original giver and founder of
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ways [Wege allererst ergeben und stiften]; it gives way or moves us [Sie be-wëgt.].531
But how can Heidegger convey meditative thinking as way-making?
Heidegger considers the Chinese word for “way,” Tao, as saying much more than
what the West calls reason [Vernunft], mind [Geist], raison, meaning [Sinn], or Logos.
This broader Saying is what Heidegger will mean by lo/goj. Tao leads us not to another
location, but only to where we already are. The word English word “way” leads away. If
“way” were not translated, Tao would lead us to what Heidegger intends. The waymaking [Be-wëgung] leads to our own neighborhood [Nachbarschaft]. We dwell in its
nearness and it reaches us by becoming our concern. Way-making doesn’t lead us to
another location, but draws us near to its region.
The nearness that brings poetry and thinking together into neighborhood we call
Saying [Sage]. Saying is the “essential nature” of language [Sprache]. This essential
nature has the twofold characteristic: the being of language: the language of being [Das
Wesen der Sprache:Die Sprache des Wesens].532 In the first phrase language is the
subject whose being is to be determined. In the second phrase, Heidegger holds that we
hear “being” as a verb, as in “being present” [anwesend] and “being absent” [abwesen],
but more so, Heidegger’s meaning leads to the verbs, “to perdure” and “to persist”
531

GA 12: 186/“The Nature of Language,” On the Way to Language 92. Again, the translator omits
another passage, which he understands as a discussion of German cognates. Within it Heidegger defines
what he means by “Be-wëgen.” Heidegger’s discussion circles the word with shades of Swabian meanings
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mit Wegen versehen. …»wëgen« besagen: einen Weg bahnen, z.B. durch tief verschneites Land. Wëgen
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example, through a deeply snow-covered land. “Waying” and “way-making” as way-paving and way as
the letting be reached belong in the same source- and stream-domain as the verbs: weighing, risking and
surging.” I take Heidegger’s meaning of “wëgen” to be one of on-going trailblazing. The meaning
conveys a way, which is never regular or linear, but its making is the same as the way itself.
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[währen und weilen] as a persistence presencing that concerns and moves us [Es west an,
währen geht es uns an, be-wëgt und be-langt uns]. Thus, we are exploring the language
of perduring.
Since Heidegger holds the two phrases together with a colon; they are quite
intimate, quite close. Heidegger states, then: “If these two modes of saying are to be
neighborly in vesture of their nearness, then nearness itself must act in the manner of
Saying [dann muß die Nähe selber in der Weise der Sage walten]; nearness and Saying
would be the Same [Die Nähe und die Sage wären dann das Selbe].”533 Heidegger means
here that language and perduring are near to one another and both are Saying. More
properly language and preduring are near as Saying, for they do not have an identity as
constrasting with the other, but identity as relational with the other.
Finally, nearness is an encounter with the fourfold. Nearness is not a magnitude.
Heidegger claims that a magnitude would make a desert534 of the encounter of the
world’s fourfold—“it is the refusal of nearness” [die Verweigerung der Nähe].535 This
would occur when a word breaks off and no thing may be. “To break off” here means,
for Heidegger, that the sounding word returns into soundlessness, back to where it was
granted: into the ringing of stillness which, as Saying, moves the regions of the world’s
fourfold into their nearness. Nearness as a magnitude leaves us deaf.
Rather, originary language as Silence draws us near and speaks. The movement
[Be-wëgung] of nearness brings us to the fourfold and to its character of things being
against each other [Gegen-einander-über der Dinge]. This type of nearness has its own
533
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sense and Heidegger calls it “nighness” [Nahnis].536 And while it is its own, it arrives
through the movement of Saying drawing near. It could be said to be the occurrence of
stillness. Nearness manifests itself as the movement of the world regions facing each
other in the fourfold as “nighness;” the unfolding of movement is the nearness as
“nighness.” Might this movement not be the Ereignis of Stillness [Stille]?537 Indeed.
More importantly, Silence draws us near Being as it draws us not to things, but to the
“nighness” of fourfold.
Thus, language [die Sprache] is no mere human faculty [Fähigkeit], but the
character [Wesen] of language, which belongs to the character of movement [Be-wëgung]
of the face to face encounter of the world’s four regions in the fourfold. This is to say
that our ordinary language speaks and listens, for its originary language already has this
characteristic. Indeed we see the close relationship between language, Being and the
fourfold.
This breaking off of the word from Stefan George’s poem, “Das Wort” is the true
step back on the way of thinking.538 To “say” means to show. Stepping back is listening.
Listening is related to Saying that grants its hearing in that region language belongs.
Listening to this region leads to the very question of whether the nature of language can
be discerned.
And yet language must somehow show its “nature.” Heidegger asserts here, and
will discuss at great length, in “On the Way to Language” that the occurrence of
appropriation acts [Ereignis] as that Saying in which language grants its essential nature
to us. In other words, because we step back, Ereignis has already reached us. Now we
536
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listen. What we hear is that language is beyond experience, beyond perception.
Language is way-making as Silence, drawing us near and drawing us “nigh” to the
fourfold.
In this essay we see two new developments: meditative thinking [sinnende
Denken] draws us to the movement [Be-wëgen] of the way; and the way is how we hear
Silence and are drawn to the region or neighborhood of language. Language, then, is not
a mere human faculty. Its character belongs to the very character of the movement of the
face-to-face encounter of the world’s four regions. Language belongs to Saying as its
movement unfolds [entfalt] in the nearness of the fourfold of all things. Language can no
longer be seen as a correspondence between word and things. Language unfolds as
Saying.
Before we move more deeply into that way toward language, we pause ever so
briefly to illustrate exactly what the way is not. In 1958 Heidegger writes “Hegel and the
Greeks.”539 Heidegger list four ways that Being has been represented through Western
philosophy: 3En, the all, is the word of Parmenides; lo/goj, reason, is the word of
Heraclitus; 0Ide/a, concept, is the word of Plato; 0Ene/rgeia, actuality, is the word of
Aristotle.540 These four words are for Heidegger incomplete. Hegel, who builds
Absolute Knowing upon them, still misses Being as well.
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“Hegel und die Griechen” was a lecture given in Aix-en-Provence on March 20, 1958 and July 26, 1958
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“The Word”

Heidegger continues his discussion on words and language between poetry and
thinking in meditative thinking [sinnende Denken] with his essay of 1958: “Dichten und
Denken. Zu Stefan Georges Gedicht ‘Das Wort.’”541 Most poignant for Heidegger is the
relation between the attunement of renunciation and Saying. Heidegger illustrates his
meaning again in the same poem of Stefan George, “The Word.” Recall again the last
stanza:
So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks off no thing may be.
So lernt ich traurig den verzicht:
Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht.542

For Heidegger the poet’s renunciation stays as Saying: “As self-denial, renunciation
[Verzicht] remains Saying [Sagen].”543 Why is the poet sad? Is it renunciation that
makes him sad? Or did sadness come over him after he learned renunciation? In either
case, the attunement of lingers.
As lingering, renunciation is also receiving. Receiving is a way of being grateful.
And so Heidegger explores how renunciation could turn into a thanking [als den
Verdank]. In the sadness of renunciation, we are brought near and let go of that which
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This text was first delivered as a lecture during the matinee celebration, at the Burgtheater in Vienna
May 11, 1958 under the title “Dichten und Denken. Zu Stefan Georges Gedicht Das Wort.” It was then
published as “Das Wort” in Unterwegs zur Sprache by Verlag Günter Neske in 1959. Its text can be
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“Words” is part of On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco, CA: Harper-San
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distances us. We turn from sadness as we are brought near to our proper “nature.” And
turning, we become thankful, and then thank; one owns oneself [das Sich-verdanken],
i.e., is most his own as thanking and is attuned to joy [auf die Freude gestimmt].544
Heidegger sees a mystery [Geheimnis] here wherein the word remains remote,
while remoteness is drawn near [das Ferne nah], in sadness there is joy. The perdurance
[Austrag] of this remoteness of such nearness is the nondenial of self [Sich-nichtversagen] to the word’s mystery. There is no word for this mystery, that is, no Saying
which could bring the being of language to language [das Wesen der Sprache-zur
Sprache zu bringen].545 To let ourselves be told what is worthy of thinking means—to
think. Meditative thinking draws us near and “nigh.” To puts this into words is to stop
thinking mediatatively. Such remains the mystery.
While listening to the poem, we are pondering poetry. While thinking about
thinking, we are pondering thinking. This is how making poetry and thinking are.”546 In
pondering, we listen. Thus, listening is how poetry and thinking can indeed occur. As
such thinking and poetry belong together with the same root of listening. Both, then, are
types of language properly construed.
In concluding this lecture, let us listen once again to George’s last stanza: “where
the word breaks off no thing may be.” What breaks off is not a word, but Word. The
oldest word ever thought for Saying is lo/goj. Where lo/goj breaks off, no thing may
be. But that is where language as Being as Saying is. Saying, which is a showing as
544
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Silence, lets a thing appear as it is, as “it is.” In renunciation, Saying speaks to man, as
drawing us near and “nigh.” We hear, subsequently lo/goj.
The same word for Saying [Sagen] as lo/goj is also the word for Being [Sein],
that is, for the holding sway of beings [Answesen des Anwesenden]. “Saying and Being
[Sage und Sein], word and thing [Wort und Ding], belong to each other in a veiled
[gehören zueinander in einer verhüllten], hardly thought and is not to be thought out, way
[Weise].” 547 For Heidegger, then, this belonging together can never be thought out
entirely, for the relationship is before words as ordinary language emerges. And yet we
insist on thinking it as lo/goj.
In 1958 Heidegger takes to heart what it means to think in Grundsätze des
Denkens.548 Its contents are interesting, but for the most part it does not advance our
argument. The grounding principle of thinking is not the Hegelian dialectic, nor is it the
Marxist production, but thinking is what is given in the nearing of the nearness. This we
learned from “The Nature of Language” and “The Word.” And so we move onward
toward the way of belonging together of Saying and Being.

“The Way to Language”

In 1959 Heidegger presented his most mature work on language and Being in Der
Weg zur Sprache [“The Way to Language”].549 Within it, Heidegger continues the
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GA 12: 224/“Words,” On the Way to Language 155. “Being” and “Sein” are both italicized to indicate
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themes of the earlier works, but adds to them the notion of language as unfolding
[Entfaltung]. The way toward language is the way unfolding as the silent call of Being as
it is coupled with man’s listening; both call and listening together are part of the Saying
enterprise of showing. This is “unfolding.”
If “call” and “listening” together can be maintained, linguistics can find its way
back to Being. This essay presumes that the studies in linguistics are true in part: that
speech is crucial; vocalization and expression, structural claims of language all are
pertinent. But Heidegger argues for something deeper as well. The way toward language
is twofold. It is listening to Being as Saying; language, too, is responding to that call
unfolding through all facets of man’s life. Thus, even linguistics is unfolding of Being as
Saying, even in its inadequate manner. Being as Saying speaks, indeed, calls until we
listen. In listening we are on the way to language.
Language is both listening and speaking as a correspondence [Entsprechen].550
And this correspondence is due to a deeper correspondence with Silence, as we have
already learned. Thus, the way toward language might seem like a human path, which it
is; but more so language is the path of Being.
What could be an apt image of our way in toto? Risking misrepresentation, we
offer the reader a brief stationary momentary image. Imagine that we follow an originary
path of language just as we blaze the path in front of us and travel on it. It is made by
another and we are in relation to it, we speak and travel the path, wherever it leads. It

print in the Fourth Series of Gestalt und Gedanke, 1959, ed. Clemens Graf Podewils. Then it was included
as a part of Unterwegs zur Sprache by Verlag Günter Neske in 1959. It too can be found in GA 12,
Unterwegs zur Sprache. Its English translation by Peter D. Hertz, “The Way to Language” is part of On
the Way to Language.
550
Heidegger’s sense of correspondence is not between word and thing, but between Being as Saying and
our listening.
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leads us as it unfolds itself; it leads and we blaze. One could also imagine the way darkly
lit path, slowly becoming more bright with use.
Heidegger begins “The Way to Language” by alluding to Novalis,551 who
proposed a progressive, universal poetry in his text, Monologue. While it seems that
Novalis is on the right track, that language follows originary language, he actually
follows a dialectical approach which is developed over time within the conception of
Hegelian absolute idealism. While Novalis claims language to be a monologue, in
actuality his is a dialogue. While linguists claim that language is a dialogue, they hold
that it arose by man alone. How did we come to such an ironic monologic/dialogic
understanding of language?
Accordingly, Heidegger comments on this situation as a way toward language:
“The way to language: that sounds as if language were far from us, some place to which
we still have to find our way.”552 This essay sets its theme as finding the way to language
via language. Heidegger expresses it rather enigmatically: language brings to language
as language.553 Thus, language is a web [Geflecht] of relations. On the one hand, this
web ensnares us in its complex weave, but on the other hand, language offers a singular,
clear insight: language is relational in its “essence.” We can never pinpoint the essence
of any one of its parts, always do its parts speak of relation. Thus, language both reveals
and conceals.
551

Novalis, born Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg, was a 18th Century, German romantic,
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Heidegger.
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Unlike in Being and Time as an event of Dasein’s discovery of the concealingrevealing clearing, we now ask how we may trace these relational connections beyond
Dasein. Heidegger speaks of untangling the knot in a way that is reminiscent of Plato’s
and Aristotle’s interest in aporia: “The point is to experience the unbinding bond [das
entbindende Band] within the web of language [im Geflicht der Sprache].”554 As such
we have entered Heidegger’s involuted relation [in sich zurücklaufende Verhältnis] as the
circle [Zirkel] of language: language is information and information is language.555
Language as information is the route of the first beginning. The names of
language in the West—glw=ssa, lingua, langue, language—are evidence that language is
defined in terms of outward signs of speech.556 Language is of the tongue.557 Aristotle’s
text on interpretation, Peri\ 9Ermhnei/aj, retains the classical structure in which language,
as speaking, remains secure. The letters show the sounds. The sounds show the passions
in the soul, and the passions in the soul show the matters that arouse them. Showing
forms the infrastructure; later the relationship becomes transformed into a conversational
relation between a sign and its signification in Augustine’s De Magistro. This notion of
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language as inner form and outward sign reached its peak with the linguistics of
Alexander Humboldt.558
Instead of reflecting on language qua language, we should seek to let language be
experienced as language. Otherwise, we build a metaphysical concept. This is not to say
that language is experience. Conversely, when we see language as saying something,
Saying559 encompasses speaking. But language is more than speaking. For example, a
silent man doesn’t speak, but may say quite a bit.560 But even more originary than a
silent man’s speaking, Silence [Stille] is a Saying. Saying [Sagen] and speaking
[Sprechen] are not identical.561 For Heidegger “Saying” means to show, to let appear, to
let be seen and to let be heard what is silent. There are manifold ways of Saying.
Speaking, on the other hand, is man’s response to Saying.
Heidegger holds that these manifold ways of Saying are united in “The essential
being of language is Saying as showing.562 Indeed it may be said that Saying is a selfshowing. This “showing” character is not based on signs, but all signs arise from a
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showing. Signs belong to “showing’s” realm and for its purposes.563 In this orientation,
speaking belongs to Saying and speaking is at the same time also listening to Saying.
Thus, speaking listens first to Saying. Because it co-responds to Saying, speaking then is
what we would say is conversational. Heidegger explains the situation in these terms:
“Speaking [Sprechen] is a listening [Hören] not while [zugleich] but before [zuvor] we
are speaking.”564
We are now able to see language as it is most properly its own. Language first
and foremost is Saying by showing as “laying.” Since originary language has no organs
of speech, which Heidegger calls its hearing, Silence, showing as listening, cannot be
perceptual. It is not the lack of sound, which is heard, but that which precedes all
perception.
Language speaks as showing, reaching into all regions of presences [in alle
Gegenden des Anwesens reichend], summons from them whatever is present to appear
and to fade [erscheinen und verscheinen].”565 Man, hearing what is shown,566 and
through his organs of speech, speaks.
In a set of rhetorical questions Heidegger most emphatically lays the proper
understanding of language at our feet. Heidegger invokes the metaphor of a stream: the
shores of the stream are brought together by the stream. Is Saying separate from us? Or
563
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is Saying the stream of the Silence, which its shores—the Saying and “Aftersaying”
[Nachsagen]— itself joins, in which it builds them.”567 Saying is both the stream of the
Silence first as need [Brauch], and then the co-joined Saying with our “Nachsagen” as
the Ereignis.
Our ordinary representations of language hardly find language as far reaching as
this co-joined Saying in Ereignis. Again, in another question Heidegger asks: Is Saying
itself the resting [Be-Ruhende], which grants the quiet of mutual belonging of what
belongs in the framework of language proper?568 Language as Saying [Sagen] draws
together Saying [Sagen] and Aftersaying [Nachsagen]. How can we conceive of this
way? We cannot; it is beyond our conceptual framework. We can say this: Saying
[Sagen] is the way and Saying [Sagen] with Aftersaying [Nachsagen] are the steps of the
way; the steps dwell in the way as the way.
In the final section Heidegger discusses this way. The way is not a progression of
thought. The way [Weg] allows us to reach something; it allows us to reach itself. The
way allows us to reach [gelangen] Saying. Everything speaks of Saying; man too, speaks
of Saying. But language also conceals Saying and reveals itself for the most part as
linguistic articulation. But, as we know, Saying is in no way the linguistic expression
[nachgetragene sprachliche Ausdruck] added to the phenomena after they have appeared.
Rather, all radiant appearance [alles Scheinen] and all fading away [Versheinen] rests
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[beruht] in the showing Saying [zeigenden Sage].569 Saying frees all present beings free
into their given presence and their given absence. All in all, “Saying pervades and
structures the openness of that clearing which every appearance must seek out and every
disappearance must leave behind, and in which every present or absent being must show,
say, announce itself,”570 explains Heidegger.
Thus, Saying is the way of openness of the clearing, wherein all appearances and
disappearances occur. Saying is the gathering [Versammlung] that joins all showings,
which everywhere it shows [Gezeigte] itself as Ereignis.571 Emphatically Heidegger
writes: “The moving force in Showing of Saying is Owning.”572 This is to say, Saying
brings all things into what is most their own. This owning which brings them there, and
which moves Saying as Showing in its showing, we call Ereignen. It yields the opening
of the clearing. Ereignen is never the effect of a cause [die Wirkung einer Ursache], nor
the consequence of an antecedent [die Folge eines Grundes]. The yielding owning [Das
erbringende Eignen] is more than a grounding; it is Ereignis itself.573
Ereignis cannot be represented, but only experienced as the Showing574 of Saying
as an abiding dwelling [nur im Zeigen der Sage als das Gewährende erfahren]. Ereignis
is the giving yield whose giving reach [reichendes Geben] alone gives us such things as a
“there is,” a “there is” of which even Being itself stands in need to come into its own as
569

GA 12: 246/“The Way to Language,” On the Way to Language 126.
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574
The reader might recall that showing includes concealing and unconcealing together.
570

202

presence.575 It is the nearest of the near and the farthest of the far.576 Ereignis is the law
[das Gesetz], not as a thesis but as a bringing, as an allowing-reaching.577
Because the showing of Saying is Eignen, even the ability to listen to Saying, our
belonging to it, rests in Ereignis.578 Man is brought to his own. Every word, every
gesture is part of Ereignis. Heidegger insists: “Every spoken word is already an answer:
counter-saying [Gegensage], coming to the ongoing [entgegenkommendes], listening
Saying [hörendes Sagen].” Through Ereignis, the needing [brauchenden], the suitability
[Vereignung] of men, Saying reaches language. Heidegger again discusses this way as
the word in Alemannic-Swabian dialect: “wëgen,” which means “to form a way,” [einen
Weg bilden] and forming it, holds it ready [ihn bereit halten]. Way-making [Be-wëgen]
thus means “to bring the way … forth” first of all [den Weg zu … allererst erbringen],
and thus “to be” the way [der Weg »sein«].579
Accordingly, Heidegger comes to his clearest point regarding language and
Ereignis: way-making brings the essence of language as Saying into ordinary language is
also the way-making of Saying into language.580 As we speak of the way to language
now it is always already the unique region [schon immer seine einzige Ortschaft] of the
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Heidegger directs us Sein und Zeit, §44; Stambaugh refers to her translation. Both refer to Dasein as
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essence of language itself [im Sprachwesen selbst], from which our thinking of language
emerges.581 Language is the Gestalt,582 the whole, from which all steps derive, even the
extreme step of enframing.
Gestalt of Saying now reveals the monological character of the nature of
language. Gestalt does not and cannot coincide with the monologue of which Novalis
was thinking dialectically. But language is a monologue in so far as it is language which
alone [allein] speaks and language speaks lonesomely [einsam].583 Rightly, language has
been called “the house of Being.”584 Language is the keeper, the shelterer, of presencing
of the Ereignis of Saying as Showing. Language is the house of Being because language,
as speaking, is the mode of Ereignis [die Weise des Ereignisses].
With the completion of “On the Way toward language,” Heidegger seems to
arrive at his most mature thought regarding Being as Saying with language unfolding as
the mode of Saying of Ereignis. For the most part, then, our discussion has drawn to a
close on Being and language.
Yet a few odd threads seem to need reweaving. One such thread is the question
of who man indeed is; since man is the speaker as listener of language, the notion of who
a person is needs to be reworked. Man is not simply a subject, but more so, if you will, a
living instrument of Ereignis. But while the spokesperson of the Ereignis, man is not
simply an automaton. Man is not fated, but man, hearing the destiny of the Silence of
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GA 12: 250/“The Way to Language,” On the Way to Language 130.
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Being is co-speaker of the silence. In his last years Heidegger reaches toward, but never
fully arriving upon, this new understanding of a person. To this new, yet not fully
developed, understanding of the human person we turn our attention. We look to Da-sein
as a way to Being as Saying.
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CHAPTER SIX:
From Da-sein toward Being:Saying

“So geeignet gehört der Mensch in das Ereignis.”585
With Being as Saying, and language as the way toward Being’s manifestation as
Ereignis, man as person seems to emerge as the next engagement of Heidegger’s
attention. With language emerging as a mode of Saying of Ereignis, a new question
arises: how does Dasein relate to language as it is now formulated? Who is man?
Though man is the speaker of language, he is first a listener; thus, the notion of “who a
person is” needs to be reworked. Man is not simply a subject, nor is he an automaton.
Man is a co-speaker of Silence. Heidegger reaches toward a new understanding of a
person in the last years of his life. To this new understanding of the human person we
turn our attention on the way to Being as Saying. We need to explore how man belongs
to Ereignis.
The human person can be understood properly only as dweller. In Sprache und
Heimat,586 Heidegger offers another version of humanity dwelling within language.
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GA 14: 28/On Time and Being 23. I translate Heidegger’s sentence: “Appropriated in this way, man as
being brought into Ereignis, man belongs to Ereignis.”
586
This lecture was read in Wesselburen, July 2, 1960. Its text can be found in GA 13, Aus der Erfahrung
des Denkens.
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Within this lecture language’s power is in its poetic nature. Language is that which is
most hidden and therefore furthest reaching, imploringly bringing forth dwelling. Rather
than language and dwelling, the directive phrase, says Heidegger, is “language as
homeland.”587 Language draws us to our true homeland and our true homeland is in true
dwelling in Ereignis.

DA-SEIN

Zollikon Seminare

Dwelling allows us to see man in his proper sense. And this is what Heidegger
surveys in the 1961 volume, Zollikon Seminare.588 While Heidegger eschews ontological
and metaphysical distinctions for the most part in his later work, we see here in these
seminars terminology quite like that of Being and Time’s ontic/ontological phraseology.
In these seminars and in this brief period in the 1960s, we see the clear demarcation
between early (works of 1930s and 1940s) and later (1950s) characteristics blurred.
Why?—we must ask. Since Heidegger is discussing psychological issues with Boss and
others, Heidegger must reenter the arena of ontology begun in Being and Time. Perhap,
wWhen discussing who a person is, Heidegger needs to pull together the early notion of
Dasein with its new place in Ereignis. At the very minimum Heidegger does need to
draw on Dasein before Ereignis and readdress the notion of Dasein after Ereignis.
587

GA 13: 180. The translation is my own.
The seminars began in March, 1959 and continued through 1972 at Boss’ home and psychiatric clinic,
“Burghölzli,” in Zollikon, a municipality of Zürich, Switzerland. It also includes letters from 1947-1971.
Its entirety can be found in GA 89 Zollikoner Seminare. See also its English translation, Zollikon Seminars,
ed. Medard Boss, trans. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 2001).
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The conclusion we are drawn to make is that the meditative thinking [besinnliche
Denken] of later years cannot preclude the ontological terminology of the early years.
Since meditative thinking is relational, it doesn’t seek fixed truths. It relates the two
beginnings by leaping. Between the philosophy of the first beginning and the other
beginning lies the Ab-grund. Between the two beginnings, meditative thinking remains.
Thus, meditative thinking must somehow relate to the ontological discussions of the first
beginning too.
Appropriately, in these seminars we see Heidegger leaping to and from the
metaphysical and ontological toward meditative thinking. Understandably, ontological
terminology is prevalent in any discussion of the human person, since understanding of
the person is still steeped in subject/object distinctions. Now we see meditative thinking
as reengaging ontology in a thematic way, though Heidegger had been adjusting his
notions of Dasein all along; and as Heidegger does so meditative thinking provisionally
uses the terms of the first beginning.
Heidegger has been criticized for a “thin” description of the human person
throughout his lifetime. While discussing Being, Heidegger’s attention would focus on
objects like the jar, the bridge and table. Complexities of the human person were always
in relation to the fourfold, given as mortal. Now this volume shows Heidegger clearly
grappling with the issues of the complicated and multi-relatedness of the human psyche
in Da-sein-analytical approach of Heidegger’s later phenomenological thinking. Part of
the human psyche, as Being and Time has shown, can never be isolated. The human
being is a being-with other beings.
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Insofar as the human being is being-with [Mitsein], as he remains essentially
related to another human, he is always engaged in language. Language as such is
conversation [Gespräch]. As being-with belongs to being human,589 so too does being
human belong to language. In Being and Time Heidegger used the word “discourse”
[Rede] for language as a structure [existentiale] of Dasein. The later Heidegger employs
a broader understanding of language as Saying [Sprache as Sage]. In the Zollikon
Seminars we presently look to Da-sein590 as the bridge emerging between existential
structures and Saying. Thus Da-sein is a way toward Being as Saying.
Many of the pages of Zollikon Seminars review, however, the territory of Being
and Time. It also looks toward a structural analysis of Da-sein, a trajectory in which
Boss and others employ Lacanian theories to explain personhood.591 While these might
be important, if overly, structural advances, we need not delve deeper into that arena.
Rather, let it suffice that we demarcate Da-sein.
First, Da-sein is not a subject and transcendence is not the “structure of
subjectivity,” but its removal! [Beseitigung], writes Heidegger to Medard Boss on March
8, 1965.592 We remove any notion of transcendence as a structure of what it means to be
a human person. Rather than employing transcendence to understand, meditative
thinking strives to remain related. And still, meditative thinking involves leaping
between the philosophy of the first beginning and the philosophy of the other beginning.
We leap between transcendence and relatedness. A new understanding of Da-sein
589

GA 89: 182-183/Zollikon Seminars 139-140.
Purposefully do we demarcate “Dasein” of Being and Time from “Da-sein” of the Beiträge and
subsequent works. The mark of hyphenation is a movement from the phenomenology of Being and Time
toward a meditative thinking.
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Most notably William Richardson takes this avenue. See his “Heidegger among the Doctors,” in
Reading Heidegger: Commemorations, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1993) 49-63.
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emerges. Instead of a transcending Da-sein, we look to Da-sein as the site of language as
Saying. Da-sein is the site of relatedness, not the site of abstract aloofness.
In such a notion, we now see that language as Saying is not an overextension
[Überdehnen] of the concept of language. Rather, language as Saying is constitutive of
ordinary language. To find it, we don’t abstract; we look for the formal indicators of
language as Saying within ordinary language. The usual meanings given to ordinary
language are constrictions [Verengungen]. Heidegger comments with distinctness of
purpose: “With this constricted concept of language in the sense of verbal articulation
[Verlautbarung], I cannot understand anything at all.”593 Language as mere articulation
lacks coherence.
Like Da-sein, language’s new meaning emerges. On May 14, 1968 Heidegger
explains to Boss in a letter: “Language [Sprache] is identical with the understanding of
being, and without this one could not experience death as death, that is, as the uttermost
[äußerste] possibility approaching Da-sein.”594 Language, Da-sein and Being as Saying
are tightly interrelated. Let us see how.
In clear contrast to Being and Time, Heidegger now understands language as the
originary language unfolding as Ereignis, which “needs” [braucht] and draws on the
service of the human being. Heidegger, in §7 of Being and Time, understood the Greek
lo/goj as discourse in the sense of the manifestation [offenbar machen] of the question of
discourse. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay, the translators of Zollikon Seminars, along
with Françoise Dastur rightly indicate that Heidegger now deepens his analysis of lo/goj
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intimate relationship is indeed far closer than what we have ever conceived beforehand.

594

210

in order to carry out the phenomenological “destruction” of logic and returns it to the
initial sense595 as a showing in itself, that is to say, as Ereignis.
But what they do not acknowledge is the fact that, in order to relate the
phenomenology of Being and Time to the destruction of logic toward the Ereignis, man
uses meditative thinking, not the subject, as the lens through which Ereignis shows itself.
Man, in his part as subject, might use and misuse phenomenology and logic to respond to
Being, but as one part of Ereignis. Man as mortal is but one element of the fourfold
through which Being manifests itself. While phenomenology occurs through man’s eyes
alone, Ereignis with meditative thinking is through man’s eyes but, more importantly,
with Ereignis Being is showing itself through man as part of the fourfold with man’s
assistance.

SEIN

“Kant’s Thesis about Being”

Perhaps more than any other fallible image, this directs us to Seinsgeschichte in
the Kehre. Turning from man as the center of the “process,” we focus on Being as
Saying. Being is no longer presence or ground, but Being as Saying is the ungrounded
ground, appearing as no-thing, heard as Silence. In May of 1961 Heidegger offers a
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GA 89: 185/Zollikon Seminars 232. See Françoise Dastur, “Language and Ereignis,” Reading
Heidegger: Commemorations ed. John Sallis (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1993) 362.
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lecture entitled, “Kants These über das Sein” [“Kant’s Thesis about Being”].596 This
lecture tries to persuade listeners that Being as ground is problematic.
But in this lecture Heidegger finds more problematic Kant’s conception of man,
wherein the unity of apperception claims to unify all that man claims to know. This
unified ground of the person as subject is what leads us to Being as ground. While Kant
is correct to understand that the unifying-gathering role is lo/goj, Kant fails to
understand lo/goj by transferring this role to the I-subject within man. This lo/goj of
the subject holds “all logic” in its custody [Haft].597
As a corrective Heidegger again enlists Parmenides’ help, namely, fragment
VIII:598
To/ ga/r a0uto/ noei=n 0sti/n te kai ei]nai.
For thinking and being are the same.599
The relationship between thinking and being is sameness, identity. In no case, as we
have learned, does “identical” mean the same as “equal” [gleich]: thinking and being are
not equal. Instead thought is the horizon [Horizentvorgabe] for the elucidation of Being.
As Kant conceives it, through thought Being is represented. But Being is properly that
which grants presence as presencing [das Anwesenheit Gewährende]600 as thinking.
Thinking as a narrow lens cannot entirely capture Being’s totality. Being’s logic cannot
be representational says Heidegger.
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Heidegger shows the deficiencies of Kant’s thinking of Being. Kant interprets
Being and thought as united through man. Hence, the unity of apperception in man
becomes the source of unity in thought; it is the ability to tie together all appearances into
one experience. Man as subject has the ability to unite all concepts in consciousness.601
How does Kant perceive this unity in man? Man is able to achieve such a unity by
resorting to a higher ground. Kant posits that the unity of perception is grounded in “e3n”
(uniting unity) [einende Einheit] which lets all the “su/n” (together) of every “Qe/sij”
(positing) [Setzung] arise in the first place. Kant, therefore, calls Being “the originally
synthetic unity” [»die ursprüngliche synthetische Einheit«].602
In Kant we have the wrong understanding of Being because we have a
representational idea of man and his essence, concludes Heidegger. What Heidegger
means is that any representation is a copy, whether it is a representation of man or his
essence. Rather, Heidegger attempts to correct both through the use of “The Turning”
and Seinsgeschichte.603 Heidegger seems to use these key notions again and again to
review his own work as a corrective to his simple phenomenology in the early years. Let
us briefly illustrate this procedure in his final works.
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11, Identität und Differenz.

213

On Time and Being
Heidegger writes in 1962 Zur Sache des Denkens.604 This work explains Sein und
Zeit’s inability to derive the meaning of Being from an analytic of Dasein, whose
structure is connected to temporality. In On Time and Being “Being” and “time” are corelational as a totality, as Space-time; as such it is a manifestation of Ereignis, not related
solely to Dasein’s care structure as explained in Sein und Zeit. Space-time, correctly
understood as a manifestation of Ereignis, includes the fourfold. Correctly understood,
man as the one who listens to Being is part of this Ereignis. Man, then, is part of
Ereignis, but does not own it. Rather Ereignis has mankind. Ereignis also has Spacetime, for the emergence of Ereignis is the onset of Space-time.
Sein und Zeit cannot derive phenomenologically Being from time because both
time and Being are more of Dasein than of Ereignis. On Time and Being redirects us.
Rather than our seeking Being, Being as that which concerns us comes toward us, as
human beings.605 Being as Saying in presencing [Anwesenheit] is the constant abiding
that approaches [angehende] man, reaches [erreichende] him, is extended [gereichte
Verweilen] to him.606 The constant abiding is not presence, but rather Being abides as
noticeable unabiding. In this fashion, can we understand the meaning of Being, through
it own manifestation in Ereignis, drawing man and the fourfold together?
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Heidegger clarifies Ereignis now. Through On Time and Being Heidegger comes
to a new insight; he explains: “In the sending of the destiny of Being [Schicken in
Geschick des Seins], in the extending of time [Reichen der Zeit], there appropriates
[Zueignen]607 a dedication [Übereignen], a delivery over into what is their own, namely
of Being as presencing [Anwesenheit] and of time as the realm of the open [Bereich des
Offenen].” Through the manifestation of Being as Ereignis, both Being as presencing
and time as the realm of the open emerge. They emerge as Being sends itself and
drawing man near it.
Heidegger continues: “What determines both, time and Being, in their own, that
is, in their belonging together [Zussamengehören], we shall call: Ereignis.”608 Ereignis is
now thought in the light of what becomes manifest in our looking ahead [Vor-sicht]
toward Being and toward time as destiny and as extending, to which time and Being
belong. We look ahead because Being draws us in time. Being and time are “matters”
[Sachen]; they are not things. The “and” between them is left indeterminate
[Unbestimmten] in their relation to each other [ihre Beziehung zueinander]. Ereignis is
no longer presencing, like phenomenology, but presencing as looking ahead [Vor-sicht].
This perennial, indeterminate character of Being as presencing typifies Heidegger’s new
phenomenology. Man is characterized as looking ahead toward Being because Being
draws man.
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What is the character most distinctive of the destiny of Being in time?—Ereignis.
It is a giving that is a self-withdrawing.609 Heidegger explains: “Denial [Verweigerung]
and withholding [Vorenthalt] exhibit [bekunden] the same trait as self-withholding
[Ansichhalten] in sending [Schicken]: namely, self-withdrawal [Sich-entziehen].”610
Ereignis has the peculiar property of bringing man into his own because Being
withdraws. Man is the being who “perceives” Being by standing with the withdrawal as
Ereignis. Thus, man as being brought into Ereignis, man belongs to Ereignis.611
Consequently, the attempt in Being and Time, §70, to derive human spatiality from
temporality without first considering Ereignis is untenable, for it misses presencing as
looking ahead [Vor-sicht]. Instead Being sends itself as self-withdrawal as Silence. This
sending out is Heidegger’s new notion of time. With Being’s sending forth, we are
drawn near, and we conceive time as the “process” of Being’s history through time.
Being has history, Seinsgeschichte, not man.
That same year Heidegger offers a summary of Zeit und Sein entitled, Protokoll
zu einem Seminar über den Vortrag “Zeit und Sein” [“Summary of a Seminar on the
Lecture ‘Time and Being’”].612 While it mostly recounts “Time and Being,” the
discussion returns to the relation between ordinary language and the language of thought
as a way toward Heidegger’s new phenomenology of Ereignis. In short, ordinary
language leads us to originary language. Speaking about ontic models presupposes that
language in principle has an ontic character. What we wish to say ontically can be made
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know only through words. Earlier in our discussion we found this to be a cul-de-sac, for
our words led away from Being. But man’s relation to language can transform itself as
man’s is changed in his relationship to Being.613 In this way, that is, through the
changing of man in the transforming contact with Being as Ereignis, ordinary language
leads us to originary language. More properly said originary language shows itself
through ordinary language.

PHILOSOPHY
“My Way to Phenomenology”

From this insight Heidegger writes in 1963, “Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie”
[“My Way to Phenomenology”].614 Rather that using concepts of traditional philosophy
or the ontological terminology of Being and Time as presencing, Heidegger now sees the
way in terms of phenomenology, but now as looking ahead [Vor-sicht]. This new type of
phenomenology of looking ahead, then, allows us to grasp presencing as looking ahead as
possibility [Möglichkeit].615 Not simply descriptive, Vor-sicht offers new possibilities of
man and beings as transformed by Ereignis.
Looking toward new possibilities and perhaps offering an instance of new
possibilities, Heidegger converses with a Thai Buddhist monk, Bikkhu Maha Mani on
September 28, 1964 in Baden-Baden. Heinrich Petzet reports his eyewitness account of
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Heidegger’s earlier, private meeting at his house in Zähringen with Bhikku Mahu Mani; a
televised version ensued. The monk describes what meditation means for Eastern
humanity: “The ‘I’ dissolves, until in the end only one thing remains: the Nothing.”
Thus, the relationship for Buddhist thought has the subject dissolving into the Nothing.
“But this nothing is not nothing,” continues the monk; “it is just the opposite—fullness.
No one can name this. But it is nothing and everything—fullness.”616
Heidegger responded as did Hegel years before this encounter: “That is what I
have been saying throughout my whole life.”617 The monk responded in turn: “Come to
my country; we understand you.”618 We have learned about Nothing previously, now we
see man’s relationship to it, and as such the proper context for a person. Ostensibly, the
dissolving of the “I” might seem to be Heidegger’s answer to the Western subject vis-àvis Being.
But in that same conversation with the monk, Heidegger sees problems emerging.
The effects of technology clouded the notion of nothingness for the monk. In his thirst
for Western technology, the monk could not really understand “nothing.” Instead the
monk opted for the “new.” Heidegger sadly noted that the people like this monk did not
have the slightest idea what damage the technological setting can do. Petzet comments a
year later: the monk left his order and joined an American television company.619 And
so, dissolving of the “I” is not the answer, for it dissolves any resolve against naïve
realism. “Nothing” is the way, but how that appears, we must wait. Heidegger is still
silent on offering his answer.
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“The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”

One reason for Heidegger’s silence on the human person is contained in what man
develops as philosophy. The subject is entangled in Western philosophy. On October
30, 1965 Heidegger offers a lecture in Amriswil, Switzerland “Das Ende der Philosophie
und die Aufgabe des Denkens” [“The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”].620
Its theme reiterates what we already know: philosophy as metaphysics has reached its
end, but what does this mean? The end or purpose of philosophy and thinking go beyond
metaphysics and traditional ideas of thinking. Both have a more originary source and
broader ken. “End” means something different for Heidegger than what Derrida has
made of it as deconstruction.
Not simply deconstruction, Heidegger’s thinking also remembers. It remembers
the task of Heraclitus and Parmenides: to protect the interplay of unconcealment and
concealment in the Lichtung des Seins. Western philosophy has interpreted this
relationship of thinking in varying ways. For Hegel the thinking is dialectic movement in
which the matter as such comes to itself, comes to its own presence [Präsenz]. For
Husserl’s thinking brings the matter of philosophy to its ultimate originary givenness, and
that means to its own presence [Präsenz].621 But for Heidegger in Being and Time
thinking is the clearing as the open region of Dasein for everything that becomes present
and absent. “This is a ‘primal phenomenon’ [»Urphänomen«].”622 Now for the later
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Heidegger Ereignis with man allows the proper clearing and presencing [Lichtung und
Anwesenheit].623 This is the task [Aufgabe] of philosophy. The purpose of philosophy,
then, is to open man to Ereignis. This is the way—through destructive retrieval and
through remembering—man is open to Being’s manifestation as Ereignis.

Seminars

Heidegger continues to demarcate the differences between Western philosophy
and destructive retrieval as a way of leaping between the two in Ereignis. He does this in
his final set of seminars, which transpires in 1966-1969. The first two of four seminars
occur in Le Thor, France;624 they contrast Heidegger’s way with that of Hegel’s
metaphysics. And so, Heidegger sees that currently conceived philosophy is still
blocking our way toward understanding how man can most properly be open to Ereignis.
In particular the second seminar takes exception with Hegel’s analysis by way of a
question: What does philosophy need? For Hegel this means that philosophy needs
something to be completed. For Heidegger philosophy always has “Need;” not as a
lacking, but philosophy always has “Need” as one of its “positive” components. Unlike
Hegel, Heidegger’s “Need” is not a missing component.
This issue of finding the “missing component” is the key toward unlocking
Western philosophy in its current state of aporia. According to Heidegger, if for Hegel
the dialectic between Spirit and matter is the driving force of philosophy, then life always
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appears as torn and in need of repair. But Hegel never addresses the source of this
dichotomy or this missing component. But whence did this dichotomy arise?
Heidegger places the question in these terms. If the tear or “scission” [Entzweiung] is the source of the need [Bedürfnisses] for philosophy, if philosophy arises as
soon as life has become torn [zerreißend geworden ist], what is the driving force
[treibende Kraft] of the dichotomy [Entzweiung]?625 In short what caused the rift of a
prior unity, of which philosophy historically tries to mend?
But, on the other hand, if life is not first a unity and philosophy is not a piecing of
it together, if life always occurs as a necessary division or multiplicity without order, then
how can we speak of a unity at all? Heidegger phrases it thusly: “If philosophy is not a
piecing-together [Zusammenstücken] and if the tearing [Zerrissenheit] is necessary
[notwendig], then can one speak of a unity [Einheit] before the tearing
[Zerrissenheit]?626 If separation is necessary, then philosophy could not hope to join its
pieces. Given Hegel’s rendition of philosophy, we are left with a quandary.
More precisely, the quandary places Hegel’s Aufhebung in an ambiguous light.
For if there is prior unity and subsequent separation and Aufhebung seems necessary,
Aufhebung is inadequate to explain the cause of separation or its need for joining. If, as
in the second case, there is never prior unity, but only a rift, then why is Aufhebung
needed to rejoin the separation? Heidegger sees Hegel’s solution of Aufhebung as a nonsolution. Heidegger explains: “Metaphysics starts from beings, raises itself to being, and
then returns to beings as beings and clarifies them on the basis of the light of being.”627
In other words, Heidegger sees Hegel’s philosophy as explaining the difference between
625
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beings by developing a concept of Being; since Being, is then used as the way to explain
beings, then we need a way to explain why beings are inadequate vis-à-vis Being.
In contrast to Hegel’s drawing together of Spirit and matter, Heidegger offers the
gathering-separation of the fourfold of Being as Saying. Rather than prior unity with the
need for joining, or the prior disunity without a reason for unity, Heidegger offers unity
and disunity as one, always occurring, occurrence. Ereignis helps us to understand both
separation and gathering.
In Ereignis Being as Saying is the way of openness, wherein all appearances and
disappearances of unity and disunity occur. Being as Saying is the gathering
[Versammlung] that joins all showings, which everywhere shows [Gezeigte] itself as
Ereignis.628 In its showing, Being shows itself as concealed. In concealing itself,
separate things appear. As separate things appear, Being appears as concealment,
gathering all things. In Heidegger’s thinking, the gathered-separateness is twofold
throughout: as Being, as language, in man, and in things. Hegel’s quandary of
philosophy is the same quandary for language, for man, and the ontological difference.
Ereignis is Heidegger’s answer to Hegel’s troubling question of the dichotomy between
Spirit and matter. With it issues of gods arise.
On September 23, 1966 Heidegger was interviewed by Der Spiegel magazine.
While the interview was intended for the general audience and its tone was chatty, it does
enter into our present topic of what is philosophy and how it affects us.629 Philosophy
and all human endeavors have never been able to transform the world as given. As Marx
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has already proffered, philosophy has been useless in that regard. To make his point,
Heidegger offers his enigmatic answer: “Only a god can save [retten] us. The sole
possibility of transformation that is left for us, insists Heidegger, is to prepare a sort of
readiness, through thinking and poetizing. Heidegger wants to ready us for the
appearance [Erscheinung] of the god or for the absence [Abwesenheit] of the god in the
time of foundering [Untergang]; for in the face of the god who is absent, we founder
[untergehen].”630 Heidegger sees his new phenomenology as a type of readiness, or
looking ahead [Vor-sicht], both in times of appearance or foundering.
What could Heidegger mean by this enigmatic sentence? And what does he mean
by the gods? Gods are part of the fourfold, yet the meaning of fourfold is not entirely
clear. Elsewhere we have covered fully three of the fourfold—earth, sky, and mortals—
presently we are able to discuss Heidegger’s meaning of the gods. At the outset
Heidegger would say that the gods are part of Saying.631 From the Beiträge we learned
that the Being [Sein] needs man to manifest the gods. But this still seems all too
incomprehensible. Let us look to another work for clarity, in which Heidegger is more
lucid.
Besinnung was published in 1938, during the same years Heidegger pondered
over the Beiträge.632 Section 70 of Besinnung discusses the gods as a type of
fundamental knowing awareness [das wesentliche Wissen].633 Not the awareness of
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certitude, fundamental knowing awareness is the awareness which lies outside of, or prior
to, propositional claims. As such the fundamental knowing awareness or gods are
without content. Without content, insists Heidegger, fundamental knowing awareness
persists nonetheless. It arises out of the fundamental attunement of startled dismay
[Erschrecken], as man is placed face-to-face with the abyss [Abgrund] of the Silence of
Being.
Turning to this abyss man honors it, keeping solemn the differentiation between
beings and Being. The gods are set in counter-distinction to man. Face to face with
fundamental knowing awareness man, then, is drawn to what is most proper to himself.
He sees the earth appear as it is, as surrounded by the stillness of a world and ventures
forth into strife. In being drawn near to the abyss of Being, man hears its Silence:
originary language. In response, man brings to Being the strife of earth and world, and
being face to face with the gods, as ordinary language. This beginning dialogue of man
and strife, facing the abyss, gives rise to a further dialogue. This dialogue is between
mortals and fundamental knowing awareness, between man as mortal and the awareness
of the possibility of permanence or immortality. Face to face in dialogue man and the
gods begin to change. Heidegger phrases this dialogue in these terms: the dialogue is
between those who are gods (overcoming their godlessness) and man (overcoming his
“dis-humanization” [Vermenschung] of being a subject and historical animal) as the
origin of their holding sway [Ursprung ihres Wesens] in Ereignis.634 In Ereignis man
becomes aware of his mortality and is always drawn beyond his finitude. Thus,
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fundamental knowing awareness traverses the region where the gods are still nameable in
ordinary language, says Heidegger.
Western philosophy has described fundamental knowing awareness in terms of
entities, as gods. But gods are not “highest,” as given by metaphysics, gods belong to the
“Need” of Being, which reverberates in everything. Gods do not invent man and man
does not invent gods. Rather, both are decided by Being, not as ruling over them, but
they are drawn together in the Ereignis. Gods are not creators. Gods are not beings, to
whom man gets close to or away from whom man falls. We now see these false
conceptions of gods emerge from the false interpretations of Being as producer and Being
as presence.635
Instead, gods arise out of the truth of Being as presencing, but cannot come to
language that emerges as metaphysical. Metaphysics always draws us to back to gods as
beings. Rather, the god’s godhood arises only out of Being in Ereignis [aus dem Seyn
nur die Götterung sich ereignet]. Out of the holding sway of Being, does their godhood
arise.
What are gods?—Nothing that we have imagined. In my own imagination, and
because they are imagined, they are wrongly conceived—gods are the possibilities of the
holding sway of Being; and man must offer a voice for their arrival. In Heidegger’s
words in the proper Being-historical thinking [seynsgeschichtlichen Denken], gods
“merely name the empty site [leere Stelle] of the undeterminateness of godhood [der
Unbestimmtheit der Gottschaft] that arises out of man’s lack of attunement
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[Stimmungslosigkeit des Menschen].”636 The gods emerge out of the beginning of the
holding sway of Being.
But today understanding gods has become impossible, for either we resort to
metaphysical conceptions or we simply posit their opposite. Both conceptions are still
steeped within the framework of metaphysics. And so Heidegger sees the last god
arriving, which draws with it the startling dismay of enframing and the possibility, full of
danger, but also of the saving grace.
Having discussed gods as the last of the fourfold (the gathered-separateness of
beings), we can now move toward Being as Saying as possibility. For this possibility to
emerge, we must first look at the method of interpretation once more. Within
interpretation the way-making of the Saying of Being unfolds as looking forward. The
forward looking [Vor-sicht] emerges into the foreground of the Being as Saying.
To address this problematic Heidegger offers a seminar on Heraclitus637 with
Eugen Fink at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau in the winter semester of 1966.638
Its prevailing theme is that of interpretation and its necessity in all avenues of thinking—
thus, we have come full circle through all our topics. Interpretation seeks what is yet
unsaid: it seeks Being as Saying in beings; it seeks Beings as Saying in man in a
community. While interpretation seems non-philosophical, it is most philosophical and
the only way toward Being and the relation between Being as Saying and beings. It is the
movement between the “literal” and the “metaphorical,” for both are of metaphysics.
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Most importantly, it is the movement of Being as Saying as seen in the Kehre in
Seinsgeschichte.
The second set of seminars centers on Heraclitus’ fragments and discusses the
issue of identity. Identity seems to be at the heart of interpretation toward Being as
Saying. How we envision identity contributes toward our interpretation of Being as
Saying. Not as a thing, not as a pure movement, Being as Saying can be interpreted as
having an identity. What is the identity of Being as Saying? To answer this question, we
must first look closer to the proper meaning of identity.
Identity must be understood as a belonging-together [Zusammengehören].”639 It
arises in the relatedness of “the one” [e3n] and “the many” [ta /pa/nta]. The Heraclitus
seminar has many participants; and thus the literary conceit of the “many” participants
emerging into “one” interpretation lends itself well to Heidegger’s notion of the holding
sway concealing/unconcealing of events as Ereignis. Roughly speaking, from the voices
of many does one event emerge.
First, the holding sway concealing/revealing of events as Ereignis place us always
already in transformation. Heraclitus’ thoughts on transformations [Wandlungen] of
“fire” [pu=r] or energy and “turning” [troph\] then imply that everything goes over into
everything; so that nothing retains the definiteness of its character but, following an
indiscernible wisdom, moves itself throughout by opposites [Gegensätze].640 Hence,
representational thinking emerges out of logic of the principle of contradiction. And at
the same time, for Hegel, identity emerges as the holding together of these opposites. We
can see how Hegel arrives at his Aufhebung.
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Yet Heidegger and Fink explore how the above meaning is not entirely
Heraclitus’ meaning. Rather than moving itself through opposites, there is a steering
[Steuern] of movement. Fink comments that the transformations of fire are in some
measure a circular movement that gets steered by lightening, specifically by the wise one
[sofo\n]. The movement [Bewegung], in which everything moves throughout everything
through opposites, is guided [gelenkt].
Second, Heraclitus knows neither of Hegelian opposites nor of dialectic.
Heraclitus knows of flux, which is steered. The steering could appear violent or
oppressive, but true steering emerges as non-violent steering.641 Heidegger holds that we,
like Being, are permanently set in motion and thus, we are caught in the hermeneutical
circle and at the same time are being steered. We are in motion and are steered. Between
metaphorical and literal language, Heidegger sees man as always already in
transformation. The transformation occurs in part by our interpretation. But more so, the
transformation is steered by Being as Saying in Ereignis, a way-making [Be-wëgung]
unfolding in all beings in all times and places.
Now that we have engaged what Heidegger means by interpretation and identity.
We see Heidegger’s interest moving toward place, for identity and interpretation is
always situated. And so Heidegger becomes intrigued again with “place” during these
last years. His third Le Thor seminar in 1969 reviews the site of Ereignis, man rooted in
a place. Heidegger notices how meaning [Sinn], truth [Wahrheit] and place [Ort
(to/poj)] are three steps along the way of thinking. These steps succeed one another.642
For Heidegger meaning [Bedeutung] signifies “the turn” [»die Kehre«] to openness of
641
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being itself, rather than the openness of Dasein in regard to this openness of being
[Offenheit des Daseins], in which thinking always more decisively turns to Being as
Being [entschiedener dem Sein als Sein zuwendet].643 Ereignis is the manifestation of
Being in history as openness. But presently, the more important question for Heidegger
is what binds [Verbindende] meaning and truth as unconcealment. What binds them is
the ontological difference as manifested by Ereignis.
We have already seen Heidegger hold Being as nothing [Sein:Nichts], but now
Heidegger takes specific aim at the binding aspect. For Hegel it is Aufhebung and unites
Being with its antipode [Entgegengesetzte] of consciousness.644 For Hegel, then, Being is
the moment of the absolute alienation of the absolute. According to Heidegger language
and its conception is what leads Hegel to this untenable position. Language is no longer
able to reach philosophy. The lack of dialogue between language and its use is troubling
for Heidegger.
Marxism knows of these perplexities, and claims that philosophers have only
interpreted the world [die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert], but the real issue is to
transform it [verändern].645 But Heidegger sees the binding factor between the world and
philosophy as language. Being as Saying transforms man when man is open to its
Silence and draws man near. In Ereignis man is transformed and his meditative language
follows suit. For Heidegger, language and interpretation do indeed transform the world,
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but not in a Marxist way.646 Being as Saying draws man near and transforms man in
man’s place of dwelling.
Heidegger explains the situation in these terms: “Ereignis of being [is the]
condition [Bedingung] for the arrival of beings: Being lets beings presence [das Sein läßt
das Seiende answesen].”647 Being allows beings to be present, while Being appears as
absent. And so Heidegger writes it thusly, “Sein: Nichts: Selbes;” Being is not alienated
from the world in varying ways as in Hegel and Marx, but Being is identical with
“nothing” as the Same.
Unlike Hegel and Marx, Being for Heidegger does not alienate man. Being,
though manifesting itself, does so with the help of man. Being needs the finitude of
beings, for man is the placeholder of the nothing [Der Mensch ist der Platzhalter des
Nichts].648 As placeholder, man doesn’t add anything to Being, but clears all other beings
so that the space is left free for Being as Saying to draw near as Silence. Man is not
alienated from Being, but drawn ever closer in Silence.
Continuing to distance himself from prevailing philosophical methods, Heidegger
offers his last lectures in this series in September 6-8, 1973 in Zähringen, Germany.649 In
this seminar Heidegger continues his onslaught against Hegelianism, but also takes aim at
Husserl as being part of that self-same metaphysical project. Husserl’s categorical
intuition is itself yet another positing of Being, insists Heidegger. Hegel and Marx are
trapped in a type of transcendence while Husserl is trapped in immanence. All are
trapped.

646

GA 15: 352/Four Seminars 52.
GA 15: 363/Four Seminars 59.
648
GA 15: 370/Four Seminars 63.
649
GA 15: 373/Four Seminars 64.
647

230

Heidegger, on the other hand, offers neither realism nor idealism, but the
openness of Ereignis. Rather than a trapped philosophy, Heidegger offers a philosophy
that is open. Hegel thinks Absolute Spirit as drawing all things unto itself. Husserl
thinks within the Ur-structure of consciousness and constrains all matters to
consciousness. Marxism thinks on the basis of world production: social production of
society wherein society produces itself and the self-production of the human being as a
social being. In each case man is trapped in a closed process.
While Hegel and Husserl seemed less influential during Heidegger’s lifetime,
Marxism was still popular. Self-production of man and society plainly prevails. In
Heidegger’s eyes, whether popular or not, all three approaches appear as inadequate.
They are inadequate for they do not fully account for the possibility of Being as Saying
manifesting itself through man and beings.
Heidegger offers neither Hegelian Absolute transcendence, nor Husserlian
solipsism. Still less does Heidegger offer Marxist social production. Rather, Heidegger
offers that the self-production of man raises the danger of self-destruction [die Gefahr der
Selbstzertörung hervorbringt]. Amid such danger man is brought to startled dismay of
his situation. He is brought to Silence. And man is drawn closer by Being’s Silence.650
Being draws man; man responds to the Silence and gives it voice. Such is the dialogue
between Being’s originary language and mans’ responding, ordinary language. The
communication always occurs in a gathering/separating, concealing/unconcealing, Being
as Saying as Be-wëgen in Ereignis—unfolding.
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Let us conclude our thoughts on this period with Heidegger’s poem, “Sprache.”
Written in 1973, Heidegger offered it to a friend a few weeks before his death. We could
construe its meaning as the abiding way for his life-work:
Sprache651

Language

Wann werden Wörter
Wieder Wort?
Wann weilt der Wind weisender Wende?

When will words
Again be words?
When will the wind of a pointing turn abide?

Language, Being, man and language: Heidegger draws us to back to Seinsgeschichte in
the Kehre. As we are moved toward Being as Silence, our words can once again speak,
when the turning abides.
We have traveled quite some distance with Heidegger; and yet we have found
only what was before us from the beginning. From the beginning we saw the path of
originary language as way-making and way-making as the originary language, “be-wëgen
als Sage” has led us back to Being. And so we conclude this chapter with the main thesis
that unfolding is that, which is most originary in language’s “process” of communicating.
Both the way of Being and the steps toward Being were explored in the works
treating language between 1949 and 1976; we investigated what this unfolding might
entail as Seinsgeschichte. In Ereignis Being is manifested with man’s help: Being as
Saying has drawn man. In the Kehre we see that the way is way-making; we are drawn
as we remain open to Being’s abiding Silence. Sein: Nichts: Selbe. Man, open to
Being’s abiding presencing, is open to new possibilities in looking ahead, most especially
in the danger of enframing.
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In our next chapter we will discuss three major paradigms of Heidegger’s notion
of Being and language, then the following chapter will look ahead to a new possibility of
Being and language, envisioning Being as Saying as way-making and unfolding though
all beings as language. As such these chapters comprise the second phase of our project.
While the first part attempted neither to present Heidegger’s work in order to disagree or
agree, but instead it was an attempt652 to allow the works to appear as they are. Our
second part pointedly discusses this very issue of hermeneutical influence.
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PART II:
WIEDERHOLEN
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
Overgrown Paths

“The time of the ‘systems’ is over.”653

In this chapter we will view three major Heideggerian paradigms and the
implications of their systems on our topic of Being and language. These interpretations
of Heidegger’s understanding of Being attempt to draw together all the various works of
Heidegger into a coherent whole, whether as an explicit account or simply as a way of
indexing the topic. We have outlined already the transcendental phenomenology of the
first chapter, employed the destructive retrieval in the second chapter, and pondered
meditative thinking of chapters three through six. Now we can begin to investigate what
hermeneutic phenomenology might look like with Heidegger’s own works to guide us.
By returning to Heidegger’s themes, we come to clarity on the entire project. Hence, we
see the pertinence of this section “Wiederholen”—we repeat. More precisely in this
chapter, we are now in a position to judge the effectiveness of paradigms by placing them
beside Heidegger’s theme of Being’s showing itself as language.
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Like any paradigm, Heideggerian paradigms give order and relation. As such,
they lay before us the issue of hermeneutic structure as the focus of our concern.
Whether the following three major paradigms of Heidegger’s pathway have
hermeneutically framed the conversations of Heideggerian scholarship over the years is
clear, whether they have done so properly is the issue of this chapter.
We list three paradigms here for the most part by their strongest proponent and
label each according to its controlling thesis. What can be called the “existential
phenomenological” approach is best exemplified by Thomas Langan. William
Richardson proffers the “thought of Being”654 model, and Joseph J. Kockelmans’
approach can best be described as the “many ways” theory. Each paradigm has certain
supporting evidence within Heidegger’s works and often conveys the influences of its
respective period.
Having written this, we likewise concur that each author had nothing but the
highest regard for Heidegger and his work and attempted to convey this authentically,
eruditely, and even tirelessly. In many ways these paradigms are indeed quite
commendable and helpful, for paradigms allow others who may not be as well-versed
with Heidegger to grasp him. Paradigms provide others with an entrée, which otherwise
would leave them unable to grapple with Heidegger’s terminology and meaning. Like all
paradigms these three sift through a vast amount of information and regularize it. They
cut out a way through the maze, a path through the forest of works. As ways, they can
reveal.
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On the other hand, these paradigms can conceal as much as, or more than, they
reveal. In their attempt to draw together, they highlight certain aspects over others. One
interpretation might highlight man’s important role, but Being is seen mostly, if not
entirely so, from man’s line of sight. This, we argue is the shortcoming of the early
portrayals of Heidegger as an existential phenomenologist. The second paradigm
attempts to move toward thinking of Being as the way, in order to move beyond the
shortcomings of the existential phenomenological paradigm. This model, then, needs to
explain the divergence of Heidegger’s approaches. Subsequently, this model bifurcates
Heidegger’s work into Heidegger I and Heidegger II. As such, its shortfall lies in its
inability to distinguish sufficiently the “two Heideggers.” The third paradigm avoids the
meta-narrative approach of the first two altogether and opts instead to depict Heidegger
as proffering many ways to Being. While citing as support Heidegger’s own phrase
contained in Klostermann’s Gesamtausgabe: “Wege, nicht Werke,” this paradigm doesn’t
attempt to gather these many ways into a coherent whole. Rather, simply it offers many
ways; its effect could mislead the reader to conclude that Heidegger cared little about any
one concern. This belies Heidegger’s explicit and continual single-minded concern for
the Seinsfrage. Each of these shortcomings conceals Heidegger’s concern regarding the
question of Being such that it becomes not a way, but a worn out path that leads away
from, not toward, Heidegger’s way. Hence, the title of our chapter indicates both that
these paths have grown over Heidegger’s way and they are outmoded and in time will be
infrequently used.655
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or overemphasize structure over content or content to the denial of structure. Most interesting have been
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For our specific topic regarding Being and language, we have seen how Being as
Saying unfolds; it illustrates Heidegger’s facility to gather together creatively all the
facets of Being and language while maintaining his insight that Being “has” a history,
Seinsgeschichte. This inability to depict both the way and the steps is how the above
paradigms stumble.
To appreciate fully this chapter, “Overgrown Paths” and the next, “Being as
Saying,” it might help the reader to recall Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions.656 While John Horgan coined the phrase “paradigm shift,”657 Kuhn draws
our attention to the fact that theories do indeed affect the way we process information, or,
as he claims in The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and
Change, “the criteria of choice … function not as rules, which determine choice, but as
values, which influence it [the choice].”658 Criteria by which we choose influence our
choices. From Kuhn’s directive, we look at the theory of the paradigm in our study of
Heidegger’s Being and language in order to scrutinize our choices and how they lead, or
mislead, us along the way.
Scientific Revolutions argues that the development of scientific theory does not
emerge from the linear acquisition of facts, but rather from changing intellectual
circumstances and possibilities. As such, the sequencing of scientific paradigms are nonlinear. Paradigms shift dramatically when a new gestalt is grasped suddenly as an
attempt to include seemingly anomalous information. One should always judge the

French philosophers into our current epoch. We shall argue in chapter nine that they too go lead away from
the question of Being and, for this reason, go astray as viable philosophical pathways. Within the
parameters of these extremes, possible avenues are explored in chapter ten.
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helpfulness of a paradigm by its anomaly, for the outlying fact often points to a failed
paradigm that is not fully articulating the system.
Applying this relationship of paradigm toward our present topic, we can
understand how paradigms have developed in Heideggerian scholarship; but more
importantly, we can understand how those paradigms are part of the intellectual, cultural
milieu of the time. Consequently, the understanding of Heidegger’s question of Being
has shifted in fits and starts. Because language seems to fit poorly in these models of
Heideggerian thought, language fits the role of anomaly in Heideggerian scholarship.
It could be argued that Heidegger isn’t presenting a science or a theory. True, this
is indeed the case. Still, in “Science and reflection” (1954) Heidegger addresses this
question in a fuller fashion, for we live in a period in which everything is viewed through
the lens and the language of science. Heidegger asks whether science is the theory of the
real. To engage this question Heidegger asks what the word, “theory” means? He notes
that the word “theory” stems from the Greek verb “Qewrei=n,” which grew out of the
coalescing of two root words, “qea/,” [the outward aspect] as in the English word, theatre,
and “ὁρὰω” [to view something attentively].659 “Qewrei=n” grows out of a phenomenon
that is characterized by an attentive looking at the outward aspect. A theory, then, has the
characteristic of looking at the outward aspect. As one looks at the outward aspect soon
the question arises regarding the “contents” of the inward. In counter-distinction to the
outward aspect, there must be an interior aspect that could be called the “real” or the
“ground.”
659

GA 7: 46/“Science and Reflection,” Question Concerning Technology 163. For our discussion here, we
do not draw out all of the implication of Qea/ and its relation to the word, “goddess,” i.e., that our looking
is a response to the goddess already looking out at us. Nor do we engage in Heidegger’s connection with
the goddess of truth. Simply our point here is to highlight for the reader that “Qewrei=n” grows out of a
phenomenon that is characterized by an attentive looking at the outward aspect.
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Heidegger concludes that although a scientific theory may be helpful, it must
always be noted that science has its “ground” in something more primordial. Science as a
theory of the real is a way toward Being, if indeed Being is to be sought.660 But Being is
not simply the ground for Heidegger, but the groundless ground. Moreover, the
distinction between inner and outer is part of the problem. Therefore, these paradigms
are helpful only as much as they convey Ereignis, i.e., allow us to view attentively the
outward aspect of Being, in their respective periods, as Being as Saying in relation Being
as it shows itself as itself. Phenomenology, then for Heidegger, is clarifying the concept
of scientific method;661 it sets aside the modernist need to bifurcate Being. This is not to
say that phenomenology is a science. Rather, it is a way.

Existential Phenomenological Approach
The earliest period of Heideggerian scholarship emphasized Dasein as a way
toward Being with language as a small part of the overall project. When Dasein becomes
the centerpiece of the model, the outcome is too humanistic replete with unique
existential and phenomenological terminology. Being and Time is the source of
Heideggerian phenomenology. We see these qualities in Langan’s early existential
paradigm of Heidegger.662 Present were strong tinges of a dark mood, looming from an
interpretation of Heidegger’s Nichts, often seen as Nietzschean nihilism. “Being-unto660

It must be noted here that it would be more proper to reverse the linguistic mood of this phrase: Science
as a theory of the real is a way toward Being, if Being seeks us through it.
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death” as Dasein’s destiny burdened the text with a sense of foreboding. Perhaps it was
the post-WWII angst that colored later interpretations of the 1927 text. Certainly
existentialists like Jean-Paul Sartre were influenced by Heidegger’s Being and Time. It
would be uncertain, though, whether Langan’s existential interpretation was more
influenced by Sartre or Heidegger.
While serious scholars no longer hold much stock in Langan’s paradigm as
illustrative of Heidegger’s entire project, it still influences pervasively the general
consciousness of who Heidegger is and what Heidegger’s philosophy is about. One only
needs to glance over any undergraduate reading list; if one finds any Heidegger texts
therein, it would be that of Being and Time. If one were to ask a layman to place a label
on Heidegger’s work, more often than not, the label would be that of “Existential.”
Langan describes Heidegger’s work in precisely that light: an existential
phenomenology. Langan wishes to place Heidegger’s work into the model of unfolding
existentialism and how that differs from the Western philosophical tradition thus far. He
organizes the book accordingly; “The Existential Analytic” and “Recalling the Historical
Destiny of the Western Tradition” are its two major divisions. The first draws out the
structural aspects of Dasein and the second shows how this had been missed in history
and how this should be viewed currently. Langan’s major thesis states that these two
sections coincide with the project of Being and Time and encompass the entirety of
Heidegger’s project. Langan reports that while the project was unfinished in Being and
Time, Heidegger never abandoned the project.663 Through this claim one is easily led to
believe that the entirety of Heidegger’s project was formulated in Being and Time, yet
simply not completed.
663

Meaning of Heidegger 10.
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The question one might have asked Langan is whether Being and Time does
contain the whole of Heidegger’s project. If the answer were yes, then why would
eighty-some following volumes be needed to complete Heidegger’s project? If the
answer were no, then one could ask Langan what different ways do the later works have
which Being and Time did not foresee. The answer, whether yes or no, depends precisely
on what is meant by the whole of Heidegger’s project.
Heidegger himself describes the shortcomings664 of Being and Time and its
inability to reach Being, his ongoing project of Seinsfrage. Heidegger writes in Being
and Time: “Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of
categories it has as its disposal [Verfügen], remains blind and perverted from its ownmost
aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this
clarification as its fundamental task.”665 If Langan meant that the Heideggerian project is
larger than what Being and Time could accomplish as ontology, he would be correct. But
one is directed by Langan to conclude that Heidegger’s project is fundamental ontology
as an existential phenomenology. And yet it is Heidegger himself who protested to such
a label; as Joseph Kockelmans writes: human existence is “neither the primary nor the
ultimate philosophical issue.”666
As evidence of our point—soon after Being and Time Heidegger moved away
from the individual’s importance in the question of Being [Seinsfrage], unseating Dasein,
664

Some of the shortcomings of Being and Time pertinent to our thesis and mentioned by Heidegger
include: originary language as Rede (adjusted in GA 12, 1950s into “Being as Saying” as the originary
language); the foundation of truth lies in Dasein’s eksistence (amended into Being is the ultimate
foundation of truth in GA 9: “Brief über den “Humanismus,” 1946; and the relationship between Being and
finitude (modified into the “ontological difference” in GA 24: Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie,
1927 and in GA 9: “Vom Wesen des Grundes,”1929); logos as inherently apophantic (transformed into
apophantic secondarily GA 9: “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” 1930 and in GA 3: Kant und das Problem der
Metaphysik, 1929).
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if you will. In its place he looks as those regions surrounding Dasein, like language and
earth, which are interrelated in such a way that man is not completely in control of them.
As Heidegger’s enigmatic phrase so aptly portrays: “Language is the house of Being.”667
Man is not the master of language; or, as is the case with Being and Time discourse is
part of the care structure of Dasein. Langan, however, describes this relationship of man
and language in a way that retains man’s sole responsibility. He writes: “The poet and
the thinker share the responsibility of ‘Bringing Being to house’ in forging language.”668
Responsibility does lie partially at the feet of the poet and thinker, indeed, but Being first
must draw them near Being as Silence, from which they forge language. Langan
mistakenly understands this responsibility of bearing language primarily as Dasein’s
responsibility.669
Likewise, in the Beiträge Heidegger illustrates the shortcomings of a fundamental
ontology; ontology needs a “ground” as well. Rather than grounding it upon another
ground, which in turn still would need to be grounded, Heidegger decides against the way
of grounding or causing. Instead, Heidegger holds that such a trajectory is part of the
first beginning, i.e., Western philosophy; it leads to nihilism. We must leap toward
another beginning: nihilism is not nothing, but Nothing is. Between theses two
beginnings, Heidegger sees Being emerging as the abyss of Silence. The Silence of
Being shows itself as Ereignis; included in the Ereignis, man is drawn near and he hears
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beyng [Seyn] as Silence. In the Beiträge man is not so much the discloser/concealer, but
more so the site of disclosure of Being.
These two paragraphs are sufficient evidence to argue that the project of
fundamental ontology of Being and Time cannot comprise the whole of Heidegger’s
project. Fundamental ontology is too narrow to encompass Ereignis. Rather, Ereignis
appropriates us and our humanistic ventures; Ereignis encompasses fundamental
ontology. Certainly this is not to say that Being and Time and fundamental ontology are
not part of the Heideggerian project; they are indeed. Being and Time, though, is not the
entirety of Heidegger’s project; Heidegger moves fundamental ontology toward Saying
as Being.
Let us examine two examples within Langan’s book in order to illustrate his
thesis that fundamental ontology is the whole of Heidegger’s project, and thereby distorts
other themes. First, the “fourfold” is gerrymandered into the three ek-stases of the care
structure of Dasein in a way that can only indicate that Langan views all of Heidegger’s
later work as a fuller explanation of Being and Time.
A case in point, Langan uses “Bauen Wohnen Denken” (1951) to discuss his
notions of the fourfold [das Geviert].670 Langan describes the fourfold quite
adequately671 until he claims that three of the four elements in the gathering-as-separate
of the fourfold can be identified as elements present in prior analyses of exstases in Being
and Time. It is the question of the “gods” which troubles him. He elaborates: “But what
of the fourth element, the Göttlichen? Are there not but three exstases possible in a
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Recall our discussion of “Building Dwelling Thinking” in the Chapter 4, “From lo/goj toward
Being:Saying,” wherein man’s mastery over language is called by Heidegger a “betriebene Verkehrung
dieses Herrschaftverhältnis” [subversion of dominance] 137-141.
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temporal horizon?”672 Langan concludes that fourth must be something more, the whole
of Being, and calls it mysterious. Langan’s phrasing leads the reader to understand the
fourfold as issuing out of Dasein’s care structure of existentiality-facticity-being-fallen
[Existenzität-Faktizität-Verfallenheit]. While one could discuss the virtues of Langan’s
approach with mortals and the world, one must question his description of the earth.
Langan describes earth as that encounter with Dasein. Yet, the earth is earth as the very
way that Dasein is not as its encounter or its origin. Langan’s formulation would be
problematic, for it would be tantamount to say that even the earth has its origin in
Dasein.673
One might defend Langan’s approach as reasonable since he had no access to the
Beiträge; for it is in the Beiträge wherein this relationship of the fourfold is best clarified.
This seems a fair defense. Yet, other works of Heidegger available to Langan have
described both Ereignis and the fourfold. Among those works, the following are listed in
Langan’s bibliography: “Zur Seinsfrage” (1956), which contains a treatment of “das
Geviert;” “Alétheia,” (1943) includes Ereignis in its discussion; “Das Ding” (1950)
discusses “das Geviert;” “Bauen Wohnen Denken” (1951) outlines “das Geviert,” as
Langan notes; “Die Frage nach der Technik” (1949-50) has a treatment of Ereignis; “Der
Ursprung der Kunstwerkes” (1935-1936) includes a discussion including both Ereignis
and “das Geviert.” In none of those works does Heidegger describe them in terms of the
Dasein’s care structure. From this evidence, it seems very likely that Langan read these
672

Meaning of Heidegger 123.
Langan’s discussion of earth always places earth as an encounter with Dasein. He writes: “The
fundamental exstasis of the earth is the present of that which is present, the now of the fundamental
encounter with the things-that-are.” Meaning of Heidegger 122. The difficulty of such a conception is that
earth by definition is always in relation to Dasein. Heidegger would never deny such a relationship, but
earth for Heidegger is that which is first and foremost fundamentally outside of Dasein’s control. Langan
underestimates this latter point.
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works through the lens of Being and Time without realizing that they contain discussions
on “das Geviert” beyond the purview of Being and Time.674
Our second example is more problematic for Langan’s model. Langan claims in
chapter 6 of his book, “The Essence of Truth,” that all paths of Heidegger’s
phenomenology lead to the essence of truth.675 We shall not argue here676 against the
claim that all of Heidegger’s work is phenomenological; however, we shall argue simply
against the claim that all paths lead to the essence of truth. For in the next chapter we
shall argue conversely that all paths, including the essence of truth lead Heidegger to
Being as Saying. Here we shall simply proffer a counterexample. The Beiträge is
certainly a good case in point. But let us proffer instead those works of Heidegger
Langan himself cites as proof against his model.
While “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” (1930), Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik
(1929), “Vom Wesen des Grundes” (1929), and “Was ist Metaphysik?” (1927) certainly
seem to illustrate Langan’s point well, one must notice that these works do not include
the whole of Heidegger’s works since Langan published his work in 1959. Why does he
narrow Heidegger oeuvre? Furthermore, all of Langan’s citations in his sixth chapter
emerge surprisingly from only one of the above four works, “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.”
Simply by the brunt of evidence, it would imply that this period, even this single work, is
the whole of Heidegger’s work. But that simply is not the case, for Heidegger himself
questions the adequacy of the term, “essence” in relation to Being and truth.
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Perhaps Langan means to claim that the essence of truth is Being; this would
soothe qualms about Langan’s missing the fact the Heidegger himself said that Seinsfrage
is his concern. But this too would be problematic. For Heidegger through his work, Kant
und das Problem der Metaphysik, finds the identity of truth with Being to be an outcome
of Kantian conceptual framework. To claim that the essence of truth is Being is simply
to add one further metaphysical step, with the result that Being is truth. For this reason
Heidegger strives vigorously to supplant metaphysics with a fundamental ontology. We
cannot equate the essence of truth with Being.
Let us be more careful in our analysis; we shall grant Langan the claim that all
Heideggerian phenomenology leads to the essence of truth, if he includes the following
rejoinder, “which in turn, leads to Being.” Being is Heidegger’s question. Is not Being
and Time and the early works all concerned with the question of Being? Heidegger, in
these works, explicitly holds Being as his central focus. On the contrary, it is the
question of truth in the history of Western philosophy that has led us away from the
question of Being. Is not Langan leading us down the path of Western philosophy?
One can easily provide other counterexamples of many available works of
Heidegger between 1930 and the publication of Langan’s work in 1959 to illustrate
Heidegger’s concern for the question of Being. For example, Der Satz vom Grund (195556) is a direct discussion on the relationship between reason and Being. As given within
this work, the Leibnizian principle of reason: “Nothing is without reason” must itself
have a principle underlying it. Heidegger concludes that between the philosophy of this
first beginning and the philosophy of the other beginning—which states the principle
thusly, “Nothing is – without reason”—lies the groundless abyss as the source of all
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beings, including that from which reason ensues. Rather than searching for the essence
of truth as the ground of reason, Der Satz vom Grund looks to Being: Nothing, which is.
Likewise, any of Heidegger’s works included in Unterwegs zur Sprache lead the
reader not to the essence of truth, but to the essence of language. But the essence of
language is Being as Saying, or perhaps at least lo/goj. Truth always emerges from this
more originary relationship of Being heard as Silence. On the other hand, propositional
language, logic, and truth lead to Being as the highest Being of Western philosophy.
Thus, Heidegger’s discovery in Unterwegs zur Sprache is indeed that the essence of truth
flows out from the essence of language, not as would an existentialist would hold. An
existential would understand that the essence of language flows out of the essence of
truth, which, in turn is derived by humanity.
In conclusion, Langan’s understanding of Heidegger as an existential
phenomenologist is a paradigm that constrains too narrowly the meaning of what
Heidegger has written. It doesn’t include the anomaly of language and too heavily relies
on Western philosophical conceptual tradition to describe what phenomenology is. It
does accurately convey the mindset of 1950s Heideggerian scholarship and leads toward
another mindset: the thought of Being. The thought of Being model quickly becomes the
new paradigm of the 1960s.

Thinking of Being Model
It is toward this paradigm of the 1960s we set our critical eye. William
Richardson took the challenge of engaging a greater swath of Heidegger’s writing to
heart. With a stir, Richardson’s new paradigm entered into Heideggerian scholarship.
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Richardson’s breakthrough displaced the centrality of Dasein for Being, moving from a
phenomenological mindset toward a thoughtful one, from phenomenology toward
thought.
Rightly this paradigm placed Being, not Dasein, at its center. For this reason,
Richardson needed to account for the divergence in Heidegger’s work, from Dasein
toward Being. Richardson famously developed the explanatory account of “Heidegger I
and II.” “Heidegger I” is concerned with the Dasein-centered Being and Time and related
works, the phenomenology of which Langan was so fond. “Heidegger II” is concerned
with the later works of Heidegger which focus on the thought of Being. Interestingly, the
works Richardson cites in his book are not much different from those which Langan cites
and the major divisions of both are remarkably similar.
How did it arise that with similar sources Richardson and Langan arrived at
different paradigms? It wasn’t a fact or a statement in Heidegger’s work, but a
movement of thought that redirected Richardson. Richardson noticed a shift in
Heidegger’s thought over time. With Heidegger’s written assistance, Richardson labeled
the trajectory of Heidegger’s work as one of a way of “through … toward.” Never
simply stationary existential phenomenology, the “through … toward” trajectory led
Richardson to a new paradigm that incorporated change.
The challenge for Richardson’s paradigm was locating the source of the change.
How did the different trajectories in the “two Heideggers” arise? Controversial677 to this
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day, Richardson’s model held this change as “Kehre,”678 the term Heidegger meant as
Seinsgeschichte. Kehre, for Richardson, was unfortunately the way of unifying two types
of Heideggerian philosophy.
This strong, new paradigm expanded the first existential phenomenological one
toward one of “thinking of being,” but now with an unmistakable unity among the works.
Richardson’s book was aptly named, with Heidegger’s assistance, Heidegger: Through
Phenomenology to Thought. Its meaning was that Heidegger moved through
phenomenology toward thought.679
The book is rich in detail, extensive in scope, and well-argued. The book is not
simple to read, but neither is it easy to lay aside. Indeed it is worth its heft. It has three
divisions (or two divisions with a section to unify): “From there to Being,” “Reversal,”
and “From Being to There.” We are clear from these division titles, which parts are
known subsequently as Heidegger I (“From there to Being”), the linking chapter
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Heidegger explains in an elegant letter to Richardson, now set as the preface to Richardson’s own work:
“… Die Kehre spielt im Sachverhalt selbst. Sie ist weder von mir erfunden, noch betrifft sie nur mein
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York: Fordham University Press, 2003) xix.1-3. In the same letter to Richardson Heidegger explains: “Das
Denken der Kehre ist eine Wendung in meinem Denken.” [The thinking “of” Kehre is a change in my
thought.] xvi-ii. The point of emphasis is that the Kehre itself is not the operative change here, but rather
Heidegger’s thinking on the Kehre has changed. I conclude from this that awareness of the Kehre is what
distinguishes Heidegger from all previous philosophers; his thinking on the Kehre has indeed shifted over
the years. I call Heidegger’s shift in thinking, following Heidegger, “wendung.” More fundamentally the
Kehre affects Heidegger’s “wendung,” but not only Heidegger’s thought. Kehre as seen in Ereignis
appropriates, and thus, changes man. As I have argued earlier, Seinsgeschichte is the Kehre in the sense
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Being. Seeing this, Heidegger is changed. See GA 11: 149-150.
I prefer translating Die Kehre as “the Turning” in distinction to Richardson’s “the reversal,” or
even to the more common, “the Turn,” for “the Turning” has fuller connotations of a verbal noun, of those
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(“Reversal”), and Heidegger II (“From Being to There”). The issues and linking of the
“two Heideggers” for Richardson is a fundamental methodological question.
The content of that methodology for Richardson lies in the following major
question: What does Heidegger mean by the thinking of Being? For Richardson the
search moves from fundamental ontology to the search for authentic thought. Sifting
through many of Heidegger’s works, noting that Heidegger speaks of it in many ways,
Richardson opts to define authentic thought as “foundational thought” [das wesentliche
Denken].680
“Foundational thought” for Richardson is not the thought of metaphysics.
Tracing thought from the philosophers before Plato and Aristotle, then moving toward
Descartes, Richardson concludes the thought of metaphysics is one of transcendence,
“‘going beyond’ the human orbit.” This is quite consistent with Heidegger’s analysis in
this period, who explains transcendence in these terms: “For Greek thinking, being that is
at rest remains purely distinguished (different) from changeable beings. This difference
between being and beings then appears, when seen starting from beings and moving
toward being [vom Seienden zum Sein hin erblickt], as transcendence, i.e., as the metaphysical.”681 “Foundational thought” is not separated from beings.
Conversely for Richardson, “Foundational thought” overcomes metaphysics,
technicity, logic and humanism. The meaning of “overcoming,” for Richardson is the
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same as the meaning of “overcoming” for Heidegger; “overcoming” means stepping
back. It is pre-subjective, pre-representative, non-logical, and even pre-rational;
foundational thought allows beings to be.682 It tries to meditate Being as the process of
truth and is brought about by the nature of man conceived as ek-sistence. As such the
nature of man conceived as ek-sistence has the open-ness of the process of a0-lh/qeia,
which is foundational thought. The conclusion of process of ek-sistence resides in a
place for Richardson, and he calls it the “there” [Da] of Being. Thus, the significance of
the word, “Dasein,” becomes apparent to us.
To understand foundational thought via Richardson, then, one must explore what
the relationship between Being and its “there” is. The reader should be aware of a latent
tri-partite division which Richardson’s analysis develops: Being, “there” and the
relationship of “is.” Let us focus on the problematic relationship of mediation first. Can
“is” mediate between “Being” and “there,” when the “is” is Being itself? Thus,
“fundamental thought” is portrayed in terms of mediation, between Being and its there.
But our analysis overemphasizes and perhaps distorts Richardson’s point.
More accurately, Being and “there” are a cor-relation. The tri-partite division is
muted somewhat. Richardson explains that Being maintains a primacy over its “there,”
yet Being needs its “there” in order to be itself. While basically correct, the final phrase
should be nuanced in light of our analysis of the Beiträge section “Beyng:” Being, which
has a history, has its “there” to show itself, yet beyng does not have a history nor does it
have a “there.” Rather, beyng [Seyn] shows itself as concealment. Being [Sein] is the
history, or the revealment of that concealment. Beyng is the ground in as much as it is
the abgrund, the non-ground. Beyng needs Da-sein in order for Da-sein to near the
682
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ground that is drawn near to the abground, for out of this relation the gods and Da-sein
are gathered.683 Between Being and beyng, Being as Saying manifests itself through the
fourfold. The point of section 267 is the question of the possibility of what Being is
before its manifestation.684 It is nothing.
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distinction that I draw regarding Being/beyng and its relation to the “there.” As evidence he argues rightly
that Heidegger calls the “there” the ground of Beyng. Rojcewicz concludes that Dasein is the ground of
beyng, and argues for even a stronger conception of Dasein than the Dasein as the “there” in Being and
Time. This last conclusion is what I respectfully disagree. While the “there” certainly has Da-sein as the
site of the manifestation of Ereignis, the manifestation “occurs” through the fourfold, not simply through
Dasein alone. Indeed we have seen that Heidegger himself employs the hyphenation distinction of
Dasein/Da-sein to illustrate what we have called the de-centering of Dasein. In Richardson’s conception,
Dasein is the ground of Being; in our conception the fourfold is the site of the manifestation of beyng, not
the ground of beyng. Beyng is the unground of Being and Da-sein is part of the fourfold. To take a stance
that Dasein is the ground of beyng would contradict Heidegger’s first sentence in section 267, “Beyng:”
“Beyng is appropriation. This word [appropriation] names beyng in thinking and grounds beyng’s
essential swaying in its own jointure.” Thus, appropriation as unground grounds beyng in thinking and its
holding sway. Thus, I argue that appropriation in later Heidegger takes a central position while Da-sein
holds a lesser position, for appropriation needs not simply Dasein, but also needs the gods, mortals, earth
and sky of the fourfold.
The “Grounding” section at first might seem to corroborate Rojcewicz’s point and thus support
Richardon. In that section Da-sein is offered as the ground of beyng. This section engages in the question
to what extent does Dasein appear as the ground as the terminus ad quem of the Ereignis. All that is
manifested needs ultimately to have one “that which sees the manifestation.” In that sense Da-sein is the
ground. But the Being/beyng distinction and its relation to the “there” is far more than its final arrival
point.
This question of terminus ad quem, is the philosophical direction, wherein I see Rojcewicz
following Richardson are led more to the philosophy of the first beginning than the leap between the
philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning. Rojcewicz argues that Being is the metaphysical
understanding of Being, with no history while beyng is Heidegger’s own understanding in that beyng has a
history, he argues. First, one must indeed be careful with the usage of the word, “history.” As early as
Being and Time, Heidegger makes the distinction between “Geschichte” and “Historie,” the latter is what
the metaphysical conception of Being entails. Instead of “Historie,” Heidegger is interested in
“Geschichte.” For argument’s sake let us presume that we all intend “Geschichte.” As such beyng with a
history would contradict Heidegger’s point that beyng is prior to the arising of mortals and gods.
Consequently, my contention throughout this thesis that in the leap between Being and beyng is the ground
as the non-ground, manifested as Ereignis, which has “Geschichte.” This latter point is the basis of my
disagreement with Rojcewicz, following Richardson.
Finally, the Beiträge’s inconsistent use of “beyng/being” distinction doesn’t nullify my point for I
argue that only in the section 267, “Beyng,” does Heidegger explore this relationship as a possibility before
it is manifested as Ereignis. All other sections discuss the Ereignis in its manifestations from all vantage
points or joinings or fugues. In that sense Heidegger and I both use the terms synonymously, for indeed
they are the same. Only when one discuss the possibility of how Being is without its manifestation in the
fourfold does the distinction makes sense or becomes relevant.
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The import of the above excursus is that Heidegger sees the pernicious effects of a
tri-partite division. Such a division makes Being into a Being, not unlike any other being.
Such a position is not tenable for Heidegger. Still a “between” somehow is manifested,
neither there, nor not there. Heidegger is acutely aware of this problematic in section 267
of the Beiträge.
Richardson, by placing foundational thought as the between obscures Heidegger’s
placement of “das wesentliche Denken,” whether we call it “foundational thinking” or
“the gods.” Instead, in section 267 Heidegger places both mortals and “das wesentliche
Denken” as arising together, but in counter-distinction to one another, not in counterdistinction to Being as its there. With earth and sky, they are the way that Being
manifests itself as Saying in Ereignis. Thus, Richardson conflates the fourfold into a correlation.
The second necessary point needed to understand foundational thinking asserts
that Being sends itself out unto its “there,” a sending that is a self-sending, and terminates
in “there.” Being conceals itself in beings as it bestows itself in hiddenness. The “there”
[Da-sein] is as the shepherd of Being. Being is known not primarily as in its “there” in
Dasein, as Richardson contends. Being appears not primarily as Da-sein, as there-being
as Richardson contends. But, as we contend, Being is know primarily by its negativity or
more precisely, its concealment; Being is a no-thing before it can be a Being-there.
Thus, one must think of Being as a sending of itself. Being sends in that it is
appears as an absence. Being is known not as it is, but as a no-thing. Being is known as
a revealment of its concealment. This revealing of a concealing is a type of sending, for
Heidegger. Therefore, Being is never exhausted by a single instance of revealing.
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For Richardson, Being-there as occurring through thought limits the complexity
of this revealing simply as appearing there. The fourfold of Heidegger broadens
significantly how that Being-there appears. Thus, we have an encapsulated view of
Richardson’s relationship between Being and its “there.”
Yet, this is not precisely the role of thought for Heidegger. Rather, as Richardson
does note, thought of Being brings the above relationship of Being and its “there” to
fulfillment.685 Thought, for Richardson, completes the process of non-concealment by
bringing Being into manifestation that is most proper to the nature of man as language.
The role of thought, then, cannot be thinking of thought and also the sending thought, at
least as Richardson conveys it, for Being sends thought for Heidegger. Heidegger does
find a way to combine thought and the sending of thought, but not with thought, but
rather with Being as Saying.
From our work with the Beiträge and other works which discuss the fourfold [das
Geviert], we understand a process of manifestation that is less focused on Da-sein. Being
is brought into manifestation as Ereignis through the fourfold, not simply Da-sein.
Certainly, man as mortal is involved; so too are the gods involved as fundamental
knowing awareness;686 the earth as unchanging and elemental; and sky as ever changing.
In many ways Richardson’s account of the Ereignis is still one of existential
phenomenology. Though Richardson does offer the added caution that Ereignis is
primarily the “work” of Being and not of Dasein.
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Richardson, “Introduction,” Through Phenomenology to Thought 21.
We have noted in the last chapter that Heidegger entitles section 70 in Besinnung as “Götter, Das
wesentliche Wissen.” Emad and Kalary translate this latter phrase in a Heideggerian fashion as
“fundamental knowing awareness,” whereas the philosophy of the first beginning would have it translated
as “the essential knowing.” See GA 66: 229/Mindfulness 203.
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For Richardson fundamental thought has an attitude as one of acquiescence of
Being and responding to its appeal and letting Being be itself. Fundamental thought has a
structure in the form of re-collection [An-denken] in the temporal dimension of future,
past, and present. “[F]oundational thought,” writes Richardson, “is by this fact historical,
sc. thinks Being-as-history in continual advent to thought through its dialogue with the
past;”687 and foundational thought thinks Being in its negativity of what is concealed as
well as what is revealed. As such, foundational thought helps Being be itself.
Richardson concludes his argument with the following sentence: “foundational thinking
is the process by which human ek-sistence responds to Being, not in its positivity but in
its negativity, as the continual process of truth-as-history.”688 This process, as
Richardson describes does indeed have its roots in Being and Time, but transforms itself
in Heidegger’s works after 1930 with the writing of “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.”
We would add that foundational thinking is the process by which human eksistence responds to being, but Ereignis is the process of Being’s manifesting itself in the
fourfold and thereby appropriating man. The later is more foundational than foundational
thinking as conceived by Richardson.
We see the roots of Richardson’s foundational thinking in Being and Time as
Richardson discusses ek-sistence and temporality; in this sense Richardson’s account is
indeed quite close to that of Langan’s paradigm. What is the difference of Richardson’s
thinking of thought? In order to show such a transformation, Richardson took the
existential phenomenology of Being and Time and translates “Rede” as “logos,”689
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following Joseph Möller.690 Richardson rightly sees the increasing importance of Rede as
“logos” making-manifest and letting-be-seen in Heidegger’s opus, but Richardson too
broadly identifies “thinking of Being” solely with “logos.”691
Richardson’s “logos” as fundamental thinking of Being is the means by which he
focuses all Heidegger’s works, from 1935 to 1951. We have already discussed all of the
works of Heidegger in our previous chapter, to which Richardson refers. The crucial
difference between Richardson’s account and ours is one of defining and applying of
language. Richardson understands fundamental thinking as bringing Being into
manifestation through that which is most proper to man, which is language. In our
account Heidegger conveys beyng, originary language, as Being as Saying, heard as
Silence. While Richardson understands foundational thinking as foundational, we see
originary language still more foundationally as “abground,” as non-ground.
Let us review Richardson’s key phrase in his argument to highlight his point:
fundamental “thought completes the process of non-concealment by bringing Being into
that form of manifestation that is most proper to the nature of man: language, through
which he says ‘is.’”692 We see in this sentence that thought completes that which Being
began. It brings Being into manifestation; Being is brought into manifestation to the
proper nature of man as language; and then man can say Being “is.” This seems wrongheaded.
Let us attempt to unpack the difficulties with this conception of foundational
thought. First, Being seems quite passive. Heidegger is careful to draw out the
690
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importance that it is Being which manifests itself through Ereignis in the Beiträge.
Admittedly, Richardson does clarify this point earlier, yet the remainder of his
discussions throughout the book seems to follow this guiding sentence: Thought
manifests Being. Being’s manifestation seems to be able to occur only through thought.
As we have noted earlier, Langan omits any reference to the manifestation of
Being through the fourfold [das Geviert]. Interestingly, Richardson incorporates the
same works as Langan does in his book, all of which Heidegger details with great effort
“das Geviert:” “Zur Seinsfrage,” “Alétheia,” “Das Ding,” “Bauen Wohnen Denken,” and
“Der Ursprung der Kunstwerkes.” What was impressive in Richardson’s book was the
fact that he included far more of Heidegger’s works than did Langan. Yet even in
Richardson’s treatment of additional works through his careful retrieval of Heidegger’s
thought in “Part III (120 pages),” scant treatment of the fourfold could be found.693
This omission should draw the reader’s attention to the fact that this paradigm of
“thinking of Being” cannot countenance the fourfold.694 This anomaly alone should give
us pause. Why would Heidegger expend much ink and reflection on such a
“conception?” Our argument comes to the conclusion that the fourfold is indeed crucial
to Heidegger’s understanding of Being; Richardson’s account fails in this regard. The
omission of the “das Geviert” is why in many ways the “thinking of being” is not far
from the “existential phenomenological” paradigm.
693

A small, two-page treatment can be found on 570-572, wherein Richardson writes tellingly of the
Quadrate (Richardson’s term for the fourfold): “What does he [Heidegger] mean by Being as the Quadrate?
The theme of our research is not Being but thought, so we do not feel obliged to solve the problem (if it can
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a narrow human thinking. Indeed the thinking of Being model cannot countenance the fourfold.
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Presently we are at a position where we can constructively criticize Richardson’s
“two Heideggers” thesis. Richardson explains that the nature of the method in Heidegger
I is characterized as transcendence, that is, to be-in-the-world, also called existence.
Heidegger II, beginning with “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” in 1930, has the method of eksistence, that is, “rescendence” or thinking again of Being. To call Being and Time
(1927) or Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929) works of transcendence would
simply belie all of Heidegger’s own careful attestation against transcendence. While the
earlier works are not worked out as fully as the later in its understanding of
“resecendence” or meditative thinking as we call it,695 all of Heidegger’s works claim
that Being has a history; or more precisely, Seinsgeschichte is Heidegger’s concern
throughout his lifetime, even in Being and Time.
Second, Richardson carefully delineates that both methods have Dasein as a
privileged being open to Being; and have a process of negativity of finitude (I, a finitude
of transcendence; II, a finitude of sending). Here we agree with Richardson’s premise
that all of Heidegger’s works outline the importance of defining “anything” more by what
they are not. Heidegger explains that the jar is more an opening of space so that fluid can
fill it, and less as a walled- and bottomed-ceramic thing; time is defined by its double
negativity of being between the “no-longer” and the “not-yet;” Being is defined as
abandonment and language is defined as hearing the Silence of Being. For Heidegger the
double negative is crucial in his mature work; on this point we agree with Richardson.
Third, Richardson claims that both methods have a temporal-historical process
(Being comes as futural as having-already in what is as past, and is rendered manifest
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through the co-operation of man as present): in I, the process is Da-sein; in II, the process
is the fundamental history as Being.696 Here too, we agree that all of Heidegger’s works
concern a temporal-historical process. Our ordinary experience of time relies on this
deeper sense of both space and time, as we have already outlined in Zur Sache des
Denkens (1962-64). This premise too finds us in agreement.
Finally, Richardson claims both methods come to fulfillment when man endorses
his liberty (as “re-solve” in Heidegger I and as “thought” in Heidegger II.) This “liberty”
claim of Richardson seems far from the discussions within Heidegger’s later works, and
even in Being and Time Heidegger makes little of this topic. Man’s liberty seems most
resonant with the Lockean terminology in Western philosophy. In “Vom Wesen des
Grundes” [“The Essence of Ground”] (1929) Heidegger explains that a deeper, more
originary freedom arises out of the problem of transcendence, and from freedom the
ground of reason emerges.697 Thus, the methods do not come to fulfillment when a
person endorses his liberty, but freedom emerges through humanity’s hearing the Silence
of Being and co-responding. The very term “liberty” comes rather from the
Enlightenment era and resounds with logic.698 Here we part ways with Richardson.
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Richardson claims that his “thinking of Being” in Heidegger II is the
phenomenology of Being and Time.699 It is the same process of hermeneutic
interpretation in a new modality. The new modality was needed when Heidegger realized
that the meaning of Being could not be interpreted solely through an analytic of Dasein.
Richardson claims that this new modality occurred with the “turning” in “Vom Wesen der
Wahrheit.” We argued that this change in Heidegger’s thinking occurred while
Heidegger worked on the Nietzsche volumes in the late 1930s. Babette Babich supports
our contention in an unusual moment of disagreement with Richardson, as she oftentimes
likes to cite Heidegger as saying: “Nietzsche hat mich kaputt gemacht.”700 In either case,
the timing of Heidegger’s change in thinking is of little consequence for this argument.
Richardson concludes his argument by saying that the two Heideggers “are not
the same (das Gleiche)—but they are one (das Selbe).”701 With all the above similarities
Richardson’s “two Heidegger” theory seems for the most part empty. We are not
persuaded, for Richardson’s above reasoning could more easily be evidence as the selfsame growing, developing process method. Certainly, Heidegger did alter his approach,
but we contend that shift in Heidegger’s thinking is less dramatic than Richardson
contends. (The astute reader would note that earlier we criticized Langan in that he

we argue that “liberty” oftentimes has the overtones of the metaphysical constraints of 18th century politics
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didn’t recognize any shift at all.)702 We noted in the Beiträge and later works that while
Being and Time and other early works have attempted to uncover Being, they fail in their
attempt because they focused on Dasein; they were successful, conversely, in that they
led the way toward understanding Being as manifesting itself as Ereignis more so than
Dasein uncovering Being. Heidegger’s main concern was the meaning of Being and so
Heidegger looked for a way toward that same goal.
The same year of Richardson’s magnum opus, 1963, Otto Pöggeler published a
polished work, Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, which also reflected this paradigm
of the thinking of Being. The theme of Pöggeler’s work examined the Being of beings in
terms of the truth of Being. This truth of Being is concealed in beings. As concealment,
Being brings the structural articulation of unconcealment as world to language.703 Both
Pöggeler and Richardson regularly used the term, “thinking” when Heidegger himself
wrote, “thinking of Being” (Denken des Seins).704 Our point here is that Heidegger is
more concerned with Being while Richardson and Pöggeler fall short of Being.
Pöggeler phrases the relationship between Being and language the way
Richardson phrases it; he writes: “Being brings articulation of the world to language.”
While this phrase seems perfectly consistent with our thesis that language and Being are
intimately related, Pöggeler, perhaps unknowing, phrases the issue in a way that situates
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articulation between language and Being. This way of phrasing is indicative of a subtle,
yet pernicious way, driving a wedge between Being and language. This, we contend, is
the major flaw of the “thinking of Being” paradigm: it sees, like the philosophy of the
first beginning (Western philosophy), that language is derivative upon thought. In many
ways this “thinking of being” model places thought as that which allows Being and
beings to cor-respond; it becomes the proverbial “tertio quid.” As such, we argue that
this “thinking of being” approach is a modified correspondence theory of truth. In the
“thinking of Being” model, thought is that articulation which is between Being and
beings.
But such a formulation still holds the same difficulties as the correspondence
theory of truth. To correspond, the middle term must be like both of the joining terms, in
this case Being and beings. While thinking is a faculty of beings, nowhere can we prove
that thinking is of Being. For this reason Heidegger avoids this type of gathering of
opposites and holds in its place that the gathering-separateness must always be together.
Being of beings, therefore, must be conceived not as the thinking of beings, but as the
ontological difference.
We argue that originary language as the Saying of Being heard as Silence
“traverses that ontological abyss.” Man, hearing this, nears Being as it manifest itself as
Ereignis. But a person can also not hear the Silence. This way is also way-making.
Originary language is that which forms all types of communication, including thought
and predication, ordinary language, silent gestures, logic, and even sciences—all emerge
from it. Originary language is the manifestation of Being; likewise, originary language is
each step of communication of Being as Saying. Thought is not needed to correspond to
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Being, for Being and man cor-respond together in a joint process called meditative
thinking.705 In short, we don’t uncover Being; Being shows itself through us and with us.
While Richardson and Pöggeler do notice this shift of Heidegger moving from
Dasein in the early works to Being in the later works, they fail to take notice of the other
shifts in Heidegger’s thinking: the fourfold, Heidegger’s emphasis on language as
originary Saying, from which ordinary language and all form of communications derive
(late 1950s); and finally, they do not recognize Heidegger’s new conception of
phenomenology called “Vor-sicht,” wherein Ereignis is no longer occurring as
presencing of that which is present, but presencing as looking ahead [Vor-sicht] (1960s).
Thus the “thinking of Being” model fails in its attempt to characterize all of Heidegger’s
ways, all the while it is successful by drawing attention to Heidegger’s own change of
thinking. The paradigm, though, is successful in that it moves our attention away from
Dasein and toward Being. This was a step forward.

“Many Ways” Theory
Let us now move to yet another paradigm, to that of Joseph Kockelmans. While
Kockelmans never intended to formulate a paradigm of Heideggerian scholarship with
his edited work, On Heidegger and Language,706 it, nevertheless, served as a paradigm
for generations. Its plan was simply to offer a number of Heideggerian scholars the
opportunity to write on the topic of language. Their work comprised eleven chapters
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organized under three basic areas of early Heidegger, later Heidegger, and general
linguistic conceptions of ordinary language.
Rather than attempt to make a meta-narrative of Heidegger’s work as did the
earlier paradigms, Kockelmans chose the approach of many approaches, seeing a guide in
Heidegger’s own reflection: perhaps Heidegger’s way was one of many ways.707
Kockelmans’ approach has evoked a strong plurality of meaning possibilities of
Heideggerian language as is illustrated in this major compilation, with a weak, nonbinding centrality. Rather than focusing on thinking of Being, this paradigm focused on
the thinking of the multiplicity of ways which the language of Being emerges.
On Heidegger and Language discusses both how Heidegger uses language in a
variety of ways to understand Being, but also explores the deeper relationship between
language and Being. Each author discusses from a particular vantage point how
Heidegger employed language toward Being. Some saw the relationship in a
phenomenological fashion. Others reflected on Heidegger’s language as though they
were comparing merely differing linguistic tools. Still others moved toward the thought
of Being model. Many theories emerged; dialogue ensued with rebuttal essays. The
book emerged as a critical analysis of Heidegger’s understanding of Being and language
and became a template for the way of many ways Heidegger himself envisioned as
typifying his work. The book encapsulated the oft-quoted phrase from the Beiträge: “The
time of the ‘systems’ is over.”708
While enormous in its contribution of voicing many possibilities in the field of
language and Being, Kockelmans’ work doesn’t attempt to weave the essays into any
707
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coherent whole. The attempt to draw some coherence came in the form of panel
discussions over individual essays with one overall final panel discussion—many types
of conversations about language and Heidegger. The effect was that while many
possibilities are indeed likely, there needed to be some unity, some criteria by which
some voices were not included as possibilities.
Certainly this tacit judgment was made at the onset of the project; otherwise, any
and all articles would have been included. Thus the “many ways” seemed not to be as it
had appeared initially: Heidegger and language, as a dialogue. More importantly, it did
not succeed entirely because it lacks the guidance in what appeared to be a cacophony of
voices. At the very least, these works should have the unity of Being as its concern, yet
this simple, but crucial concern of Heidegger is drowned out by the cacophony of many
voices. Overall, Kockelmans’ book invokes multiple interpretations without the focus of
the meaning of Being.
Singularly, some of the essays do allow the concern for Being to emerge. Essays
by Lohman, Pöggeler and, most notably, Kockelmans’ own essay entitled, “Ontological
Difference, Hermeneutics, and Language” draw the reader’s attention to Being. For the
most part, all the other essays focus not on Being, but on language, often seen as
linguistics. We have already seen that Heidegger understands Being as Saying to be
originary language, from which all ordinary languages emerge. Discussing language
solely as linguistics draws us away from Being. Even their discussions have the air of
academic argument, more so than the meaning of being.
In his essay, Kockelmans irons out precisely what the ontological difference is
and how it is primarily an early tool to heal the bifurcation of Western thought and being,
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subject and object, etc. Most crucial is this essay is his development of Ereignis and
language. Kockelmans concludes his treatment with the all-important realization that
thinking receives its structure from language. He cites Heidegger, as we have seen, in
Identity and Difference: “Thinking receives the tools for this self-suspended structure
from language. For language is the most delicate and thus the most susceptible vibration
holding everything within the suspended structure of the appropriation [Ereignis]. We
dwell in the appropriation inasmuch as our active nature is given over to language.”709
With this conclusion, we wholeheartedly concur.
But ultimately Kockelmans follows Richardson’s “early and later approachdistinction” and “thought of Being”710 template. Kockelmans encourages the reader to
place the phenomenological method of the early writings together with the hermeneutical
method of the later writings. The approaches and writings belong together, he cautions
the reader.711 They belong together, we agree. But how exactly do they belong together
is the point of our disagreement.
In a later work, Heidegger’s “Being and Time”, Kockelmans finds that both
approaches belong together as “logos;” he follows Richardson’s translation of Rede as
“logos.” More precisely said, they understand Heidegger to redefine terms from the
writing of “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” (1930) onward, from Rede to “logos.”
Kockelmans finds within Rede three levels, from the most primordial to least:
enunciation, attribution, and communicating. Thus, we see the three-part division of On
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Heidegger and Language emerging now as a conceptual framework, a means of
expressing the three levels of “logos.”
The problem with this distinction is that “logos,” as Rede, now encompasses part
of the care structure which was under Verstehen and “worldhood” in Being and Time.
Attribution is the facility to connect signs and references. Parts of Rede and Verstehen
have been conflated. Now Rede and Verstehen are seen as part of one comprehensive
structure in “logos.” Instead of Rede as one of three equiprimordial structures of
Dasein’s care structure [Verstehen-Befindlichkeit-Rede], we seem to have two: [RedeBefindlichkeit]. Rede as “logos” now carries the burden of Verstehen as well. Under
such a conception the care structure appears yoked as Logos-Befindlichkeit.712 Indeed,
this bifurcation looks much like Kockelmans’ early suggestion to keep together
phenomenology and hermeneutic methods. Would we be too bold to separate them and
index Befindlichkeit in the phenomenological method and Logos in the hermeneutical
method? Perhaps so, for others indeed devise such a difference for Heidegger’s varying
works.
At the same time Kockelmans describes what he means by “logos” as rooted in
Verstehen and Befindlichkeit. As such we return ostensibly to the traditional mindset of
the triple equiprimordial care structure of Being and Time. But how could “logos” as
Rede be rooted in the same fashion, with which Heidegger originally intended? Before
we can answer this question, let us continue a bit farther with Kockelmans’ definition of
“logos.”
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An interesting study would investigate to what extent and when Heidegger might have entertained such
a conception. One could easily find evidence for such an argument in the 1940s that Heidegger would have
held such a conception in some form. Yet in the 1950s Heidegger would have found difficulties with this
model. Certainly by the time the essay, “Das Wesen der Sprache” (1957) was published, Heidegger has
unyoked poetry and thought; in that essay poetry and thought have similar, but different domains.
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As rooted in Verstehen and Befindlichkeit, “logos” is the essence of language.713
It has two modes of keeping silent and attending to others. Thus, “logos” includes all the
elements of language: what speaking is about, what receives its shape and form through
language, communication, and making known to others. These are not properties of
language for Kockelmans, but essential characteristics of the “logos” rooted in Verstehen
and Befindlichkeit.
Rather than seeing “logos” as the essence of language, many other attempts like
those of Noam Chomsky or Sapir-Worf have placed any number of these elements as the
essence of language. Consequentially, language has been labeled as “expression,”
“symbolic form,” “communication,” “assertion,” or “the making known of experiences.”
Clearly, even if these various characterizations were to be added together, nothing would
be achieved in the way of a comprehensive conception of language. Such a conception
can be reached only by means of an accurate analysis of the mode of Being characteristic
of man as Being-in-the-world as seen in Being and Time, rightly insists Kockelmans.714
Kockelmans sees the inconsistency within “logos” of Being and Time §34 [i.e.,
Rede]. “Logos” is both atemporal, lying outside the domain of language and temporal as
a totality of meaning located in Dasein. The insistency lies in the fact that Rede can
produce meaning only to the extent that meaning is given in language temporally and at
the same time language is only an enunciation of atemporal “logos” as the totality of
meaning, in which Dasein accrues words from significations. Can “logos” be both
temporal and atemporal, both expression and system? In Kockelmans’ words:
“Heidegger still maintains a totality of meaning which [is] itself and taken as such lies
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outside the domain of language and as such, therefore, is intemporal [sic.] and
invariant.”715 Ought Kockelmans assert such a claim?
We could grant that “logos” lies outside the domain of language atemporally, if
Heidegger didn’t maintain that the totality of meaning lies in “worldhood.” But
Heidegger does indeed claim this and as such is related to Verstehen as the one element
of the care structure. “Logos” must be temporal. The totality of meaning still resides in
Dasein and in time.
Or we could grant that “logos” is indeed atemporal. As the essence of language it
does not contain meaning, expression, or sense. As such it would be an atemporal
structure. Thus, Kockelmans understands Heidegger to assert that “logos” is atemporal.
But can Heidegger claim both simultaneously, no matter whether he calls it
“logos” or language? Kockelmans contends that this is why Heidegger gave up the idea
that man has language and not is merely the place where language speaks, as in section
34. He sees Heidegger resolving the issue later by claiming that man does not have
language.
We can accept this premise that Heidegger resolves this inconsistency with Rede
in section 34, that language is primary that which houses Being and, due to this, man can
also be the place where language speaks. But this Heideggerian solution is different than
saddling Rede with the totality of meaning, as is done in Richardson/Kockelmans notion
of “logos.” For the Richardson/Kockelmans claim of “logos” reverses this de-centering
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of Dasein and instead de-centers language, by upholding Dasein as that which houses
language, which, in turn, houses Being. Certainly, this is an untenable claim.
Kockelmans explains his argument further. In “Vom Wesen des
Grundes”/“Essence of Reasons,”716 Heidegger tried to show that the problem of ground is
a problem of truth; and since truth is found in Dasein’s transcendence, the problem is one
of transcendence.717 Agreed. But transforming Rede into “logos” does not solve the
problem of transcendence. Rather, the point of “Vom Wesen des Grundes” seems to
illustrate that neither Rede nor “logos” solves the problem of transcendence. Both Rede
and “logos” are caught in the same problem of being located both in and out of time.718
Finally, the Richardson/Kockelmans “logos” solution may well have been the
avenue that Heidegger was exploring in “Vom Wesen des Grundes,” (1929) and “Vom
Wesen der Wahrheit” (1930) and “Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)” (1944).” For this
reason Richardson and Kockelmans are not entirely wrong to see Heidegger changing his
thinking from phenomenology toward thinking. But we conclude in our next chapter that
in the fifties Heidegger changed yet again his thinking, when he realized the difficulties
arising from the so-called “logos” solution, wherein Heidegger renounces language.
In conclusion, we argue that the “many ways” paradigm is also faulty, for it holds
the contradictory position of Dasein’s [the there of Being] “logos” existing in and out of
time. The shortcoming of such a paradigm, then, discusses the spectrum of language as
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multiplicity without addressing its relation to Being. Thus, it too is unable to address the
anomaly of language in all its variations vis-à-vis Being.
In conclusion, this chapter deals with successful failures: successful in that they
led the way, failures in that the Being was not reached. Langan, Richardson and
Kockelmans developed strong paradigms of how Heidegger’s corpus should be viewed.
Each had good success showing us part of Heidegger’s way: “phenomenology,”
“thinking of being,” and “many ways.” For a variety of reasons—especially since they
did not have at their fingertips all of Heidegger’s texts—they did not lead us to the
meaning of Being. And the anomaly of language remains unsolved. Yet, these
paradigms must be seen as successful failures, like Holzwege, like paths meandering in
the dense forest, unable to find a clearing.
Because of these failures, Heidegger redirects his attention from “logos” and
toward Being as Saying in a being-historical [seinsgeschichtlich]719 trajectory. Ereignis’
domain lies beyond what the thought of Being could possibly indicate. From these
paradigms, we step forward toward the domain of Ereignis, and originary language as
way-making.
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While “seinsgeschichlich” in German can indeed be formed as an adjective, some have argued that
Emad and Maly’s phrase, “being-historical” is broken English. True enough. Yet what Emad and Maly do
preserve in their unusual translation is the intimate connection between Being and its history. The
adjectival form as a constitutive characteristic construes better this relation as opposed to other English
near-equivalents of “in the history of Being” or “in the terms of the history of Being.” While it is true that,
as Rojcewicz suggests, “erkenntnistheoretisches Buch” is not translated into English as a “knowledgetheoretical book,” but as an “epistemological book,” Heidegger’s main point is that we wrongly treat Being
as we would any other being; thus, it seems that Emad and Maly successfully emphasize in their broken,
even strange sounding English phraseology that which Heidegger desires to preserve—the unusual case of
Being.
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CHAPTER EIGHT:
Be-wëgen

—“Die Sprache spricht als das Geläut der Stille.”720
The last chapter explored previous paradigms of Heidegger’s way. Like
Holzwege, they were unable to find a clearing; and in their case, they traveled amidst the
dense verbiage of existential phenomenology and thinking models of Being. Heidegger
in the 1950s found such avenues unsuccessful, yet nevertheless satisfying, for they help
him to redirect his way. They redirected his attention from “logos” and toward Being as
Saying in being-historical [seinsgeschichtlichen] trajectory. Heidegger found that
Ereignis’ domain lies beyond what the thought of Being or existential phenomenology
could entirely indicate. Following Heidegger we look toward a new paradigm, which
would place Ereignis and originary language as way-making [Be-wëgen] as its main
thesis. We hold that Being as Saying is the way-making model.
To set this thesis into place we need to outline the parameters of the problem.
First, the relationship of Dasein and language needs further delineating, then the relation
of language to Being can be gathered more intimately, and finally, Dasein’s relation to
Being can be shown as itself more fully. Three works which, in varying extents, will
720
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help light the way toward Being as Saying: Kockelmans’ 1984 work entitled, On the
Truth of Being: Reflections on Heidegger’s Later Philosophy,721 Robert Bernasconi’s
1985 monograph, The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of Being,722 and
Kenneth Maly’s 2008 hardback Heidegger’s Possibility: Language, Emergence-Saying
Be-ing.723 With the help of these works we can outline our new paradigm of “Sprache
als Be-wëgen,” language as way-making.

BE-WËGEN
On the Truth of Being

The first obstacle that needs overcoming is the issue of the relation of Dasein and
language in the previous thinking of Being model. The structure of Dasein, more
specifically, the care structure of Dasein in Being and Time needs readdressing vis-à-vis
language and the later formulations of “logos.” Kockelmans’ On the Truth of Being:
Reflections on Heidegger’s Later Philosophy begins to address this issue. It illustrates
how the “thinking of Being” model extends into Heidegger’s later works, but with a
further, important transformation. How exactly does that transformation appear for
Heidegger? And how does he develop it from his notion of “logos?”
From earlier discussions on “logos,” Kockelmans equated Heidegger’s “logos”
with Rede and extended its reach beyond time. That was helpful only to the extent that
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hermeneutics and apophantic language are related in a new way; language as assertion
now emerges out of hermeneutic process for Heidegger, not as it is conceived usually that
hermeneutics is governed by the rules of propositional language. But to the extent that
“logos” was unable to reach “atemporal” Being, it remained problematic.
In his work, On the Truth of Being, Kockelmans further explores how “logos”
could be the originary saying of Being wherein all forms of speaking respond.
Kockelmans returns to Heidegger’s treatment of truth in the Greeks. Kockelmans
follows Walter Biemel,724 in the conclusion that Heidegger’s philosophy on the whole
centers725 on the question of Being and truth as a0lh/qeia. Using the Greek notion of truth
[a0lh/qeia], Heidegger notices that its alpha privative is a supplement to the stem [lh/qh],
the river of forgetfulness. Thus, Heidegger holds that the Greeks saw truth as a sway of
forgetfulness and remembrance, of concealment and non-concealment, signified by a0lh/qeia. Listening to Greek thought Heidegger held that concealment is the default mode
of truth. Concealment, though, is a mode of showing that is silent. In its silence,
concealment speaks.
For Heidegger, Kockelmans adds, concealment is the way toward Being.
Kockelmans explains the process. Concealment is a way of showing, which we hear as
Silence, which leads us toward Being, unlike any being that we might hear. Showing as
Silence, then, is also the essence of language, for Silence is a way of Saying, a Saying
that is without words. To elucidate this point, Kockelmans writes chapter seven, “On the
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is a difference, as we shall shortly see.
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Essence of Language.” Within that chapter, Kockelmans outlines Heidegger’s trajectory
of Being as Saying toward the late 1950s. Since Being as Saying becomes Heidegger’s
ultimate formulation of Being, the relationship between language and Being is drawn
ever closer. Kockelmans’ model is shifting from thinking of Being toward Being as
Saying.
Kockelmans rightly describes Heidegger’s Being-as-Saying in terms of the
essence of language. Kockelmans contends that “logos” understood properly hearkens
back to language’s original meaning. “Logos” as it is conveyed by its related verb,
“legein,” does mean “to say” and “to speak.” But more primordial is its meaning “to let
something lie forth.” The “letting lie forth” reveals as a non-concealment while
“speaking” conceals. Moreover, both aspects of revealing and concealing occur together.
As such, “logos” is the originary Saying of Being, argues Kockelmans, while man’s
vocalization of it is a response.726
While we will argue against Kockelmans’ claim that “logos” is the originary
Saying of Being, we will agree that man’s response to it is ordinary language as we know
it. We shall formulate our argument more fully in the next chapter; through the Beiträge,
that Heidegger sees the “logos” as part of the manifestation of Ereignis, as the Beiträge
informs us: “Er-eignis names beyng in thinking.”727 But originary language is more
originary, that originary language is the holding sway of Seyn/Sein “before” it is
manifested as Er-eignis. This is originary language.
Let us compare this to Kockelmans’ argument. At first Kockelmans relates the
essence of language and the essence of Being as related through thought as the “Letter on
726
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Humanism” (1947) describes. As Kockelmans writes: “In its own saying, thinking
merely brings the unspoken word of Being to language.”728 Thought is the means to
language. Invoking “Letter on Humanism,” Kockelmans describes the role of thinking as
that which brings the unspoken word of Being to language. Being comes to language as
illuminating itself. As such, Kockelmans tacitly understands illuminating itself as
“logos.”
Eventually, Kockelmans’ terminology moves away from the “logos” terminology.
When, in the 1950s, Heidegger unfolds the relationship between Being and language,
Kockelmans describes this movement without any hint of the thinking of Being model.
In 1950 the term, “language” conveys the essence of language not as speaking but as
primordial saying, given as a showing or pointing. Primordial saying is heard, listened
to, before a person speaks. The remainder of Kockelmans’ chapter discusses Heidegger’s
various works which discuss this relationship. Kockelmans treatment there of primordial
saying is fair and careful, including the fourfold; and it depicts language less as a
relationship, which merely humans have. It now depicts language more as language is
the relation of all relations.729 Kockelmans surely sees Heidegger’s movement toward
language as the path toward Being.
Kockelmans understands the point of this period of Heidegger’s work to be one
wherin the relationship of Being and language no longer holds language as the middle
correspondence between Being and things; we concur. The relationship is described in
terms of “between” without anything in the “between.” While separation does still occur,
728
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it is one of gathered-separatedness, of “dif-ference” [Unter-schied]; the division is one of
intimate relation of things and world. Kockelmans explains in an earlier chapter that the
“dif-ference of the ontological difference must be understood as a process: “a dif-ferre, a
bearing each other out, as if both Being and beings shared a common center that remains
interior to both, a common measure that serves as the single dimension of both, a primal
unity by reason of which each adheres to the other and out of which both ‘issue forth.’”730
Because the ontological dif-ference is a primal unity, language and Being must also have
such a nearness—“Where the word breaks off no thing may be.”731
Language is the correlation of Being and beings as di-ference, but the dif-ference
itself can be seen only in the form of world and things.732 In itself it is conceived as
between things. We see the relationship of language reflecting that nearness:
Being:beings::world:things. Yet it is not Being as nothing, but “logos” as nothing. With
this explanation Kockelmans defers to Richardson as Kockelmans reemploys the term,
“logos.” Language is “logos” coming to pass. “Logos” spans both dimensions of
temporality and atemporality. “Logos” then gathers as the calling.
But originary language is also that which calls. Since Being calls, we understand
some sort of separation. Richardson suggests that there is a tension between the unity of
gathering and the duality of separateness in the “logos-as-scission.” Kockelmans follows
Richardson explicitly.
Barring the “logos-as-scission” phraseology, tension is indeed a suitable
description for the process. Tension does exist in the fact that the calling of Being is both
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Being which calls and Being as the calling. But the tension is confused when we speak
of “logos.” For Richardson and Kockelmans that tension arises primarily from a
conceptual/linguistic tension, not an ontological/ontic tension. And for this reason we
have serious concerns regarding the “logos-centric” models. We employ the provisional
phrase “language-centric” model to indicate that both Being as Saying is originary
language and this primary mode is ontological before it can be conceptual or linguistic.
Heidegger intends that the ontological tension is primary, that ontological
difference is the source of any subsequent tension. During this period in the 1950s
Heidegger’s solution for this ontological tension of dif-ference is Being as Saying, heard
as Silence. Hearing Silence man is drawn near to speak words and to “world” the world
as the gathering fourfold. Because Being as beyng turns inward, and Being conceals
itself, Being is heard as Silence. Being appears twofold. That is to say that Being
conceals, and in its concealment it reveals its concealment. Thus, while Being is both a
concealing and revealing, the primary mode is concealment, for that which is revealed is
a concealment as concealment. Heidegger calls this originary language. Because Being
is such a process as originary language, all language, all beings also have this dynamic
tension of gathered-separateness.
Richardson’s terminology of “logos” with Kockelmans following him in this
discussion reverts back to the 1940s, and leads the reader to assume that the discussion
still focuses on thought, not language. This reader could easily conclude that the essence
of language is “logos” as thinking. Thus both Richardson and Kockelmans speak of this
originary relationship as “thought of Being” or the “truth of Being.” As such they are not
incorrect, but they are not sufficiently originary. Heidegger’s point, however, is that the
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essence of language is originary language as Saying, heard as Silence. This is the
distinction of Seyn/Sein in the Beiträge, section 267.733 Sein has the truth of Being while
Seyn is without the truth of Being. Being all-the-while is both. Thus the Sein/Seyn
distinction of section 267 includes this tension of gathered-separateness.
This is not to say that thinking doesn’t enter the process. It does, but “logos”
emerges afterwards in Ereignis. Thought emerges as the manifestation of Being [Sein] as
Ereignis. Ereignis emerges for Heidegger as the better way to explain the ontological
difference. It involves the fourfold. Within the fourfold emerge thought and ordinary
language. Recalling briefly the process of eight aspects of Ereignis from the Beiträge,
we saw the gods are part of the manifestation of Being in Ereignis. Mortals bring the
gods forth. Being needs mortals to give life to the gods. Gods and mortals emerge as
gathered opposition. Earth and sky, respectively, hold firm and give sway. Together the
fourfold as gathered-separateness allows a thing to emerge. When a thing appears, Being
recedes as concealment. When Being allows itself to appear in a momentary flash,
beings recede. “Logos” cannot explain all these aspects, only can Being as Saying.
Thus, Heidegger opts for Ereignis.
This is the not-fully articulated nor understood ontological difference as held by
Heidegger in the early years. It is not a conceptual/linguistic difference as encouraged by
Richardson; though, we grant that such a conceptual tension occurs subsequently. But it
occurs not because it is originary, but because any epistemological/metaphysical/
linguistic outcropping will have traces of the ontological dif-ference, the Ereignis. This
process is best described provisionally as a Being as Saying model.

733

See our earlier discussion in chapter 2, “Early Approaches: II” 93-98.

280

As Heidegger writes, as Kockelmans notes, and as we are drawn to cite again:
“Thinking receives the tools for this self-suspending structure [sich schwebenden Bau]
from language [aus der Sprache].”734 We emphasize the point that thinking receives the
tools from language. Heidegger continues, but Kockelmans does not quote the next
sentence: “For language is the most delicate and thus the most susceptible vibration
[Schwingung] holding everything within the suspended structure of the appropriation.”735
Thought has the tools of this vibrating structure because language has this self-vibrating
structure and grants it. From it, all forms of language emerge in their enunciation as
expression and their silent “expression,” an all-important mode of any expression. From
it worldhood emerges; from it both authentic an inauthentic modes of discourse and
technology emerge. And similarly, from it emerges metaphysical structures.
As metaphysical and worldly structures emerge, and with them, the danger of
technology, we are able to see the prelude to Ereignis. But with the danger we also see
the saving grace of the Ereignis. Thus, we see the important distinction for Heidegger in
this period: Ereignis is never produced solely by man; man’s transformation occurs by
virtue of the Ereignis. The danger of technology isn’t simply man’s failure to be
authentic. It is the manifestation of Being as Ereignis. In the danger, Being appears in a
flash.736 And as quickly it appears, it again conceals itself.
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Yet its return to concealment is not without effect, for man is transformed in this
process. Being as Ereignis will bring back technology into the servitude of man.737 In
this vibrating [schwingende] Ereignis, man and Being reach their active “natures” and
shed the qualities accrued in metaphysical speculation.738 How might these active
“natures” appear? We take this vibrating Ereignis to be a holding sway. Not unlike
vibrating strings, which remain yet move, Being always remains yet moves between its
appearing and concealing. Beings too have this holding sway quality. Through the
experience of language, the holding sway of Being and beings appear. But more so,
Being and beings are drawn close in the experience of language.
Kockelmans, did not, but could have cited Heidegger’s essay, “moi=ra”739 (1951)
to support his thesis that thinking and Being are more intimate than language and Being.
In “moi=ra” Heidegger holds that thinking and Being are the same. But we see that
Heidegger does not mean the same as what Kockelmans intends. Heidegger’s
understands that Being and thinking are the same in the sense that there is always a
gathering-separation between thinking and Being. Both must retain their difference as
gathered, not unlike that of “internal difference” of metaphysics.
But even in this essay, Heidegger’s “thinking” is not the whole of Being. This
premise has two important consequences. To say otherwise, to say that “logos” is the
whole of Being, is to say there would be no separation of the gathering-separation, no
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ontological difference, only One.740 If Being is no-thing, and there is only One, then
whence come beings? But to say the contrary, that there are only beings without Being—
without beings Being—is absurd. The problems of the One are legion.741
Second, to claim the contrary, that Being is never “logos,” that there is no
gathering of the gathering-separation, would be a claim for only difference. To claim that
there is only difference, is a claim that everything is the same. For if only difference
exists, then it is all the same. While it seems that we have engaged in a bit of Sophism,
we have indeed hit on a problematic. We have come to an equally absurd possibility both
ontologically and epistemologically.742
Between these two extremes we understand Heidegger to hold that “logos” is not
included in the Seyn part of the gathering-separation of Being, while “logos” is part of the
Ereignis as the gathering-separation of Seyn/Sein. While Being must have a gatheringseparation as Seyn/Sein, “logos” is not its source. Instead Ereignis is. To be fair,
Kockelmans would never claim either of the two conclusions above. Yet he does lean
too heavily toward “logos” as did Richardson’s thinking of Being model. Thus,
Kockelmans wrongly saddled “logos” for the work of Ereignis.
Another important distinction of the gathering-separation of Seyn/Sein is the fact
that beings must always be distinguished from Seyn, otherwise their existence would be
conflated simply as Being.743 As such, they would be Fated without any possibility of
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would be Spinozan pantheism, Whitehead’s process philosophy and Hartshorne’s process theology, and
most recently Pierre Teihard de Chardin’s panentheism of the 1950s. For an interesting exposition of this
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being otherwise. Yet Heidegger explains that this gathering-separation of thinking and
being is fateful (moi=ra); that, while separate, thinking and being are gathered throughout
one’s portion of life—in creation, sustaining, and destiny—fateful, but not fated. That is
to say, in order to indicate the relationship between Being and thinking as a gatheringseparation is to indicate that the destiny of Being is always holding sway, always a
vibrating. The fact that Being is a holding sway doesn’t dictate the details of man’s life.
But as Being is holding sway, so too is the case for man’s “essence.” And man’s essence
appears as occurring through thinking while it, in turn, has its essence in language.744
As we learned, however, in “The Essence of Language” (1957), any experience of
language entails an experience in the domain of the essence of language, which has
different yet similar regions of poetry and thinking. Both are modes of Saying [Sage].
As such, this essay helps us to unyoke discourse and thinking in the “logos” model of
Richardson and Kockelmans. While poetry and thinking have similar domains and seem
always to work together rooted in Befindlichkeit, they are not of the same region as we
come near the essence of language. In this region there is a difference. Let us look more
closely at the region not called thinking.
Heidegger calls language the language of Being. Language is possessed by
Being. Language makes the way of Being as presencing. Kockelmans, then, concludes
that since Saying has two modes, any experience of language would involve these two
modes: thinking and poetizing, saying and nearing.745 Language of Being is way-making

topic, see John W. Cooper’s Panentheism: the Other God of the Philosophers - from Plato to the Present
(Grand Rapids, MI, 2006).
744
We shall cover more of this topic in the next chapter on the unfolding of Being as Saying.
745
On the Truth of Being 166. It is not clear whether Kockelmans holds thinking is the mode of saying and
poetizing is the mode of nearing. This would not be Heidegger’s meaning. Rather both modes of language
as thinking and poetizing are a saying and a nearing, but in different regions.
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in that it both is a saying and a drawing near. Both thinking and poetizing in their proper
understanding say and draw near as modes of the language of Being. Man does not draw
near and say Being. Rather, Being draws near as absence and “says” as originary
language, to which we respond. Kockelmans explicates well the notion of originary
language, which “precedes” thinking. Kockelmans now moves beyond the model of the
truth of Being.
Kockelmans’ way glosses over, however, the importance of way-making as
always toward, never to, beings—always toward, never to, Being. The phrase, “to
beings” describes a trajectory that has an end point: “logos” resides in Dasein. As such
“logos” articulates meaning. Kockelmans describes this new direction as Heidegger decentering language, ending in humanity. Kockelmans describes this as the question of
“logos.” For Kockelmans language is de-centered around Dasein, that is to say, language
has its end, which arrives with Dasein. Dasein is the end point of “logos” and the end
point of language of Being in its modes of saying and nearing, thinking and poetizing.
The phrase, “to beings” always leads to thinking of Being and “logos.” Language is not
central for Kockelmans; unfortunately for Kockelmans Dasein is central.
Conversely, the phrase “toward beings” describes a trajectory that is always on
the way. On the way toward articulation in ordinary language, Being can never fully
arrive in beings. Beings always pose limitations. Thus, “toward beings” describes the
way Being is partly expressed in beings. Dasein can only in part express Being as it
speaks to us as originary language. We must recall the vibrating effect and the
transformational aspect of Ereignis, wherein Dasein is a part of Ereignis. Having heard
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the Silence of Being, Dasein responds with ordinary language. Thus, we see that
originary language cannot fully be captured by humanity.
Thus Kockelmans describes a third approach for Heidegger, the Saying of Being
model. Kockelmans explains that Heidegger developed it between 1957 and 1959. Yet
Kockelmans’ explanation of it is not without with some holdovers from the previous
“logos” period of the 1940s. We shall explain it without the “logos” verbiage.
The Saying of Being model has its roots throughout all of Heidegger’s work.
While the 1930s discussion on Hölderlin’s poetry helped Heidegger to clarify the relation
between the thinker and the poet, the lectures on Stefan George in the 1950s led
Heidegger into a deeper reflection on language and Being. While Hölderlin’s poetry
convinced Heidegger that his language needed to be transformed to draw nearer to Being,
George’s poetry drew Heidegger to be transformed in his own relation to language: the
language of Being drew him. The two major works, “The Essence of Language” and
“The Word” illustrate Heidegger’s second major “change” in his approach to Being as
language. This shift is from a language model to a renunciation of language. Our
relation to language is transformed. It is the movement of language moving us toward
originary language.
Still, Kockelmans entitles his book, On the Truth of Being, not “On the Saying of
Being.” With this conception Kockelmans nears Being, but still looks toward Being as
thinking, not Saying. He still looks to “logos” as the bridge, rather than Ereignis as the
way. As such he starts to develop, like Richardson, other Heideggers—not simply
Heidegger I and II, but III and others. We, on the other hand, see transformation in
Heidegger’s works; but, still, we see the single question before us: the question of Being
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as Saying, which moves us closer to Being than thought is able to move us. From this
analysis of On the Truth of Being, we were able to overcome our first problem of the
relation of Being and language as a model of thought. Being as Saying as the vibrating
and transformational way-making is the solution.

The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of Being

In order to address our second problem in this chapter—how can the relation of
language to Being be gathered more intimately—we look to Robert Bernasconi, for he
does indeed look toward the Saying of Being as originary language as manifested by
Ereignis as its prime reflection.746 Rather than many Heideggers, Bernasconi rightly sees
continuity in Heidegger’s work. This is our second aspect of way-making. In addition to
Being as Saying as way-making, the vibrating and transformational aspect, from which
all beings emerges; Being is, nonetheless, unified.
In The Question of Language, Bernasconi begins with the same theme, which we
have just delineated in Kockelmans’ work, namely, the thinking of Being. The way that
“logos” and “a0-lh/qeia” of the 1940s and early 1950s reiterated the 1920’s and 1930’s
language of Being and Time’s thrownness and projection—all belonging together in the
thrown project (geworfenen Entwurf) is the monograph’s major theme. Thus, the poet
and the thinker have similar domains in Being. Both articulate in part that the essence of
language and the essence of Being are closely related. But in part both find ordinary
language failing to express that which expresses the meaning of Being fully. But while
746

See Bernasconi, The Question of Language 49. Bernasconi offers us the traces of Heidegger’s
transformation in his thinking while maintaining that there is still continuity.
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thinking alone and poetry alone can never reach Being, neither can they reach Being
together. Thus, we see once again Heidegger’s need to find a new way.
Bernasconi, like Kockelmans, discusses the effects of the inadequacies of
language: sadness and renunciation. The poet, and we could easily include the thinker,
renounces [verzichtet] his hope of finding the meaning of Being through ordinary
language. Bernasconi charts new ground when he describes this renunciation as
Heidegger’s approach to a new way. It is not in spite of this renunciation, but through the
“unsaying” that takes place in renunciation, which points to the still as of yet
unexperienced domain of the truth of Being.747 Yet, as the perspicacious reader notices,
Bernasconi still adheres to the truth of Being mindset at the beginning of his argument.
Soon he discusses this domain as the “primordial non-essence of truth.” While we have
discussed this renunciation before, Bernasconi offers a clear insight of this movement. It
is the movement away from a Dasein-centered world view toward an experience of the
meaning of Being. Sadness occurs for both poet and thinker when they experience this
lack of control over their world. Bernasconi pens: “man encounters only himself [as] ‘the
final delusion.’748 For this man is truly sad.
Among the various ways of interpreting this effect of renunciation, Bernasconi
now describes it as the Kehre. It is the turn away from a Dasein-centered, purely
humanistic world view to one of “Being centered.” We disagree in this particular
assessment of the Kehre, for Heidegger uses this term far earlier than in the 1950s—when
he first comes across the notion of renunciation of ordinary language as the way of the
meaning of Being—and far broader than a simple reference to ordinary language.

747
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The Question of Language 67.
The Question of Language 72.
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Perhaps we have outlined Bernasconi’s conclusion in simplistic terms; but careful
explication is not necessary to judge his premise as false. We need to offer only the
counterexample of the “The Turning” (1949) when the term, “Kehre” was employed and
delineated by Heidegger. It is not meant as renunciation. There exists at least a decade
between turning and renunciation, between Kehre and Verzicht.
Bernasconi’s robust argument does have its merits; it places Ereignis at the center
of his enquiry. He notices that while Heidegger came to understand Being and Time as
arising from a single experience, that of oblivion of Being, his dialogue with George’s
poem “Das Wort” directed Heidegger toward another experience; Heidegger underwent
an experience with language.”749
Bernasconi argues that this is the difference between Erfahrung and Erlebnis,
between an experience of Angst and a lived-experience over a lifetime. While Being and
Time led Heidegger to the oblivion of Being, “Das Wort” led Heidegger to a “saying notsaying” [sagendes Nichtsagen].750 The not-saying is not Heidegger succeeding in saying
what others have not said. The triple negation of the previous sentence leads us closer to
the way of Heidegger, infers Bernasconi. The “saying not-saying” is Erlebnis and our
access to Ereignis. Erlebnis connotes the idea of a venturesome journey over time.751
As such, our access to Ereignis is not through logical proofs, nor persuasive
arguments, but through the lived-experience which leads us to renounce apophantic
language; language as assertion is inadequate to reach the meaning of Being. The long749

The Question of Language 81.
The Question of Language 77. See GA 11, Identität und Differenz: 66/Identity and Difference 77.
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Both Rojcewicz and I find this treatment of Erlebnis to be specious. Erlebnis is always a pejorative
term for Heidegger. Bernasconi’s introduction of this term as a way of describing experience seems
misleading at best. How does one have a lived experience over time? Rojcewicz poignantly comments
that there is no sense of experience over time. Moreover, Heidegger does not employ this word, “erlebnis”
in his works.
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in-coming realization for Heidegger—that the logic, the language and the philosophy of
the first beginning fail—is the renouncing. It is both danger and a saving power. It
arrives in prelude form as Ge-stell, the enframing mankind in modern technology. For
Bernasconi, living with this danger is the access to the Erlebnis of Ereignis.752 We would
simply say living with this danger is access to Ereignis.
Ereignis is not another word for Being, nor is Erlebnis. But for Bernasconi
Erlebnis names the long term experience which arises as the lack of any word to convey
the withdrawal of Being as oblivion and as its remembrance [Andenken]. This Heidegger
calls Ereignis. It brings before the eyes as concealment what was once concealed entirely
from the eyes. It brings before the eyes the un-traversable abyss, which words can never
be attained. The way is via a double negative.753
While Bernasconi describes this as Erlebnis, the lived-experience of man,
Heidegger de-centers man and calls the occurrence, Ereignis. Bernasconi is quite
accurate is his assessment of Ereignis and Erlebnis coming together for Heidegger as a
singular moment of greater importance. Yet Bernasconi concludes his discussion on the
question of language in Heidegger’s history of Being without looking at the Beiträge
wherein Ereignis is described beyond the Erlebnis of Dasein. Thus, Bernasconi describes
the renunciation as Heidegger “breaking apart” of language around humanity.
Conversely, we would say that Da-sein is de-centered and language is placed into
the foreground. While Bernasconi describes well the experience from Dasein’s
experience, he fails to encounter the meaning of Being. Concluding his argument at this
752

The Question of Language 81. See GA 14, Zur Sache des Denkens (1962-64): 57/Time and Being 53;
GA 11, Identität und Differenz (1955-57): 25/Identity and Difference 37.
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Way-making has always been explained by Heidegger as a double negation. For this reason
Bernasconi’s explanation above as a triple negation, including Erlebnis should also advise the reader’s
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juncture as he does, Bernasconi allows the state of the question to remain focused on
Dasein with Erlebnis. The Beiträge does not, nor should we.
Before we move onto our last part of this chapter, we must assess what we have
learned thus far. The relation of language to Being can be gathered more intimately as
the Saying of Being as originary language as manifested by Ereignis. In addition to
Being as Saying as way-making, the vibrating and transformational aspect, from which
all beings emerges, we now see continuity in Heidegger’s work as a singular quest for the
question of Being, which now is intimately entwined, not with thought, but with
language. With Being/beyng and language so intimately related, we have found the
solution to our question of how language has unity. Its unity is the Saying of
Being/beyng as Silence.
Despite the great strides Bernasconi has made on the relationship between
Erlebnis and Ereignis, he still falls short of Heidegger’s goal of reaching the meaning of
Being. One must ask why. In his preface, Bernasconi protests against his critics, who
find some traces of Derrida’s philosophy in his interpretation. Despite his claims to the
contrary, Bernasconi’s monograph and argument, as it stands, is more a matter of
deconstructing the philosophy of the first beginning, than a leaping between the first
beginning and the other beginning as Heidegger advises in the Beiträge. As such, it
appears like a mode of deconstruction à la Derrida. There are other traces of Derrida.
Namely, Bernasconi uses the term, “rupture,” a few too many times; it is a term
associated with the falsely attributed deconstruction method of Derrida. Instead of the
Heideggerian “freeplay” in the ontological difference, Bernasconi uses “rupture;754
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instead of history as “geschichtlich,” Berasconi calls it a series of “ruptures.”755 These
are minor excursions; yet the fact remains, Bernasconi doesn’t leap and misses the
meaning of Being.
What “leaping” Bernasconi does not undergo leads the reader to surmise: does
this discussion on language appear merely as another step in the philosophy of the first
beginning? Could it be a Hegelian tendency of Aufhebung? We shall see. While helpful
in many ways, this particular work of Bernasconi and his other essays756 approach
Heidegger’s pathway as if it were indeed a negation of desire,757 especially on the topic
of Erlebnis and renunciation. But Heidegger—and Bernasconi, for the most part—
undergoes more than a negation of desire, for negation of desire, nevertheless, still
remains in the domain of the subject. Heidegger does leap from the philosophy of the
first beginning toward the philosophy of the other beginning. Heidegger also outlines
what the other beginning might look like. Leaving the charge of “Hegelian tendencies”
for another scholar to discern, we opt instead to explore what that leap between the two
beginnings entails.
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The Question of Language 36.
See Bernasconi, “The Experience of Language,” in Heidegger and Language, ed. David Wood
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Heidegger’s Possibility: Language, Emergence-Saying Be-ing758

To explore the leap, we proceed toward answering the final question of this
chapter: what is Dasein’s relation to Being? How does Being show itself? This is the
Ereignis, wherein the subject-object distinction collapses. Kenneth Maly sets the
framework of the Beiträge as the singular project of his book, Heidegger’s Possibility.
Maly begins his argument where Bernasconi had finished: the crucial issue of
renunciation. Maly describes this as the third major step in Heidegger’s works.759
Within this step of renunciation we can focus on the relation of Being and Dasein.
This relationship is illustrated through Being as Saying in the Ereignis. It enables us to
see what is the “essence” or the “ownmost” of human beings and what is ownmost to
language. Through renunciation we can move beyond the philosophy of the first
beginning and leap toward the other beginning. It is not a renunciation of the philosophy
of the first beginning, so as to disown it or to overcome it; rather, it is a leap that remains
between the two—between the philosophy of the first beginning and the other
beginning—and thus overcomes metaphysics.
It is not a renunciation of the subjectivity of a human person, but a leap into a
new, fuller subjectivity that allows the human person the freedom to leap between
philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning. Then, as a human person, he
does not delude himself that he is the center of the unfolding of Being as Saying. Such a
758

The reader should recall that ascription of “Be-ing” or “be-ing” always refers to Heidegger’s “Seyn.”
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Maly, Heidegger’s Possibility, 7. The first two steps, as the reader knows, are the following: 1) Dasein
as Being there; 2) the ontological difference as the difference of Being and beings. Our third is the
renunciation and the movement into the Ereignis as the manifestation of Being. All three involve
Seinsgeschichte, the history of Being, not as linear history, but history as unfolding. This is the topic of
next chapter.
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way cannot be seen merely via analytic thought or ordinary language, but employs760
both in order to seek Being as Saying. Maly describes this turn as the “essential turning”
of en-owning761 and we call Seinsgeschichte, the history of Being.
Maly describes the process as one wherein “Being says-itself to thinking, and
human thinking, thus addressed, actively says, ‘back’ to that saying of being. These two
belong in a single dynamic.”762 Let us describe the process in these terms from the
Beiträge: Seyn/Sein in its turning [Einkehr] is as a concealment. But as a concealment, it
reveals itself as a concealment. As a revealing concealment Being says as originary
language: Saying [Sage]. This is heard by humans as Silence. Heard Silence is the
abandonment [Verlassenheit] of Being. Hearing Silence, humans are drawn near in need
and respond to it as it is heard. It is heard and responded as response [Nachsagen]. The
essence of Nachsagen is “logos.” All of the above occurs as one dynamic “process” and
appears to us as Ereignis.
Ereignis can never be thought or experienced as ordinary language or described
from a metaphysical construal of language. Both Erfahrung and Erlebnis fall short of
Ereignis. Rather, Being occurring as Ereignis arrives primarily on its own, but in part
with our help. Appearing in time and because Being has our help, Being can be said to
have a history [Seinsgeschichte]. For this reason Heidegger has many times found that
the ascription that we have of Being is always inadequate; nevertheless in the crossing of
the fourfold, i.e. the fourfold’s gathering-separation, Being is historical [geschichtlich].
Heidegger maintains that Being manifests itself in time—and in part we experience it.
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Moreover, Being as Ereignis, manifesting itself in the fourfold is what Heidegger
mean primarily by the Kehre. While in section 267 of the Beiträge the Kehre763 is an inturning, now we see the manifestation of that in-turning through the fourfold is the cause
of beyng-historical thinking. Through thought and experience, even through
metaphysical construals, we devise what we think we heard, but Being always with
lightning flash appears again and man is transformed. Thus Being transforms us, if we
are open to it. We are closed to it when we remain fixed on own thoughts, our
experiences, our metaphysical constructions. Open to Being, Being draws us from
thought, experiences, and philosophy of the first beginning toward Being. Between the
philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning, we leap. In leaping, we are
between. In leaping, we are not leaping from the first to the second, but leaping from the
philosophy of the first beginning toward the other beginning. As between, man is
brought near to Being as Saying, listening to the Silence and responding to it.
Having been brought near to Being, man is transformed. We are transformed
with the realization that language is not ours, but we are its shepherd. Before beings take
form in our world and language is uttered, we come to Being as Saying as originary
language. Attuning ourselves to this, we are drawn into our ownmost “selves.” As we
are drawn to Silence, we are led to shape language.
Our earliest shaping of language is as lo/goj. Maly, following Heidegger’s “Das
Wesen der Sprache,” writes that lo/goj is the name both for word, and Being. As way763

The reader will recall Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann four ways of interpreting Kehre: 1) in division
two of Being and Time, the Kehre describes the turn from the Zeitlichkeit of Dasein to the Temporalität of
Being; 2) the turn from the fundamental ontology of Being and Time to beyng-historical thinking, generally
characterized by the works of the 1930s and 1940s; 3) within the Beiträge the in-turning [Einkehre] within
Ereignis; 4) and the turning from the abandonment of beyng. See Herrmann, Wege ins Ereignis: Zu
Heideggers “Beiträgen zur Philosophie” (Frankfurt am Main, DE: Klostermann, 1994) 67-68. We are here
referring specifically to Herrmann’s third way of interpreting the Kehre.
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making [das Be-wëgende] it “gathers everything into the nearness of the over-againstone-another.”764 And it does this soundlessly, and it is called the ringing of the stillness
[das Geläut der Stille.]”765 Both language as linguistics and thinking find their essence
here. From it, not “logos” but way-making we must interpret what we hear and place into
words. It also transforms us. Thinking, poetry and ordinary language follow. Any
discussion of language and its origins or its meaning arises from this originary site, which
Maly calls the “discussion that opens.”766
What is most originary about language is its Saying [Sage] as Being. As we
learned from “On the Way to Language,” “Sagen” means to show, to let appear, to let the
world appear. “Sagen” allows the world to appear as a concealing/revealing, as a holding
sway. “Sagen” is revealed in a flash, and quickly recedes behind beings. As Heidegger
reminds us: “The moving force in Showing of Saying is Owning.” [Das Regende im
Zeigen der Sage ist das Eignen].”767 The showing as Saying is drawing us to our
ownmost selves. This way of Saying is the way that Ereignis speaks. In speaking, it
draws us to what is our ownmost.
The way that Saying speaks in Ereignis shows us that thinking and ordinary
language are a part of that site. But we do not control it, nor is language or thought in our
control. We arrive there at the site through Being, Being as Saying. This is way-making.
This site Heidegger admits is dark, and incomprehensible.768 For this reason we
must move from clear concepts and logic, from that which we believe we know, and
move toward a relationship with language that allows it to draw us. By renouncing the
764
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delusion that we are in control of language and we know its concepts, we are drawn into a
new relationship with language that draws us into new possibilities.
Maly draws us closer to this dark, incomprehensible site. He offers us
possibilities of Saying and Being throughout his book. As such, his book is helpful. Yet
the book, too, has some drawbacks. Many of the drawbacks are drawn in the chapters of
introduction and conclusion. In any work which discusses possibilities, soon the
possibilities can become so fanciful, that the possibilities, themselves, may become the
obstacle rather than the way of Being as Saying.
Maly’s discussions of the possibilities of theoretical physics are interesting.
Citing Stephen Hawking’s finite universe with no boundaries, Maly piques the interest of
the trendy physics reader. Interesting too, is the human-versus-nature paradigm of a new
holon-movement. Hans-Peter Dürr of the University of München, (a former colleague of
Heisenberg) asks philosophers for a new “holon,” a new model of particle-physics and
transcendence.”769 Interesting too are the questions of string theory and the “vibrating”
nature of Being. All these questions one could argue are indeed interesting. Interesting,
yet they miss the Heideggerian question of Being. Maly seems to have lost the original
question in these flights of fanciful thought. He sometimes loses Being for the
reductionisms of transformation and dynamism as ends in themselves. But overall, the
body of the text remains close to Heidegger’s question.
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Before we move on to our next chapter to see how new possibilities unfold, let us
gather some of our separated aspects of Being as Saying together. In addition to Being as
Saying as way-making, the vibrating and transformational aspect, from which all beings
emerges; it is, nonetheless, unified. Being as Saying is the source. It draws us near. It
does not dictate our life as fate; but we have a two-fold destiny because Being is twofold. It makes our way. To find that way, we must have the proper awareness of
language. Being as Saying does guide us in this gathering-separateness, in which we are
drawn and transformed into its design. It hints and beckons us. To this unfolding aspect
of Being as Saying we now turn.
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PART III:
URALTES EIGNIS
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CHAPTER NINE:
Unfolding

Die Sprache ist nicht ein verfügbares Werkzeug, sondern dasjenige Ereignis,
das über die höchste Möglichkeit des Menschseins verfügt.770
If the last chapters were described as investigating the “essence” of Being as
Saying, then this chapter would describe the method of Being as Saying as unfolding—
be-wëgen. But describing these chapters in this fashion falls into inflexible, metaphysical
conceptual jargon. Unfolding is not the method of Being;771 Being is not a datum. Being
as Saying is unfolding—unfolding is Being as Saying. This chapter shall address what
this sentence might mean, while our concluding chapter lights the way of those who
followed in the wake of Heidegger’s unfolding.
Through these two chapters we can discern better what unfolding can mean. They
comprise this final section entitled, “Uraltes Eignis,” meaning age-old self showing.
Being has through the ages shows itself as itself and we are draw closer to our ownmost.
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How that appears in every epoch is both the same but also new. Unfolding always occurs
as Being as Saying. Its way-making is the self-same; yet every epoch sees it anew. As
such we redirect our attention to the ontic appearancing of Being.
In the last chapter we outlined Ereignis. In a brief, but helpful summary let us
repeat the chapter. Seyn/Sein, through its turning in [Einkehr],772 conceals. But in
concealing, Being reveals itself as a concealment. As a concealment it says that it is
indeed a concealment, as originary language as Saying [Sage]. This is heard by humans
as Silence. Silence is the abandonment [Verlassenheit] of Being. Hearing Silence,
humans are drawn near and respond to it as we hear it. It is heard and subsequently our
response to Silence is an after-response [Nachsagen]. The essence of Nachsagen is
“logos.” Since it is dialogical as an after-response, language is primarily dialogical.
From it, all forms of perception, logic, thought and language emerge as separate, while
gathered by originary language.
Heidegger describes the above depiction as the “unfolding” [Die Entfaltung]. As
the “unfolding” Being unfolds out as le/gein, as a showing, a saying by laying forth.
Heidegger taught us in What is Called Thinking? that noei=n unfolds itself [entfaltet sich]
out as le/gein.773 Since Being is two-fold as Saying in Silence—it is a
concealing/revealing, it follows that le/gein unfolds as lo/goj as twofold: as a0-lh/qeia,
as a not-forgetting. But more importantly, we learned in the last chapter that lo/goj is a
mode of originary language, not originary language a mode of lo/goj. Language, then,
belongs to Saying as its movement unfolds [entfaltet] in the nearness of the fourfold of all
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things.774 Finally, Being as Saying always already has a twofold component: it reveals in
its concealment. Heidegger’s Being as Saying, then, needs man to respond, perhaps even
complete its Saying. It is dialogical, in the sense that Being and beings need one another.
Ordinary language flows, or better said, unfolds from originary language. This is
not to say that this “from-toward” phraseology is primarily spatial, temporal, or causal.
Rather, unfolding is relational in such a way which allows spatial, temporal and causal
relationships to occur. More precisely, unfolding speaks of the destiny of Being. We
noticed in earlier chapters the destiny of Being [Seinsgeschick] is two-fold; Being always
unfolds historically as a revealing/concealing. Thus, the Saying of Being as originary
language unfolds historically.
Heidegger holds that ordinary language is twofold because originary language is
twofold; it speaks of Being and the thing of which it speaks. It is dialogical because
Being as Saying is dialogical. In this way language is a sign, as Being and Time
illustrated.775 In the worldhood of Dasein, the totality of references has an elaborate web
of meanings. Ordinary language of Dasein has corresponding polyvalence. Later in
1955 Heidegger explains that for this reason language is polysemic—having many
meanings.776 While polysemic, language still is more fundamentally twofold; it is
ambiguous. The ambiguity springs from the fact that Being is two-fold. Whenever we
are speaking of language, we can notice a trace of the Being of beings in every being.777
Language points both to some “thing” and to Being. This ambiguity unfolds historically.

774

GA 12: 189/“The Nature of Language,” On the Way to Language 108.
GA 2: 107/110.
776
GA 10: 143/The Principle of Reason 96.
777
GA 10: 143/The Principle of Reason 96.
775

302

Thus the title of this section directs our attention to the way unfolding occurs
historically through time in epochs. It is not the occurrence as Western philosophy has
conceived thus far. How does it appear? We must engage Western philosophy, to know
what it is not, then we leap between the philosophy of the first beginning and the
philosophy of the other beginning. Between them we shall come closer to the unfolding
of Being as Saying, unfolding.

UNFOLDING
Reversal of Hegel’s Aufhebung

But we must be clearer on what we mean by unfolding historically. History is not
Hegel’s ladder of ascent, as Robert Bernasconi calls the Hegelian system, or even as a
ladder of descent as the so-called right Hegelians might refer to Hegel’s Aufhebung.
Rather, Heidegger’s history of the growing oblivion of Being was a reversal of Hegel.778
Not an ascent or descent at all, Heidegger’s unfolding of Being is as Saying; unfolding is
as a showing. Historically, unfolding for Heidegger is the showing of the Being of
beings as Saying. Being manifests itself as Ereignis as the gathering/separation of the
fourfold with the help of mortals. Being shows itself in beings. From Ereignis and
through beings, our notions of space and time follow. This is what Heidegger means by
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historically unfolding;779 it is the originary relational way that allows our models of space
and time.
Our experience of the history of philosophy, then, unfolds as the destiny of Being
for Heidegger, not as an unfolded ladder of ascent and descent. Rather, it is the point of
constant reentry into the philosophy of the first beginning, including Hegel’s ladder.
Conversely, the experience of history for Hegel comes in the shape of the history of
Spirit. While it might seem to the reader that the distinction of these two descriptions of
the history of philosophy is merely a semantic distinction; they are different in more than
linguistic ways. They are very different because each experiences the “end” of
philosophy differently. For Hegel philosophy occurs as a goal extended through time,
while Heidegger’s occurs as a showing.780 It shows by reentering the philosophy of the
first beginning, and for this reason Heidegger’s notion of philosophy is a showing in and
through time.
The “experiencing” of the experiencing of philosophy also occurs differently for
Hegel and Heidegger. Hegel’s experience is related to the ongoing parousia—as
Bernasconi describes it—the ongoing, increasing, showing of Spirit as presence
throughout time. Heidegger’s experience of the destiny of Being is letting the
nonapparent appear as apparent.781 While Hegel outlines for us rules of presencing,
Heidegger steps back from the rules of presencing and, in Heidegger’s phrase, leaps
between rules of presencing and remembers it as commemoration.
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But Heidegger’s way is not the converse of Hegelian dialectics, for that too would
be replacing one metaphysical system with another. Rather Heidegger’s way is a leap
between the rules of presencing and stepping back, allowing the abyss between them to
emerge as the ungrounding “ground.” As such Heidegger’s way is not the converse of
Hegel. Heidegger’s experiencing of philosophy is the way of remembrance [Andenken]
in the 1940s and emended as the way of meditative thinking [besinnliche Denken] in the
1950s and 1960s.
Thus for Heidegger, “historically unfolding” shows the possible ways in which
Being shows itself. This means for Heidegger “historically unfolding” is the way
Ereignis manifests Being. It is a matter of moving from the philosophy of the first
beginning, leaping toward the other beginning, all the while remaining between the two,
Being’s unfolding [Die Entfaltung]782 has, and does not have, characteristics described by
the philosophy of the first beginning.
These relational characteristics of unfolding have been outlined variously and
inadequately throughout history as external and internal, or transcendent and immanent.
We saw how Duns Scotus assisted Heidegger’s understanding of relation.783 Scotus,
amending Aristotle, developed the category of relation which included both external and
internal characteristics. Likewise, unfolding for Heidegger is a relational “category,” but
primarily one of internality, not one of external extension. Noticing the philosophy of the
first beginning’s understanding of unfolding as extension (seen strongly in Descartes),
Heidegger overcomes it by reentering it. Heidegger’s understanding is not one of
medieval ontology, nor does it illustrate modern methodus as its immanent framework
782
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which Leibniz might define as ratio or Spinoza might define as natura. Nor its opposite
is Heidegger’s meaning. Kant and Hegel both saw unfolding as transcendental. In
particular, Hegel noted the unique characteristic of language’s unfolding as having both
external and internal aspects.784
Along with the relational aspect of unfolding the question emerges in the first
beginning of “where” the relation is located; between what does it relate? The relation
was located variously as solely in the material world, or solely in the intellect, a
connection between the world of ideas and the material world, or in the human person, or
even in the Absolute Mind. The late modern philosophers in general saw unfolding as
located in consciousness. Since the late modern period philosophical labels could be
ascribed in broad, sweeping generalizations as idealism and materialism, and for this
reason tend to oversimplify. Kant tried to bridge this division with his synthetic a prori
and Hegel then tied to unite them in dialectical fashion, as extended consciousness
through time.
Unfolding for Heidegger avoids all these pitfalls of the philosophy of the first
beginning and leaps toward the other beginning. Certainly unfolding for Heidegger is not
of the Hegelian dialectic, given as progress. Unfolding originary language as Saying is
not a relationship of linear cause and effect, but is an unfolding of possibilities of
limitations785 from which our conceptions of Space-Time causality subsequently emerge.
Unfolding shows apparent what was non-apparent; thus unfolding emerges as possibility.
784
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But possibility always emerges limited as a destiny of Being, that it to say, it emerges as
twofold, showing beings and the Being of beings. Simply said, unfolding for Heidegger
is more originary to any of the conceived understandings of the philosophy of the first
beginning. And yet the leap is the site between the philosophy of the first beginning and
the other beginning.
Showing beings and the Being of beings is more than observing simple principles
of causality; it is more primordial than perception as sensation in general or perception as
given by Kant’s unity of apperception.786 Instead, in Ereignis we see the fourfold
[Geviert] emerging as a complex, multivalent set of influences that lay out possible
situations, from which we can derive principles of causality, time and space. Indeed we
oftentimes derive incorrectly such principles. For instance in our epoch, it appears that
we are independent subjects, viewing objective nature with established principles, but
this subject/object dichotomy, for Heidegger and we argue, is derived from the
fourfold,787 of which we as mortals are but one element in the relational
gathering/separation of the fourfold as manifested in Ereignis.
Kenneth Maly describes this historical unfolding in Heidegger’s Possibility.
Citing the Beiträge, Maly argues that “be-ing itself must enown thinking to itself.”788
Barring his awkward phraseology, we hold that Maly still draws out an important notion
of unfolding of Being as historical. Being as Silence draws all beings. Drawing as
Silence, Being draws Dasein as well as thinking unto itself. That is to say that thinking
786
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isn’t simply a human affair while reflecting on observable data and principles. Instead,
thinking is drawn toward Being to be more like the destiny of Being is; Being as Saying
is twofold and thinking, following Being, is drawn to be twofold. Being as Saying
unfolds in the Ereignis historically; Being as Saying also unfolds in the Ereignis as
drawing thinking unto itself. More precisely, Ereignis is “between” the outward flowing
of historical patterns and the timeless clearing of the now. Ereignis occurs as
Seinsgeschichte. This is what we have argued as Heidegger’s fundamental understanding
of Kehre, from which all tertiary understandings of history and turning derive.
Described in terms of the philosophy of the first beginning, Being has both
indwelling and outward flowing characteristics as Being as Saying; also in terms of the
philosophy of the first beginning, unfolding occurs between man, ideas and the world.
Described in terms of Heidegger’s meditative thinking, Ereignis manifests Being.
Unfolding’s clearing site is located as the gathering/separatedness of the fourfold—
between earth, sky, gods and mortals—manifested as Ereignis.
While man is no longer the sole clearing site of Being, manifestation of Ereignis
nevertheless needs man to play a part in the fourfold. Hearing Being as Saying as
Silence, Da-sein is drawn to respond. This is the other important notion of unfolding.
Not only is thinking drawn to Being, but also Da-sein is drawn toward Being as Saying.
Maly would describe this as Da-sein’s being “enowned.” Again prescinding from the
“enowning” language, we simply say that Da-sein is drawn ever closer to who Da-sein is:
a listener of Being. Thus Da-sein is transformed in the listening. This is what
Richardson understands as the Kehre and we argued was a subsequent effect of the
originary Kehre.
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What are the implications of this unfolding for Da-sein? At the site of the Riss, or
the ontological difference, man notices Being and beings. As has already been described
in many ways, the site of the de-cision or the Riss, man has, what has been called in
various ways, as freedom or liberty. Freedom and liberty invoke connotations of license
to do as one would wish. Rather than freedom or liberty, the opening site of de-cision
does not lend itself to unlimited possibilities, for the Riss still has the same
“characteristics” of the twofold destiny of Being. License to do as one wishes, when one
wishes, now is seen incompletely as part of the philosophy of the first beginning, as the
subject’s willing, making a choice, or even being willful. It lacks the twofold character
of Being as Saying: showing beings and the Being of beings as the ontological difference.
Instead, man is drawn to the Riss, and is transformed by its dif-ference. Rather
than freedom, man is drawn to listen to his ownmost “self.” Drawn to the Riss, man is
drawn to Being’s Silence. Drawn, man is transformed by his renunciation of language’s
inability to express properly the ontological difference, or the Ereignis. Having been
transformed, man is open to Being’s call. Man is disposed [verfügt] to Being. Man is
then drawn to dwell properly.

Verfügen

“Verfügen” is the second important distinction of unfolding. Drawn to Being,
man is transformed to dwell properly. What does “verfügen” entail? The common
translations of the German word, “verfügen” are given as the following: “to command,”
“to dispose,” “to enact,” “to decree,” “to order,” and “to regulate.” One might say that
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Being, in drawing, commands man not unlike Sein und Zeit, but now in the sense that
man is transformed by the Silence. We now define “verfügen” precisely as “service.”
Thus, man is at the disposal of Being; Da-sein is at the service of Being.789 The human
will of the philosophy of the first beginning lies solely in the domain of the subject. As
Da-sein is part of the fourfold, as Being manifests itself as Ereignis, verfügen lies
between the subject and the object, it resides “in” Being.790 Verfügen is not simply
freedom, but it also draws Da-sein back to Being, to be of service to Being’s unfolding.
Thus we are free only to the extent that we are at Being’s disposal.
Language is the way we are at Being’s service. It is through ordinary language
that man comes to the realization of man’s inability to characterize Being fully. In
renouncing ordinary language as a tool at man’s disposal, he is transformed. But
language is the way, not as a tool in the usual meaning of tool. Rather, as Heidegger
writes: “Language is not a tool at man’s disposal, but that primal event [Ereignis] which
disposes of the highest possibility of man’s being.” [Die Sprache ist nicht ein
verfügbares Werkzeug, sondern dasjenige Ereignis, das über die höchste Möglichkeit des
Menschseins verfügt.]”791 Language is at the service [verfügen] of the event, Ereignis,
not as mere tool, but as the unfolding “tool” of Ereignis. Through language, more
precisely, through the renunciation of language, Da-sein is drawn to his ownmost as one
element of the fourfold in the gathering/separation of Ereignis as the manifestation of
Being. Being drawn, Da-sein comes to de-cision.
789
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Thus, the de-cision of Da-sein allows the opening of the clearing; it opens up the
“ontological space” for concealing/revealing. It involves Da-sein as part of the fourfold
as gathering-separating. It occurs as the unfolding of Being. It occurs as Ereignis. As
such it allows the moment of happening [Augenblick], but more so it opens Da-sein to be
more properly who he is: the shepherd of language. As Maly writes: “The coming-apart
is at the same time a gathering of that open, midpoint, time-space for be-ing human.”792
Thus, Ereignis is not simply the manifestation of Being, but it is also the manifestation of
beings and most decisively, it is the manifestation of Da-sein in de-cision.
Unfolding is the manifestation of Being in Ereignis. Unfolding manifests as
Being as Saying through the fourfold. Man as mortal is one element of the fourfold and;
at the same time, Da-sein is the site of language as we are drawn toward Being, to dwell,
to think, and to build. Language is the way; Da-sein is the site of the way. Man, then is
peculiar in that he is but part of the manifestation of Being, but also the only way by
which we come to know the manifestation of Being in the fourfold. Man is both
appropriated by Being and the interpreter of that appropriation; man is twofold; man is
twofold because Being is twofold. We are fated to be open to this appropriation, in the
sense that appropriation is not the sole accomplishment of our wills. This appropriation
occurs ambiguously as a “gathering” and a “going away.”
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Gathering-going away

Maly describes this de-cision not simply as a gathering together of the fourfold,
but as well a going-away. Both gathering [hinein] and going-away [entgehen] are held in
dynamic tension. This dynamic tension, Maly calls a con-tension; he also calls it
“po/lemoj,”793 the Greek word usually translated as “war.” While war or confrontation
seems too strong a meaning, there certainly is tension. Maly uses Heidegger’s translation
of Heraclitus, Fragment 53 for the source of po/lemoj. It is the tension of the
concealing/revealing of Being vis-à-vis beings. What is being gathered and what is
going-away? Both Being and beings are involved in this relational tension of the decision.
This con-tension of Maly is exactly what Heidegger simply calls “Ereignis” in the
Beiträge. Maly borrows from section 267. The characteristics of the going-away
[entgegen] are the descriptions of the first five of the eight aspects of the Ereignis as
unfolding. The last three are the gathering [hinein] aspects of Ereignis. Yet these do not
occur as oscillations of gathering, then going out; nor is it one of going-out then
gathering. Rather the gathering and going-out is always already in dynamic tension.
While we have already discussed the eight aspects of Being in detail in chapter two, here
we shall highlight their going-away vis-à-vis gathering as the mode of unfolding.
Maly, following the Beiträge,794 lists the going-out aspects as: Er-eignung
[Appropriation as an over-all process], Ent-scheidung [de-cision], Ent-gegnung
[countering], Ent-setzung [setting-free], and Ent-zug [withdrawal]. It must be said that
793
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Er-eignung is not so much a going-out aspect, but more so the completion of the overall
process. Its prefix, “er-” conveys the completion of any action.795 The remaining four
terms do, as Maly indicates, convey a “going-out” more properly.796 Taking the meaning
of this prefix to its fullest extent, Maly hightlights the “going-out” of Being. Er-eignung
is the overall process of going-out. De-cision [Ent-scheidung] is projecting-opening of
Being. This projecting-opening is the ongoing strife between “world” and “earth.” “Decision” is not the actual strife of the “world” and “earth,” but “de-cision” emerges out
from the cleft [Riss] as would a rune etched into a tablet.797 The gods and man are drawn
out as countering [Ent-gegnung] each other and are set-free. Setting-free [Ent-setzung]
distinguishes beyng [Seyn] from beings. Moreover, this setting-free is also the
withdrawal [Ent-zug] in the domination of machination. These aspects of Ereignis all
have the “going-out” characteristic. One might see here the very clear indication of
unfolding of beings from Being. But this falsely would limit unfolding to the philosophy
of the first beginning.798
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Yet, unfolding also includes “enfolding,” the turning in [Einkehr] of beyng799 as
part of Ereignis. Maly describes these aspects as the gathering [hinein] of Ereignis.
The last three of the eight aspects of beyng as enfolding are: Einfachheit [simpleness],
Einzigkeit [uniqueness], and Einsamkeit [aloneness]. Simpleness [Einfachheit] is the
relation simpliciter of the Ereignis. Rather than imagining that beyng is due to the
relation of the “between” between gods and man, we see that Ereignis is indeed the
relation of the “between” between gods and man. Beyng is simple. Beyng as a mark of
simpleness is unique, in that beyng alone designates modes of beyng. Beyng is
uniqueness [Einzigkeit], from which all varying modes of Being derive, whether as
concealing or revealing. Beyng’s uniqueness grounds its aloneness [Einsamkeit] and
surrounds itself only with the nothing [das Nichts]. All three aspects have the “ein”
prefix, which follow “ein” of “Einkehr,” of turning-in. One might falsely presume that
this is an enfolding as opposed to unfolding. This too would limit these aspects to the
philosophy of the first beginning.800
As gathering-going away, Being is always two-fold, a holding sway, a
concealing/revealing.801 It is never a process of procession, and then recession. Instead,
the elements of the gathering-going away are held in constant tension. This tension
characterizes Being as Saying as Silence and Silence as Being as Saying. Being shows
itself in its Silence and Being is Silent in its showing. Being is always already twofold.
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Now that we have looked at the Being “side” of Being as Saying as unfolding, let
us now look at the “unfolding” side of Being as Saying. That is to say, let us look at
ordinary language. Though we must always be conscious of the fact that there are never
“sides,” for all of the previous paragraphs and that which follows is all unfolding of
Being as Saying. Also, it would be wrong-headed to imagine that Heidegger is searching
for the origin of language.802
Ordinary language must have the same twofold characteristic: holding sway,
concealing/revealing, gathering/separating. Ordinary language is ambiguous because
Being is twofold. Conversation is both a listening and a speaking. Poetry is both a
revealing and concealing. The study of linguistics shows us that language is both
revealing expression in a concealed structure. Language both grants as saying something,
but also conceals by holding back other words and ideas. Ironically, apophantic
statements as assertion cover up meaning803 and the apophatic tradition in theology
reveals through not-saying. Each and every interpretation then conceals and reveals.
This is not to say that every interpretation reveals and conceals correctly. But it is to say
that every interpretation is twofold, a concealing/revealing.
Heidegger warns against a strong reliance on language as linguistics. For
linguistics disseminates itself and refuses to listen to Being. For this reason language
appears as fixed, as a tool for man’s usage, a tool that adequately bridges things and
ideas. But these are all false appearances of language. Language as linguistics is not
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adequate simply for its false appearance of competency, but it is not adequate more so
because in its false appearances: it conceals Being.
But all is not lost, for in realizing the inadequacy of language, man renounces
both his command of language and language’s ability to reach completely Being. In the
renunciation, man is drawn to Being and is led toward meditative thinking. Thus,
language can lead to the possibility where words lead to the region where both poetry and
thought have similar domains as lo/goj. But remarkably so, the renunciation of ordinary
language leads to the Silence of originary language. As such ordinary language has the
trace of Being as Saying. This is the unfolding of Being as Saying.
One final remark must be mentioned on the relation of Unfolding and the
philosophy of the first beginning. While we have distinguished sufficiently Heidegger’s
way as con-tension, we may have led the reader inadvertently onto other paths. If the
relation of unfolding is not one of procession or recession in time, then it might be
surmised that we are speaking of relations of extension, of the mind and body akin to
Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza; or that we are speaking of “unfolding” as a relation of
difference and repetition à la early Deleuze, relation as “territorialization” and
“deterritorialization” on planes of immanence and transcendence of the later Deleuze and
Guatteri or the relation as the “mathematical” of Badiou. These philosophers have used
the term unfolding and have referred to unfolding and the fold in ways that are not
consistent with Heidegger’s meaning of unfolding. Each would be far afield of
Heidegger’s thinking on “unfolding” in a variety of ways as either too humanistic, too
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materialistic, or having no-relations-occurring-as-sameness or having relations-occurringas-difference.804

Way-making

Rather than stepping down the path of the first beginning, let us leap to
Heidegger’s unfolding of Being as Saying. While it may seem as though the two “sides”
of language—originary and ordinary—are bridged by the Ereignis, they are not bridged
at all. Rather, they are the site of Ereignis in con-tension, as gathering-going away. It
does not simply show us the way, but as Heidegger explains it is way-making, “bewëgen.”
Be-wëgen, therefore, leads us to proceed cautiously. We barely know what our
relationship to words is. We hardly know how language works, as Maly claims.805
Language is most helpful when it shows us its boundaries. At the point of it limitations,
language show its possibilities. Language draws us toward our boundaries and relations.
Most importantly, language unfolding as be-wëgen transforms us.
Seeing how be-wëgen of Being as Saying transforms us, we are now able to
reenter the discussion of what Heidegger means by his new phenomenology. If be-wëgen
is way-making, if it is transforming us as we are drawn near to Silence; if, by showing
itself Being as Saying brings us to our ownmost and we are part of the fourfold, then
phenomenology can no longer be defined solely as Heidegger first defined it in Being and
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Time as that which shows itself in the very way that it shows itself. While the
phenomenology of Being and Time is not false, we see the further implications of what
showing itself means.806 Phenomenology now also means that in showing itself Being
transforms beings.
We see how the phenomenology of Heidegger unfolds. From Being and Time of
Heidegger’s earliest period and through the destructive retrieval toward the Ereignis in
the middle period and finally the meditative thinking as the lens through which Ereignis
shows itself in Heidegger’s later works, phenomenology shows itself as it transforms.
Phenomenology for Heidegger is way-making. While all three periods include within
phenomenology the meaning that it is the study of that which shows itself in the very way
that it shows itself. The later period looks closer at the way Being shows itself. Not
simply though Dasein does Heidegger hold that Being shows itself, but through the
fourfold.
When simple phenomenology appears as occurring through man’s eyes alone, it
appears as man’s project. His language appears at times ontically, as a tool. The world is
at man’s disposal. Man builds technology and political society to fit into man’s
metaphysical worldview. Technology outpaces man’s ability to control, finally
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“enframing” and machination draw us toward danger and toward the saving power.
Through man’s eyes, all appears purely in human terms. But this cannot hold.
For, in a flash, Being appears.807 Realizing the saving power, man is drawn to
listen and through destructive retrieval tries to rebuild, tries to relearn that man is not in
control. Man realizes that he is but one of the elements of the fourfold, becomes more
aware of the Silence of Being as Saying and abides more authentically. But as man
rebuilds new structures to live more authentically, these new structures of polity, religion
and psychology, even green technology entangle man and beguile him once again such
that he believes that he can control his destiny. Technology builds and machination and
enframing draw us toward danger and the saving power. Once again Being appears in a
flash as Ereignis.
While it may seem to the reader that such a flash is what we might call novelty; it
is not the case, for Being is always as holding sway. It may appear novel at the time, but
that would only be a semblance. What has occurred in machination is a movement away
from Being as Saying.
Maly describes unfolding as like a dance between the role of humans and that
which is “thrown” to humans. While this is not entirely different from Dasein’s role as
given in Being and Time, the noteworthy emphasis from the time of the Beiträge onward
Heidegger draws out the implications that Dasein isn’t the focus of the
revealing/concealing of Being. Rather, man, as mortals in conjunction with the gods,
earth, and sky, are involved in the gathering/separation of the manifestation of Being as
Ereignis. Maly portrays this dance in the following way: “The dance is between
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emergence and interpretation, between the role of humans (the enowned throwing open
of the throw of be-ing, which Da-sein does) and the emerging unfolding that throws itself
to Da-sein.”808 In other words, Ereignis is both appearing and interpretation, both
hermeneutics and phenomenology. What is different in the phenomenology for later
Heidegger is the fact of Da-sein’s decreasing role and Being’s increasing role in Ereignis.
Ereignis with meditative thinking is through man’s eyes but with the addendum
that Ereignis is showing through man. Being and Time framed the site of clearing with
Dasein. Dasein uncovers Being and time. Heidegger worked beyond this notion of
unfolding. Now “unfolding” is seen as manifestation of Being as Saying in Ereignis.
What determines both, time and Being, in their own, that is, in their belonging together
[Zussamengehören], “we shall call: Ereignis,” writes Heidegger.809 Ereignis is now
thought in the light of what becomes manifest in our looking ahead [Vor-sicht] toward
Being and toward time as destiny and as extending, to which time and Being belong.
Being and time are “matters” [Sachen]; they are not things. The “and” between them is
left indeterminate [Unbestimmt] in their relation to each other [ihre Beziehung
zueinander]. Ereignis is no longer presencing, like phenomenology, but holding sway as
looking ahead [Vor-sicht]. This always indeterminate character typifies Heidegger’s new
phenomenology: Being through ordinary language draws us to originary language, to
itself. It is indeterminate in that the possibility is always open, never determined, even
while we are drawn to originary language.
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Vor-sicht

From this insight, Heidegger writes in 1963 “Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie”
[“My Way to Phenomenology”].810 Rather that using concepts of traditional philosophy
or the ontological terminology of Being and Time as presencing, Heidegger now sees the
way of unfolding in terms of phenomenology, but now as looking ahead [Vor-sicht].
This new type of phenomenology of looking ahead, then, allows us to grasp holding sway
as looking ahead as possibility [Möglichkeit].811 Not simply descriptive, Vor-sicht offers
new possibilities of man and beings as transformed by Ereignis.
Later in 1966 Heidegger describes what the transformation of man and beings by
Ereignis would look like in the “Heraclitus Seminar.” Heidegger describes it in terms of
a directing or steering. The steering of Being could appear violent or oppressive, but true
steering emerges as non-violent steering.812 We, ourselves, like Being, are permanently
set in motion and thus, we are caught in the hermeneutical circle and at the same time are
being steered. Between metaphorical and literal language, Heidegger sees man as always
already in transformation, steered by Being as Saying in Ereignis. Steering is waymaking [Be-wëgung], unfolding in all beings in all times and places. Not only does
Being guide us, but we in turn, as guided, guide things in our “worlding of the world.”
Being guided and guiding, man now listens to Being less as a shepherd and more
as a listener. Listening to Being as Saying, heard as Silence, man is changed. As
changed, man now sees his “world” in new ways. Non-apparent Being-made-apparent,
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now reveals and conceals in new ways to Da-sein. As we know, Da-sein is Heidegger’s
later distinction to indicate that man is “by nature” open, that is to say always fated to
look-forward to new possibilities, directed by the appropriation of Ereignis. Da-sein
understands himself and his world in new ways. Dwelling anew is brought on by the
discomfit of his non-revealing inhabiting of his “world.” Dwelling is listening, but
listening in a way that allows existential listening. Heidegger calls this Gelassenheit, a
letting-be. Gelassenheit is a delicate balance between philosophy of the first beginning
and the other beginning. It is a leap between the two beginnings. The division of
philosophy of the first beginning as pure contemplation and philosophy as practical is no
longer tenable. Rather, Gelassenheit is a balance between being guided and guiding,
between purely contemplating and changing—that is transforming the “world.”
Marx knew well these perplexities,813 and claims that philosophers have only
interpreted the world [die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert], but the real issue is to
transform it [verändern].814 Transforming the world came in the form of political and
economic reformation, in the form of material dialectics. Together with French
existentialism like that of Sartre, transforming the world, one’s sense of being an
individual, indeed has become the self-production of man.
But Heidegger understood the danger contained in such a position. Heidegger
maintains that the self-production of man raises the danger of self-destruction [die Gefahr
der Selbstzertörung hervorbringt].”815 It has real possibilities because of this
misunderstanding of Being and beings, and Dasein. The danger of such a position is that
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it does not grasp the dependence man has on Being, and the need for Man to listen to the
Being as Saying, heard as Silence. In such a false position, man is no longer drawn to
Being, but asserts himself; rather than service to Being, man asserts himself.
But such a position is not merely dangerous: there too is the saving power.
Heidegger sees the binding factor between the world and philosophy as language. Being
as Saying transforms man when man is open to its Silence and draws man near. In
Ereignis man is transformed and his meditative language follows suit. For Heidegger,
language and interpretation does indeed transform the world, but not in a Marxist way.816
Being as Saying draws man near as transformation.
Unlike the dialectics of Hegel and Marx, which place man in an antagonistic
position with the world, Being for Heidegger needs man in a cooperative gatheringwhile-separating stance. Being needs man to listen. Being needs the finitude of beings,
for man is the placeholder of the nothing817 [Der Mensch ist der Platzhalter des
Nichts].818 As placeholder, man doesn’t add anything to Being, but clears all other beings
so that the space is left free for Being as Saying to draw near as Silence.
Silence quells all subsequent notions of alienation. Man is not alienated from
Being, but drawn ever closer in Silence. Man is not alienated from himself as given by
Freud, for Being draws man most properly to himself. Nor must man be alienated from
the earth or his “world” as given in strife. Moreover, man need not be alienated from his
gods given as fundamental knowing awareness, whether proffered in opinion or religion.
Man need not be alienated but can be, as being guided by Being, with Dasein’s dual
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possibilities: of listening poorly to the philosophy of the first beginning or leaping well
between the philosophy of first beginning and the philosophy of the other beginning.
The dual possibility of listening arrives from the Dasein’s “de-cision.” Dasein’s
“de-cision” is what could be called the ontological space, where Dasein interprets Being
as Saying, heard as Silence. It too has the character of unfolding, in con-tension. While
drawn to Silence, man interprets it as a call to action, inner reflection or reflection on
Being itself. Hence man’s response [Nach-sagen] is always guided by Being and is
interpreted. Man is open.
Thus unfolding is not a ladder of negation or desire; nor is it one of alienation of
man from all aspects of his world. Rather, unfolding is bringing man into proper relation,
guided by Being and man guiding beings, not throughout time, but “unfolding” is making
the non-apparent apparent in time.
While few would claim that Heidegger falls into the materialist tradition as
offered above in the Marxist tradition, still, others offer the misguided claim that
Heidegger is an idealist. This is surprising, given the multiply ways in which Heidegger
discusses his reliance on “materialist’s concerns.” These include the fourfold, including
the earth, the sky and the gods, all of which are outside of Da-sein’s control.819 William
Blattner820 is one who claims that Heidegger’s thought is idealism. In his book,
Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, Blattner employs primarily early Heideggerian
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references to the exclusion of later works that would lean toward an “idealistic” mindset
that places Heidegger’s within the tradition from Plotinus to Kant.821
Furthermore, Blattner poses his central argument that Heidegger’s temporal
ontology relies upon a temporal idealism which fails because Being and Time cannot
reach a nonsequential form of time. He contends that, with later works like the Beiträge,
Heidegger sets out, also unsuccessfully, to evade this problem. The problem, as Blattner
outlines it, is that since Being is not an entity, language needs to engage various failed
phrases to cope with the failure: “the truth of Being,” “das Ereignis,” “presencing
[wesen],” to name a few.822 The result, concludes Blattner, is a quasi-mysticism.823 In all
cases, he argues Heidegger relies on the priority of ideas and their formulation. And as
James Swindal well noted, this point alone would not make Heidegger into an idealist.
The difficulty with Blattner’s assessment occurs primarily in his conclusion that
Heidegger’s terminological shifting, that is linguistic transformations, is the point of
Heidegger’s questioning. But as we have argued, Heidegger, through the Saying of
Being heard as Silence and the renouncing of language, man’s centrality in the question
of Being is de-centered and the gathering/separation of the fourfold takes place in
Ereignis. As such, man and his ideas cannot be the major premise in any of Heidegger’s
later work, as Blattner contends. Finally, any claim that Heidegger is a materialist,
idealist, conceptualist, or pragmatist, would falter on Heidegger’s fourfold and its
unfolding in Ereignis.
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One final query regarding unfolding needs to be explicated. It is the question is of
man’s perception of con-tension, for man is part of the interplay of the fourfold.
Overemphasizing the perception of the gathering/going out either as simply “gathering
in” or “going-out,” one risks what would be experienced as total control or revolution. In
a sense it would bear relevance on what Heideggerian would call totalization of
machination. For instance, Jacques Derrida, though not a Heideggerian but one who
studied under Heidegger’s French collaborator, Jean Beaufret from 1946 to 1962,
describes Heidegger’s “de-cision” as a rupture, as being out of joint. In Specters of Marx,
Derrida takes Heidegger to mean in “The Saying of Anaximander” that the “de-cision” or
the jointure [aus der Fuge] is the site of harmony or joining. Likewise, Derrida holds
Heidegger to be saying that unfolding is a gathering, an ordering. Opposed to order is
disorder. Disorder is to be “out of joint” for Derrida. From our perspective Derrida is
half right.824
What does it mean to be out of joint? Derrida equates “out of joint” with
injustice and untimeliness. He wrongly sees Heidegger advocating order and “gathering”
with justice. Countering this conception Derrida argues that “out of jointness” is the
possibility of alterity. Derrida explores this phrase: “Is not the disjuncture the very
possibility of the other? How to distinguish between two disadjustments, between
disjuncture of the unjust and the one who opens up the infinite asymmetry of the relation
to the other, that is to say, the place for justice?”825 Derrida rightly sees “out of
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jointness” as both the site of the possibility of the other and the site of justice/injustice.
Through his analysis of German Ideology, Derrida tries to uncover what is out of joint in
our own era and concludes that Marxist thought is still relevant to today's world, even
given globalization; such a Marxist construal would result in a new messianism, a
messianism of a “democracy to come.” For Heidegger, our epoch exemplifies the
inadequacies of the so-called idealistic and materialistic philosophical traditions.
But Derrida overemphasizes Heidegger’s intention of gathering. Derrida writes:
“Heidegger, as he always does, skewed the asymmetry in favor of what he in effect
interprets as the possibility of favor itself, out of the accorded favor, namely, of the
accord that gathers or collects while harmonizing.”826 Instead, Heidegger, as we outlined
above, holds the two in constant and ready tension.
Given the con-tension of the gathering-in and going-out, Heidegger might agree
with Derrida that this is the site of the possibility of the other. But Heidegger sees the
con-tension not primarily in terms of politics, morality or ethics, but as the condition of
the possibility from which they can emerge. Having emerged, they have already taken on
the form of metaphysics. Rather than dismissing this as altogether untenable, we would
see the acceptance of such as part of the leap between the philosophy of the first
beginning and the philosophy of the second beginning.
Consequently, Derrida is but one of many who take up Heidegger’s project in a
way that may not be completely felicitous. Many of them, like Derrida, take up this very
possibility of unfolding-as-dwelling. Each attempts to contend with Heidegger’s Being
as Saying heard as Silence and its unfolding. We shall discuss these in the next chapter
and analyze to what extent they take up Heidegger’s project as the possibility of the
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twofoldness of Being as manifested by Ereignis and its gathering/separateness of the
fourfold.
Thus, this chapter’s major emphasis was the discussion of the unfolding of waymaking first from the false avenues of interpretation. While one might inquire what is the
positive way of understanding unfolding, we have found, following Heidegger, that more
is garnered by the negative. A cup is more what it is not, than what it is. It is that which
by means of its emptiness can contain fluid. Man is more a placeholder. Similarly,
unfolding is best understood via what it is not.
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CHAPTER TEN:
Dénouement

“…phenomenology is a path that leads away to come before …,
and it lets that before which it is led shows itself.827
The Oxford English Dictionary defines dénouement as an unraveling or the final
solution of a complication, difficulty or mystery. Following the OED, we shall work
toward the unraveling of Heidegger’s way in this chapter with those who have taken on
Heidegger’s task, with those who have engaged in the way-making of Being as Saying.
In one way, our topic may seem to arrive at a quiet end, like a comfortable death
somewhat like the Einkehre of Seyn/Sein: to come to peace or quiet, as a turning-in.
Certainly a quiet resolution can shine forth. But equally so, “dénouement” has the
connotation that might conjure up thoughts of a revolution or collapse of an epoch.
If the goal of Dasein of Being and Time was to uncover Being in fundamental
ontology, if the Beiträge was to circle Being, nearing its Silence in constructive retrieval,
and if Heidegger’s renouncing of language in the later works drew Da-sein closer to a
way-making of Being as Saying, then the challenge of Heideggerians is to allow Being to
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reveal itself as concealment, that is to reemerge in ontical dwelling—all the while
realizing that man is not in control.
The burgeoning world, the fracturing of the Cartesian self, the “silence” of God in
the post-Holocaust era, and the rise of fundamental religious sects—all lead man into a
crisis of non-control in our epoch. Epochal conclusions have been formulated in a
variety of ways since Heidegger’s death. But the issue for us really isn’t regarding man’s
lack of control. Rather, at issue is the completion or fulfillment of the way-making of
Being as Saying, heard as Silence, manifested as Ereignis; our issue is not speaking of
the end of an epoch, but speaking of a Saying of Being heard as Silence unfolding in the
fourfold in all epochs as way-making.
And consequently, this final and chapter, “Dénouement,” engages the possibilities
of unfolding of language as Saying as encountered in the “world” and in our epoch. This
chapter will not engage the reception of Heidegger in all its manifestations—a near
impossible, if not a monumental, life-task. Instead, we will characterize the reception,
only to the extent that it bears relevance to our topic of Being as Saying unfolding as
way-making. Specifically, the topic of this final chapter is Being as Saying unfolding as
Ereignis, and how the fourfold appears or hides in our epoch.
To structure our chapter, let us first recount the major aspects of way-making.
We already know of the gathering/separating of the fourfold, occurring in the Ereignis.
Being as Saying is heard as Silence. Man is drawn near. Being and man together are
transformed. Because Being is twofold as concealing/revealing, all manifestations also
occur as twofold. These steps of the way were already outlined. Furthermore, we
discussed how Being as Saying, heard as Silence, is way-making.
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What still needs further exploration is how way-making continues to unfold
ontically. Heidegger famously claimed that way-making is not his way, but the way of
Being.828 Since Heidegger’s death and repose in Meßkirch on May 28, 1976, Being’s
way-making continues—that is, if Heidegger is indeed correct in his assessment, and we
do concur. We listen intently and look closely for ways in which Being shows itself to us
as a concealing/revealing.
Consequently, we set our gaze on the reception of the way, as the phenomenology
of looking ahead [Vor-sicht]. In an appropriate fashion, for Heidegger’s way to be
assessable viably, including his later notion that the fourfold replaces Dasein as the fuller
site of Being’s showing, it follows that the way-making of Being as Saying can be
verified only when Heidegger as the primary bearer of the clearing of Being gives way to
many others. For if Heidegger’s way is not his way, but the way-making of Being, then
Being’s manifestation as Ereignis should continue to speak to, and indeed transform, us
today. Just as Being is twofold, so too is language; as Da-sein829 is de-centered in waymaking, so too is Heidegger’s works. Let us “look-ahead.”
Certainly, this chapter is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis of all those who
have engaged Heidegger. Even the celebrated two-volume work of the late Dominique
Janicaud,830 which masterfully recounts the reception of Heidegger into France, is not
sufficient to analyze all the various layers, permutations, and locations influenced by
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Heidegger’s way-making.831 Our work in this section is not one of historical layering of
an epoch, but one of finding the patterns that emerge within that epoch, which indicate
way-making more audible or noticeable.
Taking the research in Janicaud’s work as persuasively conclusive, we shall
simply outline four basic patterns or ontological regions that have been fertile ground for
the continuation of Heidegger’s work. While few employ Heidegger’s terminology, like
that of Ereignis, nevertheless, they still are concerned with the unconcealment of Being
through time. By extension they too are interested in Heidegger’s project of the
unconcealing/revealing of Being. Listing them in terms of common parlance and with
clear ties to the philosophy of the first beginning, we will engage the regions of
anthropology, religion, politics, and technology. More precisely, we gauge their
proponents’ attempts to leap between the philosophy of the first beginning and the
philosophy of the other beginning.
Finally, the chapter will conclude that, in order to be more consonant with the
way-making of Being as Saying, heard as Silence, these regions are not the elements of
the fourfold, but occur as ek-static, ontic regions of expertise that emerge from man’s
attempt to build and dwelling therein. With this caveat we explore these regions.
Finally, we must engage them hermeneutically and phenomenologically not as isolated
but as interrelated regions, related in their meaning, ontology and usage. As decompartmentalized regions they will resonate better with the manifestation of Ereignis in
the gathering/separateness of the fourfold. After all, ontical regions all have the twofold
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gathering/separateness of the fourfold as the manifestation of the one site of ontological
difference, or de-cision, or most properly said, Ereignis. Each seems to be located in
different regions, but as Heidegger tells us they are all but variations of the self-same
Saying of Being.
Why do we choose four regions? Four regions correspond roughly to the
fourfold. If we take man as mortal as the starting point, we see all things through that
single gaze, as elements of human anthropology. If we gaze solely at the earth and even
the cosmos as unchanging, in the sense that it always consists of matter, then what
emerges is an objective, concrete thing, separate from, but related to, man. If we gaze
solely at the gods, that is the fundamental knowing awareness (as translated by Emad and
Kalary), then we see opinions, beliefs, ideas as our own—but not simply ours, but only
ours in our control. Finally, if we look solely at the sky, that is the principle of incessant
change, then we see only some method or change—or in its extreme form, only chaos.
Four ontological regions coincide with a concentrated view of one of the fourfold
separated from, but not gathered as, fourfold. What we see is everything in terms of
beings, and we see nothing, but not the no-thingness of Being.
One caution must be proffered from the outset. Our project admits from the start
that Being is the primary influence upon the emergence of these regions; man’s influence
is secondary. So in any building of institutions, dwelling and listening to Being are
located as that of Da-sein’s. Indeed Being always already is our main question: Being as
Saying, heard as Silence, manifested as Ereignis, unfolded in the gathered/separateness of
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the fourfold.832 Our regard here is to allow, in as much as we able as part of the fourfold,
to allow ourselves to hear the Silence of Being as Saying.

French Reception
Before we look at specific philosophies of French reception, one must ask the
question whether this discussion should be included in the larger discussion on Heidegger
and language. To answer this question in the affirmative we shall use Heidegger’s own
words: “When you will have seen my limits, you will have understood me. I cannot see
them.”833 The engagement with those who follow will help us to sees the limits of
Heidegger, but more importantly, help us to understand way-making. The reception of
Heidegger’s philosophy is the way we can assess way-making in our epoch. With these
parameters lets us enter the four regions of interest as it was received in France.
Contrary to the mood of our chapter title, the late Dominique Janicaud834
describes the reception not as peaceful, but as a veritable polemical maelstrom. By way
of entrée, let us look first at the French Cartesian tradition of consciousness and reason,
which soon adopted Heidegger’s phenomenology. Janicaud supports our earlier claim
that Jean-Paul Sartre had a robust influence on the public’s consciousness with Being and
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Nothingness [L’être et le néant]; a veritable explosion of public interest swirled around
French existentialism.
Being and Nothingness radicalized the role of human responsibility, to such an
extent that each unique individual can and must from his situation extract meaning.
Through the person’s choices, he defines his essence. Thus, the person is radically free
and must choose in order to assert one’s being, since a person exists for himself (poursoi) and negates his nothingness. Nothingness is the state of a thing existing in itself (ensoi). As such man is “condemned to be free”835 to negate his nothingness.
Sartre assumed some of Heidegger’s terminology and themes, and not without
many flagrant misunderstandings. While unfortunate, this misappropriation of
Heidegger’s Being and Time, unwittingly washed onto the shores of France an interest in
Heidegger and flowed into the minds of non-professional philosophers together with
French existentialism.836
Other significant figures beside Sartre who stirred interest in Heidegger included
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, and Paul Ricœur.837 Not
surprisingly, each philosopher has taken up, or opposed, the Heideggerian banner, which
focuses on what seems to be some form of an ek-static aspect of the fourfold or their
interrelations. Merleau-Ponty developed his notion of the lived-body; Levinas wrestled
with the complete otherness of God; Derrida employed a method of criticism, stylized by
others as a deconstructive methodology; and Ricœur engaged Heidegger and
hermeneutics. Responding to hearing Silence so prevalent in the post-Holocaust era, they
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heard as their ears enabled them to listen; usually their response was in some form of
conversation with Heidegger and his works.
Derrida’s works engaged and challenged in part Heidegger with works like On the
Spirit. His deconstruction was not unlike Heidegger’s own destructive retrieval. In later
works, like Rogues and Specters of Marx, Derrida even employed and altered
Heidegger’s own terms. Specters of Marx conscripted Heidegger’s “aus der Fuge,” but
“out-of-jointness” for Derrida did not so much refer to the ontological difference as it did
abiding sense that something is amiss. Indeed, the ontological difference is displaced
with différance. Différance occurs due to the “space” between the sign and the meaning;
meaning can never be attained and needs a constant string of terms or signs to continue
its ongoing meaning. Yet meaning is always a step behind, always deferred.
Justice, a case in point, is constantly in need of redefining. Derrida mis-takes
Heidegger’s “aus der Fuge” to be disorder and injustice, while harmony is justice.
Derrida writes that Heidegger “interprets Dikē [justice] as joining, adjoining, adjustment,
articulation of accord or harmony”—a never ending string of terms838 While Derrida
rightly sees Heidegger’s concern for a close link between things and persons, Derrida,
sees Heidegger advocating structure and harmonious order at all costs in the name of
justice.
But Derrida’s real criticism with Heidegger is with the ontological difference
itself; Derrida sees it as ontotheology. Thus, he understands Heidegger’s concept of
justice to lacking. But the later Heidegger himself has supplanted the ontological
difference with Ereignis. Rather than Dasein, meaning or the terms which are part of the
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ongoing effort to bridge meaning and its definition, Heidegger steps back to place the
ontologicaldifference into the fuller Ereignis. In Ereignis no gap is found between
meaning and its terms. Likewise, de-cision is part of Ereignis and not solely a function
of Da-sein. Roughly explained, Heidegger’s concern was regarding a relation between
Being and human consciousness and choice, which he now places all within Ereignis.
Similarly in Rogues, Derrida explores political theory and its need for defining
and excluding those it deems unsuitable as a constitutive element for order. Alterity and
différance become central concepts as a means to explore politics. Derrida asserts:
“Thinking of différance is a thinking of the political.”839 Thus, Cartesian notions of the
autonomy of a subjectivity in charge of itself and of its decisions, evolving freely and in
perfect independence is misguided. Instead, the human person is relational and employs
others negatively as part of that definition both corporately and for self. Derrida rethinks
both subjectivity and political theory as relational, but still maintains the human as central
to any definition. Heidegger would consider Derrida’s efforts as a philosophy of the first
beginning. Conversely, Heidegger allows Being to appropriate man, not simply man to
Being.
These were the persons and themes of the first wave of French engagement in
Heidegger’s wake, which remain relevant to our thesis.840 While never clearly
demarcated as such, the second wave of French Heideggerians engaged phenomenology
in other ways, which dialogued with philosophical trends of the day, especially ethical
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and political concerns, as well as philosophical currents that opposed existentialism. In
particular, the engagement of structuralism and post-structuralism, begun earlier than
Heidegger, now took on renewed vigor with Heideggerian jargon.

False Paths
In many ways structuralism became the philosophy in opposition to the overly
humanistic existentialism of Sartre and the overly chaotic experiences in the post-war era.
If the nothingness of Being could not be an entity, and if the way-making of Being as
Saying transforms us, then Heidegger seemed to resonate with structuralism’s claims that
the structure is that which determines each part. Structuralism succeeded in France in the
1950s and 1960s due to its claim of rigorous method and clear scientific certainty. It was
a key moment of critical consciousness.841
Beginning with Ferdinand de Saussure of the nineteenth-century with language,
structuralism includes such persons as Claude Lévi-Strauss in anthropology, and the
Marxist LouisAlthusser. Soon structuralism gained popularity with the early Michel
Foucault (the later Foucault became a structuralist-turned-post-structuralist) who took on
what he saw as the crisis of power and ethics. Foucault’s notions of “bio-power”
reflected Heidegger’s machination; his non-linear genealogy imitated at times
Heidegger’s Seinsgeschichte; and most evident in Foucault’s key ideas of epistemés, the
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“pan-opticon” and “knowledge is power” are themes possible in part from Heidegger’s
destiny of Being. Finally, Jacques Lacan has developed a structural psychoanalytic
theory that fits nicely with “Daseinanalysis.” These later structuralists found renewed
vigor in Heidegger’s thought. Still, they ignored Heidegger’s primary question: the
question of Being. Consequently, they misconstrued Heidegger’s Being as Saying,
unfolding as way-making, as a conceptual framework, a methodological key, which could
unlock systems.
If the structuralists were drawn to Heidegger’s “method” and “framework,” then
the post-structuralists were born out of the distaste of such structural or systemic answers.
Interestingly, both structuralists and post-structuralists find Heidegger’s philosophy
useful. Claims of post-structuralists, which reject absolute truth or raw facts about the
world, would find in Heidegger’s hermeneutics an ally. Heidegger’s “many ways,”
interpretation, Dasein’s involvement in “worldhood,” and the fracturing of the Cartesian
self were topics that readily appealed to post-structuralists. While we could name a few
of these post-structuralists—Jacques Derrida,842 Roland Barthes, Gilles Deleuze—all sonamed would indeed deny the label.
Indeed eschewing labels and categories, meta-narratives and metaphysics were
part of the way of post-structuralism. Denial of the transparency of language and
accessibility to the real were common themes.843 Cultural multiculturalism became the
agenda of a new political left, and the distrust of institutional influences became part and
parcel in the 1960s with the student riots in Paris or the race riots in America. While
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each had particular issues to solve, the way toward their solving came via a deep distrust
of authority and institutions in any fashion. A naïve, yet deadly serious, love of
revolution stirred thickly in the air.
Both Structuralism and post-structuralism found Heidegger’s work a goldmine of
resources. In such a brief treatment as this, our attempt is not sociological, political, or
psychological, and certainly not exhaustive philosophical analysis. Rather than a point
by point, toe-to-toe, rebuttal, our point is simply to illuminate the effect Heidegger had
not simply upon the philosophical world but on the general populace.844
More importantly, we find in the structuralists’ and post-structuralists’ themes a
strong resonance with Heidegger’s way, albeit overemphasized in ways that resemble
more a Holzweg, a path which has no end. The debate surrounding structuralism and
post-structuralism seemed to hold up one or the other of the two aspects (at the expense
of the other) of Heidegger’s Being as Saying of the de-cision: either its “gathering”
aspect or its “separate” aspect; either emphasizing the path itself or the steps along the
path; either pure unity or pure multiplicity; either merely nothing or merely entities.
We can see how this could easily transpire. Taking one work of Heidegger’s
oeuvre in isolation or excerpting one point leads toward bias. For instance, we could
separate a section of our own Chapter 8, “Be-wëgen,” which speaks of way-making. The
citation certainly sounds consistent with structuralists’ concerns. Let us cite such a
passage from Chapter 8: “In addition to Being as Saying as way-making, the vibrating
and transformational aspect, from which all beings emerge, Being is, nonetheless,
unified. Being as Saying is the source. It draws us near. It does not dictate our life as
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fate; but we have a two-fold destiny because Being is two-fold. It makes our way.”845
This passage could be used to infer that we are arguing for a “determinative sans human
decision” approach. Simple proof-texting can easily lead us astray.
Or we could paraphrase a current American Heideggerian, Babette Babich, who,
while discussing her paper topic at the Heidegger Circle in May 2009, voiced a robust
structuralists’ theme. She asserted that while the details of any poem and the language in
Milton, Hölderlin, and Heidegger satisfy the intellectual curiosity, the real work is what
occurs in the process of the poem, in this case Hölderlin’s Der Ister and John Milton’s
1637 Lycidas. One could easily draw the analogous case in her paper presentation. The
process of the presentation does the “work” while the audience is distracted in the
details.846 Structuralists—whether anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, or
psychoanalysts and psychologists—certainly hear structural answers to human
questions—humans are being formed. But this is but a half-truth.
Similarly, post-structuralists’ concerns can be noticed in Heidegger’s work during
the period of the 1930s and 1940s, as recounted in Chapter 2, “Early Approaches: II.”
Discussions of destructive retrieval, fracturing truth, the end of metaphysics, rupturing
things, language and aesthetics as well as nihilism—all speak readily to poststructuralists’ ears. Most loudly do post-structuralists hear Heidegger’s oft-quoted
sentence, as if it were a battle cry: “The time of the systems is over.”847 We offer another
current example of the same conference cited above, though this example highlights poststructuralists’ theme. A discussion ensued between two Heideggerians, Trish Glazebrook
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and Larry Hatab, whether Odysseus returned home from his travels for a hero’s welcome
or love. One response emerged that no one single answer will ever be true; that as many
people and interpretations as there exists, is the possible multiplicity of true answers. 848
Post-structuralists’ concern for pure possibility of multiplicity is but an incomplete
answer as well.849
What is heard in both the structuralists’ and post-structuralists’ claims is but a
partial answer for Heideggerians. And for Heidegger this partial answer is insufficient to
draw us toward Being. Half-answers will not allow Being as Saying to emerge as
Ereignis. It may seem as though the two “sides” of language for Heidegger, whether
originary or ordinary, or the two aspects of language, whether structure or content, or
context or expression, do indeed allow Being to emerge through the subject in a variety
of possible ways. Yet we have seen earlier that the problematic modern conception of the
self is one reason Heidegger moved first to Dasein, then to language, then to the fourfold
as the site of the manifestation of Being as Ereignis. Any one “side” is a partial answer.
From the post-structuralist or postmodern,850 we stop for a brief moment to listen
to the voice of the anti-postmodern. Oftentimes Alain Badiou, the Italian Giorgio
Agamben, and the Slovenian Slavoj Žižek are included as anti-postmodern philosophers.
What is common to them is the problematic issue of the self and the need to find another
way beyond the self to allow Being to appear.
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In Being and Event Badiou attempts to recover Being through set theory. For
Badiou, Being is an empty set, a membership without inclusion. This seems similar to
Heidegger’s “Nothing,” but it is different, for it is not Heidegger’s fullness of
nothingness. Moreover, Badiou’s “evental site” is an abnormal multiple, “that none of its
elements are presented in the situation,”851 that “the event does not belong to the
situation.”852 What was Being, manifested as Ereignis for Heidegger is now replaced
with mathematics as the language of reality with man as one of an unlimited number of
variables. The “evental site” could not be farther away from Heidegger’s Ereignis,
through which Being manifests itself in beings. Mathematics, which has no Being, is the
expression of reality (beings). But mathematics is still part of Ratio. And as such,
mathematics is a type of calculation. Reckoning, as orienting something in terms of
something, always presents something and thus is in itself a yielding, or an appearing.853
Thus, mathematics is the expression of reality, but mathematics is also the calculation of
the human, who in turn is part of reality—a part for which there is no mathematical
formula. It is false way of positing the calculative while foregoing the calculator.
Badiou’s expression of reality cannot fully expressing reality, even with his clever notion
of the empty set.
Giorgio Agamben, on the other hand, doesn’t attempt to empty the situation of
Being. Being, beings, and language are still very much a neuralgic issue. Agamben
proposes that man is the living being who separates himself in political life from his own
bare life. Bare life is not a biological or eugenic sense, but bare life is the life of sacred
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man (homo sacer), “who may be killed and yet not sacrificed.”854 Bare life coincides
with the Greek haplōs, the term by which first philosophy defines as pure Being.855 Once
politics saw the bare life as easily dispensed, now Agamben reinvests the bare life with
sacredness.
Man maintains his bare life in relation to his political via language. Agamben’s
concern is the question: in what way does the living being “have” language. Between
bare life and political life language lies sovereign as an “inclusive exclusion;”856 not as in
Badiou’s empty set, but “inclusive exclusion” as a member of the political group, but
foremost as an exclusion from the political group. Language, for Agamben, is sovereign
in that “[t]here is nothing outside of language and language is always beyond itself.”857 It
is a bridge which allows man to maintain his bare life together with his political life. No
longer do political camps hold sovereign over man. Language holds sovereign.
We see in Agamben’s conceptual theory that language fills a similar role as
“logos” did for Kockelmans; it bridges finitude and infinite, though language for
Agamben bridges the singular with the plurality. But in either event, bridging the finite
and the infinite with the finite is philosophically untenable. Heidegger’s way-making
does not attempt such a path.
But Agamben acknowledges parting ways with Heidegger’s language as originary
Being as Saying and way-making. According to Agamben, Heidegger’s Being loses all
sovereignty in its nothingness;858 man loses his ethical and moral sense. Heidegger’s
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abandonment of Being and its manifestation as Ereignis remains an untenable situation
for Agamben. For this reason, Agamben holds that Heidegger’s Seinsfrage is without
effect, without consequence.
Political life is the wedge between Heidegger and Agamben859. Agamben holds
that the political is still part of the essence of man. For Heidegger, Agamben’s argument
would still be metaphysical. Perhaps, simply put, language for Agamben might be
similar to Heidegger’s notion until the 1950s, when Heidegger renounces language as the
means by which Being can show itself. Heidegger’s way-making limits human agency
while Agamben reinvests human agency with a sacred task.
Agamben holds a unique linguistic turn, language turned sovereign—man’s
sacred life turns life into a task.860 In simplistic terms, Agamben’s language could be
conceived akin to Being, leading man to a task between the bare and political lives.
Language, then, as sovereign prohibits bio-political camps which emerges in the West as
fascism or Nazism. It holds bare life as sacred.
While ostensibly noble, we contend that Agamben’s task is yet another
metaphysical building, from which danger (and saving power) will emerge in the end.
For whoever holds the defining characteristic of the sacred also holds the keys to the
power of sovereign language. Whoever controls language controls man.861
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Insightfully, the quirky Slavoj Žižek, a Lacanian Marxist, writes: “Heideggerians
are … in search of a positive, ontic political system that would come closest to the
epochal ontological truth, a strategy which inevitable leads to error.”862 It is the search
for the perfect epochal, utopian strategy that is the error. Yet, Žižek is not in total
agreement with Heidegger either. Žižek finds Heidegger’s way-making to be
problematic because the world is problematic. There can never be a true intersection
between the ontic and the ontological, Žižek argues in The Ticklish Subject.863 This
seems to be an anti-Heideggerian approach.
Žižek returns to the idea of the subject; the subject is brought back to the central
location of the site of the non-showing of Being. Leaning on the conceptual framework
of the structuralist and psychoanalyst Lacan, Žižek postulates that reality is “constructed”
by humans in “retroactive causation,” that is to say, as a futural imaginative act by man,
yet unlike the modern conception, the world can never be encountered.864 Thus the world
constructed but never truly encountered shows the subject to be both interesting and a
wellspring of possibilities for the political. The political is understood through the
subject. Yet subjectivity always corresponds to a lack, an empty space, which the
political can never fully conscript.
The empty space of subjectivity seems at first blush to correspond to Heidegger’s
latter notion of man as a placeholder. Yet self-identity for Žižek is impossible, while
self-identity [Eigentlichkeit] is crucial in the early Heidegger and man as related to Being
as Saying in the fourfold is quite evident in the later Heidegger. If man does not hear
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Silence, Being cannot speak as a concealed revealing. In The Ticklish Subject, Žižek
argues primarily against Being and Time’s Dasein. As such, Žižek sees Heidegger’s
position of Destiny emerging out of resolute anticipation as lacking “insight into the
radically antagonistic nature of every hitherto communal way of life.”865
It is the communal life, from which Heidegger recoils into the historicity of
Being, that is the difficulty,866 insists Žižek. With the historicity of Being, the
“ontologization of this ‘speech-in-itself’”867 evolves as a proto-speech, as if speech in fact
pre-exists itself as a kind of fully-constituted “speech before speech.” Thus, Žižek holds
that Heidegger simply reifies Being once again, now as originary language and robs the
subject of its full imaginative power. But we maintain that Being for Heidegger is never
reified; Being is nothing.
One need only think of the Hollywood version of the “pre-cogs” in Steven
Spielberg’s 2002 film, “The Minority Report,” to gain a sense of Žižek’s version of
Heidegger, writes Thomas Brockelman in Žižek and Heidegger, Techno-Capitalism.868
Pre-cognition, though, is not Heidegger’s intent. Rather, ontology “is prior” to cognition
in any form. Being as Saying, heard as Silence, is not another being or a deeper
consciousness. Rather, Heidegger’s belabored point is that Being is nothing [Nichts]. As
such, it is heard as Silence, and reveals itself as concealment, not a concealed thing. But
this complaint of Žižek is not incorrectly lodged against Being and Time. But Heidegger
had long ago found that to be problematic and emended his later work accordingly.
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Žižek’s other complaint with Heidegger occurs with technology in “The Question
Concerning Technology.” Žižek understands Heidegger to be a Luddite, fearing
technology. In contrast, Žižek sees technology to be something akin to a prosthesis for
the human body. What man cannot do alone, he can do wonders with the aide of
technology. In The Parallax View Žižek mocks Heidegger: “Danger? What Danger?”869
What danger? One need only read the newspaper on any given day in our epoch
in order to fear deeply nuclear armaments in the hands of fundamental extremists to
realize the absurdity of Žižek’s remark. But the real point against Žižek here is that
Heidegger is not a Luddite, for in the same source of Heidegger’s “danger” lies also it
“saving power” as in Hölderlin’s poem, “Patmos.” Heidegger rightly notes: “But where
danger is, grows the saving power also.”870 Heidegger’s point is that technology does
have an effect on us. But the concern is not one of earthly demise, but one of not hearing
the Silence of Being in machination. Yet, even in such a case, Being appears like a flash.
Technology is both danger and saving power in Being, heard as Silence, manifested in
Ereignis. Indeed it is the way-making of Being which transforms us. Way-making is not
anti-postmodern; perhaps the ways of post-modernity and way-making are both antimodern.
Finally, way-making is not linguistics. The current debate in language,
considered as linguistics is a non-way, according to Heidegger, for we are led away, not
toward, Being. And we speak, listen, understand and learn in language nevertheless. Our
ability to listen to Being is steeped in language. The words of understanding and
discussion of what is more originary, still, must be related in ordinary words. The effect
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is that ordinary language, too, reflects this mode of structure versus expression. More
precisely, it reflects the two-fold character of Being as concealing/revealing. The debate
continues in linguistics between the innate grammar-as-structure approach in contradistinction to the expression-as-content approach. 871 It seems that these are “bridged” for
Heidegger by Ereignis.
Yet Heidegger cautions us that structure and expression are not bridged at all.
Rather, they are the site of Ereignis in con-tension, as gathering-going away. For this
reason, then, structuralists and post-structuralists cannot be said to follow the waymaking. Nor can the way of the anti-postmoderns, for it too doesn’t speak of gathering871

One could spend one’s life investigating linguistic discussions—a non-way, according to Heidegger.
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going away, but speaks only of inversion or emptying of Being. Nor can linguistics
speak properly of Being as Saying, heard as Silence and manifested as Ereignis. And yet,
Ereignis emerges nevertheless in all of these discussions. It is to the proper attunement
of Ereignis we now turn.

Regions of Ontology
From the ways of false paths, we turn our sights and listen to the words of authors
who guide us toward possible ways of Being as Saying as Ereignis. They try to hear
Heidegger’s way-making more closely. Indeed they seem to follow the fourfold and
develop regions of ontology, which do allow Being as Saying to emerge as Ereignis.
They are building, dwelling, thinking the dance between man and Being. And dwelling
is belonging within the fourfold. Such a dwelling is not simply attuning oneself
poetically, but more importantly, renouncing language. In renouncing, man is open to
hearing Being as Saying, heard as Silence. In hearing Silence, man responds by
dwelling. By dwelling, man builds. In building, man enframes; machination occurs
and—in a flash—Being appears. Man is transformed. And yet once again Being
disappears.
By way of introduction to this next section of current regional of ontology, let us
first listen to a verse in The Ister:
Hier aber wollen wir bauen.
…
Es brauchet aber Stiche der Fels
Und Furchen die Erd’,
Unwirthbar wär es, ohne Weile;
Was aber jener thuet der Strom,

But here we wish to build.
…
But the rock needs incisions
and the earth needs furrows,
Would be desolate else, unabiding;
Yet what that one does, the river,
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Weis niemand.872

Nobody knows.873

We hear of human desires, of the unfathomability of the river, and of the earth between.
We hear of incising of rock and the desolation of unabiding. Heidegger appropriates this
poem in 1942, we contend, as voicing the way-making of Being as Saying with man. It
speaks of the fourfold, and of appropriation and transformation.
These verses of The Ister shall be the criteria by which we judge the success of
the following regions of ontology. While we already spent much time with authors who
offered arguments contrary or outside the limitations of Heidegger’s way-making, we
now present some positive examples of way-making in regions of ontology, though not
without a few caveats. Let us listen to Jean-Luc Marion as he appropriates way-making
to his theological concerns, Bernard Steigler to technology, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe to
the political, and Jean-Luc Nancy to the human person. As we listen, we must ask
ourselves whether we hear the dance between Being and Da-sein more clearly of Being
as Saying, heard as Silence—Ereignis.
April 29, 2009 Jean-Luc Marion presented a paper on the phenomenological
relationship between theology and philosophy.874 Discussion ensued regarding his
phenomenologically charged notions of liminality: “saturated phenomenon,” alterity,
God, love and experience.” Borrowing broadly from the sixth century Christian Neo-
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Platonist, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite,875 Marion defines saturated phenomena are
those which have overwhelming givenness; any attempt to retrieve them is fraught with
difficulties, since the phenomenon is beyond human expression; as such, they are
saturated. “Saturated phenomenon” is problematic since it traverses limits of finitude and
reaches into the infinite. Like Heidegger’s discussions of lo/goj, “saturated
phenomenon” tries to bridge the gap between human expression and infinity in love.
Similarly, love proves to be elusive. Like St. Augustine, Marion bemoans the fact that
we all experience love, yet when asked to define it, it slips through our fingers.
Moreover, any attempt to define it, limits its experience too narrowly.
In God without Being, Marion posits the reality of God’s revelation as pure gift.
Beyond gift, categorizing God becomes problematic for Marion. Icons are those
representations that refer the viewer beyond the image, and allow God to shine through.
Idols, on the other hand, are those representations, which direct our gaze back at
ourselves. Icons defy metaphysical categories, while idols are steeped in the
metaphysical, argues Marion. The idol is always determined by a reflex, which allows it
to come from a fixed point, an original from which it returns.876 (The idol is a specter, un
revenant, or Gespenst, which haunts the conscience.)877 Not real, yet lingering, idols are
the stuff of which metaphysical construction is built.
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Marion follows Heidegger’s Identity and Difference, to describe the clearing of
Being through beings while Being remains intact.878 This seems quite plausible in the
case of icons. But what prevents an icon from becoming an idol? To answer this
question Marion must indeed leap beyond the icon, beyond the ontological itself to the
theological. This is the leap of faith to the Other, to God; thus, Marion equates God
(theological) with Being (ontological). This is not consistent with Heidegger’s
Seinsgeschichte. We would not make such a leap. Indeed if Marion desired to remain
within the bounds of Seinsgeschichte, perhaps a better choice for him would be the
second Person of the Trinity, Jesus the Christ, Logos made flesh. But Marion chooses the
unfathomable Other as that which prevents an icon from its stagnating into an idol.
But, nevertheless, Marion heard the Silence, which he heard in terms of gods, one
of the fourfold. Marion in another work, The Erotic Phenomenon, breaks through the
aesthetic; in The Idol and the Distance Marion attempts to leap between the philosophy
of the first beginning to that of the other beginning—all the while applying this
Kierkegaardian-Heideggerian leap and calling it faith, and at times God. These attempts
all follow Heidegger’s listening to the Silence, but all equate God with Being. In
Heideggerian terminology, Marion is making the mistake of ascribing Seyn of the
Beiträge to “do” the work of Seyn/Sein in the turning-in [Einkehre]. In that event Seyn
now has a history. In short Marion delves into what others have mis-labeled Heidegger’s
work, as onto-theo-logos.
And still, Marion is admirably working within the fourfold to a certain extent.
Certainly we see how “gods” enter. Mortals too are present. Interaction between them in
opposition with this “mediated” vis-à-vis the earth and its permanence in the materiality
878
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of the world, all bring together the fourfold to a certain extent. What we don’t see is the
element of change or sky. Indeed the icon becomes a moment made infinite, and
Augenblick, a presence, is not presencing. Thus, Being as Ereignis doesn’t seem to
emerge. And so we remain ambivalent regarding icons and idols. How can we ever
know that one is not the other? Indeed the dis-ease of religious articles, lies in this
uncanny wonder whether they are not simply superstitious items—doubt is always mixed
with belief in religious ontology.
From our ambivalence toward religious ontology, we move to the unsettling one
of technology. Bernard Stiegler discusses well the issue of technics and its role in
modern culture in the first half of Technics and Time, 1. Within its pages, Stiegler not
unlike Žižek, draws out the extended allusion that technics is but a prosthesis, for which
man develops in order to compensate his otherwise lack of prowess. Like a cornea
transplant or a knee replacement, technics is an appendage added onto human faculties.
In general, for Stiegler, technics “designates in human life today the restricted and
specified domain of tools, of instruments, if not only machines.”879 Here Stiegler holds a
clear separation between the man and his tools.
At the same time Stiegler designates language as a tool of man. Rhetoric, poetry,
speech are employed to persuade, cajole, and powerfully coerce, not unlike a tool. In the
same breath Stiegler admits the distinction of language as tool blurs the definition. For,
as we know, language too is that which speaks to us beyond our control, as originary
language. We are mere shepherds. Language is not a tool in that case—certainly not a
prosthesis—but the site of Ereignis.
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Indeed this situation is the problematic. Language, once considered a tool at our
disposal, now lies beyond us. Could not our technics also be able to outstrip us and
become our master? Such is the food of any rabid sci-fi buff. Yet, the ambivalence is
clear and the subsequent dis-ease is present. Can our technics, the tool, be the very
“essencing” of who man is: homo faber? The relation between artifact and artificer
seems blurred.
Relational blurring increases as we speak of language, the individual, and
community. Stiegler questions Rousseau. He asks: does language occur for the
foundation of society, or does society arise from a decision of language? Stiegler argues
against Rousseau in Discourse of Social Inequality, wherein Rousseau argues that
language was not necessary until man stepped outside himself into a community;
language has its origins as a “will” in society. But if that were the case, then speech and
thought, even gesture, has it occurrence as a will to power of the individual before the
community. But then language cannot be an originary Saying. For this reason the quest
of language persists.
Indeed language, thought, community and subjectivity are all interrelated, but not
simply as linguistics. Stiegler writes: “This fractioning out of Rousseau’s fiction can
only at once express and ignore the fact that since language is thought, since the will-tosay is saying, language is the institution of society, and society is the institution of
language.”880 Thus, Stiegler argues that technics and language have correlate levels, as
Heidegger realized in “The Essence of Language.”
Stiegler argues that this search for origins is part of the metaphysics of the
philosophy of the first beginning. He writes: “Speech, and later politics, proceed from
880
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this memorial, in this speech, they come to invent. Religion, speech, politics, invention—
each is but an effect of the default of origin. The essential is the accident, the absence of
quality.”881 Thus, we agree that the fictional “source” of language is but an accident.
The essential element is that of Being and it disappears. In its disappearance we
construct its absence as a presence, a source. Stiegler uses mythology to explain this
effect; it is Prometheus’s fault for stealing fire, the power of the gods, to compensate for
the experience of the lack, the need.
Ingeniously, Stiegler describes man’s compensation as the source of the two-fold
nature of language, a concealing and revealing. “Language, the logos as language,”
Stiegler suggests, “occurs (it too is disappearing, it too is two-faced, always capable of
meaning the opposite of what is intended) through technics, through the theft of fire and
the ‘arts’ (tekhnai). The logos, qua religion, qua politics, is (on the basis of the fault)
wholly technical, fruit of an originary incompleteness of technical being.”882 Because
man is incomplete, he needs to overcompensate through technics. Because man is
incomplete, man is as technical being. Through this, Stiegler explains, the temporality of
mortals is set up.
As in the Heideggerian analytic, this knowledge of the end, which is also a nonknowing, forms the primordial situation out of which each person conducts himself or
herself. Stiegler adds one further premise. Through man’s use of tools, tools disappear.
“Their mode—the mode of what—is being-already-to-hand. A mode ignored by
theoretical knowledge. Tools are foresight—Prometheus is the foreseeing one.”883
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Contrary to Heidegger, looking ahead is developed through time with technology.
Heidegger sees “Vor-sicht” as part of man’s “essence.”
With Stiegler’s foresight, then, we see the interaction of the gods, mortals, earth,
and sky. It seems that Stiegler has all the elements of the fourfold in play. Their
gathering/separateness should be the occasion of Being as Saying, heard as Silence, to
manifest Being as Ereignis. And yet it seems we are closer to an answer of the question
who or what is man, not to the question of Being. Or perhaps more accurately said, we
are discussing man’s relation to beings, not Being. We are squarely in the ontological
region of metaphysical anthropology. The question of Being seems to have disappeared.
Is this Being’s doing? Or is it the effect of our machination? It is unclear. This lack of
clarity, we contend, is the call of the Silence and the dis-ease we feel regarding
technics.884 This final attunement does draw us nigh.
From the Silence of man’s needs, we move toward the deafening silence of the
noise of the political. From the “essence” of man we move toward the “essencing” of
community. Hannah Arendt and Henri Birault linked the distress, the dis-ease of our
world, with the appeal to an ethics which could exorcise it, and with it the specter of
totalitarianism. Of all of the regions of ontology, Heidegger has been most silent—and
most criticized—on politics. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, a loyal Heideggerian and vibrant
critic of Heidegger’s silence on the Shoah, co-authors Retreating the Political with JeanLuc Nancy. Within its pages Lacoue-Labarthe explores the relation between politics and
psychoanalysis. The question seeks to answer the internal and external dynamics of a
person when the person is part of a “wider stage.” Given the specter of totalitarianism,
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Lacoue-Labarthe asks, can politics be a plausible answer to our dis-ease or must we call
for a “retreat” from politics? Given brutal reactions, fearful regimes, nuclear armaments,
terrorist cells and the destabilization of order, can we return to politics as our antidote?
Do we increase more structure with control or more freedom, the question persists. We
are ambivalent toward politics.
With these questions Lacoue-Labarthe turns to, and away from, Heidegger. For
Heidegger this region of ontology in Being and Time is called “Mit-sein” and its ek-static
form, “Mit-Dasein.” The terms are indicative of a “gathering” more than a “separation.”
But Lacoue-Labarthe opts for the Levinasian terms of “l’autre” and “autrui.”885
Immediately, the reader should be alert to the fact that Lacoue-Labarthe has bracketed
Heidegger’s “Being-with” structure and engaged the usual, conflictual understanding of
community, which arises throughout all of the philosophy of the first beginning, and
especially in the modern era with Hobbes, Rousseau, and Freud. With such a basic shift,
it seems that Lacoue-Labarthe is signaling that he is emphasizing “separateness” over
“gathering” aspect of the fourfold.
Yet Lacoue-Labarthe retains the Heideggerian understanding that any discussion
of Being-with is equi-primordially “Being-in” and “worldhood.” Thus any discussion of
the philosophy of the first beginning, say that of Freudian projection [Einfühlung], always
already presupposes the relation to the “Other” with both internal and external relations.
In identifying the “Other,” we identify ourselves as different and as subject and in the
“world.” We are integrally related.
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Moreover, these societal relations are relations of language for Lacoue-Labarthe.
This is not inconsistent with “discourse” in Being and Time. While language has a
structure of identification, language also is a process of “alteration,” of otherness.
Lacoue-Labarthe asks an insightful question on the relation between the subject and
others, culture and politics, and power: “if with the subject something other than the
subject is in question, then, with power something other than power is in question.”886 In
other words, if we have difficulties with the modernist’s conception of the self, then too
difficulties will surely arise with modern social/political structures of power.
While Lacoue-Labarthe sees difficulties with politics, he doesn’t retreat first, as
the title of his book might suggest. Rather, first he finds it crucial to understand the
dynamics involved in politics. Thus, the ambiguity of the title: he offers another
treatment of the political. He deconstructs its meaning, and then he returns to it with
renewed understanding. Lacoue-Labarthe chooses the concept of “figure” to explain our
present difficulties. For example, the figures of “fatherland” and “motherland” become
fixed and represent dynamic processes. The figure for Lacoue-Labarthe is a mark of an
originary fiction at the heart of metaphysics; it is the identity principle of community.
Yet the “figure” is a myth. It is, we contend, the onto-theo-logical construed as language.
While initially helpful, “figure” soon becomes problematic for Lacoue-Labarthe. The
figural undermines the transcendence impulse and leads towards the totalitarian impulse.
Now that Lacoue-Labarthe finds “figure” to be part of our difficulties, he suggests
that we reinvent politics with a “non-figure” so that we may retreat from sovereignty.887
This, he argues, allows something to appear or sets something free. It means retreating
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from the political as philosophically defined. One might ask: after the retreat from the
political, what next? Here Lacoue-Labarthe leaves open, that is to say, refuses closure on
the essence of the political. For in closure a figure is employed and impulse toward
totalitarianism ensues.
Analyzing Retreating the Political according to our criteria of the fourfold seems
both simple and yet incomplete. Lacoue-Labarthe does indeed engage mortals, gods (as
basic fundamental ideas), sky (transition), and perhaps earth (specificity as opposed to
generalities). But ultimately Being does not emerge. Our sights are fixed doggedly on
our needs as a person and as a community and the interrelation between the two. The
“retreat” could be construed as a renouncing of our language, a renouncing of our power,
even a leaping between the philosophy of the first beginning toward the other beginning.
And yet political “retreating” still seems unsatisfying.
Retreating the Political does not discuss tensions between equality and freedom,
or between socialism and free-market capitalism. Discussions of utilitarianism, Marxism,
multiculturalism or libertarianism are absent. So too are any discussions feminism. Each
has its own concerns and foundational principles. How could these closed systems
interact? Moreover, wouldn’t a unifying system that would bring them together simply
be another meta-narrative, which inevitably eviscerates alterity? Dis-ease enters and with
it the saving power of Being.
Since politics seems not to draw us closer to Being, or perhaps more accurately,
politics draws us toward Being in its Silence of Being. Let us explore a region of
ontology which engages directly the question of Being and its emergence. Jean-Luc
Nancy composed The Birth to Presence with the emergence of Being as it central
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question. For Nancy “presence” is not the standing, immobile or impassive presence; nor
is it the platonic Idea. Rather, “presence” is a “come-to-there” or a “to-be-here”
“presence.” In other words, presence is presencing, on-going, never stagnant. The birth
of presence hasn’t occurred once, nor does presence cease being born.888
If we were speaking of the presence of the “I,” the self-same “I” would be
stationary and would have been born once. For Nancy identity of the self, however, is
relational in time and place and never ceases to be born.889 If we were speaking of Being,
it is not the supreme Being, a thing, but Being as Saying in abandonment. Being speaks
in all things as Silence. As such it is open and abundant.890 If we were speaking of the
presence of narrative of the written words in language, the narrative would be fixed for
all times and places. Yet the narrative comes to life again each time in new ways.891 If
we were speaking of the presence of a thought, it would be a permanent truth. Yet truths
are situated and need to reinvested with meaning to be true for a given person.
Whether we speak of the person, language, thought or Being, Nancy insists that
all partake of a dynamic structure, which belies concrete once-for-all answers. Like
political, anthropological, religious systems which are closed, any discussion of Being
must be relational and dynamic. Systems are closed and ignore alterity; and yet pure
multiplicity and difference, whether of the Derridean or Deleuzian sort, make the fourfold
intangible, even untenable. For pure presencing cannot occur unless it occurs in tangible
things.
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Thus, any region of ontology must include discussions of permanence and
change, mortals and gods, that is the fourfold. A region of ontology too includes a contension of “gathering” and “separating.” As Being is two-fold, both concealing and
revealing, so too any region of ontology is two-fold. As Being as Saying—heard as
Silence, speaks to man as Ereignis, and man listens and responds by dwelling—is
conversational, so too any viable region of ontology also is dialogical. Man nears Being
through a double renunciation: that of the ground of the Abyss and that of language as
crossing the Abyss; so too any region of ontology includes meditative thinking, that is
renunciation of having “the” answer. As Ereignis manifests itself as the fourfold, any
region of ontology mirrors Ereignis, all the while allowing itself to be appropriated to
Being as man is appropriated to Being in service [Verfügung]. Finally, and more
insightfully in the past, regions of ontology—religion, politics, anthropology, and
technology—dialogue, interact and indeed are in relation to each other, for together as
gathering/separating, they allow Being as Saying to emerge as Ereignis.
Each the above regions of ontology engages for the most part the fourfold. Each
element of the fourfold mirrors the presence of the others.892 Moreover any treatment in
a region of ontology takes seriously Heidegger’s injunction to dwell meditatively.
Within each of the regions we saw first excavation of the prior structures of the
philosophy of the first beginning. From there we build, and then inhabit. In building the
construction becomes a closure; the closure knots towards an aporia. The dis-ease of the
aporia leads us to listen to the Silence. There Being draws us nigh, and manifests itself as
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Ereignis. It might seem as though it is our doing, or not our doing at all, but Being’s.
Rather, Heidegger holds that is through both Being and man.
In conclusion, this last chapter argued that current non-Heideggerian approaches
are inadequate. They can be either too humanistic, or non-humanistic as scientism or
idealism. Linguistic theories are still metaphysical; structuralist theories cannot account
for the divergence of multiplicity; French theory893 cannot account for any true
communication in the face of multiplicity; thus they lack any unity. Badiou, in his Being
and Event, does seem to balance these issues of the “world,” but he fails in that he is
unable to account for the human. Likewise, Anglo-American and post-analytic theories
of language fall short of human experience.
In contrast, the above regions of ontology creatively hold Being, beings, language
and humans; they gather and, in gathering, unfold into all aspects of the event Heidegger
called Ereignis. Only way-making seems to negotiate these issues with “Sprache als Bewëgen.” Thus unfolding of language and Being in Heidegger’s way still is viable, hardly
passé in our current philosophical discussions. In Ereignis language and Being in the
fourfold influence all arenas of human interest and study. This we argue is the true
unfolding with language and Being as Sprache als Be-wëgen, a dynamic paradigm shorn
of Hegelian overtones, and invested with Ereignis, way-making Being shining through,
and transforming, beings.
Heidegger’s last line to Richardson in April 1962, written in Richardson’s preface
seems quite appropriate at this moment: “… may it [Richardson’s text] help to bring on
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the way, the manifold thinking of the simple, and therefore, the fullness, the sheltering
matter of thinking.”894 Way-making allows the simple and hidden matter of thinking to
emerge fully in the many ways of thinking. More importantly, Being emerges as Saying.
This hope is true for any philosophy in any epoch that allows Being to emerge as waymaking.
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CONCLUSION

But the call of the pathway speaks only as long as there are men, born in its
atmosphere, who can hear it. They are servants of their origin, not slaves of
machination.895
Every epoch has its dangers. Gregory Bruce Smith lists what he considers to be
matters of greater moment, those important issues of concern, impinging upon in our
epoch. He deems four issues worth our attention: irrelevance of philosophy to everyday
life, increasing politicization, increasing homogenization of humanity and reduction of
humanity to universal workers-consumers, and finally, the confrontation between
globalization and balkanization.896 Smith could have also included fundamental
extremism and the conflict between religious versus secular beliefs, or even the threat to
our environment. Our epoch does find itself increasingly in danger.
Whatever list a person might compose, the issues of our epoch, like any other, do
indeed call to us. But we are not slaves of the dangers of machination. That is not our
origin. Our origin, if we can hazard this speculation regarding our origin, is not
895
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machination, but our origin is the pathway of Being as Saying or the “Sprache als bewëgen.” We are born within it. We hear the Silence of Being. In hearing Being’s call,
we are transformed and attempt to dwell accordingly. Indeed it is through the ordinary
dwelling [Aufenhalt] by which Being calls and Being unfolds. This call of dwelling both
leads us into the danger and with it becomes the part of the power to save us. Such is the
way of Being; such is our way.
Our way has followed a long, winding pathway with side trails. Although some
trails have led us down cul-de-sacs, we have kept our questioning eye upon Being. But
more importantly, we have found that Heidegger’s work led us in circles, not vicious, but
helpful non-linear pathways. Through hermeneutics and through phenomenology,
Heidegger has led us near Being and, then realizing its utter Silence as communicating to
us, redirects us to allow Being to flow through us as part of the fourfold. As part of the
fourfold, man can dwell, through which Being shows itself. Heidegger calls this
Ereignis. Ereignis is Being manifesting itself as Saying, heard as Silence. Being as
Saying has a history [Seinsgeschichte]; we noted this to be the “Turning,” [Kehre]. As
such, Being is originary language; our response occurs as ordinary language. Language,
then, is indeed intimately related to Being for Heidegger. Because Being is Saying as
Silence, we are drawn into communication.
Finally that communication is a way-making that both draws us and allows us
freedom within its way. Freedom arises in the fact that Being is two-fold. That is to say,
Being is as communicating itself as hidden. Being as Saying is a concealing-revealing.
Wherever we look, we find this ambiguous situation throughout. In Being, between
Being and beings, in the strife between earth and world, between gathering-separating of
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the fourfold, and in ordinary language—all carry this destiny of ambiguity of concealing
revealing. Between the philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning
Heidegger urges us to leap. Leaping, we are appropriated to Being and we can choose to
dwell accordingly.
Our chapters have led us in three parts. First, we attempted to allow Heidegger’s
own writings to allow Being to show itself in the way that it shows itself. Through the
repetition of the second part, we came to appreciate ways that misconstrued Heidegger’s
meaning, but more importantly, did not allow Being to show itself. Finally, our third part
offered possibilities situated within our epoch, wherein Being might show itself. Being
shows itself as always already showing itself. Between this and our interpretation of it,
Being’s age-old history comes to light. We have viewed it in stages, but the way-making
is not necessarily linear; neither is it merely structural nor is it merely content. Nor is it
merely Being’s process entirely; certainly way-making is not merely man’s doing. Being
is nothing and its way-making is best described by what it is not.
Heidegger appreciated this Being as Saying as way-making in light of the
Ereignis. But he could not have come to it without first traveling the route of his
transcendental-horizonal phenomenology of Being and Time, then the rocky path of
destructive retrieval toward the Beiträge, and ultimately arriving in circling fashion
toward meditative thinking and phenomenology as “looking ahead.” Heidegger’s
thinking did adjust through the years, but it always had the question of Being as its
primary focus. Let us retrace briefly the steps of this path so that we can retain the major
signposts along the way of Being as Saying, language as way-making.
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As much as Being and Time attempted to uncover Being through phenomenology
and hermeneutics, it concluded rather inconclusively, that, though we indeed know more
about man as Dasein as Being-in-the-world, we had not come closer to thinking about
Being. Moreover, ordinary, ontic dwelling led us to believe at times that language was a
tool, and yet ontological analysis revealed language to be far richer. Language is
enmeshed in worldhood and yet, language is always already part of the existential
structure of Dasein, who himself is enmeshed in worldhood. Worldhood “contains”
meaningful relations to things and the care structure is the “means” by which Dasein
relates meaningful content. Being and Time, then, left us with a conundrum regarding
language and its relation to Being.
And so in its inconclusiveness, Being and Time led us to another path, which
began not with Dasein, but with Ereignis, the manifestation of Being. As such, it gave us
evidence that not man but Being has a history, Seinsgeschichte; and this turn, Kehre,
toward the history of Being was from the outset part of Heidegger’s pathway. Being and
Time has given us the formal indication that Dasein alone cannot be the site of Being’s
disclosiveness.
As Heidegger delved into poetry, poetry of the philosophy of the first beginning
in order to draw out the ramifications of language and Being, he noticed that any
conceptual framework and its contents vary with regard to the vantage point of the
viewer. Dasein, if viewing too close to things, sees all multiplicity, if viewing too far
from things, sees all unity. Thus, with such a destructive analysis Heidegger arrived at
the point that all viewings are still too humanistic in their approaches.
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Indeed Heidegger had come to the realization that all such approaches in Western
philosophy ultimate lead us to nihilism, for all such approaches are still ways of the will
to power. The discordance between truth and art illustrated well this point. While
philosophy structures experience and poetry breaks open that structure; both still are
expressions of the will to power. Placing philosophy and poetry in such a dialogical
process, Heidegger saw that language all along resonated between structure and content,
between “world” and “earth.” Language somehow was crucial to his investigation of
Being. Still language, while circling seemed to define and redefine truth and art vis-à-vis
the other, yet language of this sort never reached Being. Language led us to no-thingness.
Rather than fear nihilism as a tragic consequence like Western philosophy,
Heidegger saw it revealed a new insight; it revealed the way of Ereignis. In no-thingness, Being reveals its-self as itself as a withdrawal. With Being’s withdrawal, Dasein is
brought to a startled dismay. Being’s main way of disclosure is through Dasein’s startled
dismay. But Ereignis, the manifestation of Being, reveals other elements of its
disclosure. Ereignis shows the relation between the gods and man. Ereignis too shows
the resonance of the holding sway of Being as originary language as Silence, the Saying
of beyng. The Saying of beyng for Heidegger was originary language.
Thus, for Heidegger language in this period was both the means of destructive
retrieval toward Being and the originary language as Saying of Being. Originary
language emerged out of nihilism, as the withdrawal of Being. Originary language
emerged through ordinary language. This was an important realization for Heidegger.
The difficulty with the Beiträge still to this day, though, is its incomprehensibility.
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Thus, Heidegger needed to find a way along less winding and perilous ways to
find the same insight. His insight that originary language more properly spoke also
meant that originary language has a history, and subsequently man has a history. That is
to say that Being in its abandonment, heard as Silence transforms man; that man having
been transformed dwells more attentively to Being; and, at the same time man rebuilds,
the building of which draws man away from Being’s call of Silence. Both revealing and
concealing occurs. All paths lead to this awareness of Being as Saying as the originary
language unfolding in all epochs as holding sway: concealing/revealing. And yet each
path offers us new insights. Each recircled toward Being; Saying.
Heidegger’s first path directly engaged the topic of language and Being as the
way toward Being as Saying. This period began with the insights of the Beiträge and
developed them further in the Bremen lectures. What Heidegger showed in those lectures
is the relation between things and Being lies in language. Indeed how Being conceals
itself is how Being reveals itself as concealment—all through language.
This relationship between Being and things helped Heidegger to delineate a
deeper relationship of Being to language as Being as Saying. For a thing’s truer “nature”
is seen more by its lack, than by its positive characteristics. A jug is a jug by virtue of its
emptiness; it can contain something. Rather than a thing qua thing, a jug is the relational
gathering of the fourfold. Similarly, Heidegger provisionally would understand that
words speak to us by their relation to Being and by their lack, so as to span things and
Being. Thus language for Heidegger in this period acts like a bridge, spanning the divide.
This metaphor of connecting sides is why we call this understanding of language
provisional.
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More importantly, Heidegger realized that language is not man’s device primarily,
but language is that which nears man to his ownmost, to Being. Language is not the
means; rather, language is primarily stillness. This shift of the site of language from man
to Being helped Heidegger to see that man was not the sole discloser of Being. Man is
but part of Being’s disclosiveness of concealedness. Man conceals and reveals because
Being conceals and reveals. Stillness, the decisive element of language, brings man to
his ownmost.
In this realization man is pained, and recognizes the difference between Being and
beings. Heidegger calls this dif-ference. In pain man then hears attentively; in hearing
man sees and dwells properly. As such, man responds rightly to the Silence. Yet man
too can turn away from the Silence. In this event, man attunes himself more to things and
Being draws further away. This relationship between man and Being is primarily Being’s
“action” and secondarily man’s response. For Heidegger this relationship between man
and Being is like that of conversation.
Conversation as a working model led Heidegger to looking more properly at
language as such. Hence, Heidegger revisits lo/goj. Heidegger noticed that Being is
primarily a showing as concealment in originary language before it is a laying down as
revealing in ordinary language. Lo/goj follows Being. But language as such is not
concealing then revealing, as might a conversation occur. Originary language is
simultaneously both together a gathering and a laying down.
Moreover, thinking does not bridge Being and language. Rather thinking as
thanking, as a response to Being’s original call, is also relational. Thus thinking properly
seen is another variation of originary language. It too is two-fold, both gathering and
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laying forth because Being is two-fold. As such thinking and ordinary language, though
manifold and flowing as unconcealing/revealing, are also related to Being in the same
way.
While language seems to capture Being as Saying provisionally due to its
authentic poetic style and its dialogical structure, Being is nevertheless still absent.
Though language conveys the aspect of silence, which Being as Saying is most properly,
it is not Being. Originary language is as nothing. Ordinary language, then, is a response,
as in a conversation; it dialogues with silence. While Heidegger saw that language’s
words hint at a two-fold character that leads to the two-fold character of Being from
beings, he also saw that this cannot be experienced directly. Thus, Heidegger looks away
from lo/goj and toward Ereignis.
Heidegger’s new way includes Gelassenheit, “letting-go,” letting go of lo/goj,
but also letting go of things toward the mystery of the unfolding of Being as Saying as
nothing. Neither passive nor controlling, this new path of meditative thinking is drawn
out as man converses with Being. Both reason and identity are refocused in light of this
new path. They emerge as concealing and revealing, as two-fold because Being as
Saying is two-fold. Thus, philosophy and its principles, like language, are relational.
Letting go of traditional philosophy, Heidegger reassigns to philosophy the old search for
Being, not clarity of thought.
Rather than searching for the ground of thought, Heidegger looks to Being. Since
Being is two-fold as Saying in Silence, and since ordinary language flows from originary
language. Being now emerges as the “ground of all beings,” not as a thing, but as an

372

utterance of the unfathomable Silence, as the abyss [Ab-grund]. Being is the groundlessground.
What does this mean? In silence, the abyss calls. To this abyss, we cling. We
belong to Being and identify ourselves in relation to it. As such we are listening beings.
But man also belongs to Being in that uniquely man listens to Being because man is
appropriated to Being. Being, in turn, belongs to man in that Being is present only when
man is open to its holding sway. We see, then, both man and Being are appropriated to
each other. As such, we can say that Being is the groundless-ground.
Rather than using the term, groundless-ground, Heidegger called the unfolding of
this relationship, Ereignis. But the unfolding of this relationship isn’t noticed until man
and Being are mutually challenged by technology in enframing. Precisely in that startling
experience man is dismayed by his lack of control. Lack of control delivers man over to
the Silence. Man leaps into the Silence. As such man and Being are delivered over to
each over. This is the event of the appropriation, the Ereignis. This springing we call
meditative thinking emerges from Ereignis.
In our relation to Being, we also notice the ontological difference, now manifested
as Ereignis. While this difference was once noticed, then it was forgotten, now our
recalling it is the basis of lo/goj. Thus, lo/goj emerges from originary language, from
the ontological difference. According to Heidegger, history once grasped wrongly that
language emerged from lo/goj. In Ereignis Heidegger comes to appreciate that thinking,
dwelling and language are intricately interwoven as emerging out of Being.
Let us look more intently as the ontological difference. We see that what is held
in the difference, i.e. Being and beings, perdures. But it isn’t conceptual, nor is it a thing.
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Being appears as perduringly absent. Perduring occurs as holding and as swaying.
Perdurance as holding is a circling: Being and beings circle around each other. One
comes over the other—Being and beings; the other arrives in the one in reciprocal
reflection. Thus, we see in the ontological difference, now called Ereignis a new
dynamic, from originary language emerges lo/goj. Lo/goj, then, is the manifested
“essence” of ordinary language. Lo/goj as language, as the Beiträge relays to us,897
emerges from the gathering ring of stillness, which is the ownmost of language.
As we turned directly to ordinary language, we saw that our dwelling with
language can be comfortable or uncomfortable. But always it is originary language, not
man, which genuinely speaks. Man speaks only to the extent that he in each case coresponds to originary language. Poets help us to co-respond. Heidegger circles his way
through the thicket of Western philosophy as he did with destructive retrieval to find a
clearer path toward language and Being. But unlike that period of destructive retrieval, in
this period of meditative thinking Heidegger uses comparison as a way to find the closer
connections and relationships, not breaking apart concepts. Heidegger nears the
relationship between originary language and ordinary language.
But alas, in those close connections and relationships Heidegger still is unable to
reach Being via language. This realization brings Heidegger to his most mature
meditative thinking. He renounces ordinary language as a way toward Being. This is a
linguistic turn of a sort. But such renunciation still reveals. It reveals for Heidegger that
language draws us to the hiddenness of Being in that it is unable to go beyond beings in
their relation to Being. This Silence is the way; it draws us. In fact, Heidegger calls it
way-making [Be-wëgung]. Through Being as Saying, way-making [Be-wëgung] leads us
897

See GA 12: 27, 204, 241.
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to our own neighborhood. Way-making draws us near. Indeed nearness and Saying are
the same. Both draw us to the fourfold in a similar way called “nighness.” Thus man and
Being are appropriated to one another, and man is appropriated to the fourfold. Thus,
meditative thinking draws us to the movement [Be-wëgen] of the way; and the way is
how we hear call the region or neighborhood of language. Language belongs to Saying
as its movement unfolds [entfalt] in the nearness of the fourfold of all things.
We can now say that the relationship between language, Being as Saying and the
fourfold occurs in the attunement of renunciation. In renunciation, there is also a
receiving nearness and relinquishing distance. As such, we are brought to our ownmost
“nature”—for this we are thankful. Due to the word’s remoteness, we are drawn near.
This is the “essence” of language: its perduring-remoteness-drawing-near. We listen.
Thus, both thinking and poetry have their root in listening.
Next, Heidegger explores the unfolding characteristic of originary language. It
unfolds as two-fold—a response to the Silence—into all regions of dwelling, into
common language. Language is both listening and speaking as a correspondence not
between word and thing, but between Being as Saying and our listening. The path
unfolds itself; and wherever it leads, it leads us. It leads and we are drawn near. In this
sense language is unified, not as a universal grammar, but as a two-fold unfolding, a
revealing-concealing.
The revealing and concealing correspond. Language is revealing as
information—the route of the first beginning. True, language is of the tongue. There are
manifold ways of speaking. But language is also a concealing, in that it lets Silence be
heard. Silence is of the other beginning. Saying is both the way of the Silence first as
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need [Brauch], and then the co-joined Saying with our “Nachsagen.” As such Being as
Saying manifests itself as Ereignis. Ereignis gives us a “there is,” of which even Being
itself stands in need to come into its own as presence. The “there is” is not simply
Dasein, but primarily as the fourfold. Ereignis as way-making brings the essence of
language as Saying into ordinary language. Language as language brings us to language.
But Being primarily reveals itself as concealment in language.
Through the insights of the fourfold Heidegger redirects our notions of man.
Though man is the speaker of language, he is first a listener, then a dweller. Always man
is related. Da-sein is not first a subject and transcendence is not the “structure of
subjectivity,” but its removal [Beseitigung]. Meditative thinking strives to remain related
rather than resorting to understand through transcendence. Man is related as a gatheringseparateness of the fourfold. Meditative thinking helps us to let go of overly humanistic
thinking. Meditative thinking involves leaping between the philosophy of the first
beginning [transcendence] and the philosophy of the other beginning [removal]. We
leap between transcendence and relatedness. With such a leap, a new understanding of
Da-sein emerges as part of the fourfold.
With the new understanding of Da-ein as related to the fourfold, we arrive at
language’s new meaning. Language [Sprache] is identical with the understanding of
Being. Language, Da-sein and Being as Saying [Sage] are tightly interrelated. By
redirecting our understanding of man as part of the fourfold, we come to a proper
relationship of Being and Da-sein. Appropriation of man by Being and subsequently of
Being by man, we see the transformative relationship in Ereignis. Ereignis has mankind.
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Ereignis also “has” Space-time. Thus, Heidegger returns to the themes of Being
and Time, in a new, proper understanding of the relationship between language, Being
and man and the “world.” Through the manifestation of Being as Ereignis, both Being as
holding sway and time as the realm of the open emerge. They emerge as Being sends
itself and draws man near it. Most distinctive of the destiny of Being in time is Ereignis.
It is a giving that is a self-withdrawing. With Being’s sending forth, we are drawn near,
and we conceive time as the “process” of Being’s history through time. Being has
history, Seinsgeschichte, not man.
From this insight Heidegger now sees the new way of phenomenology, as looking
ahead [Vor-sicht]. This new type of phenomenology of looking ahead allows us to grasp
Being as Saying. We grasp it as holding sway, as looking ahead as possibility
[Möglichkeit]. Not simply descriptive, Vor-sicht offers new possibilities of man and
beings as transformed by Ereignis. Ereignis appropriating man affords us the proper
notions of clearing and presencing as holding sway. This is the task [Aufgabe] of
philosophy. The purpose of philosophy is to open man to Ereignis. This is the way—
through destructive retrieval and through remembering—man is open to Being’s
manifestation as Ereignis.
Having allowed Being to manifest itself, we analyzed in chapters seven and eight
ways that issued from Heidegger’s own work. Our criterion was the extent to which
these models afforded Being to show itself as Ereignis in the fourfold. Chapter seven
dealt with the successful failures of Langan, Richardson and Kockelmans, who developed
strong paradigms of how Heidegger’s corpus should be viewed. Each had good success
showing us part of Heidegger’s way: “existential phenomenology,” “thinking of being,”
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and “many ways.” For a variety of reasons—especially since they did not have at their
fingertips all of Heidegger’s texts—they did not lead us to the meaning of Being. These
paradigms were not able to resolve the issue of Heidegger’s later work, wherein Being
occurred as Saying in Ereignis. Nevertheless, these paradigms must be seen as
successful failures, like Holzwege, like paths meandering in the dense forest, unable to
find a clearing.
Because of his own failures, Heidegger redirected his attention in his own work
from “logos” and toward Being as Saying in a being-historical [seinsgeschichtlich]
trajectory. Such a being-historical way takes shape within language. Ereignis’ domain
lies beyond what the thought of Being could possibly indicate. From these paradigms,
we stepped forward toward the domain of Ereignis, and originary language as waymaking. What “logos” fails to achieve in its spanning of temporality and atemporality,
being-historical accomplishes in Ereignis manifesting through the fourfold. Finally, the
way of being-historical is always appropriated to Being as holding sway, a concealingrevealing.
Chapter eight then helped us to outline the parameters of the problem. First, the
relationship of Dasein and language needed further delineating, then the relation of
language to Being was gathered more intimately, and finally, Dasein’s relation to Being
showed as itself more fully. Thus the Sein/Seyn distinction of section 267 best illustrated
this tension of gathered-separateness. Not a conceptual, but an ontological distinction,
Sein/Seyn led us away from thinking toward originary language as showing.
This is not to say that thinking doesn’t enter the process. It does, but “logos”
emerges afterwards in Ereignis. Thought emerges as the manifestation of Being [Sein] as
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Ereignis. Ereignis emerges for Heidegger as the better way to explain the ontological
difference. It involves the fourfold. Within the fourfold emerge thought and ordinary
language. Recalling briefly the process of eight aspects of Ereignis from the Beiträge,
we saw how Being manifests itself in the fourfold. Together the fourfold as gatheredseparateness allows a thing to emerge. When a thing appears, Being recedes as
concealment. When Being allows itself to appear in a momentary flash, beings recede.
“Logos” cannot explain all these aspects; only can Being as Saying. Thus, Heidegger
opts for Ereignis. Being as Saying reveals and conceals.
This is the not-fully articulated nor understood ontological difference as held by
Heidegger in the early years. It is not a conceptual/linguistic difference as encouraged by
Richardson; though, we grant that such a conceptual tension occurs subsequently. But it
occurs not because it is originary, but because any conceptual outcropping will have
traces of the ontological dif-ference, the Ereignis. This process is best described as a
Being as Saying model.
In our model of Being as Saying, metaphysical and worldly structures emerge,
and with them, the danger of technology, we are able to see the prelude to Ereignis. But
with the danger we also see the saving grace of the Ereignis. Thus, we see the important
distinction for Heidegger in this period: Ereignis is never produced solely by man; man’s
transformation occurs by virtue of the Ereignis. The danger of technology isn’t simply
man’s failure to be authentic. It is the manifestation of Being as Ereignis. In the danger,
Being appears in a flash. And as quickly it appears, it again conceals itself. We
experience this as a type of communication or language.
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As we learned, however any experience of language entails an experience in the
domain of the essence of language, which has different yet similar regions of poetry and
thinking. Both are modes of Saying [Sage]. As such, “The Essence of Language” helped
us to unyoke discourse and thinking in the “logos” model of Richardson and
Kockelmans. While poetry and thinking have similar domains and seem always to work
together rooted in Befindlichkeit, they are not of the same region as we come near the
essence of language. In this region there is a difference.
As we move toward the “essence” of language, we see language of Being is waymaking in that it both is a saying and a drawing near. Both thinking and poetizing in
their proper understanding say and draw near as modes of the language of Being. Man
does not draw near and say Being. Rather, Being draws near as absence and “says” as
originary language, to which we respond with thinking and ordinary language.
Dasein can only in part express Being as it speaks to us as originary language.
We must recall the vibrating effect and the transformational aspect of Ereignis, wherein
Dasein is a part of Ereignis. Having heard the Silence of Being, Dasein responds with
ordinary language. Thus, we see that originary language cannot fully be captured by
humanity.
This Heidegger calls Ereignis. It brings before the eyes as concealment what was
once concealed entirely from the eyes. It brings before the eyes the un-traversable abyss,
which words can never attain. The way is via a double negative. Way-making has always
been explained by Heidegger as a double negation.
The relation of language to Being can be gathered more intimately as the Saying
of Being as originary language as manifested by Ereignis. In addition to Being as Saying
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as way-making, the vibrating and transformational aspect, from which all beings emerge,
we now see continuity in Heidegger’s work as a singular quest for the question of Being,
which now is intimately entwined, not with thought, but with originary language. With
Being/beyng and language so intimately related, we have found the solution to our
question of how language has unity. Its unity is the Saying of Being/beyng as Silence.
How does Being show itself more fully? Heidegger draws us toward his third
major step. The first two steps included first that Dasein was as Being there and second,
the ontological difference was as the difference of Being and beings. Our third now is
the renunciation into the movement into Ereignis as the manifestation of Being. All three
involve Seinsgeschichte, the history of Being, not as linear history, but history as
unfolding.
It is not a renunciation of the philosophy of the first beginning, so as to disown it
or to overcome it; rather, it is a leap that remains between the two—between the
philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning as Silence—and thus
overcomes metaphysics. It is not a renunciation of the subjectivity of a human person,
but a leap into a new, fuller subjectivity that allows the human person the freedom to leap
between the two, as a human person, who does not delude himself that he is the center of
the unfolding of Being as Saying as Ereignis.
Moreover, Being as Ereignis, manifesting itself in the fourfold is what Heidegger
means primarily by the Kehre. While in section 267 of the Beiträge the Kehre is an inturning, now we see the manifestation of that in-turning through the fourfold is the cause
of beyng-historical thinking. Through thought and experience, even through manifold
metaphysical construals, we devise what we think we heard, but Being always with
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lightning flash appears again and man is transformed. Thus Being, always vibrating,
transforms us, if we are open to it. We are closed to it when we remain fixed on own
thoughts, our experiences, our metaphysical constructions. Danger builds, but so too the
saving power. Open to Being, we are drawn by Being from our thought, experiences, and
philosophy of the first beginning toward Being as the groundless ground. Between the
philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning, we leap. In leaping, we are
between. In leaping, we are not leaping from the first to the second, but leaping from the
philosophy of the first beginning toward the other beginning. As between, man is
brought near to Being as Saying, listening to the Silence and responding to it.
Having been brought near to Being, man is transformed. We are transformed
with the realization that language is not ours, but we are its shepherd. Before beings take
form in our world and language is uttered, we come to Being as Saying as originary
language. Attuning ourselves to this, we are drawn into our ownmost “selves.” As we
are drawn to Silence, we are led to shape ordinary language. Any discussion of language
and its origins or its meaning arises from this originary site. What is most originary of
language is its Saying [Sage] as Being.
The showing as Saying is drawing us to our ownmost. This way of Saying is the
way that Ereignis speaks. In speaking, it draws us to what is our ownmost. The way that
Saying speaks in Ereignis shows us that thinking and ordinary language are as part of that
site. But we do not control it, nor is language or thought in our control. We arrive there
at the site through Being, Being as Saying. This is way-making.
For this reason we must move from clear concepts and logic, from that which we
believe we know, and move toward a relationship with language that allows it to draw us.
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By renouncing the delusion that we are in control of language and we know its concepts,
we are drawn into a new relationship of language that draws us into new possibilities.
Through these the last two chapters of the final section entitled, “Uraltes Eignis,”
we can discern better what unfolding can mean. Being has through the ages shows itself
as itself as a concealing/revealing and we are drawn closer to our ownmost. How that
appears in every epoch is both the same but also new. Unfolding always occurs as Being
as Saying. Its way-making is the self-same; yet every epoch sees it anew. Unfolding
historically is not via Hegel’s ladder of ascent in the Aufhebung. Rather, Heidegger’s
history of the growing oblivion of Being was a reversal of Hegel. Unfolding is as a
showing. Historically, unfolding for Heidegger is the showing of the Being of beings as
Saying. Being manifests itself as Ereignis as the gathering/separation of the fourfold
with the help of mortals. Being shows itself in beings. From Ereignis and through
beings, our notions of space and time follow. This is what Heidegger means by
historically unfolding; it is the originary relational way that allows our models of space
and time.
“Verfügen” is the second important distinction of unfolding. Drawn to Being,
man is transformed to dwell properly. We defined “verfügen” as service. Thus, man is at
the disposal of Being; Da-sein is at the service of Being. The human will of the
philosophy of the first beginning lies solely in the domain of the subject. As Da-sein is
part of the fourfold, as Being manifests itself as Ereignis, verfügen lies between the
subject and the object, it resides “in” Being. Verfügen is not simply freedom, but it draws
Da-sein back to Being, to be of service to Being’s unfolding. Thus we are free only to
the extent that we are at Being’s disposal. We are fated to be open to this appropriation,
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in the sense that appropriation is not the sole accomplishment of our wills. This
appropriation occurs ambiguously as a “gathering” and a “going away” held in dynamic
tension.
As gathering-going away, Being is always two-fold, a holding sway, a
concealing/revealing. It is never process of procession, and then recession. Instead, the
elements of the gathering-going away are held in constant tension. This tension
characterizes Being as Saying as Silence and Silence as Being as Saying. Being shows
itself in its Silence and Being is Silent in its showing. Being is always already two-fold.
Seeing how be-wëgen of Being as Saying transforms us, we are now able to
reenter the discussion of what Heidegger means by his new phenomenology. If be-wëgen
is way-making, if it is transforming us as we are drawn near to Silence; if, by showing
itself Being as Saying brings us to our ownmost and we are part of the fourfold, then
phenomenology can no longer be defined solely as Heidegger first defined it in Being and
Time as that which shows itself in the very way that it shows itself. While the
phenomenology of Being and Time is not false, we see the further implications of what
showing itself means. Phenomenology now also means that in showing itself Being
transforms beings. It also means that man interprets Being’s silence as a call to action,
inner reflection or reflection on Being itself. Hence man’s response [Nach-sagen] is
always guided by Being and is interpreted. Man in his “essence” is open.
Thus unfolding is not a ladder of negation of desire; nor is it one of alienation of
man from all aspects of his world. Rather, unfolding is bringing man into proper relation,
guided by Being and man guiding beings, not throughout time, but “unfolding” is making
the non-apparent apparent in time. Being as Silence appears as itself.
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The final chapter engaged the possibilities of unfolding of language as Saying as
encountered in the “world” and in our epoch. We explored how way-making continues
to unfold ontically, as the phenomenology of looking ahead [Vor-sicht]. Being as Saying
was not so much Heidegger’s way, but the way-making of Being.
We explored possible ontological regions of anthropology, religion, politics, and
technology as examples of looking-ahead. These regions are not the elements of the
fourfold, but occur as ek-static, ontic regions of expertise that emerge from man’s attempt
to build and dwelling therein. In this discussion we come full circle to the ontic, but with
the new insights Ereignis, the fourfold, unfolding and openness—all a two-fold holding
sway of concealing and revealing, of gathering-going out of originary language.
In the structuralists’ and post-structuralists’ themes a strong resonance with
Heidegger’s way, albeit overemphasized in ways that resemble more a Holzweg, a path
which has no end. The debate surrounding structuralism and post-structuralism seemed
to hold up one or the other of the gathering-going out aspects of Heidegger’s Being as
Saying, either emphasizing the path itself or the steps along the path; either pure unity or
pure multiplicity; either merely nothing or merely entities.
Yet Heidegger cautions us that structure and expression are not pathways, nor are
they bridged. Rather, they are the site of Ereignis in con-tension, as gathering-going
away. For this reason, then, structuralists and post-structuralists cannot be said to follow
the way-making. Nor can the way of the anti-postmoderns, for it too doesn’t speak of
gathering-going away, but speaks only of inversion or emptying of Being. Nor can
linguistics speak properly of Being as Saying, heard as Silence and manifested as
Ereignis. And yet, Ereignis emerges nevertheless in all of these discussions.
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From, not through, the ways of false paths, we turned our sights and listen to the
words of authors who guide us toward possible ways of Being as Saying as Ereignis.
They try to hear Heidegger’s way-making more closely. Indeed they seem to follow the
fourfold and develop regions of ontology, which do allow Being as Saying to emerge as
Ereignis. They are building, dwelling, thinking the dance between man and Being. And
dwelling is belonging within the fourfold. Such a dwelling is not simply attuning oneself
poetically, but more importantly, renouncing language. In renouncing, man is open to
hearing Being as Saying, heard as Silence. In hearing Silence, man responds by
dwelling. By dwelling, man builds. In building, man enframes; machination occurs
and—in a flash—Being appears. Man is transformed. And yet once again Being
disappears.
Any region of ontology must include discussions of permanence and change,
mortals and gods, that is the fourfold. A region of ontology too includes a con-tension of
“gathering” and “separating.” As Being is two-fold, both concealing and revealing, so
too any region of ontology is two-fold. As Being as Saying—heard as Silence, speaks to
man as Ereignis, and man listens and responds by dwelling—is conversational, so too
any viable region of ontology also is dialogical. Man nears Being through a double
renunciation: that of the ground of the abyss and that of language as crossing the abyss;
so too any region of ontology includes meditative thinking, that is renunciation of having
“the” answer. As Ereignis manifests itself as the fourfold, any region of ontology mirrors
Ereignis, all the while allowing itself to be appropriated to Being as man is appropriated
to Being in service [Verfügung]. Finally, and more insightfully in the regions of
ontology—religion, politics, anthropology, and technology—dialogue, interact and
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indeed are in relation to each other, for together as gathering/separating, they allow Being
as Saying to emerge as Ereignis.
Each region of ontology engages for the most part, one or another element of the
fourfold. Yet each element of the fourfold mirrors the presence of the others. As so the
regions of ontology are interrelated. Moreover, any treatment of a region of ontology
takes seriously Heidegger’s injunction to dwell meditatively. Within each of the regions
we saw first excavation of the prior structures of the philosophy of the first beginning.
From there we build, and then inhabit. In building the construction becomes a closure;
the closure knots towards an aporia. The dis-ease of the aporia leads us to listen to the
Silence. There Being draws us nigh, and manifests itself as Ereignis. It might seem as
though it is our doing, or not our doing at all, but Being’s. Rather, Heidegger holds that
is through both Being and man.
The regions of ontology creatively held Being, beings, language and humans; they
gather and, in gathering, unfold into all aspects of the event Heidegger called Ereignis.
Only way-making seems to negotiate these issues with “Sprache als Be-wëgen.” Thus,
unfolding of language and Being in Heidegger’s way still is viable, hardly passé in our
current philosophical discussions. In Ereignis, language and Being in the fourfold
influence all arenas of human interest and study. This we argued was the true unfolding
with language and Being as Sprache als Be-wëgen, a dynamic paradigm shorn of
Hegelian overtones, and invested with Ereignis, way-making Being shining through, and
transforming, beings.
The pathway indeed gathers in whatever has its Being around it; to all who pass
this way it gives what is theirs. This conversation has long ago already begun: the path
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begun. What shall it and we decide to do with it next? We remain open, looking ahead,
for that is who we are. More importantly, Being as originary language shines through us
as part of the fourfold, manifesting itself as a revealing/concealing in Ereignis. We are
drawn toward its silence and are brought into service. Being unfolds as language, as
Sprache als Be-wëgen, as way-making. We are drawn—we build, dwell, think—into its
way-making as it shows itself, Being as Saying. Let us conclude where we began—with
Heidegger’s own words: “But the call of the pathway speaks only as long as there are
men, born in its atmosphere, who can hear it. They are servants of their origin, not slaves
of machination.” 898 Indeed we are servants, who are called … into service. And we hear
the Silence of originary language.

898

Martin Heidegger, “The Pathway,” trans. Thomas F. O’Meara, O.P., revised by Thomas Sheehan,
Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago, IL: Precedent, 1981) 70.
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